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CHAPTER 1: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECRETARIATS: FRAMING THE
ISSUES AND THE QUESTIONS
Introduction
This study analyses the roles performed by the secretariats of global
environmental treaties or conventions in carrying out their treaty
implementation tasks, and the influence that these international
organizations exert on the outcomes of multilateral agreements.
Achieving the objectives of international environmental treaties is less a
problem of treaty negotiation than of treaty implementation. Implementation
has been the forgotten stage of international treaty making, and the treaty
secretariat as the organizational actor responsible for implementation
coordination and management, has been overlooked as a significant actor in
studies of treaty effectiveness. Yet management of the processes and problems
of treaty implementation determines the success or otherwise of the original
treaty negotiations. While it may take several years to negotiate and ratify a
treaty, it can take generations to ensure that a treaty is implemented and the
desired policy effects are achieved.
The central research objective of this study is to demonstrate that activist
international treaty secretariats, as the international organizations (IOs)
responsible for assisting governments to manage and implement a global
environmental agreement, treaty or convention, exert more influence on
international public policy outcomes that has been either understood or
acknowledged to date. Secretariat influence may be either positive or
negative. That is, it may enhance the achievement of treaty objectives, or it
may obstruct their achievement. My research aims to show that secretariats
exert influence through the performance of their policy implementation
tasks, and the ways in which they interpret and carry out their primary role of
network manager of the treaty system.
I am particularly interested in the approaches that secretariats use to avoid
and manage conflicts and to resolve disputes that occur during
implementation, and I focus on the kinds of conflicts that occur during the
performance of three key secretariat tasks. These tasks are: (i) oversight of
national reporting and performance review; (ii) the provision of assistance to
developing countries; and, (iii) working with non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), to monitor compliance. My interest in
the conflict management capabilities of secretariats, arises from my earlier
empirical research on these organizations which appeared to indicate that
secretariats have the potential to play key roles in the prevention and
management of conflicts and in the resolution of disputes that arise among
treaty stakeholders.
I seek to answer the following questions:
1. How do global environmental treaty secretariats go about meeting their key
substantive tasks of: overseeing national reporting and performance review;
providing financial, expert, administrative and other assistance to developing
countries (capacity building); and working with non-state actors to monitor
national compliance ?
2. What obstacles have global environmental treaty secretariats experienced in
attempting to meet their assigned responsibilities ?
3. Specifically, why have these obstacles to treaty implementation
emerged?
4. How have secretariats tried to handle these obstacles ?
5. What can we say 'in general' about the influence that global treaty
secretariats have had on treaty outcomes? What are the most important roles
they play?
6. In practice, how might the roles of treaty secretariats be enhanced to
maximize their positive effect on treaty implementation?
My results explain how and why environmental treaty secretariats exert
influence on stakeholder behavior and implementation outcomes. I identify
the obstacles that treaty secretariats face in performing their tasks as network
managers, and I suggest how they might deal with such challenges. This study
enables me to make recommendations about the ways in which the
organizational capacity of international treaty secretariats might be enhanced
to positively influence treaty outcomes, to minimize implementation
problems, and to manage those that do occur.
The theoretical and methodological issues will be addressed in two
introductory chapters. This chapter identifies the research problem and
examines the significance of secretariats as international organizations in the
global environmental policy process as identified by myself and other
scholars. The key terms used, and the contributions of my study to advancing
the theoretical frontier are also outlined. The final sections of this chapter
explain the research approach including the boundaries and limitations of the
study, case selection, data collection, results, and the structure of the
dissertation. Chapter 2 outlines how I have adapted and applied a theoretical
framework from interorganizational theory as the most useful approach to an
interdisciplinary study such as this one.
Statement Of Problem
The majority of global environmental accords are supported by treaty
secretariats - intergovernmental organizations created by the signatories and
staffed primarily by international civil servants. The purpose of a secretariat is
to assist the parties to meet the terms of the accord. Yet the significance of
environmental convention secretariats as organizational actors in
international policy implementation, and their potential to influence the
outcomes of international agreements, have been overlooked as a focus in
scholarship.
In research carried out between 1991 and 1994, I found no evidence in
international law, political science, organization theory or public
administration, that global environmental treaty secretariats played
important roles in treaty implementation (Sandford, 1992;1994), although
some consideration had been given to the role of secretariats in international,
environmental pre-negotiation and negotiation processes (Susskind and
Babbitt, 1992; Sjostedt, 1993; Rubin, 1993; Susskind, 1994).
I take this to mean two things. First, the focus of international attention in
recent years has been on treaty negotiation not on treaty implementation.
This is understandable as scholars and politicians alike, prepared for the
signing of several global environmental treaties at UNCED (The United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development) in 1992. Second,
treaty implementation lacks the public appeal of treaty negotiation, which is
frequently a high-profile, political process that attracts considerable media
coverage. In contrast, implementation is a long and arduous process carried
out primarily by international and national civil servants away from the
limelight of the initial negotiations; implementation outcomes are often not
apparent for many years; and as mentioned, scholars have not viewed
secretariats as significant units of analysis.
As Thomas Weiss (1975) suggests, the secretariats of international institutions
are stable elements in changing international systems; they have been
formally assigned tasks to improve global interests; and they have been
significant forces in international affairs, hence they are an important
analytical focus. McLaren (1980), Pitt and Weiss (1986), Beigbeder (1988),
Mourtizen (1990) and Jonsson (1986;1993), all support Weiss' view about the
analytical significance of secretariats, although their perspectives on, and
reasons for, the significance of these organizations, vary.
In his comparative study of what international secretariats do, McLaren (1980)
studied five large, United Nations Specialized Agencies-IMCO (Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization), ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization), ITU (International Telecommunication
Union), UPU (Universal Postal Union) and WMO (World Meteorological
Organization). He concluded that international secretariats that are not
program-oriented (as distinct from having a solely administrative function),
do not have a significant policy-making role in the policy processes of their
organizations. Second, the findings of policy making concerning the
secretariats of national governments are not applicable to the secretariats of
international organizations as their constitutional basis and their ability to
impose legal sanctions, differ. For example, few international secretariats
have enforcement sanctions. Third, there are four factors that determine a
secretariat's role and that need to be considered before a secretariat can be
assumed to have -a policy-making effect. They are: the size of the secretariat;
the expertise of the politicians of member governments; whether or not the
secretariat has executive or implementation functions in the post-decision
stage; and the personalities of the secretariat officials.
McLaren's focus is policy-making, not implementation. In selecting the
parameters of his study, he made a clear distinction between policy-making,
and implementation and enforcement. Nor did he actually study the
personalities of the officials, commenting that while the personality of the top
secretariat official may be the key to the international organization, to study
personalities "adds little to an objective study of international organizations"
(McLaren, 1980: 137). McLaren's view is contra-indicated by recent studies of
the role of leadership in international regimes and by the numerous memoirs
of former Secretaries-General of the U.N. Secretariat (Cox, 1969; Young, 1991;
Hall, 1994). These works clearly indicate that leadership roles and styles can
significantly influence policy outcomes, especially in conflict situations
Pitt and Weiss (1986: xi) comment,
There have been historical investigations and a few internal studies about the
effectiveness of international administration. However, there have been too few critical
case studies of international secretariats accompanied by theoretical efforts to determine
the relevance of international bureaucracies as presently constituted for future UN
programming.
The Pitt and Weiss book is an attempt to fill this void. As with McLaren
(1980), the case studies used in Pitt and Weiss are of the secretariats of large,
U.N. agencies, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization), WHO (World Health Organization), FAO (Food and
Agricultural Organization), ILO (International Labour Organization) and
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), and the
research focus remains on the inner workings of these organizations. A
difference between McLaren and Pitt and Weiss, apart from case study
selection, is that the emphasis in Pitt and Weiss is on how secretariats provide
assistance to developing countries. Pitt and Weiss conclude that the
international career civil service must be reformed so that it can deal more
effectively with the needs of developing countries which are emerging as an
increasingly powerful constituency in UN politics.
Beigbeder's (1988) book was written in response to what he saw as threats to
the international civil service emanating mostly "from conservative
American circles who question the need for UN organizations; challenge
their programs; criticize their budgets and management; and expose their
bloated, overpaid ineffective bureaucracies" (1988:2). In 1986, the UN General
Assembly (in response to such criticisms) agreed to a staffing reduction in
U.N. organizations. Beigbeder endeavored to show that innovations in
recruiting, staffing and leadership policies and practices were needed if the
modern day international civil service was to face the constraints and
pressures of the 1980s and beyond. In his words, "The traditional
international civil service is now being challenged: in order to survive, grow,
and tackle new tasks, it needs to adjust to new realities, to accept new
modalities, to change threats into opportunities"(1988:179).
In contrast with the intraorganizational foci of the previous authors,
Jonsson's (1986;1993) interest is in interorganizational networks - their
structure, actors and interactions - in which international organizations,
including secretariats, operate in carrying out their tasks. As Jonsson (1993:9)
notes,
The basic premise of realism - that states are the most powerful actors in international
politics by virtue of their military might - has led us to underestimate the power of
international civil servants.........especially in issue-areas (such as the environment)
where information is a more important resource than brute force.
He comments further, that secretariat leverage is often enhanced by the
interagency mobility and networking of its staff, for example, where "in-and-
outers", that is, secretariat members with the fixed-term contracts, go back and
serve in the national bureaucracies of member states (Jacobson, 1984:90). In
this way, they indirectly contribute to representing the interests of
international organizations in national policy-making processes. These
comments are directly applicable to the secretariats of environmental accords
which are responsible for directing information and communication flows in
the treaty system; employ "in-and-outers"; and which network extensively
with the parties and their national bureaucracies as well as with
environmental NGOs, professional associations of experts, including
scientists, and industry.
Yet despite their significance, secretariats have been overlooked by scholars as
important organizational actors in policy implementation. This failure to
address the phenomenon of the secretariat in international public policy,
defies what Mouritzen (1990:133) cites as two primary reasons to study
international civil services such as secretariats. They exert an influence of
their own, even where the odds are most unfavorable;. and if they are to
function as more creative international institutions, then we must be able to
prescribe reforms for them. Mouritzen argues that even if secretariat
influences are modest at present, if developments in international politics
provide increased freedom of manoeuvre for such organizations, then this
freedom will increase the opportunities for them to exert influence in policy
matters.
Jonsson (1993) appears to support Mouritzen's argument that secretariat
influence has the potential to increase. He suggests that global challenges
which require international collaboration such as protection of the
environment and human rights, and AIDS (Auto Immune Deficiency
Syndrome), seem to be receiving increased attention, and that renewed hopes
are attached to international organizations regionally and globally to promote
and facilitate international cooperation. In such a climate Mouritzen and
Jonsson argue, and I agree, there is all the more reason to try to understand
how, and under what conditions, secretariats influence treaty outcomes.
Findings from my recent interviews with the Executive Heads and
professional staff in seven international environmental treaty secretariats
support two general conclusions. First, some multilateral environmental
treaty systems experience significant conflicts which hinder treaty
implementation. For example, disagreements among governments, scientists
and policy makers over the interpretation of new scientific data; differences
regarding how the monitoring of results should be undertaken and by whom;
and decisions about how to get countries to comply with treaty
implementation requirements. These issues are all quite controversial.
Second, activist environmental treaty secretariats have the potential to
positively influence treaty implementation at both the international and the
national level (Sandford, 1994), by providing expert advice and direct
assistance to the parties on how to meet their treaty reporting commitments;
by working with governments, NGOs and the media to promote public
awareness of treaty aims and processes; and by building alliances with
international NGOs and their domestic counterparts, to monitor compliance
in a country.
The Significance Of Global Environmental Treaty Secretariats
Most global treaties, including environmental treaties, are supported by
secretariats. For example, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
have secretariats, as has the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction). Unlike
environmental treaty secretariats, these secretariats have large budgets and
many staff. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention has planned for
a staff of several hundred and an annual budget upwards of $US100 million
(Chayes and Chayes, 1995). In contrast, the CITES Secretariat, the largest
environmental treaty secretariat, had 11 professional and 11 support staff and
an annual core budget of $US 500,000 for 1992-94 (Green Globe Yearbook,
1994).
There has been a significant increase in the number of international
environmental treaties signed in the past 20 years. As Jacobson and Brown
Weiss (1994) comment, before the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, there were only a few dozen multilateral
treaties dealing with environmental issues. By 1992 there were more than 900
international legal instruments (mostly binding) which were either fully
directed to environmental protection or had more than one provision
addressing the issue. According to Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1994), the need
for international treaties to protect the global environment will continue and
is likely to accelerate .
On the other hand, some national and global media report (The Times
Magazine, 1994; The Weekend Australian, August, 1994), that the enthusiasm
for environmental protection that gave rise to UNCED is abating, and
membership of environmental NGOs such as the Wilderness Society and
Greenpeace, is declining in many of the developed countries which so
actively supported the UNCED negotiations.
Whether the demand for environmental treaties continues, or whether it
declines, the services of secretariats will still be required. In both cases they
will be required to monitor national performance (including stimulating
national responses) and compliance, to assist developing countries, and to
work with NGOs. In the first scenario, as now, they will continue to assist
countries to meet their treaty commitments. In the second scenario, they will
have an additional responsibility - to ensure that any diminishing support for
environmental protection does not erode the conservation gains achieved to
date.
Secretariats are lynch-pin (also known as linking pin) organizations. They
direct information flows, smooth communications, and oversee
implementation. Their professional staffs, including their Executive Head, are
boundary-spanners (also known as boundary-role personnel). That is, they are
the personnel who formally and informally link the organization to the treaty
parties, industry, NGOs and other treaty interests, through either information
processing or external representation (Roos & Starke, 1981 in Jonsson, 1992).
Boundary-spanners rarely have formal authority. As a result, they have to
rely on more informal means of influence such as expertise and personal
friendship (Organ, 1971), and they must use bargaining and negotiation skills
to get things done (Jonsson, 1986; 1987; 1993). As lynch-pin organizations,
secretariats are thus important instruments of policy implementation.
As boundary-spanners, the professional staff of secretariats must often deal
with implementation conflicts. If the staff of secretariats have well developed
liaison and communication skills, as well as extensive formal and informal
international networks of governmental, NGO, scientific, technical and
bureaucratic stakeholders who have an interest (a stake) in the outcomes of a
treaty, then they are in a prime position to act as intermediaries. These
personnel are also expected to facilitate consensus-building and problem-
solving among stakeholders (Sandford, 1994). For example, in disagreements
among the parties over the development of reporting guidelines, secretariat
personnel act as intermediaries to help the parties reach agreement. In
addition, the Executive Head or his/her delegate, may chair meetings to
resolve problems on the need for financial assistance to specific countries, as
happened between developed and developing countries in the Montreal
Protocol. (Pers. Com. Montreal Protocol Sec, 1993)
Environmental treaty secretariats are unique in the family of international
bureaucracies. Unlike the large, well-equipped secretariats of the NPT and the
GATT, environmental treaty secretariats are typically small and have few
resources. However, recently established (and future) secretariats can learn
from these differences. In many cases environmental secretariats have
developed innovative strategies to overcome organizational constraints and
to assist the parties to meet their treaty responsibilities. In 1995, the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) had a total of 22 professional and administrative staff to service
125 treaty parties, yet it has been regarded as the most activist and perhaps the
most effective international environmental treaty secretariat (Trexler, 1989;
Young, 1993). An example of an activist initiative undertaken by the CITES
Secretariat is the development and coordination of regional training
programs among selected bureaucracies from several countries in a bioregion
such as South East Asia or the NeoTropics. These bureaucracies are
responsible for treaty implementation at the national level. The objectives of
the training programs are twofold. First, to build understanding and
cooperation among countries in a bioregion and thus encourage regional
compliance. Second, to educate national bureaucracies about CITES reporting
and compliance requirements and processes. These bureaucracies often
compete for in-country resources and political support and CITES' objectives
tend to get lost in the melee. By providing financial and administrative
support, and expert input to training workshops, scientific management
authorities and enforcement agencies, come to understand each others
responsibilities in treaty reporting and compliance. In this way the CITES
secretariat performs an active role as a bridge-builder, educator, and conflict
manager.
Thus, scale may not necessarily limit effectiveness. A small secretariat is less
conspicuous and poses less of a threat to national autonomy. Small
secretariats can also be encouraged to use organizational development
strategies such as: the multiskilling of personnel; the use of personnel
secondments from national bureaucracies and NGOs; the formation of
institutional linkages with a wide range of NGO stakeholders to off-set the
limitations of resource dependence on governments; and, the creative use of
conflict management strategies.
In 1995, the Ramsar secretariat, known as the Ramsar Bureau, had a total 10
professional and administrative staff to provide support to 85 parties. To meet
this challenge, the Bureau operates as a closely-knit team with professional
staff substituting for one another as necessary. Each professional is an expert
in his/her own discipline, for, example, biology or law. In addition, each
Bureau official has developed a range of interdisciplinary skills which is
essential in the tasks s/he performs. Each professional officer is also
responsible for overseeing implementation initiatives in a bioregion. This
includes visiting countries in the region to discuss problems they might be
experiencing in meeting their commitments; and providing direct assistance,
both financial and advisory, to help them formulate regulations and
incentive schemes to achieve compliance. Networking with parties, non-
parties and NGOs to increase understanding of Ramsar objectives and
requirements, and to encourage non-parties to become members of Ramsar is
another task, as is the promotion of greater regional cooperation in Ramsar
implementation.
Personnel secondments are yet another strategy used by secretariats such as
the Ramsar Bureau to supplement their limited staffing resources. Short-term
secondees, that is contract personnel from national bureaucracies and NGOs,
are used to work on specific tasks such as compiling the Ramsar Convention
Implementation Manual; coordinating educational programs; and providing
expert advice for field projects .
I am sure that there are lessons to be learned from the relative success of
global environmental treaty secretariats that are transferable to the secretariats
of other treaty systems such as those of human rights, trade and arms control,
as well as to the new 'batch' of global environmental conventions whose
permanent secretariats come on-line over the next few years.
These new United Nations conventions are: the 1992 Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC); the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD); and the 1992 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
(CCD). They face special problems of scientific uncertainty, issue complexity
and problem definition, especially the climate change and biodiversity treaties
where the science is less precise than in desertification. Implementation of
these treaties will be even more difficult than it has been for the three I have
been studying. Over the past 20 years, the competing global pressures of
population growth, economic development and environmental protection
have increased. Now it seems, these pressures are being compounded by an
increased reluctance by some governments to commit resources for
conservation (Sandford, 1994).
Locating The Theoretical Frontier: Literature Overview
Disciplinary-based literature necessarily constitutes the starting point of an
interdisciplinary adventure such as this one. I have identified seven fields
relevant to my study. They are: international law; international relations
(including regime theory and the study of international organizations);
organization theory and strategic management; public policy implementation;
public sector management, (which is distinguished from, and contrasted with
national public administration); negotiation and dispute resolution. From
this literature I identified four themes of relevance to my research. I was also
able to identify a number of reasons why each of these bodies of scholarship is
individually inadequate to provide a framework or lens for an
interdisciplinary study such as mine. The challenge has been to develop from
this vast body of work, a lens that will shed a new or a different light on the
subject of global treaty secretariats, so that the activities, roles and influence of
future secretariats can be gauged and predicted.
The key themes that I have identified from my literature review and which
locate the current theoretical frontier are:
(i) International environmental treaty regimes are the legal and institutional
building blocks of international cooperation and sustainable development.
They provide the framework within which international organizations
operate in their implementation of treaty policy decisions. As agents of the
treaty decision makers, IOs obtain their legitimacy, authority and influence
from their legal mandate, their institutional location, and the roles they play
in the treaty system.
(ii) Treaty implementation is perhaps the most difficult stage of international
public policy decision making. Implementation is the stage of the policy
making process, be it national or international, where policies are put into
action, and where the success of a policy initiative is ultimately evaluated.
Research on the effectiveness of international environmental treaties has
traditionally concentrated on how to get governments to meet their treaty
obligations (Chayes and Chayes, 1991; Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993; Young
and Osherenko, 1993; Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1994; Keohane, 1995; Chayes
and Chayes, 1995). What has been virtually neglected in the literature is an
analysis of the roles of secretariats in assisting governments in this process.
(iii) As the lynch-pin organization of treaty system, secretariats have
institutional legitimacy, limited authority, professional expertise, and
extensive, and often influential, global networks and interorganizational
relationships. Of particular significance is the secretariat as the institutional
memory of the treaty system (Pitt and Weiss, 1986; Jonsson, 1986; 1993;
Mouritzen, 1990; Sandford, 1994).
(iv) Secretariats are led and staffed primarily by international civil servants.
The international civil service is acknowledged as being significantly different
from national civil cervices and thus warrants study in its own right
(McLaren 1980; Mouritzen 1990). However, in an extensive survey of
international organization and public administration literature and research,
Robert McLaren (1980) commented on the virtual absence of any form of
empirical evidence about the international secretariat as an actor in
international affairs. McLaren (1980), Jonsson (1986) and Mouritzen (1990) all
identify the need for additional empirical data on the roles, creativity and
influence of the international civil services of international organizations, as
in their opinion, the current international trend is for these organizations to
increase in number and strength over the next decade or so.
(v) The professional staff of secretariats are in a prime position to use their
roles as boundary-spanners in treaty implementation to influence
international cooperation and harmony. Literature in the areas of
international relations, organization theory, negotiation and mediation has
been virtually silent on the interface between organization structures,
influence and the roles of organizational actors as intermediaries in treaty
implementation (Babbitt, 1989; Kolb and Faure, 1994). As organizational
actors, bureaucracies such as secretariats are not neutral, but neither is any
intermediary. Most mediation theory is built on the premise that mediators
must be 'neutral' in order to be acceptable. That is, the mediator does not
impose his/her values, norms or interests on the participants. But practice
regularly contradicts this axiom (Faure, 1989; Babbitt, 1989; Susskind, 1994).
For example, Kolb and Spalter (1989) and Kolb (1994) document many cases in
which the acceptability of the mediators is enhanced specifically because they
are not neutral. As Susskind and Babbitt (1992) note, the key is finding
someone the parties believe can assist them and in whom they have
confidence.
There is still very little empirical information on international secretariats as
'neutrals', with the exception of the United Nations Secretariat (Skjelsbaek
1991; Susskind and Babbitt, 1992). To date, I have found no empirical data on
the roles and influence of environmental treaty secretariats as 'neutrals' in
treaty implementation conflicts, although as mentioned previously, some
consideration has been given to the role of secretariats in international,
environmental negotiation processes.
Theoretical Inadequacies
The above literary streams provide insights but are fundamentally inadequate
for my research purposes as they individually and collectively reflect a
theoretical tendency to explain the world as they would like it to be, rather
than as it actually is in practice. These streams thus fall short in their abilities
to explain the specifics of 10 operations and influence, limited as they all are
by their disciplinary blinders.
International law (IL) creates and focuses on the formal structures, processes
and procedures of a treaty system, the skeleton of the system. However it
neglects the people, the informal processes and the networks. It is the
interactions of these elements that put the flesh on the bones of a treaty
system, that make it work or not work. Legal assemblages alone are
insufficient to explain how and why treaties and their secretariats work in
practice. As discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, international and
national law is ponderous, reactive, and cannot keep pace with the rapidly
changing world which secretariats must navigate to survive.
In international relations (IR), regime theory is similarly inadequate for my
purposes because of its insistence on focusing on nation states and to a lesser
extent on NGOs, as if they were they only actors of note in treaty systems. IR
tends to be preoccupied with formal power, authority and control and seems
reluctant to acknowledge or concede, that with increased globalization and
interdependence of international and national political and market systems,
formality is being steadily supplemented (even replaced), by informal
interactions of growing significance. While regime theory provides some
useful explanations of interactions among institutional actors, it neglects the
informal interactions and processes that make up a significant proportion of
treaty implementation activities and that are major contributors to treaty
success.
In the study of IOs, under the rubric of IR, attention has been focused on the
large IOs of UN programs such as FAO, UNEP and UNESCO and the UN
Secretariat, the latter being the subject of numerous internal and external
studies of efficiency and effectiveness. To my knowledge, there have been no
studies of treaty secretariats, and it cannot be assumed that the findings from
studies of these larger IOs are transferable to treaty secretariats. There are huge
differences of scale, resources, formal authority and power, tasks and
management style.
Organization theory sheds light on the internal workings, the
intraorganizationl aspects and dynamics of organizations including treaty
secretariats, but goes little further. Organizational theory is limited for my
purposes by its historical origins in studies of private sector organizations.
Here, an organization's relationship with its external environment (especially
its resource-dependence or independence) is relatively obvious and clear cut,
as the stakeholders are fewer and known, unlike the field of international
public sector relations.
Network analysis and strategic management which also have their
intellectual origins in organization theory, have been adapted by a number of
scholars (Gage and Mandell, 1990; O'Toole, 1990; Hanf and O'Toole, 1992) for
application in domestic intergovernmental management in the USA.
However, with the exception of Jonsson's work (1986; 1987; 1993), I am not
aware of other scholars who have endeavoured to apply these concepts to the
analysis of IOs.
Public policy implementation literature has been a useful source of
information on models, 'top-down', 'bottom-up' and 'mixed' (Mazmanian
and Sabatier, 1989; Elmore, 1979; Sabatier, 1986) for understanding
implementation as applied to US domestic public policy implementation.
Research and writings on US public policy implementation have flourished
in the USA since the 1970s (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1974)
and more recently Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989).
In the late 1990s policy implementation seems to be enjoying a resurgence,
having been transformed to some extent into 'intergovernmental
management' by scholars with home bases in organization theory and most
recently, interorganizational theory. This later group of scholars, seems
relatively unaware of the earlier classical works mentioned, as they come
from different disciplinary bases. Members of the earlier group tend to come
from the perspective of critics of existing state and national implementation
regimes who want to change the public sector management system to achieve
a greater degree of social justice for the public good.
On the other hand, the 'intergovernmental management group' of the 1980s
and 1990s with a background in organizational theory/strategic management,
appear primarily concerned with achieving more efficient public sector
management (program delivery) among multiple levels of government, and
they include examples of public policy implementation as case studies.
The boundaries of the body of literature that is variously described as public
sector management, intergovernmental management, national public sector
administration, and international public administration/management, are
confused at best. Except for the obvious distinction between the national and
international dimensions, it appears that scholars in these fields are talking
more or less about similar issues and concerns. There also appears to be some
disagreement over the use of language, with 'administration' being
overtaken by 'management', as the preferred term, although they are
historically and strictly speaking different concepts. However, I surmise that
'management' may be the currently preferred term as it gives organizations
more 'room to move' in interpreting their responsibilities and performing
their functions than does the older and more restrictive concept of
'administration'. The gist of all these literatures is their concern about how to
manage intergovernmental initiatives; how deal with competing
governmental priorities and policies; how to manage resource dependency
and resource constraints; and, how to survive and grow as organizations. As
with organization and strategic management theories, this wedge of literature
is sector focused. It is inclined to concentrate on the internal workings of
public sector organizations, their relations with each other and their relations
with their political masters, and neglects consideration of interorganizational
relations with stakeholders outside of an organization's immediate
environment. This approach is thus inadequate for understanding
international treaty secretariats who as international IGOs, practice a version
of public sector management, but who are also mindful of the intricacies of
managing complex, interorganizational networks of state and non-state
stakeholders both inside and outside of the treaty system.
Negotiation and dispute resolution literature with its legal and game theory
origins, is philosophically distinguished from conflict resolution whose
disciplinary base is essentially in the social sciences of psychology and
sociology. They perceive 'conflict' and its solutions differently. The
negotiation and dispute resolution exponents focus more on what could be
called settlement of the here-and-now episodes of acute conflict which they
term disputes, while 'conflict resolutionists' such as Burton (1990) strive to
understand and resolve the wider societal causes of conflicts which arise from
struggles over identity, values, power, and limited resources (Dukes, 1996).
Neither theoretical stream offers an adequate explanation for managing and
resolving the conflicts and disputes experienced by secretariats, who
frequently have to deal with episodic disputes in a wider field of more low-
level, chronic conflicts. Secretariats spend a considerable proportion of their
time trying to build consensus among stakeholders to avoid and manage
conflicts, and to resolve the disputes that occur at all levels of government
during treaty implementation. To do this they appear to take the view that
conflict or the potential for conflict is an implementation constant,
punctuated periodically by bouts of acute disagreement (disputes). In this
context, secretariats need to have an in-depth understanding of the national
and international conditions and issues that give rise to conflict emergence
("conflict resolution"), while at the same time having the expertise and
resources to manage and resolve them within the legal framework of the
treaty ("negotiation and dispute resolution").
In summary, as argued above, none of the above disciplinary lens' is in itself
adequate to explain the phenomenon of the secretariat as a potentially
influential, organizational entity which survives (relatively successfully, it
seems) in an essentially hostile, or at best indifferent, international public
policy environment. A single-lens or disciplinary-based perspective only
permits us a limited view of a complex and multifaceted entity. In my
opinion, we need to adopt a more creative, interdisciplinary approach to
understanding the secretariat as an organizational prism - an
intergovernmental instrument of treaty implementation; a non-traditional
facilitator and mediator of multi-issue, multi-party implementation conflicts;
and an unacknowledged influence on treaty outcomes.
To sceptics who suggest that interdisciplinary frameworks are not sufficiently
rigorous I say, that as the physical, social, political and economic
environments of the globe have the capacity to change, so too should
intellectual environments. Network analysis and strategic management
theory were initially adaptations of organizational theory as is
interorganizational theory; and negotiation and dispute resolution theory
developed from legal constructs. These bodies of theory which are now
accepted as 'mainstream', are essentially interdisciplinary.
Advancing The Frontier: My Contribution To The Field.
The little information that is available about secretariats tends to concentrate
on intra-organizational interactions. Large, UN bureaucracies such as
UNESCO (United nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization),
and FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization), ILO (International Labour
Organization) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are featured.
The most important findings from this literature are: (i) international
secretariats are a neglected, but analytically significant, unit of study; (ii) policy
making by the secretariats of national governments differs significantly from
that of the secretariats of international organizations; (iii) the power of
international civil servants, especially those in issue-areas such as the
environment, has been underestimated; and, (iv) secretariats do exert
influence on policy outcomes, their leverage being enhanced by the
interagency mobility and networking by their staff . However, it remains to be
seen to what extent the findings of research on large United Nations IOs such
as those listed above, are generalizable to treaty IOs.
This dissertation explores the application of an interdisciplinary approach
known as interorganizational theory, to the study of a sub-set of international
organizations, namely global environmental treaty secretariats.
Interorganizational theory is an interdisciplinary hybrid derived from
organization theory, network analysis, implementation studies and theories
of strategic and public sector management, and as such it is particularly
appropriate framework for an interdisciplinary research topic such as mine.
Interorganizational theory evolved as a result of the frustrations of scholars
and practitioners alike, with the inadequacies of each of its contributing
theoretical streams to deal with what actually happens in the real-world
context of public sector management, as distinct from hypothesising what
should happen, from the relatively distant realms of academia. While each of
the disciplinary streams contributes to our understanding of various aspects
of international public policy management, none is adequate is its own right
to develop the complete picture of, or to explain how and why IOs act as they
do in managing implementation processes. Given their limited authority and
powers, what management strategies contribute to an 10's organizational
success or failure as a network manager? and, how might IOs be used most
effectively as an institutional resource, rather than being perceived - often
erroneously - as a institutional liability?
Another criticism of the theoretical progenitors of interorganizational theory
is that few are based on empirical research (Mandell, 1990), and that the
empirical content of those theories that do have an empirical underpinning,
is based predominantly on United States domestic data. This being so, it might
be thought that interorganizational frameworks of analysis do not necessarily
translate readily to the complex world of the international public policy
practitioner. However Jonsson (1986; 1987; 1992; 1993) applied a framework
derived from interorganizational theory and network analysis in his
empirical study of a specific international aviation issue known as the Show
Cause Order. Jonsson concluded that his analytical framework proved useful
and that the case study largely corroborated his hypothesis that selected issue-
specific and organization-specific background variables account for an
organization's 'linking-pin' (his term) position in an interorganizational
network - and ultimately its influence.
In the world of international public policy implementation, if models and
theories do not, or are not seen to, capture the day-to-day reality of the policy
world, they will be disregarded by even the most reflective of practitioners.
Scholars and practitioners have much to learn from each other. In this
context, there is a need for prevailing theoretical constructs to be revised and
applied in a "real-world" context. My research then, builds on Jonsson's
framework for explaining network structure and performance. Where my
research departs from Jonsson's model, is that I pay particular attention to the
performance of secretariats as network managers. In this respect, I go beyond
Jonsson's (1986) analysis of selected background variables accounting for an
organization's linking pin (or lynch-pin) position in an interorganizational
network. In particular I focus on secretariat roles in managing conflicts. I also
take on board, input from recent US intergovernmental management studies,
and from negotiation and dispute resolution literature, in order to address the
operational difficulties that international treaty organizations face in
managing interorganizational public policy conflicts.
Although the presence of conflict as an interorganizational network norm is
acknowledged by Mandell and Gage (1990), the management of conflict has
received very little attention in the intergovernmental management
literature sources from which Gage and Mandell draw in advancing the
debate on the value of interorganizational theory in understanding public
policy management. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the negotiation and dispute
resolution literature has provided more food for thought in respect of conflict
management strategies for network managers.
Chayes and Chayes (1995) in developing what they call a new theory of
compliance in an increasingly interdependent world, a "new sovereignty",
note that dispute settlement is one of three elements of what they describe as
an active management strategy, the other two elements being adaptation and
modification of treaty norms and capacity building. These authors discuss the
benefits and limitations of formal and informal approaches to dispute
settlement, and suggest that international conventions might benefit from
consideration of the raft of informal dispute settlement measures which have
been developed in the USA, and which have been applied with some
measure of success, to the resolution of a range of US domestic public policy
disputes.
I take the Chayes and Chayes (1995) active management model a step further,
by proposing that the informal dispute settlement measures which they
suggest as a strategy of active management in international organization
circles, are not new. They have for many years been practiced by
environmental treaty IOs in their capacity as the network managers of
international agreements. In fact secretariat use of what are known in the
present day USA public policy dispute resolution literature as public policy or
environmental dispute resolution processes, is one significant way in which
these organizations exert influence.
The difference between the ways in which IO's use their knowledge of and
skills in conflict management, and the techniques described by Chayes and
Chayes (1995) and Dukes (1996), is that the secretariats do not name nor do
they understand, that what they do to manage and resolve conflicts, is
"informal dispute resolution" . They would, however, agree that special skills
and expertise are required to perform such tasks successfully. Rather,
secretariats regard conflict management and dispute resolution as a normal
part of a secretariat's strategic management portfolio in managing a treaty
network. Conflict management skills are an essential component of a
boundary-spanner's professional repertoire, an extension of what Jonsson
describes as 'quiet diplomacy' or the powers of persuasion, which constitute
the fundamental basis of secretariat communications and are essential
currency for organizational survival. That is, secretariat boundary-spanning
personnel regularly, and unwittingly, use and have done for many years,
what Chayes and Chayes (1995) call "informal dispute settlement".
In summary, my research seeks to fill a significant gap in the literature on
international convention secretariats by explaining their roles and their
potential to influence public policy outcomes as organizational actors in
interorganizational treaty networks. Second, I suggest that my findings are
transferable to the secretariats of other treaty systems including those of arms
control and trade. Finally, I believe that this study breaks new ground in the
conflict management and dispute resolution fields by analyzing secretariats as
non-traditional intermediaries of international public policy conflicts.
Explanation Of Key Terms
Secretariats are the international, executive support organizations created by
the members of an international agreement, convention or treaty to assist
them to manage and implement the convention. In the case of multilateral
agreements, secretariats are staffed primarily by international civil servants
(ICSs) and led by an Executive Head or Secretary-General (S-G). Secretariat
personnel are usually international, career civil servants and recruits from
the national bureaucracies of member countries appointed for a fixed-term.
On occasion, their ranks are expanded to include recruits from NGOs and
industry. All personnel, contract and permanent, are similarly bound by ICS
ethics and the ICS code of practice while they are employed by a secretariat as
international civil servants. Internationalism, rather than nationalism, is
supposed to be the core value of a secretariat.
There are two models of secretariats, passive and activist. In the former,
emphasis is on efficiency in administration rather than on creativity. The
Secretary-General has little power, conducts diplomatic activity behind the
scenes, and does not take initiatives when executive authority might be at
stake (Boyd, 1962). In the latter, the Secretary-General is more than an
administrator. S/he is a spokesperson for the treaty community, and is
acknowledged as an influential leader in the executive system. The legitimacy
of the activist secretariat thus derives from its executive authority and power,
its structural position in the treaty system, high profile, and acceptability to
the parties (Young 1967).
Treaty implementation is the third stage of international treaty making. The
first stage is pre-negotiation which involves identification of the issues to be
negotiated and getting the relevant parties to the table. The second stage is
negotiation. This is when the representatives of national governments sit
down to negotiate the parameters and content of a treaty prior to taking it back
to their governments for ratification. Once the agreed number of country
ratifications has been obtained, the treaty enters into force. This may take as
little as 2 years (CITES) or as many as 10 years, as in the case of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS).
The implementation stage commences when a treaty is ratified. Countries
which have ratified a convention are then legally required to honor their
obligations by implementing measures at both national and international
levels to achieve the treaty objectives. These measures may include the
provision of regular national reports on national implementation progress,
and the development of processes and institutional mechanisms to
coordinate national implementation initiatives at the global level.
Effective treaty implementation requires the cooperation and coordination of
a wide range of national and international, state and non-state actors. They
include: national governments (treaty members and some non-members);
IOs; industry organizations; international and national economic and
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs); associations of
experts such as scientists; and the general public
The tasks that secretariats perform are the means by which secretariats
influence treaty outcomes. A secretariat's implementation tasks differ from
those that it performs during treaty negotiations. During the negotiation
stage, secretariats may be considered interim organizations and limit their
activities to assisting in the collection and dissemination of information,
setting agendas for meetings, and otherwise servicing meetings of the parties
as required. Secretariats are less inclined to take organizational risks or to be
innovative during negotiations, in contrast with their activities in the
implementation stage by which time they have acquired permanent
organizational status.
Organizational permanency, structure, budgets and tasks are confirmed at the
first Conference of the Parties (CoP) after a treaty enters into force. The
implementation tasks performed by secretariats vary substantially. There are
two primary tiers of secretariat tasks - core tasks and substantive tasks.
Common core tasks are identified in the treaty text and tend to be essentially
routine, administrative or executive duties such as: minute and report
preparation; the organization of CoP and Committee meetings; and
information dissemination among treaty members as requested by the parties
and relevant committees. There is, however, significant variation among the
substantive tasks performed by secretariats. It is in the performance of these
tasks in particular, that implementation problems are most frequently
experienced.
This second tier of substantive tasks is where I shall focus. They include:
(i) Overseeing and coordinating national reporting and performance review.
This includes assisting countries with the development of agreed criteria for
reporting on treaty implementation progress at the national level; analysis of
the country/national reports submitted; and oversight of national
implementation progress in accordance with the agreed criteria.
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(ii) Helping to build national capacity in countries where special assistance is
needed with: the development and implementation of reporting, legislative
and regulatory processes to enable a country to meet its treaty obligations;
transfer of technology and skills from developed to developing countries; and
the training of in-country management authorities to administer the new
regulations.
(iii) Monitoring compliance by working with non-state actors to achieve on-
ground domestic and ultimately global, compliance.
Constraints. Secretariats face a number of obstacles or constraints in their
performance of the three implementation tasks identified above. Constraints
include: limited organizational capacity such as inadequate financial resources
and personnel shortages; limited decision making authority; and lack of
commitment from some treaty members.
Influence. Cox and Jacobson (1973:3) define influence as "the modification of
one actor's behavior by another". Keohane and Nye (1974) and Mouritzen
(1990) focus on influence exerted, as distinct from influence capability. In this
study, I consider influence exerted and define 'influence' as: the effect on the
behavior of the treaty stakeholders, of the roles performed by secretariats in
carrying out their substantive tasks. By performing various roles, the
secretariat contributes to the modification of other actors' behavior, that is, it
exerts influence, or has a policy effect (Mouritzen, 1990). The role(s)
performed by a secretariat will affect the nature and extent of influence
exerted, and certain roles require more organizational capacity (influence
capability) than others.
Roles are aggregates of activity indicating a certain relation of the secretariat to
its salient environment (Mouritzen, 1990: 14). Secretariats perform multiple
roles in fulfilling their organizational responsibilities in treaty
implementation. Role constellations have been identified in the political
science literature by Weiss (1975); McLaren (1980); and Jonsson (1986; 1993).
They revolve around the relationship of IOs to their international
constituencies, in particular nation states. However, I do not find these role
definitions very useful for understanding and analysing the roles secretariats
perform in coordinating and managing international public policy
implementation in the context of complex, multilateral networks. Although
nation states and legal regimes provide the policy skeleton, it seems to me
that it is the formal and informal networks and interactions of people and
processes that transform policy into action.
I therefore use 'role' in the network management context. The primary role
of a secretariat is that of network manager, in particular that aspect network
management known as multilateral brokerage.
In the interorganizational literature Mandell (1988; 1990) identifies the role of
multilateral broker as potentially the most significant role performed by a
network manager. It parallels the roles described by various analysts as: 'fixer'
(Bardach, 1974); 'activist broker ' (Jonsson, 1986); 'facilitation' (O'Toole, 1986);
and 'steering' (Hanf and O'Toole, 1992). I also demonstrate that secretariats
perform multilateral brokerage roles on a continuum from passive to activist.
This is described in detail in Chapter 2.
Research Design
Research Questions
This study examines the roles and influence, that is, the policy effects, of
secretariats in the implementation of three global environmental treaties.
They are: Ramsar (1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat); CITES (1973 Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora); and CCAMLR (1980
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources).
More specifically, I examine the influence of these secretariats in performing
their three key tasks: oversight of national reporting, performance review and
assessment; the provision of assistance to developing countries; and
secretariat interactions with NGOs in monitoring compliance. I also analyse
the organizational capacity of these secretariats insofar as they are expected to
manage conflicts which occur during treaty implementation. The conflict
management and dispute resolution strategies they use, such as fact-finding,
collaborative problem-solving, policy dialogue, facilitation, and mediation,
are of special interest.
My study assumes that international environmental treaty secretariats as
organizational actors in global environmental treaty networks, play more
complex and influential roles than might be obvious. Secretariats adopt
constellations of organizational roles to expand their influence and to ensure
their own organizational goals of survival and growth. For example, the
CCAMLR Secretariat has a total of 14 staff and is relatively unsupported in an
institutional sense. Unlike the secretariats of CITES and Ramsar, it has no
parent body to provide bridging finance or additional personnel resources if
needed. To ensure its own survival and enhance its influence the CCAMLR
Secretariat interacts formally with influential scientific groups and
committees in its own treaty system, and with other ATS-relevant
organizations such as the IWC (International Whaling Commission). The
CCAMLR Secretariat also interacts both formally and informally with
national bureaucracies and environmental NGOs especially ASOC (The
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition), The Antarctica Project, and
Greenpeace. These organizations provide the secretariat with data from their
own scientific research networks and information on compliance monitoring,
thus enabling the secretariat to fulfil its responsibilities for the oversight of
national reporting.
My research looks closely at the ways in which these three secretariats have
gone about meeting their responsibilities. I also examine the obstacles they
have faced, the reasons they feel that these have occurred, and how they have
tried to head them off. My analysis of responses to these questions from
secretariats, NGOs and government representatives, explains how and why
environmental treaty secretariats exert influence on implementation
outcomes, and it enables me to make recommendations about the ways in
which the organizational capacity of international treaty secretariats might be
enhanced to positively influence treaty outcomes, to minimize
implementation problems, and to more effectively manage those that do
occur.
Underlying my research questions are five themes which I believe have
implications for secretariat influence on treaty outcomes. They are:
The more activist a secretariat is, the more it is able to influence parties to
conform with treaty requirements. Secretariats can use country reporting
requirements to influence members' behavior. For example, secretariats often
assist parties to interpret reporting requirements and to formulate their
regular national reports for submission to the CoP. This is one way
secretariats exert influence on the type of information that is collected; on the
sources of in-country and external expertise consulted; and on the
development of national reporting and performance review capabilities,
including reliance on NGO input and public participation. In addition, when
secretariats act as reviewers and independent analysts of preliminary country
reports and country performance, they can directly influence the claims that
countries are able and willing to make, as well as internal national decisions
about what needs to be done to improve a country's performance.
By providing technical and other expert assistance to developing countries to
help them meet their international treaty obligations, secretariats are able to
influence national capacity building in these countries. Most global
environmental treaties include trust funds that can be used to provide
assistance to developing countries to help them to meet treaty obligations.
When secretariats are responsible for the administration of such funds then
they are able to direct the nature and timing of disbursements given to these
countries. Financial assistance may be allocated for the identification and
provision of scientific, technical and legal expertise to assist countries to put
in place required reporting, legislative and regulatory processes, or to train
management authorities in the administration of new regulations. Secretariat
involvement in these activities provides opportunities for them to penetrate
national policy and decision making processes, and to exert influence on the
institutions that countries put in place to meet their treaty commitments.
To extend their limited formal influence, secretariats often form alliances
with non-state actors. These groups can bring pressure to bear domestically on
a party and increase a country's willingness to comply with treaty
requirements. Non-state actors such as environmental NGOs, industry
organizations and associations of experts are representatives of constituencies.
As such, they are in a position to both empower the general public, and to act
as potential obstacles to the uncontested implementation of governmental
policy at the national level. Non-state actors use a range of strategies to
achieve their objectives. To raise public awareness, NGOs might initiate
national and international media coverage, drawing attention to policy and
behavior they particularly like or dislike.
Through alliances with non-state actors, secretariats can extend their
influence into domestic political life without formally violating national
sovereignty. That is, a secretariat's ability to safeguard treaty values and
objectives within countries, can be enhanced by its interactions with domestic
NGOs. If successful, these secretariat-NGO partnerships should deprive
parties of the "domestic excuses " they give for not meeting their treaty
obligations (Mouritzen 1990).
Secretariats also enlist formally and informally, the assistance of NGOs in
monitoring in-country compliance. One example is the formal relationship
between the CITES Secretariat and the WWF (World Wildlife
Fund)/TRAFFIC (International Traffic Network) to monitor illegal trade in
endangered species; another is the informal relationship between the
CCAMLR Secretariat and the more militant Greenpeace in monitoring
marine resources in Antarctica. The relationship between the CITES
Secretariat and WWF/TRAFFIC is formally specified in the treaty text. In
contrast, the relationship between the CCAMLR Secretariat and Greenpeace
appears to consist of an informal information flow from Greenpeace to the
Secretariat. The CCAMLR Secretariat has no formal contact with Greenpeace,
although it is able to use the information provided by Greenpeace to assist it
in monitoring compliance in a remote and inaccessible region.
Secretariat-NGO alliances can be mutually beneficial. An NGO's bargaining
power diminishes at the international level. At this level, there are a greater
number of NGOs and groups competing for policy space; access to decision
making is restricted; and effective NGO input to and monitoring of treaty
implementation, is costly and difficult to sustain over time. Through
alliances with treaty secretariats, NGOs seek to transcend these limitations.
To the extent that secretariats are able to enhance their own organizational
capacity, they are more likely to have an impact on treaty implementation
outcomes. A secretariat' capacity to perform its tasks is heavily dependent on
the extent of its financial, administrative and personnel resources, as well as
on their relations with other groups and key individuals. The organizational
capacity of secretariats is best measured in terms of its: financial capacity
(budgetary diversification and funding predictability, that is, the regular
payment of country contributions); administrative capacity (institutional
legitimacy and decision making authority vis a vis a secretariat's parent
organization and its CoP ); personnel capacity (leadership, secretariat size and
composition, professional expertise, personnel qualifications and experience,
recruiting and staffing policies, and succession planning in a highly mobile,
career civil service); and organizational scope, that is, the diversity and
intensity of secretariat networks with the parties, experts, national
bureaucracies, international and national NGOs.
If a secretariat is able to decrease its resource-dependence on the most
powerful and wealthy treaty members through the diversification of
budgetary sources, the innovative use of limited personnel resources and
optimal use of its organizational networks, then it increases its organizational
capacity and thus its ability to influence implementation outcomes.
Diversification of budget sources is what really improves an organization's
position (Mouritzen, 1990). That is, if not all of a secretariat's budget originates
from one or several of the most powerful treaty members, but some of it
comes instead from other sources such as NGOs or individual countries
which are not part of a powerful clique. Personnel secondments to secretariats
from NGOs and professional/expert associations also improve secretariat
capacity. Expansion and diversification of a secretariat's skills base and
networking, enhance an organization's autonomy and capacity as they
decrease resource reliance on a dominant power or group.
Finally, as secretariats increase their capacity to avoid, manage or resolve
conflicts and disputes among contending interests in their treaty system, their
impact on treaty outcomes increases. When a secretariat decreases its
resource-dependence, it increases both its autonomy and the likelihood that it
will be perceived as impartial, rather than as an instrument of a powerful
member country or group of countries. This then enhances the secretariat's
acceptability as an intermediary in the prevention, management and
resolution of conflicts. As a intermediary, a secretariat can exert influence on
treaty outcomes by: building consensus among parties on issues in
contention; assisting the parties with problem-solving; facilitating meetings of
scientific and implementation committees; and mediating stakeholder
conflicts. In these ways secretariats can change stakeholder behavior and
influence treaty outcomes.
Impartiality is one of basic tenets of the international civil service (ICS). The
parties recognize that a secretariat needs to protect its own interests. However,
if the parties have confidence in the secretariat to act as an impartial
intermediary vis a vis the other parties in a conflict or dispute, and if they
believe that the secretariat can assist them to resolve the conflict, then they
will usually accept the secretariat as an intermediary.
The conflict management activities of the Montreal Protocol's Secretariat
provide examples of consensus building and problem solving by a secretariat.
The facilitation skills of its executive head and professional staff were used in
collaborative fact-finding and problem solving workshops to assist parties to
identify, and come to agreement on, data and information needs, and to
establish agreed research priorities and processes (Sandford, 1994).
Methodology
My research approach relies on "structured focused comparison" described by
Alexander George (1979), in which data is collected on the same variables
across units or cases (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). In this context, George
proposed an "analytical inductive approach to theory development",
comparable with "explanation-building analysis" as outlined by Robert Yin
(1984). George's design uses as its basis, Eckstein's "heuristic" case study (see
George 1979 ), that is, the case study is used "as a means of stimulating the
imagination in order to discern important new general problems, identify
possible theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable
relations that were not previously apparent". In a similar vein, Yin (1984:113)
describes "explanation-building analysis" as an iterative process, the goal of
which is "to analyze the case study data by building an explanation about the
case". King, Keohane and Verba (1994) support George's contention that the
case study method is meant to be systematic scientific observation,
"systematizing the information in descriptive case studies in such a way that
it could conceivably be used for descriptive or causal inference".
Case Selection
I track treaty implementation and the development of problems over time in
three case studies. The three cases are:
(1) Ramsar (1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat)
(2). CITES (1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora).
(3) CCAMLR (1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources)
The cases were selected for the following reasons:
All the treaties studied are global. They reflect extensive implementation
efforts. As Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1994) point out, a study of proposed
(and even recent ) accords that have yet to be implemented will tell us little
about what makes a successful agreement.
The treaties chosen all deal with the management of natural living resources,
as distinct from atmospheric issues such as ozone depletion and global
warming, or pollution as from hazardous wastes.
All the secretariats are well established. They have substantial data bases, and
their Executive Heads and professional personnel have a wide range of
experience in dealing with treaty implementation issues and conflicts in both
developed and developing countries. These treaties and their secretariats
have set organizational precedents for the implementation of more recent
treaties such as the 1992 conventions on climate change, biodiversity and
desertification.
The secretariats are similar with regard to their organizational structures,
staffing profiles, operations and the constraints with which they are faced.
The secretariats differ with regard to arrangements with parent/partner
organizations. IUCN (World Conservation Union) and IWRB (International
Wetlands and Waterfowl Research Bureau) jointly support the Ramsar
Convention Bureau; and UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme),
the CITES Secretariat. The CCAMLR secretariat has no discrete parent body.
Rather, it is nested in the ATS (Antarctic Treaty System) and it relates directly
to a number of the institutional components of this system.
Some other global environmental treaties have not been included as case
studies for several reasons:
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has
not been included because of its scientifically unique (single issue) nature, and
my lack of funds to travel to its three treaty secretariats for fieldwork. The
primary treaty implementation secretariat is based in Nairobi, there is a
secretariat presence with its parent body (UNEP) in Geneva, and a completely
independent secretariat for administering the Multilateral Fund is located in
Montreal, Canada.
Another example of a global environmental treaty not included in the study
is the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. Basel has only had a permanent
secretariat since December 1993, and as yet it does not have an established
implementation "track record". However the experiences of secretariats such
as these will be taken into account.
Data Collection
There are several elements of my data collection procedures. They are:
First, an extensive literature review has been conducted. Second, relevant
documentation, reports and files in the secretariats, their partner agencies-
IUCN, IWRB, UNEP, the ATS, and the United Nations system were studied.
Documentation from NGOs and national delegations was also reviewed.
Third, I directly observed a number of treaty implementation negotiations. I
observed Conferences of the Parties (CoPs); policy, scientific, technical and
reporting committee sessions;and intra-and inter-secretariat meetings. I was
an observer at CITES' CoP 9 in Florida, USA in 1994; and Ramsar's CoP 6 in
Brisbane, Australia in 1996. CCAMLR refuses to allow outsiders, even
independent researchers such as myself, to observe any of its meetings unless
approval has been obtained by consensus from the parties 12 months prior to
Commission and Scientific Committee Meetings. In practice it is virtually
impossible for observers to attend CCAMLR meetings unless they can
persuade either a national delegation or ASOC or IUCN to allow them to
participate as a delegation member. As requests such as this are frequent, the
delegations typically refused. The CCAMLR Secretariat took a very passive
approach to my request for assistance to attend the CCAMLR Commission
and Scientific Meetings in 1995, 1996 and 1997. It did not appear to obstruct my
request, nor did it facilitate it, unlike the Ramsar Bureau and the CITES
Secretariat.
This is a limitation on my field-based information about CCAMLR as CoPs
are useful places to access and interview national delegates and NGO
representatives.
Fourth, fieldwork was undertaken in the USA, Switzerland, UK and
Australia. In-depth, confidential, personal interviews were conducted with
several past and with all current Executive Heads and professional secretariat
personnel, and with support personnel as appropriate. Two interviews were
conducted with each secretariat subject, a total of approximately 1.5 hours
with each secretariat subject.
An open-ended interview protocol using a standard question format, was
developed in consultation with my dissertation committee members and
advisers, and key practitioners with relevant intergovernmental and
secretariat experience. Interview questions were pre-tested on subjects with
relevant practical and academic expertise and amended as appropriate after
the first round of secretariat interviews. The interviews were confidential and
were tape recorded with the permission of the subjects.
Personal and telephone interviews were also conducted with relevant others,
for example, former secretariat personnel and selected key senior executives
from UNEP, IUCN, IWRB, the Humane Society, and the ATS. Some
members of developed and developing country delegations and national
bureaucracies responsible for treaty implementation were interviewed
personally or by telephone, as were representatives of environmental NGOs
such as the WWF, TRAFFIC International, The Species Survival
Commission, and the Humane Society which are involved in monitoring
country reporting and non-compliance; and representatives of business and
trade organizations, including organizations representing the wildlife trade
(CITES) and the fishing industry (CCAMLR), all of which are stakeholders in
treaty implementation.
These categories of subjects were identified from internal secretariat
documentation, and correspondence; from external reports of treaty and
secretariat activities by, for example, NGOs; and from my first round of
interviews with secretariat personnel. The aim of these interviews was to
obtain a range of perspectives on the ways in which secretariats were
perceived to conduct their tasks. These interviews were either tape recorded,
or notes were taken during the interviews. Sixty nine interviews were
conducted in this category, making a research total of one hundred personal
and telephone interviews.
Using the interview and documentation data, and based on my research
questions, case studies have been prepared to track developments, and to
highlight watershed or critical implementation issue and events, such as
treaty-specific constraints.
Using data obtained as indicated above, I have conducted a thorough
examination of the problems of treaty implementation confronting
environmental treaty secretariats and the approaches they have used to deal
with these. I have examined why these problems occurred, and how a
secretariat's experiences in dealing with such problems over time, influences
its choice of network management strategies including its decision to use or
not to use, conflict management and dispute resolution processes such as
consensus building, facilitation, and mediation.
Study Limitations
A limitation of this study was that some of the national delegates that I had
initially planned to interview, including a number from developing
countries, felt unable or were unavailable to participate in the study. Nor did
they want their identities disclosed. They were understandably wary of
telephone interviews with an unknown researcher, and personal interviews
were not an option because of funding, mobility and time constraints. Access
to delegates was facilitated primarily by my attendance at CoPs and related
meetings as described above. That is why denial of my request to attend the
CCAMLR meetings was such a problem. English as only working language of
the researcher also limited the field of potential subjects.
Finally, while some non-state actors were prepared to criticize aspects of
secretariat performance, it was virtually impossible to obtain negative
comments about secretariat performance from national delegates of either
developing and developed countries. Nor were 'negative paper trails' able to
be located within the time and resources available for my research. I discuss
possible reasons for these reactions in Chapter 7.
From the data collected, it appears that stakeholder response to secretariat
performance is overwhelmingly positive. However, I am aware that the
limited negative feedback on secretariats from delegates may skew my
findings. There is thus a need for further research in this area to ensure that
my sample reflects the real situation as accurately as possible.
Results
There are two sets of results, expected and "unexpected", which appear to
confirm my original belief that global environmental treaty secretariats are
more influential than is generally thought. By "unexpected" I meant that
these results or findings are unacknowledged or unrecognized in any of the
literature I examined, that is, they are at odds with the conventional
literature.
Expected Results
I found that environmental treaty secretariats exert influence over
stakeholder behavior in several ways. In brief, they achieve this via: their
organizational position as the lynch-pin organization and network manager
of the interorganizational networks of treaty systems; task performance; and,
the boundary-spanning roles of their personnel, in particular the role of
multilateral broker.
In addition, the expected results confirm that the more activist a secretariat is
in carrying out its three key tasks - oversight of national reporting and
performance review; assisting developing countries with capacity building;
and working with NGOs to monitor domestic compliance - the more likely it
is to change stakeholder behavior and have a policy effect (influence) on
treaty outcomes.
Second, as secretariats increase their organizational capacity, so they increase
their potential to influence treaty implementation. Whether or not they
exercise their organizational potential depends on the extent to which they
are activist or passive secretariats.
Third, as secretariats increase their capacity to avoid and manage conflicts and
to resolve disputes among treaty stakeholders, they exert a considerable and
positive influence on treaty outcomes by changing stakeholder behavior.
"Unexpected" Results
To my mind, the "unexpected" results outlined below are more exciting and
offer opportunities for further research. They are:
Secretariats tend to favour the use of the informal interorganizational
networks and processes which develop among stakeholders in a treaty system,
rather than the more limited formal ones specified in the treaty text, to fulfil
their convention responsibilities and to exert influence.
Secretariats have a greater knowledge of informal, national and sub-national
interorganizational processes and networks, and they make far more
extensive and more long-term use of these (in-country penetration), than is
often understood or appreciated by governments and scholars. That is, the
secretariats of multilateral environmental conventions use their in-
country/domestic connections and knowledge to get things done and to exert
influence.
Secretariats form informal, even covert, alliances with key non-state actors to
get things done and to exert influence.
Secretariats use conflict management and dispute resolution processes
unwittingly, to manage tensions and conflicts that occur among stakeholders
during treaty implementation, and to exert influence. It is also apparent that
for the twenty-first century, treaty secretariats need to reassess their roles and
diversify their resource base to off-set competition in a world of diminishing
resources and an increasing number of international conventions. A 'new'
direction would be to ramp up their conflict management skills and capacity. I
present policy prescriptions for this in the final chapter.
Organization Of The Study
Chapter 1 establishes global environmental treaty secretariats as significant
units of analysis. It outlines the issues to be studied, identifies the research
questions to be answered, the methodology followed, and the results. Chapter
2 examines relevant theoretical concepts and frameworks that have been used
to study IOs and international agreements, and then examines the application
of an interorganizational framework to analysis of the roles and tasks
performed by secretariats in the implementation of global conventions, with
special reference to the convention case studies; Ramsar (1971 Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance , especially as Waterfowl Habitat);
CITES (1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora); and CCAMLR (1980 Convention on the Conservation
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of Antarctic Marine Living Resources). Chapter 3 discusses the core and
substantive tasks performed by secretariats, while in Chapter 4 the challenges
or constraints confronting international treaty secretariats are analysed with
specific reference to those facing environmental convention secretariats.
Chapter 5 then looks in depth at the difficulties facing the secretariats of
Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR and asks why did these problems emerge? The
approaches taken by these secretariats to transform these constraints or
obstacles into opportunities, are the focus of Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 presents the "unexpected" results of the research and seeks to
answer the questions: What have we learned from secretariat practice about
the sources of secretariat influence? and, What does this allow scholarship to
say "in general" about the influence of international secretariats in practice? I
suggest that activist global environmental treaty secretariats are critical actors
in a process I term catalysis which is the previously undiscovered 'missing
link' between implementation and compliance as these theories are currently
identified in the literature. Catalysis is the interorganizational, network
management process by which secretariats actively assist countries in
transforming domestic implementation concepts into tangible compliance
with international treaty objectives. As network managers and boundary-
spanners, secretariat personnel act as catalysts in activating and brokering
those sets of initiatives that constitute "catalysis
As catalysts, secretariats facilitate: national capacity building; informal
network interaction among both international and 'in-country' state and
non-state actors; and the prevention and management of implementation
conflicts through activities such as consensus-building, fact-finding and
collaborative problem-solving. When secretariats act as catalysts in this
context, they assist countries to take that step from a theoretical agreement to
implement an international convention, to the actual achievement of 'real-
world' compliance .
My argument is that while catalysis is no guarantee of compliance, without
entities such as activist secretariats in each treaty system, it appears likely
from my findings that the level of compliance with multilateral
environmental accords would be considerably less.
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, then advances some policy prescriptions
for enhancing both the process of catalysis and the organizational potential of
treaty secretariats, thus optimizing the chances for more positive
international environmental policy outcomes.
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING THE THEORY
Introduction
This chapter is in two parts. Part I, discusses two sets of theoretical concepts or
constructs that underpin my examination of secretariat tasks, roles and
influence. The first grouping of concepts consists of treaty 'implementation',
'performance', 'compliance', and 'effectiveness' which are used by
contemporary political scientists, and international lawyers to understand
and evaluate the dimensions of treaty success or failure; and 'activist' and
'passive' secretariats. The concepts of activism and passivity are used describe
the levels of initiative demonstrated by secretariats in performing their
implementation tasks and roles.
The second set of constructs is derived from interorganizational theory and
the management of interorganizational networks. These concepts are used by
social scientists working in the areas of intergovernmental and public sector
management, public policy implementation and organization theory, to
understand the ways in which public policy is implemented at all levels of
government. To date, the application of network analysis and
interorganizational theory has overwhelmingly concentrated on domestic
policy activity. However, I believe it can be readily applied to an examination
of international policy networks and their management. For the reasons that
I explain below, its inclusivity makes it a particularly relevant theoretical
framework for my study.
In Part 11 of this chapter, I consider and adapt Jonsson's (1986)
interorganizational framework for application to my study of global
environmental treaty secretariats as the network managers of international
public policy networks. In particular, I examine the issue-area and
organizational-specific variables that impact on the performance of their
primary tasks of overseeing the management of treaty implementation and
compliance. Of particular interest is the extent to which secretariats perform a
passive or an activist role in carrying out their tasks, the former being less
likely to have an impact on treaty outcomes than the latter.
I then examine the roles that activist or passive secretariats might use to carry
out their tasks and to overcome the organizational constraints they
encounter. I adapt the framework of 10 roles developed by Mouritzen (1990)
as my starting point.
My fieldwork subsequently revealed inadequacies in both Jonsson's and
Mouritzen's frameworks. These limitations are discussed in Chapter 8 where
I develop catalysis as my contribution to theory.
PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE THEORY
Explaining Implementation, Performance, Compliance, and Effectiveness.
The extent to which governments fulfil, or make significant progress towards
fulfilling, their treaty obligations determines whether or not a treaty is
successful. However, a general lack of consensus about the precise nature of
successful 'implementation', 'performance', 'compliance' and 'effectiveness'
is apparent in the literature. As a preamble to my study, I have tried to
explain these terms as used by several prominent US researchers. They are:
Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1994); Young (1994) and Chayes and Chayes
(1995).
Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1994:1) argue that international accords are only
as effective as the parties make them. In their opinion, implementation
refers to,
measures that states take to make international accords effective in their domestic law'.
Some accords are self-executing; that is, they do not require national legislation to
become effective. But many international accords, including CITES and Basel, require
national legislation or regulations to become effective
Effectiveness is the result not only of how governments implement accords (the formal
legislation or regulations that countries adopt to comply with the accord) but also of
compliance (the observance of these regulations and the commitments contained in the
international accord).
In this context Jacobson and Brown Weiss argue for clear definitions of
implementation and compliance.
Another important distinction is between 'performance' and 'effectiveness'.
Young (1994) identifies an effective governance system, as "one which
channels behavior in such a way as to eliminate or substantially to
ameliorate the problem that led to its creation"(1994:30). He argues that while
a system may perform or affect (actor/stakeholder) behavior dramatically, it
may not be effective in addressing or resolving the original problem.
Young goes on to suggest that the factors that channel such behavior may be
endogenous, exogenous, or a combination of both. Endogenous factors relate
to the regime itself, including the internal mechanisms for achieving
compliance. In contrast, exogenous factors relate to a range of factors such as
the introduction of new technologies or a re-configuration of power in
international society.
Compliance goes beyond implementation. Compliance refers to whether
countries adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the implementing
measures that they have instituted.
As Jacobson and Brown Weiss comment;
Measuring compliance is more difficult than measuring implementation. It involves
assessing the extent to which governments follow through an the steps that they have
taken to implement international accords. In the end assessing the extent of compliance is
a matter of judgement (1994:3).
Compliance has several dimensions: procedural, such as the requirement to
report; substantive, such as the obligation to cease or control an activity; and a
broad normative framework within which these obligations are located, that
is, the spirit of the treaty (Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1994:3). Young (1994)
and Chayes and Chayes (1995), appear to concur with this breakdown of the
elements of compliance identified by Jacobson and Brown Weiss.
Compliance is related to, but not identical with, effectiveness. Countries may
be in compliance with a treaty, but they may not be effective in attaining their
objectives of addressing the problems they were intended to address. For
example, a country may comply with a treaty requirement to cease
international trade in ivory which could effectively stop the ivory trade, but
it may have little impact on the decimation of elephant herds (Jacobson and
Brown Weiss, 1994:3).
In their recent work on compliance with international regulatory
agreements, Chayes and Chayes (1995:2) argue that the traditional model of
treaty compliance with its analytical focus on nation states and its emphasis
on coercive economic or military enforcement measures to sanction
violations, is politically costly and rarely works as countries are reluctant to
invoke such measures against each other. In fact even where international
agreements have "teeth", that is, sanctions, they are seldom used. Peer
review and peer pressure or "shaming", are the preferred compliance
strategies of most treaties.
Chayes and Chayes (1995:3) propose an alternative "managerial model" for
achieving compliance with international agreements which is based on the
assumption that most states comply with their international obligations most
of the time. The Chayes' model relies primarily on a cooperative, problem-
solving approach instead of a coercive one. They argue that their approach is
better suited to an increasingly complex and interdependent world where the
negotiation, adoption and implementation of international agreements are at
the center of cooperative regimes by which states seek to regulate major
common problems such as environmental degradation (Chayes and Chayes,
1995:1).
The Chayes' model consists of a number of instruments which taken
together make up a compliance strategy. These are: (i) reporting and data
collection; (ii) verification and monitoring; (iii) instruments of active
management, (capacity building, dispute settlement and the adaptation and
modification of treaty norms including legal norms, and transparency of
institutional decision making); and (iv) policy review and assessment.
Central to the success of this model of compliance, are the tasks performed by
international organizations and NGOs.
There are a number of areas of complementarity between my research and
that of the Chayes'. First, my research, incorporates the concept of treaty
implementation and compliance as a management strategy. In my opinion, it
is this change of emphasis (from a judicial to a management mode) that
distinguishes the stage of treaty implementation in the policy process from
that of treaty negotiation where the focus is on achieving legal or judicial
solutions (treaties) to problems of distributing common pool resources. Not
only does the decision making emphasis in implementation differ from that
of negotiation (membership compliance rather than membership
recruitment), but the operational apparatus differs. Bureaucracies of national
and international civil servants, and domestic and international NGOs,
rather than lawyers and diplomats, dominate treaty implementation.
Implementation is where these organizational actors come into their own
over time, providing the institutional memory of the regime and ensuring
policy continuity.
Second, I also agree with the Chayes' that when it comes to enforcement,
adversarial strategies such as the use of sanctions, have rarely achieved
sustainable outcomes. In fact, they risk exacerbating, rather than alleviating,
implementation problems by aggravating tensions and provoking conflict
among treaty stakeholders.
The Chayes' approach considers a cross-section of international agreements
and it relies heavily on secondary sources. My research differs from the
Chayes' in that it focuses on one category of international regimes (global
environmental conventions), and a specific sub-set of international
organizations (environmental treaty secretariats). In addition, I make
extensive use of primary data collected from personal and telephone
interviews. Thus, the angle of my investigation differs from that of the
Chayes' as do my data sources. I do, however, consider in detail a number of
elements which the Chayes' identify as being crucial to compliance: national
reporting, data collection (and data analysis), performance review and
assessment; national capacity building; working with NGOs to monitor
compliance; and dispute settlement, which I examine from a less judicial
perspective than the Chayes. In spite of these differences, my approach to the
analysis of secretariat tasks will be analogous in many ways to that employed
by the Chayes' in their development of a managerial model of compliance.
In summary, I agree with Young, Chayes and Chayes, and Jacobson and
Brown Weiss, that implementation, performance and compliance are crucial
to any measurement of treaty effectiveness or success. However, my focus
differs in several ways. While the analytical focus of these authors, is on what
they variously term 'international governance systems', 'regimes', and
'institutions', my focus is on the international organizations (IOs), that
manage or administer the implementation of international governance
regimes, systems and institutions.
Finally, I believe that the implementation tasks, the processes used to carry
out these tasks, and the roles performed by environmental treaty secretariats
in environmental governance systems, are crucial to establishing,
maintaining and adapting many of the linkages and interactions among the
various elements that impact on country performance and treaty success.
Servant of the Parties or Agent of Influence? Distinguishing between
Secretariat Activism And Passivity in Task Performance
There are two schools of thought about the impact a secretariat can have on
treaty outcomes. One school argues that secretariats and their executive heads
do the bidding of the parties. The other supports a more activist role, viewing
secretariats as servants of the global community, rather than just as servants
of member countries. The proponents of this more activist view believe that
secretariats are in a position to affect treaty outcomes. Both schools of thought
acknowledge the influence of secretariats in treaty decision making
(Sandford, 1992).
In his analysis of the role of the UN Secretariat in international negotiations,
Young (1967) identified two categories of secretariats, minimalist (passive)
and maximalist (activist). He notes that this categorization describes the
divergence between the two basic theories about the role of the Secretary-
General as the focal point in the UN system (Young, 1967:264 in Sandford,
1992). As Young states, the cornerstone of minimalist theory is the
requirement that the Secretary-General be "politically celibate" and focus on
the internal administration of the organization. He/she should not
endeavour to act independently, nor participate as an equal in policy or
decision making (Young, 1967:266). In this (passive) model, the emphasis is
on efficiency in administration rather than on creativity. As noted by Boyd
(1962), a passive Secretary-General (and secretariat) has little power, conducts
activities behind the scenes, and does not take initiatives when executive
authority might be at stake. In contrast, the hallmarks of a maximalist model
include emphasis on the general executive authority and powers of the
Secretary-General and Secretariat and on the position of the executive in the
UN system as an important, even a co-equal in the organization (Young,
1967:266). In this model the Secretary-General is more than just an
administrator. He/she is acknowledged as an influential leader. As both
Young (1967) and Cox (1969) note, the leadership qualities of the Secretary-
General have a significant effect on the functions of secretariats. The League
of Nations and the UN exemplify the two models - passive and activist - of
international secretariats. (Sandford, 1992)
The legitimacy of the activist Secretary-General derives from the position's
executive authority and power, its structural position in the UN system, high
profile, and acceptability to parties (Young, 1967:264). The activism of many
UN Secretaries-General is mirrored in the activities of and leadership
displayed by, the Executive Heads of other UN agencies and programs. The
entrepreneurial leadership of Mostafa Tolba, the former Executive Director of
UNEP is universally acknowledged as the major driving force behind the
activism of UNEP in the ozone negotiations which culminated in the
Montreal Protocol (Young, 1994). The successful conclusion of Basel, and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also owe much to Tolba's
activism. Thus, the legitimacy criteria of UN Secretariat activism can be
extrapolated to the secretariats of other UN agencies and programs.
The Secretary-General and the secretariat may be better placed to play the role
of intervener or intermediary than most other potential intermediaries
because of the prestige and respect accorded to their suggestions, their unity
and ability to act coherently, their diplomatic skill, and their ability to
coordinate and mobilize action (Young, 1967:119).
Touval (1982:4) defines an intermediary as a 'third party' whose stated
purpose for intervention in an international conflict is to assist in its
abatement or resolution, and whose intervention is accepted by the parties to
the conflict. However, Touval challenges Young's concept of intervener
"impartiality" (1989:4), preferring the notion of "acceptability" by the parties
as a prerequisite for successful intervention. Acceptability acknowledges that
intermediaries or interveners do not have to be perceived as impartial to be
acceptable to the parties, nor to be effective in conflict resolution. The use of
the good offices or mediation of the UN Secretary-General and the UN
Secretariat in over 100 disputes indicates the acceptability of a secretariat as an
intermediary (Susskind and Babbitt, 1992). A passive secretariat would
neither have undertaken such activities, nor have made such a positive
contribution to world order.
Global Environmental Treaty Secretariats
The roles and tasks of the Secretaries-General or Executive Heads of global
convention secretariats and their organizations, are comparable with those of
the UN Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat on which they are
modelled. All are international organizations which operate within the
context of the larger UN general system. This applies to the secretariats of
trade, human rights, and security conventions, as well as to those of
environmental agreements.
Irrespective of the category of secretariat, activist or passive, all global
environmental treaty secretariats perform policy implementation tasks.
While there may be structural, operational and leadership differences among
secretariats, there are nevertheless, two types of implementation tasks and
responsibilities which are common to all. They are: core tasks and
substantive tasks. The former I take to mean those administrative support
tasks formally identified in the original treaty text. Substantive tasks I take to
mean, those tasks assigned to, or acquired by, a secretariat as a result of
decisions and resolutions of the parties subsequent to the signing of the
original text.
My use of the term "core tasks" will apply to tasks such as preparing agendas
and documentation for meetings of the parties and the distribution of
information and reports as directed by the parties. Substantive tasks will be
used to describe tasks such as overseeing national reporting, data analysis,
and performance review; assisting developing countries with national
capacity building; and working with NGOs to monitor compliance.
If secretariats were to be identified as either activist or passive solely on the
basis of their performance of their core tasks, then most would be deemed
'servants of the parties' rather than 'agents of influence', as core
administrative tasks tend to be narrowly circumscribed with little leeway for
creativity or initiative. An organization which is perceived by itself and
others to be a 'servant of the parties', tends to get cast in a reactive rather than
a proactive role.
The nature of the relationship between the secretariat and its parties, and the
parties' perceptions of the secretariat's roles and tasks is crucial here. For
example, Secretariat A may be directly controlled by its parties which actively
discourage or stifle its initiative and creativity, even though the secretariat's
suggested initiative(s) might assist the treaty to achieve its objectives in a
more cost-effective way. Secretariat B on the other hand faces no such
obstacles to exercising organizational and policy initiative. Instead, its parties
and may actively encourage it to suggest ways in which they might improve
their performance and meet their treaty obligations. Of my case studies,
CCAMLR is considered an example of the former, and CITES an example of
the latter.
The manner in which a secretariat carries out (or does not carry out) its
substantive tasks, determines to a significant extent whether it is activist or a
passive. This then determines the extent to which the organization has an
impact on treaty outcomes. Positive impacts change stakeholder behavior to
facilitate the achievement of treaty objectives. Negative impacts impede this
process.
Secretariats use implementation tasks and processes to exert influence. This
is most apparent in the ways in which they carry out their substantive, rather
than their core, tasks. Substantive tasks are more open to interpretation than
core tasks, and so they offer greater scope for the organization to display
initiative in its task performance in influencing members' behavior and
decision making.
Why should a secretariat seek to exert influence if it is not the ultimate
decision making entity in the system? It is in a secretariat's organizational
interests to ensure that it is assigned or acquires a range of treaty
implementation tasks so that is has a legitimate mandate (tasks) and the tools
(resources) to survive and to adapt to changing circumstances. It is thus in
the organization's interests to ensure that treaty implementation proceeds as
smoothly as possible so as to acquire the necessary resources to achieve this.
Treaty survival means organizational survival as secretariats are dependent
on their treaty members for resource allocation.
Interorganizational Theory
My second set of theoretical constructs derives from interorganizational
theory and network management. Interorganizational theory has its origins
in several disciplines, in particular network analysis, organization theory and
strategic management. Mandell (1990: 34) comments, the study of networks is
not new and has roots in anthropology, social psychology, and sociology
(Tichy, 1984). Mandell goes on to say that the application of this concept to the
study of interorganizational relations, is however, a relatively recent
phenomenon (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Friend, 1981; and Sterm, 1979). To
a public policy practitioner, the interdisciplinary connection between
networks, interorganizational relations and intergovernmental management
practices seems perfectly obvious as it reflects what actually happens in the
policy practitioners world. However, this perspective is not evident in the
conventional literature.
Networks
The concept of networks, their interactions and their management is the
primary building block of interorganizational theory.
The interorganizational field relates to the characteristics or patterns of networks as a
whole (Warren, 1967). The focus is on the structure of the interaction of the actors, rather
than on the constraints of the boundaries of the interorganizational network. The concept
of the interorganizational field thus points to the centrality of the interaction processes
within the network. The emphasis is on the ability to manage relations within a system
of organizations. Network analysis is used to examine the structure and patterning of
network relations as a way to identify both their causes and consequences (Mandell, 1990:
34).
Aldrich and Whetten (1981:388), view networks as populations of
organizations loosely joined, hierarchically differentiated, adaptive in ways
that preserve network structures, and integrated by their ties to lynch-pin
organizations. They note that lynch-pin organizations have extensive and
overlapping ties to different parts of a network and play the key role in
integrating a population of organizations. They are the nodes through which
a network is loosely joined. Secretariats are the lynch-pin organizations in an
international treaty network.
The CITES Secretariat as the lynch-pin organization or node of the CITES
network links CITES member governments; non-member states with an
interest in what CITES does; IGOs such as IUCN; environmental NGOs such
as WWF and the Humane Society; trade organizations from a multitude of
product and trade sectors as diverse as elephants, crocodiles, birds, plants and
invertebrates; UNEP as CITES' UN partner organization; scientific experts
throughout the world; media outlets; and national and international
bureaucrats (including other treaty secretariats) who are responsible for
implementing the convention at both the national and the international
level.
Each of these organizations in a treaty network is, in turn, linked to a body of
constituents and their organizational and individual networks. Some of
these networks are formal, others are informal. Collectively these networks
constitute a formidable web of contacts and interactions for the CITES
Secretariat, as they do for any secretariat.
While the focus in the literature is primarily on formal organizational
networks, my research has discovered that the professional and personal
informal networks of individuals are perhaps more important than formal
organizational networks.
Three functions of lynch-pin organizations are particularly important. They
serve as communication channels among organizations; they may provide
general services linking third parties to one another by transferring resources,
information, or clients; and, if they are dominant or high-status
organizations, they may serve as models to be imitated by other
organisations, or they may use the dependence of other organizations on
themselves to direct actively the behaviour of action-sets (Baumgartner et.al.,
1976 in Aldrich and Whetten, 1981:390). Action-sets are groups of
organizations which form a temporary alliance for a limited purpose
(Aldrich and Whetten, 1981: 387). Secretariat alliances with NGOs are
examples of action-sets. More will be said about these alliances in Chapter 7.
Networks and Public Policy
I support Hanf and O'Toole's (1992:163) explanation of interorganizational
networks as vehicles for carrying out policy programs as it speaks directly to
public policy implementation. These authors comment, and I agree, that
policy implementation 'on the ground', has been neglected in policy network
analysis. They maintain that the focus of network analysis has been on the
relationship between actors, and the context within which actors engage in
the formulation (as distinct from the implementation) of public policy. It is,
however, surprising to me, that Hanf and O'Toole seem oblivious to the
existence of the large body of public policy implementation literature in the
USA.
Hanf and O'Toole use network analysis to describe the interactions of actors
involved in policy formulation, as well as to characterize intergovernmental
relations. They then apply these insights to the management of the structures
through which this policy is implemented, management being the link
between research on policy formulation and research on policy
implementation. This seems to parallel Mandell's (1990) argument in
support of network management as the link between strategy formulation
and strategy implementation.
Hanf and O'Toole's work is premised on what they see as a crisis in
governance in the US domestic sector and the problem of 'steering'
(managing) complex systems of interorganizational relations. They argue that
the complexity of the policy environment now requires the involvement of
numerous substantive specialities (disciplines) as the rate of growth in
knowledge continually accelerates. This complexity is further exacerbated as
the links among specialties become necessarily more dense, while the degree
of differentiation implied by hyper-specialization continues to rise. Hanf and
O'Toole suggest that this then raises questions about the need to rethink the
role of government and the way in which it goes about its business. They
further suggest that these phenomena require a redefinition of the concept
and difficulties of 'government steering', in the interorganizational nature of
the politico-administrative world (Hanf and O'Toole, 1992:166).
Even though Hanf and O'Toole's research is based on US domestic policy
experiences, it translates comfortably to the international policy
implementation arena. Both the domestic and international public policy
arenas are experiencing discomfort with major changes in network
complexity, interdependence, rapidly increasing knowledge and
specialization, and dense linkages of policy networks. If anything, the
interorganizational networks of the international policy field are even more
numerous, dense and complex to manage than their US equivalents.
The major problems experienced by the parties to the FCCC in late 1997 in
trying to negotiate a global protocol for agreed targets and timetables for GHG
emissions at CoP 3 in Kyoto are a stark reminder of the difficulties of
managing recalcitrant countries such as Australia and complex, international
networks.
In response to this scenario, Hanf and O'Toole (1992:166) suggest that if policy
action is to be successful it must be multilateral and it inevitably will involve
a variety of actors and units, both public and private, that have differing
perspectives, interests, and levels of influence. For. example, in an
environmental treaty context, different actors - governments, NGOs and
scientific experts - possess different pieces of information, represent different
interests and pursue different, often conflicting, courses of action.
As policy problems tend to cut across boundaries of specializations and
jurisdictions, the ability of individual decision units to achieve their own
objectives will increasingly depend not only on their own choices and actions
but also on those of others. It therefore make sense that "effective problem-
solving systems will typically involve participants from different decision
levels and from a variety of functionally specialized units" (Hanf and
O'Toole, 1992:166). This is certainly true in international public policy
networks.
The value of interorganizational theory in international policy
implementation is that it draws attention to the linkages between the
individual and organizational units responsible for implementation on a
global scale.
However the question for international public policy remains: the policies
are formulated and the implementation structures are in place, but are
effective action and compliance emerging? To answer this question we need
to look at the characteristics of networks and interorganizational relations as
the unit of analysis, and then examine interorganizational relations in terms
of their effect on policy outcomes.
Characteristics Of Networks
In identifying the characteristics of networks, Mandell (1990:35) draws from
Porter and Warner's study (1979) of "implementation structures" which, to
quote Mandell (1990:35), "examines some of the unique characteristics
managers must confront when trying to implement programs within a
network of organizations."
These characteristics provide the basis for the study of the strategic
management of in interorganizational networks. The characteristics of all
networks are:
(i) An array of public and private actors as members of organizations: actors
are usually members of separate organizations, but whole organizations are
not usually involved. Representatives of Australia's federal environment
department, Environment Australia, WWF Oceania, and Wildlife
Management International P/L, a trading company, are all involved in CITES
implementation activities in Australia.
(ii) A variety of goals and objectives: actors and organizations have a variety
of goals and objectives. These are not always compatible. Interests and
incentives also vary among organizations. Environment Australia is the
CITES management agency in Australia to ensure that the government
fulfils its CITES obligations; WWF Oceania assists Environment Australia in
monitoring national reporting in compliance with CITES requirements;
while Wildlife Management International trades in CITES-approved species
for which it has identified an international market and has a CITES export
permit. One of its export commodities is crocodile skins.
(iii) Program-oriented actors: actors are rationally oriented and view
resources in terms of mobilization strategies. The successful implementation
of Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR all depend on the ability of their secretariats
and other actors - notably national bureaucrats - to make rational decisions
based on objective criteria and to mobilize the political, financial and
organizational resources required to implement the convention. They argue
that rationality is the only way to overcome the subjective elements such as
differing values and emotions, that impinge on treaty decision making and
which are manifest in the tension between the habitat preservation and
commercial development supporters in the CITES camp.
(iv) Dominance of professional values: traditional hierarchical relations
which focus on authority are less important than the values, ethics and
beliefs of professionals which dominate behaviour. These views of Mandell's
encompass what Haas (1990; 1992) calls 'epistemic communities'. More is said
about 'epistemic' communities in Chapter 7, and in Chapter 6 I discuss the
significance of Weber's (1962) notion of a 'calling' as it applies to the
professional personnel of environmental treaty secretariats.
It is certainly true that scientific, legal economic and other professionals
dominate the substance of many environmental conventions. However,
formal power in the form of national governments, has the final say in
decision making.
(v) Groups of actors and subgroups of actors perform specialized roles and the
coordination of roles varies within implementation networks. Fisheries
scientists and ornithologists are two groups of CCAMLR scientists which
occupy distinctly different specialist niches. However, although their roles are
highly specialized, their activities and outputs are coordinated in the context
of achieving a common outcome for CCAMLR.
(vi) Membership in several implementation structures: organizations in a
task environment belong more to one implementation structure than to
others. The primary allegiance of secretariat personnel on contract or
secondment from their home base, be it a national government or
environmental NGO, is to their 10, even though they retain a substantive
position in their home organization. For environmental NGOs, even though
they might publicly and actively support CITES objectives, their primary
loyalty is to their NGO which may not always agree with measures taken by
CITES. It seems that several NGO representatives were individually opposed
to the way their organizations promoted the dismissal of the CITES Secretary-
General in 1989, but these individuals as representatives of their NGO, were
bound to publicly support the organization's position in the CoP. (Pers.
Coms. NGOs, 1995).
Although these six characteristics apply to all interorganizational networks,
not all networks are structured alike. Understanding the structural
differences is the first step to being able to develop a revised model of
strategic management in interorganizational networks (Mandell, 1990:36).
Network Structures
Mandell (1990:36) notes that structural arrangements in interorganizaional
networks lead to different types of interdependencies. For example, networks
may be arranged along vertical, horizontal or voluntary lines, and these
differing structural interdependencies have an impact on the performance of
the network.
However, Mandell's typology of vertical, horizontal or voluntary network
structures does not adequately explain the complexity and interrelatedness
across and among the state and non-state actors and the many levels of
government which make up an international treaty network. An
international treaty system resembles a web, rather than the more linear
arrangement of network structures suggested by Mandell.
Organizational linkages and interactions are generally readily visible in
formal networks. In contrast, informal networks are difficult to identify and
track unless the researcher goes to an individual level of interaction where
evidence is largely anecdotal - thick description (Geertz, 1973), spontaneous
stories (Mouritzen, 1990) and narrative policy analysis (Roe, 1994). My
research appears to indicate that informal networks are significant factors in
the effective management of international policy networks.
Policy Implementation as Network Management
Network management is a form of interorganizational management.
According to Hanf and O'Toole (1992), network analysis focuses on the
structure and process through which joint action is organized and managed.
Networks are thus viewed as management processes and linkages through
which actors in polycentric settings try to 'direct' policy implementation or
problem-solving. An actor as a network manager, has to build, maintain, and
change the multi-unit network. Functions such as 'fixing' (Bardach, 1974),
facilitation (O'Toole, 1986), the 'multilateral brokerage role' (Mandell, 1988;
1990) or 'steering' (Hanf and O'Toole, 1992), best describe the primary
functions of network managers of interorganizational networks.
Network management is the essentially a problem of cooperation, how to
obtain it, how to maintain it, and what constrains it. Cooperation is obtained
largely by inducements such as the exchange of resources and information,
and the ability to build lasting cooperation depends on: policy characteristics,
inter-organizational structure, information and problem-solving (Hanf and
O'Toole, 1992:172). Policies determine the actors and their relationships with
one another. Managers can manipulate policy linkages among actors to
increase coordination and cooperation or to reduce it. The structure of
interorganizational interdependencies helps to determine the loci of power
in a system, as well as the likelihood of bargaining as a network management
strategy. The polycentric structure of an interorganizational networks
requires a problem-solving capacity within the network. This highlights the
importance of the network manager's role as a facilitator or intermediary.
Information and its management are crucial variables. Interorganizational
settings provide plenty of opportunities to influence the perceptions and the
flow of information. Those managing or steering a network can play an
important role in this by articulating, recording and enforcing commitments
across organizational boundaries and by respecting confidences and averting
unnecessary embarrassments, thereby raising the overall degree of trust in
the setting. They may also change perceptions that may inhibit
implementation; they can time the use of information in such a way as to
maximize its chances of success- or failure- and they can adjust the flow of
information to encourage the perception of shared interest (Hanf and
O'Toole, 1992: 173).
Secretariats as network mangers use information in all the ways described by
Hanf and O'Toole to direct treaty implementation. They also act as
intermediaries and facilitators in problem-solving; use negotiation and
bargaining as their primary network management and coordination tools;
and use, the interorganizational linkages within and between formal and
informal treaty networks to achieve policy objectives.
The problem for international policy implementation as a network
management strategy is one of combining 'action areas' in decision situations
which are characterized by chains of formal and informal action from the
CoP down to the local community level. This involves not only linking
levels of government and administration, but also the 'assembling' of the
public and private actors required for joint action at any level of government
(Hanf and O'Toole, 1992: 174). To deal with this, Hanf and O'Toole suggest
that the 'bottom-up' approach to implementation captures the reality of
managing policy implementation networks from the level of the individual
through to the 'top'. In this study, the 'top' is the CoP.
Interestingly, coming as they do from the 'public
management/administration school', at no point do Hanf and O'Toole (1992)
acknowledge the extensive research on approaches to implementation,
including the 'bottom-up' approach, that has been undertaken by scholars of
public policy implementation such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973),
Bardach (1974), Elmore (1979) and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989), except for
a passing reference to the role of 'fixer' (Bardach, 1974) as mentioned
previously.
The value of interorganizational theory as an analytical framework for my
implementation research, is that it links all levels of an implementation
network from the individual in a local community through to the CoP. This
spread of actors from the local to the international level, gives some idea of
the range, diversity and complexity of the interactions and linkages that an
international treaty secretariat has to coordinate and manage. The
relationship between the individuals who form a network and the
organizational entities to which they belong, is central to the notion of
'implementation structure' as originally developed by Hjern and Porter
(1981). Hjern and Porter go on to argue, and I agree, that the group dynamics
of the individuals representing organizations are as important as the
strategies of organizations per se to the analysis of institutional linkages
among the different relevant actors. To my mind, this is where
interorganizational theory comes into its own. That is not to say that
individuals act as totally free spirits within the network. Rather, they act as
representatives of organizations. Kaufman (1986:16) in Hanf and O'Toole
(1992) has this to say about organizational representatives:
Insofar as persons interact as representatives of organizations there will always be three
frames of reference operating in the mind of the actor: the frame of reference of the
individual actor as a person; the frame of reference of the organizations he is
representing; and the frame of reference of the interaction he is participating in.
As Hanf and O'Toole say, the advantage of the network concept is that it
enables us to stress the interrelatedness and interdependencies, the linkages,
between separate actors without assuming that these are integrated around a
set of common objectives as implied by the systems concept. Having said this,
they go on to point out that there seems to be a qualitative but gradual
distinction between those actors who are linked in a goal directed activity and
those who, out of a concern for their own self interest, follow these activities
either defensively or in a supportive manner. Stakeholders in international
conventions belong to both groups of actors, although some degree of
commitment to joint action, as demonstrated in the legal obligations that
accompany the ratification of convention, is a minimum precondition for
inclusion.
In summary, the findings from my previous research on secretariats
(Sandford,1992; 1994; 1996) certainly indicated the need for an analytical
framework that had the capacity to pick up actors at all levels of
implementation, the interactions and the history of the interactions, among
them. From the interviews I had conducted it was apparent that the
organizational success of a global environmental treaty secretariat depended
to a significant degree on the relationships its personnel formed with
individuals, as well as with organizations, both within the formal boundaries
of the treaty system and beyond. Secretariat relations with members of other
relevant networks such as the networks of non-state actors and domestic
policy actors, were seen to be significant factors in secretariat success and
organizational survival.
It was also clear from these interviews that although there might be a formal
policy structure or network in place, that did not mean that implementation
proceeded smoothly. It appeared to me that it was largely the actions and
initiatives of secretariats acting as network managers and brokers that were
the glue that held the disparate pieces of the implementation puzzle together
and helped the treaty progress towards compliance
Network Management Constraints
Network management is not smooth sailing. Network managers face a range
of constraints or obstacles which they must overcome to be considered
successful as organizational performers in assisting treaty members to
achieve policy implementation and compliance objectives.
Mandell (1990) cites three categories of constraints confronting network
managers m interorganizational networks. They are: compatibility of
network members; the environment for resource mobilization; and the
social and political environment of the network.
According to Mandell (1990:37), the primary problem for the strategic
management of an interorganizational network, is how to meet an
overriding interorganizational goal (or set of goals) while at the same time
allowing each organization (government) in the network to also meet its
own interorganizational goals. The first step is to establish a basis for
agreement. In the context of an international agreement, the treaty text
provides the basis for agreement of members to an underlying theme
otherwise known as the "megagoal", for example, the wise use of wetlands.
The network management problem then is how to deal with the problem of
achieving this megagoal goal. The key is for managers to develop and/or
encourage the members (and other relevant stakeholders) to develop a
process or series of processes whereby the members can negotiate their way
towards the megagoal.
Public policy implementation is thus an ongoing negotiation and
renegotiation process and trade-offs between means and ends are part of the
negotiations. Policy implementation is a dynamic process, and while there
may be no clearly defined end-point as such, all actors are expected to strive
towards achieving the convention objectives, the megagoal.
Managers in interorganizational networks rely on what Porter and Warner
(1979) cite as the importance of values, ethics and beliefs, and the smooth
running of the network depends on the degree of congruence between
members of the network. In turn, the value of congruence in any one
network depends on the degree to which trust and respect can be established
among members of the network. Where there is polarization and
fragmentation among network members, management is obviously more
difficult than when there is a greater degree of congruity.
The less the degree of value congruence in a treaty system, the greater the
likelihood of conflict, and the greater the need for strategies and processes to
prevent, minimize and resolve value and other differences in the interests of
achieving the megagoal. Value differences are perhaps most clearly
demonstrated in conventions such as the FCCC where there are major
differences between groups of members, in particular between the developing
and developed countries over the issue of global warming and regulations
for the control of greenhouse gas emissions.
Interorganizational theory also highlights the importance of the roles of
individuals in network management.
Since it is not usually total organizations, but strategic members within organizations,
that are involved in an interorganizational networks, individual relationships become a
critical component of network management. The establishment of relations is based m
professional relations within a total system of management networks of which managers
are members (Wright 1983).
Significant relationships among individuals are formed when the
individuals representing organizations or parts of organizations in the policy
network interact during implementation. Most often these interactions form
among the boundary-spanners in each organizations who, over time,
frequently establish both professional and personal relationships based on
trust, respect and mutual confidence in carrying out their tasks as boundary-
spanners. As my research found, it is not uncommon for relationships
among key individuals (as distinct from organizations) which start out as
mutually advantageous professional relationships, to be transformed over
time, into more personal relationships as trust develops among individuals
working together towards a common objective.
It is through interactions such as these that 'bargaining arenas' are created
(Pressman, 1975). However agreements reached through these bargaining
arenas are often tempered by the degree to which members have access to
needed resources (national capacity) Mandell (1990;40). Porter and Warner
(1979) refer to this as the resource mobilization environment.
The second network management constraint identified by Mandell (1990) is
the resource mobilization environment. Members of an interorganizational
network identify resources within a total field, and within this field members
develop strategies to mobilize resources. According to Mandell (1990:40),
Porter and Warner found that public administrators build a "gestalt" (or
understanding) as to which tasks will be performed by which organization
and from where the resources will be drawn. This "gestalt" is a personal
understanding or consensus by the leaders in an interorganizational
network. Since resources are generally scarce, members must rely on their
ability to influence others to obtain these resources. Effective network
management therefore relies on members' ability to influence others in
horizontal as well as in vertical or hierarchical relationships. To accomplish
this members will need to build pockets of commitment both within and
outside the network.
In treaty networks, secretariats build pockets of commitment via alliances for
mutual gains with state and non-state actors. To build relationships,
commitment and support for additional organizational resources, secretariats
use the bargaining arenas formed when assisting nations with capacity
building, and when managing implementation tensions and conflicts.
The third constraint Mandell identifies is the social and political
environment. Of major importance in studies of interorganizational
networks is the idea that power is derived both from the internal network
structure and the external linkages of network organizations. This is
highlighted by Benson (1975) where he describes interorganizational
networks as a "political economies". According to Benson (1975:233),
organizations in an interorganizational network gain power in two ways.
One is through the" centrality" of their functions to the network (that is,
their control of resources) The second is through the linkages of
organizations to a larger pattern of social organizations.
In relation to treaty networks, I have difficulty with Benson's equation of
power with functional centrality and control of resources. A secretariat's
functions and institutional position are definitely central to the network but
a secretariat does not have control over its resources, at least not formally.
However, to take up Benson's second point, secretariats endeavour to
compensate for this formal lack of power by developing formal and informal
linkages (alliances) with stakeholders, and by controlling and managing
communication and information flows. My research suggests that these
management strategies are fairly successful as sources of de facto power and
influence.
As Mandell (1990) notes, Benson's work points to the ability of an
organization to build pockets of internal and/or external support which can
have a major impact on the control of the network by one dominant member
or group of members, such as a wealthy member country; a developed
country bloc (G7; or a developing country bloc (G77). Since each member is
relatively autonomous/independent of all others, building these pockets of
commitment (or alliances) can be a major determinant of effective network
management. However they can also led to major areas of conflict.
Patterns of conflict are an essential feature of a network and a major
constraint of network management (Mandell 1990). Conflict among
organisations is seen as an inevitable outcome of the interdependencies
among them (Asseal, 1969; Brown, 1983 in Mandell, 1990; and Buntz and
Radin, 1983). As Buntz and Radin argue, the inevitability of conflict means
that it must be "actively managed", but this is not necessarily an obstacle.
Buntz and Radin are of the opinion that it is more valuable for managers to
view conflict as having positive or constructive outcomes, than it is, for
them to focus on the existence of conflict as an obstacle or as an indicator of
implementation failure.
According to Mandell (1990), recent articles on both conflict management and
interorganization studies focus on the more positive aspects of conflict. She
comments that numerous authors have demonstrated that a model based on
bargaining and negotiation has been useful in managing relations in the US
domestic intergovernmental arena (for example, Calista, 1986; O'Toole and
O'Toole, 1981; Richman, White, and Wilkinson, 1986; in Mandell, 1990). The
key idea of the bargaining model is that all parties need not agree, but the
network is maintained because all parties agree that is mutually beneficial to
maintain it. The focus is on trade-offs, compromises and coalition building
(Mandell, 1990:42).
This approach contrasts with the more negative focus of the legal negotiation
and dispute resolution literature which views conflict and disputes as
negative situations which must be resolved. I believe that the contrast of
these two approaches to the framing of 'conflicts' is instructive for network
managers, as the way in which a problem is framed will determine an
organization's 'conflict management mindset' and its approach to the
management and resolution of network conflicts and disputes. Consequently
it is better for network managers to anticipate and accept patterns of conflict
as a fact of interorganizational life and manage strategically with this in
mind.
Comparing Network Management Constraints
The managerial constraints identified by Mandell correspond fairly well with
the constraints on IOs identified in the international relations literature and
in my earlier studies (Sandford, 1992;1994; 1996). The six categories of
secretariat constraints that I have identified are: political constraints; financial
constraints; availability of resources; social and cultural considerations;
organizational loyalties and leadership; and implementation conflicts.
Implementation conflicts occur between and among member countries;
between members, IGOs and NGOs; in-country disagreements between
governments and domestic NGOs; and, in-country competition for resources
and policy priorities among national bureaucracies each of which claims
responsibility for implementation at the domestic level.
Mandell's three categories of network management constraints (member
compatibility, resource mobilization and social and political environment)
approximate those I have identified. However, in this study I use my
classification of organizational constraints, as they are more precise; they
have been developed from empirical research and field-tested in global treaty
network; and they appear inclusive of Mandell's key points.
My reasons for this decision are as follows. First, in the case of treaty
networks we need to consider the term 'member' more broadly than the
formal term as it is used in the treaty text where it refers to the member
governments of states which have ratified a convention. In a network
management, 'member' also includes non-state actors (in addition to
member governments) whose cooperation is essential for effective
implementation.
Second, my field research, revealed two significant types of resource
mobilization constraints - financial constraints, and organizational capacity
and management constraints. This breakdown more directly reflects the sorts
of problems faced by secretariats in meeting their responsibilities.
Organizational capacity includes the availability of administrative resources
such as personnel, time and technology.
Third, Mandell's 'social and political environment' is too broad a grouping
for my purposes. Mandell's term could presumably include what I have
identified as: social and cultural constraints (internal and external diversity);
implementation conflicts; and political constraints.
Finally, at no stage does Mandell (1990) appear to consider internal
organizational factors such as organizational loyalties to be a potential
problem. I presume this is because her interorganizational focus is just that,
inter (not intra) organizational. Yet an individual's loyalty to her/his
organization may be a factor in task and role performance, particularly where
that individual is a boundary-spanner. Problems with an organization's
leadership, or lack of leadership, may also act as constraints on its
performance.
Network Management and International Conventions
Network management is a way to manage change and to change stakeholder
behavior. To assess the influence or the policy effect of the actions of a
network manager, we must be able to determine the nature of this effect;
whether the effect is positive or negative; and to what extent it has an impact
on implementation outcomes. That is, we need to determine that the
behavior of actors in a given network has changed as the result of specific
network management strategies adopted or actions taken by the network
manager.
In the absence of studies and documentation on the network management
strategies of international convention secretariats, primary data collected
from personal and telephone interviews with a range of actors in each
network provides the empirical data needed to substantiate my contention
that secretariats as network managers are more influential than most
governments and scholars believe. Attempts were also made to corroborate
primary data using paper trails of convention recommendations and
resolutions. Paper trails included the resolutions and recommendations of
Standing Committees and CoPs, many of which are now available on the
internet. However, evidence of negative or critical incidents and reports
relating to secretariats was more difficult to obtain than expected. This is
discussed in Chapter 7.
In this context, my analysis concentrates on the operational problems of
managing strategically in a structurally complex interorganizational setting,
and on the network management role of the activist or multilateral broker
(MLB).
There are two basic implications of this approach for secretariats (adapted
from Mandell,1990).
First, network management implies the need for the manager of a network to
actively manage interdependencies (Buntz and Radin, 1983) rather than
adopting a laissez faire approach to management. We therefore need to
modify intraorganizational management ideas about the ways in which
organizations use strategic management to establish control over their
environment, as the ability and skills required to effectively manage a 'field'
of organizations, differ substantially from those required to manage within
an organization.
Second, the linkage between strategy formulation (treaty negotiation) and
strategy implementation (treaty implementation) is less clear when
managing in an interorganizational network. Unlike the intraorganizational
perspective, a manager's ability to correctly analyse the environment, in and
of itself, will not be the overriding determinant of whether her or his
strategies will prove effective. Instead, the strategic management processes of
mobilizating stakeholder behavior and marshalling organizational resources
in order to first create a more viable environment, will dominate behaviour
in an interorganizational network
Managing Conflict as a Constraint
Finally, to illustrate network management in action in an international
setting, I shall describe the conflict management and dispute resolution
approaches of secretariats acting as passive and activist network managers,
fixers, brokers or multilateral brokers in interorganizational networks. As
noted above by Mandell (1990) and Buntz and Radin (1983), patterns of
conflict are inevitable obstacles to effective network management and they
need to be 'actively managed'. My previous research appeared to indicate that
secretariat approaches to conflict management reflected their organizational
'conflict management mindset' and their attitude to their role as a network
manager. That is, their approach to managing network conflicts, acted as a
barometer of secretariat activism or passivity and the extent to which an
organization was prepared to use initiative and to take risks to manage and
resolve network conflicts in order to secure treaty objectives, and to establish
and maintain its organizational authority and power in the network.
Activist secretariats consciously and strategically use what they regard as
network management strategies, diplomatic processes and skills, to avoid,
defuse and resolve tensions that emerge among stakeholders. In this capacity
they perform the role of multilateral broker, activist broker or intermediary.
So, when an activist secretariat or its representatives acts as a broker or
intermediary to manage patterns of conflicts and resolve disputes in a treaty
network, it is also actively managing its network to overcome the potentially
negative impacts of conflicts as interorganizational network constraints.
In contrast, passive secretariats such as CCAMLR are far less likely to
demonstrate initiative in taking up conflict management strategies. Instead,
passive secretariats tend to stick to conservative and approved network
management practices which focus on the performance of their core tasks
such as servicing meetings of the parties and preparing documentation as
requested.
PART 2: APPLYING THE THEORY
In this section I review Jonsson's (1986) framework as a starting point for
explaining network structure and performance in complex multilateral
networks. I chose Jonsson's model as it seemed to be the most appropriate
interorganizational framework for my purposes and it had been field tested
in an international issue-area. Its limitations proved to be its inability to deal
with detail when it came to determining precisely how lynch-pin
organizations such as secretariats actually dealt with the constraints they
encountered in managing their networks and how they exerted influence.
The limitations of Jonsson's model are further examined in Chapter 8.
Understanding and Applying Jonsson's Framework (1986)
Jonsson's framework (1986:39) emphasises the pivotal role of what Jonsson
and other European scholars call 'linking-pin organizations' (known in the
US as 'lynch-pin organizations'), and what he calls 'boundary-role occupants'
(known in the US as 'boundary spanners)', within international
organizations in transnational networks. In this study I shall use the terms
'lynch-pin organization' and 'boundary-spanners'. Jonsson then identifies a
set of issue-specific and organization-specific factors which he asserts account
for variance in network structure and performance.
The populations of organizations of interest to Jonsson are known in
international relations literature as issue-area networks. In the context of my
study, an issue-area is a field of interest or concern to a population or set of
organizations-national, subnational and international. International
aviation, wetlands of international importance, Antarctic marine living
resources, global climate change, and the conservation of global biodiversity
are all issue-areas. It is possible, at least theoretically, to identify a set of
organizations or interorganizational networks which tend to become
involved in the preparation, making and implementation of decisions
within an issue-area, and which maintain direct or indirect links with each
other (Jonsson, 1986:43). Jonsson refers to this set of organizations as a
potential network. The part of the network that becomes operative in the
handling of a specific issue, he labels a mobilized network. Jonsson's
acknowledges that this conception parallels Hjern and Porter's (1981) notion
of 'implementation structures' which were discussed in Part 1.
My study focused on mobilized networks, issue-areas bounded by the formal
legal arrangements of an international convention. International agreements
or conventions, are considered to be mobilized networks, that is,
governments have agreed to mobilize their resources and to commit to
taking positive action in relation to a specific issue of international concern
or interest. CITES members are committed to taking action to control and
manage the international illegal trade in endangered species; Ramsar
members have agreed to conserve and wisely use, wetlands of international
importance; and CCAMLR members are united by their objective to conserve
Antarctic marine living resources. Where there have been expressions of
general concern, but no or very little organized activity (mobilization), these
issue-areas remain potential, as distinct from mobilized, networks. The
protection and sustainable management of global forests is an issue of
international concern, but countries remain unable to agree on the form that
a legal agreement and mobilization might take.
As Jonsson notes (1986), networks are constructs created by researchers to
guide analysis and "interorganizational networks are identified by tracking
down all of the ties binding organizations in a population defined and
explicitly bound by an investigator" (Aldrich, 1979,:324 in Jonsson, 1986:41).
Transnational networks, like other networks, are made up of actors and
relationships or transactions.
Actors in a transnational system such as an international convention include
both public and private organizations, and the individuals who act as
boundary-spanners at the interfaces of these organizations where they link
the organization with its environment. As Jonsson (1986:41) comments:
National and organizational networks typically include both private and public
organizations and therefore have to operate concurrently in markets and hierarchies. In
other words, network analysis encompasses entities which are usually studied in
separate analytical frameworks (Hernes, 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981). This applies, a
fortiori, to transnational organizational networks where national networks of private
and public organizations constitute subsystems, and where intergovernmental as well as
non-governmental international organizations (IGOs and NGOs) typically participate.
It is one thing to identify the organizations that make up a network.
However, where organizational theory and international relations literature
are deficient in analysing the influence of organizations on international
policy outcomes, is that they persist in using the organization and the nation
state as units of analysis, even though scholars such as Cox (1969), and Young
(1991) note that leadership and individuals as organizational leaders, can
have a significant impact on organizational success and failure.
Interorganizational theory, on the other hand, recognizes that individuals as
well as organizations can play a significant and influential role in an
interorganizational network; that individuals are in fact the 'stuff' that
organizations are made of; and that in their capacity as organizational
members or representatives, individuals perform tasks which have an effect
or impact on the consumers of those tasks. As Jonsson (1986:41) comments,
participants in networks are not organizations in their entirety but they
occupy certain roles in their constituent organizations:
....... We should not forget that organizations, as such, do not interact with the
environment. Individuals do the interacting, and they do it within a greater or less
detailed framework of role demands, role expectations, role conflicts, and resultant role
stress. (Jonsson, 1986:41 quoting Organ, 1971:80)
The interface between organizations consists of what Jonsson calls 'boundary-
role' occupants (boundary-spanners). Jonsson suggests that boundary-role
occupants, are typically susceptible to a high degree of role conflict. They often
get caught in the cross-fire between divergent role expectations of their own
organization and those of other organizations, as well as between varying
role conceptions of their own constituents. As 'activist brokers' between their
own organization and its environment, boundary-spanners must represent
not only the organization to the environment, but also represent the
environment to their own constituents. They are therefore more likely to be
aware of the inadequacies of their organization and to become agents of
change.
In relation to boundary-spanners and secretariats, Jonsson says the following:
Boundary-role occupants may be found at various levels of national organizational
structures. In international organizations they are typically found within the
secretariat. National and international boundary spanners alike are predominantly
bureaucrats......Boundary roles do not necessarily follow formal positions, and boundary-
role occupants constitute only a fractions of national administrative units and
international secretariats (1986:42).
Network management is about managing change and in a multilateral treaty
system network management it is carried out primarily by the boundary-
spanning personnel of secretariats including the executive head, scientific,
legal and other expert (professional) personnel, and key executive support
personnel such as the administrator/funding manager of the secretariat, and
public relations personnel.
Those forms of communication known as bargaining, negotiation, and
coalition building are the lifeblood of all IOs. IO survival depends on an
organization's ability to communicate effectively under pressure in a myriad
of forms, with diverse and often difficult stakeholders, on issues of great
complexity and in conditions of uncertainty and change.
As Jonsson notes,
One important source of interdependence [among actors in a network] is the fact that
transnational networks normally consist of formally autonomous organizations with
diffuse accountability and division of responsibility rather than hierarchically ordered
organizations with fixed accountability...... Therefore decision making as well as
implementation typically requires the participation and coordination of several
organizations at both the international and the national level. As a result... bargaining
and coalition between participant organizations are prevalent processes in transnational
networks...... (1986:42)
It should not be forgotten that when we talk of 'organizational survival'
what we really mean is that the survival and growth of an organization,
especially a lynch-pin organization, depends on the skills of its personnel,
notably the communication skills of those personnel in boundary-spanning
roles. While responsibility for an organization's communication with its
environment rests primarily with its executive head and professional
officers, in small organizational units such as environmental treaty
secretariats, an intraorganizational emphasis on multiskilling means that
administrative and public relations staff also need to have excellent
communication skills as they interact regularly with stakeholders. In fact they
often stand-in for professional personnel when professional personnel are
absent from the office on missions. This is usually an informal in-house
practice to overcome resource constraints associated with personnel
shortages. However it works to good effect in many resource-poor
organizations, and there are always professional personnel on hand to assist,
if necessary.
Lynch-Pin Organizations
The concept of lynch-pin or linking-pin organizations is central to the study
of interorganizational networks.
Linking-pin organizations that have extensive and overlapping ties to different parts of
a network play the key role in integrating a population of organizations. Having ties to
more than one action- set or subsystem, linking-pin organizations are the nodes through
which a network is loosely joined. (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981:390) in Jonsson, 1986).
As Jonsson (1986:43) goes on to say, lynch-pin organizations occupy central
positions in terms of being reachable from, and able to reach, most of other
organizations in the network. Thus, lynch-pin organizations may serve as
communication channels between organizations in the networks, may link
third parties to one another, and may actively direct behaviour of other
organizations or coalitions. In short, lynch-pin organizations tend to occupy
broker roles in networks (Aldrich, 1982:288-91 in Jonsson, 1986). This concept
is akin to Mandell's concept of the network manager's multilateral brokerage
role.
As both Mandell and Jonsson point out, the position of the lynch-pin
organization and network manager are seldom based entirely on formal
authority but rest in large measure on their ability to manipulate network
characteristics by mobilizing coalitions around specific issues or marshalling
behavior to support or change the treaty norms. Jonsson goes on to say, that
lynch-pin organizations seem to face the same dilemma as 'unauthorized
mediators' in international negotiations. Their ability to serve as impartial
brokers is often complicated by their obvious self-interest in the issues under
deliberation, making other actors uncertain whether their interests are being
mediated or manipulated. However, a qualification is warranted here. As
Susskind and Babbitt (1992) found, a degree of organizational or party self-
interest is expected. It is more a case of finding someone the parties believe
can assist them. As I found, in many cases that 'someone' is the secretariat.
Applying Jonsson's Framework
Jonsson identifies two sets of background factors which he argues account for
variance in network structure and performance, specifically the ability of the
boundary-spanners of an organization to assume and maintain a lynch-pin
position and use the network to influence other actors. In the first instance
Jonsson distinguishes between issue-specific (treaty specific) and
organization-specific (secretariat specific) explanatory factors. Issue-specific
factors include both issue- area and regime characteristics.
Jonsson identifies four issue-specific factors: issue-area; issue-structure; issue-
setting; and regime;
Issue-area. It is a common assumption in public policy and foreign policy
studies that different types of issues evoke different sets of behavior. Public
administration and 10 literature suggest that issue-areas or policy arenas, can
be distinguished according to their technical complexity. The more
technically complex the issue-area, the more potential leverage national or
international administrative units are expected to have by virtue of their
technical expertise. 10 literature further notes that international secretariats
are not allowed to play a significant role in issue-areas which touch upon
'high politics' and involve, directly or indirectly, state security (Jonsson,
1986:44).
Issue-structure. This is a concept used by Keohane and Nye (1977) to denote
the distribution of capabilities among different actors in a specific issue-area.
Jonsson (1986:44) found this a useful concept, specifically the degree of
concentration and polarization of issue-specific capabilities among state actors
(hegemonic, polar or fragmented issue-structure), as it seemed relevant to the
possibility of international organisations assuming lynch-pin positions.
Hegemonic and polar issue-area structures, where issue-capabilities are
concentrated in one or a few states, can be expected to allow less room for
manoeuvre by international organizations than fragmented ones (Cox,
1969:229 in Jonsson, 1986:44).
Issue-setting (which approximates issue-framing in the US policy context),
denotes the environment in which a specific issue evolves. IOs are typically
forums for discussion, negotiation, bargaining, conflict management and
dispute resolution efforts.
From the viewpoint of a prospective linking-pin organization, it obviously makes a
difference whether the issue involves-and is dealt with in-pluralistic open or
authoritarian closed societies. The ability of an international organization's boundary
role occupants to reach into, bring to bear within, a given country depends on access to-and
intelligence concerning-influential domestic groups; in other words, it implies a pluralist
polity (Jonsson 1986:44).
He goes on to quote Cox (1969:230): "the prospects of system change through
the agency of international organizations and their executive heads would
seem to be linked with the progress of pluralism in polities"
As I discuss in Chapter 7, these comments are pertinent to my findings that
the extent and nature of in-country (domestic) penetration by international
treaty secretariats, ostensibly in pursuit of treaty implementation objectives,
is more substantial and more varied than scholars and governments
recognize. However, different network management strategies are used in
different political systems. In the pluralist systems of the Western, developed
country, democratic mould, secretariat in-country penetration is achieved
primarily by using long-standing, formal and informal collegial networks of
national and international bureaucrats, and informal networks of scientists,
NGO and industry representatives. In developing countries, or countries
with less open or less stable political regimes, and fewer or less well
organized non-state networks, domestic capacity building as a legitimate
secretariat activity is a useful vehicle for these organizations to achieve treaty
compliance objectives while informally monitoring national performance,
and building relationships within a particular country. Capacity building is
generally perceived by the recipient country and by the secretariat as a
positive (and acceptably intrusive) task, as distinct from a critical analysis of
national performance reports by the secretariat. For IOs, the positive
relationships which develop when they assist countries with capacity
building, are a very useful organizational survival tool. A secretariat can,
informally, seek the voting support of a recipient country to obtain additional
organizational resources to carry out its capacity building tasks.
Regime. The definition of an international regime has been attempted by
numerous scholars of international relations including Krasner (1983);
Keohane and Nye (1977); Haas (1990); Young (1989); and now Jonsson (1986)
as: 'principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which
actor expectations converge in a given issue-area". Regimes vary with respect
to explicitness, adherence, and stability. In general, an explicit regime such as
an international environmental convention, is based on written legal
documents, which designate a specific organization as the central decision
making forum or even the regime caretaker. A regime which is adhered to by
a large majority of states and which remains relatively stable, appears to
maximize the potential for that particular organization to effectively assume
a lynch-pin position. However, the worst kind of regime from the viewpoint
of a prospective lynch-pin organization, is probably an explicit, stable and
widely adhered to regime which does not bestow any significant role upon its
lynch-pin organization (Jonsson, 1986:45)
To sum up. I find Jonsson' explanation of lynch-pin organizations confusing.
It is not clear whether he is referring to secretariats or to CoPs in his
comments about the advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of
regimes for lynch-pin organizations. Both secretariats and CoPs are, in
practice, lynch-pin organizations. However they have very different
responsibilities, authority and power, and presumably the effects on each of
different kinds of regimes would also differ.
Aldrich and Whetten (1981: 398) identified several network variables They
are: density, loosely joined relations, reachability, distance, hierarchy and
centrality. These concepts were adapted by Jonsson (1986:450) who describes
them as organization-specific variables or background factors which account
for variance in network characteristics and performance. Jonsson then goes
on to identify five organization-specific factors which he claims impact on
secretariat performance. They are: reachability; mobility; conspicuousness;
constituents; and leadership.
Reachability. In network analysis this term refers to the direct or indirect path
between two elements (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981:398). In order to assume
an effective lynch-pin position, an organization needs to have a location in
the issue-specific network which allows it to reach, and be reached by, other
important organizational actors. The more direct and indirect, formal and
informal links an organization has with its treaty actors, the more these
linkages and relationships can be expected to enhance ..leverage of the
prospective lynch-pin organization (Aldrich, 1979: 336). For example, treaty
secretariats use their position as a lynch-pin organizations, task performance,
and their roles as boundary-spanners to increase their reachability and thus
their leverage. The question for researchers is: How can 'reachability' be
measured ?
Mobility. Distance in terms of costs of transportation and communication is
normally considered an environmental constraint on organizational action.
In times of resource shortages, organizational travel budgets are the first
budget items to be cut. The extent to which an organization is able to
overcome this constraint and to 'be present' at the deliberation of other actors
through either personal travelling (missions) or communication media
(telephonic and electronic media such as e.mail or fax ), is of obvious
significance in its ability to assume a lynch-pin position. To overcome
distance and mobility constraints, contemporary secretariats make extensive
use of electronic media to obtain the information required for reporting and
monitoring. CCAMLR is reliant on satellite surveillance systems to obtain
fisheries management data to supplement the fishing logs maintained by the
skippers of individual vessels. Logs are notoriously unreliable and entries are
frequently falsified.
However, the question that remains for researchers is: How to benchmark
'mobility' ?
Conspicuousness. The brokerage role of a lynch-pin organization is facilitated
by a relatively low profile, quiet diplomacy and persuasion rather than a
confrontational stance. A high profile (conspicuous) organization, which
attracts a lot of public interest and media coverage and is a matter of
controversy, seems less equipped for a lynch-pin position. Parties do not want
a high profile secretariat. They are concerned that if their secretariat were
perceived to be more successful than they in dealing with conflict, it would
undermine their glory and would threaten the parties' individual and
collective sense of power and authority as the decision makers of the system.
For a resource-dependent organization to assume a high public profile it
must be confident that it has the support of powerful allies in the network.
Once again, Jonsson's criterion leaves a question. In this instance: How does a
researcher measure 'conspicuousness'?
Constituents. As Jonsson notes, the balance of capabilities between the
boundary-spanners of an organization and their constituents is another factor
of importance. An organization's dependence on funds from its constituents
can give those constituents predominant influence at the expense of
boundary-spanners. It is also a common notion that international secretariats
may derive influence from their technical expertise. McLaren (1980)
concludes that since the constituents (governments and government
agencies) of these organizations share technical expertise and maintain a
monopoly of political expertise, they will normally not allow the
international secretariat to play a political role. However, and as mentioned
in Chapter 1, McLaren's research emphasis was on the intraorganizational
workings of the large secretariats of UN programs whose growth poses a
potential threat to governments. In contrast, although all of the treaty
secretariats I studied are small cells of expertise, they frequently play key
political roles in treaty implementation.
Leadership. Strong leadership is often considered the key to the leverage of
an international secretariat (Cox, 1969; Young, 1991). In addition, for a
prospective lynch-pin organization it appears important that boundary-
spanners occupy the most central rather than the peripheral positions within
that organization. Again, Jonsson, Cox, and Young are referring to large IOs.
In the smaller treaty secretariats, boundary-spanners are less likely to be
marginalized as there is less of a distinction between central and peripheral
personnel. The reasons for this relative lack of differentiation appear to relate
to organizational size and the need in a small organization for everyone to
contribute as and where they can.
In summing up, (Jonsson, 1986:46) reminds us that these organization-
specific categories are obviously interrelated, and they refer to access
(reachability, mobility), style (conspicuousness), and resources (constituents,
leadership) of the boundary-role occupants of an organization.
Some of the difficulties of applying Jonsson's framework to my three case
studies Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR are evident in Table 1. At first glance, it
appears that all three conventions exhibit a high degree of technical
complexity and low politics; second, there appears to be a low degree of
polarization in each network and power is fragmented; each secretariat is
allotted a specific role; and finally, the network environments are primarily
pluralist polities.
Table 1:
Network Structure and Performance of Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR Secretariats (after
Jonsson, 1986):
Variance Factors Environmental Convention Secretariats
Ramsar CITES CCAMLR
Issue-Specific Factors
1. Issue-area
Degree of:
i. Technical Complexity High Tech High Tech High Tech
ii. High/low politics Low/EHigh LowAHigh Low/EHigh
2. Regime
Degree of:
i. Explicitness explicit explicit explicit
ii. Adherence formally "high" formally "high" formally "high"
iii. Stability stable stable stable
iv. Role allotted to significant significant significant
organization
3. Issue-structure
Concentration of power:
i. Hegemonic on specific issues on specific issues on specific issues
ii. Polarized on specific issues on specific issues on specific issues
iii. Fragmented generally generally generally
fragmented fragmented fragmented
4. Issue-setting
i. Pluralist polity
ii. Authoritarian polity 1
Organization-Specific
Factors
1. Access
i. Reachability Multiplex links Multiplex links Multiplex links
ii. Mobility High Presence High Presence Low presence
2. Management Style
i. Conspicuousness Low LowEHigh Low
3. Resource
i. Constituents Asymetric Asymetric Asymetric
distribution distribution distribution
ii. Leadership
Central position Central position Central position
However, I have some comments to make on the limitations of Jonsson's
framework as it might apply to international environmental conventions.
First, most environmental treaties are technically complex with science and
science-policy playing a key role in decision making to manage the global
commons. While these treaties/issue-areas are currently 'low' politics in that
they rarely touch on security issues, in the years ahead it is highly probable
that their status will change as environmental security moves up the
political agenda. The escalating issue of global and regional water shortages in
Asia and Africa could well see the CCD move from an area of relatively low
technical complexity and 'low' politics into the area of 'high' politics. When
this happens, network management will become even more of a challenge
for its secretariat, a challenge it should anticipate and for which it should
plan.
Adherence is a difficult construct to measure for environmental treaties. If
adherence means an official low level of non-compliance, then
environmental treaties will always come in at the upper end of the
adherence/compliance scale for the reasons discussed in Part 1, that is,
'shaming' , rather than formal disciplinary action such as sanctions, is the
preferred way of dealing with violations.
Using Jonsson's model, it appears that the issue-structures of my case study
conventions could be classified as 'generally fragmented'. However, this is
not a consistent reflection of their status which can fluctuate over time
depending on the conflicts they are trying to manage. For example, when
CITES members debate conflicts such as harvesting ivory, and the FCCC
debates targets and timetables for GHG emission reductions, these regimes
often become polarized or hegemonic for the period of the conflict, with
polarization along G7/G77 lines in the case of the FCCC, and concentrated in
accordance with hegemonic capabilities in the case of CITES.
The issue-settings of member states vary considerably in many
environmental treaty regimes. The international treaty as a developed
country concept which emerged from the European legal tradition,
presupposes that Western-style democracy will dominate in international
treaty systems. International conventions appear to be couched with these
norms in mind. Since World War 11, the world has seen the dismembering
of colonial regimes and more recently the end of the Cold War. It has also
seen an influx of the resulting 'new' nation states into the UN system. Many
of these 'new' states do not subscribe to European-style democracy and
operate along more authoritarian political lines. So, environmental treaty
regimes are now a mix of pluralist and authoritarian polities, as these states
seek to join older treaties such as CITES and Ramsar as well as more recent
ones such as the FCCC, CBD, CCD, Basel and even CCAMLR which is very
much a specialist treaty with a regional focus although it is open for global
membership. The mix of polities means that secretariats must be versatile
network managers and use different strategic approaches to performing their
tasks depending on the nature of a member's polity.
I found the organization-specific factors of Jonsson's framework more useful
than his issue-specific factors, for examining the variables likely to impact on
secretariat performance. It correlates well with the findings from my
fieldwork. See Chapter 7. For example, looking at the secretariats of my three
case studies it is clear that: the organizations have multiplex links with key
actors; they maintain a 'high' presence at the deliberations of other actors by
going on missions and through informal talks; their management styles are
generally 'low profile'; there is an asymmetric distribution of political
expertise in favor of boundary-spanners who can capitalize on the
organizational memory, networks and expertise of the secretariat: and, the
boundary-spanners occupy central positions in the secretariats.
Having now identified the key variables which are likely to affect the
performance of secretariats as lynch-pin organizations in the political
landscape of a multilateral network, what, if anything, is missing from
Jonsson's framework, and what does this tell us about how secretariats
manage their networks?
What Jonsson's framework still does not tell us, is how secretariats go about
managing their networks and what roles do they perform in doing so.
Understanding and Applying Mouritzen's Roles
In this section I describe the 10 roles identified by Mouritzen (1990) as they
might apply to my case studies. Secretariats perform multiple roles in
fulfilling their organizational responsibilities in treaty implementation. As
Mouritzen (1990) emphasises, some of the roles may occur in all phases of the
decision making process, that is, in the preparation, decision, and
implementation phases. Comparable role constellations have been identified
by Weiss (1975); McLaren (1980); and Jonsson (1986;1993). I have selected (and
adapted) those identified by Mouritzen (1990) as they appeared to most
realistically approximate the roles already identified by my previous research
(Sandford, 1994). However, as my research found and as I analyse in Chapter
8, Mouritzen's role classifications are not without their limitations.
Adapting Mouritzen (1990:14-22), I identified two categories or constellations
of roles - political and substantive (Mourtizen's equivalent term is
'substantial') roles - which are performed by secretariats in assisting parties
with global treaty implementation.
Political Roles
Bridge-building roles
Bridge-building roles are harmonizing roles. When secretariats perform as
bridge-builders, they are usually seeking to build harmony among the
frequently diverging interests of the actors in a convention system. According
to Mouritzen, bridge-building roles include:
Conflict preventer. This role aims to prevent disharmony (conflicts,
disagreements) from arising. As Mouritzen notes, conflict prevention also
encompasses actions in favour of specific convention policies or, negatively,
against views that might threaten convention consensus. His findings were
that the majority of secretariat bridge-building activities are directed towards
member parties. However, secretariats may also seek to influence certain
domestic political interests or parties in the 'correct' direction. Such
intervention may technically violate the treaty system's rules (member
states' sovereignty), but it can be done in a discreet fashion (Mouritzen,
1990:15; Sandford, 1996). Secretariat rationale for such action is that by
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undertaking initiatives such as these, they are often able to prevent
governments from being pushed into conflicts for domestic political reasons,
and that their initiatives assist countries to meet their treaty responsibilities.
Passive or active mediator. Once prevention has failed and a conflict has
become manifest as a dispute (though not necessarily to the public), a
secretariat may be approached to act as an intermediary in disagreements
among the parties. Less frequently, a secretariat may be called upon
informally to assist a party with a conflict which occurs within a country, as
between NGOs and a government on a specific implementation issue.
According to Mouritzen, passive and active mediation occur in all three of
the decision-making phases - preparation, the decision phase, and
implementation.
According to Mouritzen, 'passive mediation' implies that a compromise is
suggested by the ICS to the contending parties which is close to a weighted
average of their initial positions. 'Active mediation' is described by
Mouritzen as, mediation combined with initiative. Here, a secretariat
proposes its own independent ideas for the management and solution of a
conflict/disagreement. These ideas are not designed to be a weighted average
of the parties' initial position. Instead the ideas can be based on the
secretariat's conception of the treaty system's 'objective' common interests.
In his words,
Being an active mediator requires a stronger imagination, expertise, or authority in
broader terms, than passive mediation.... Whereas active mediation requires a certain
prior authority an the part of the mediator, it will also, if successful, further enhance
this authority (prestige) and, hence, influence capability of the ICS (Mouritzen 1990:15-
16).
Communication facilitator. The communication facilitator brings together
contending parties and/or passes information between them for the purpose
of bridge building (Young, 1967 in Mouritzen 1990:17). It is a very common
role for secretariats to play.
Boundary Guardian
The role of boundary guardian is essentially an organizational maintenance
and survival role. Expansion, or at least maintenance, of an organization's
boundaries, is a means to ensure an organization's growth (size), both in
terms of personnel and in terms of resources in broader terms (task
expansion or maintenance) (Mouritzen 1990:17). As Downs (1967:264)
explains in Mouritzen: "The expansion of any organization normally
provides its leaders with increased power, income, and prestige: hence, they
encourage its growth ...Growth tends to reduce internal conflicts in an
organization."
Downs' comments relate specifically to national organizations, however
Mouritzen goes on to argue that there is no reason to suppose that these
tendencies should not also be widespread in the ICS, at least to some extent.
He then adds that unlike the secretariat roles directed towards substantial
values and to a lesser extent bridge-building roles, the role of boundary
guardian is likely to be wholly self-designed. Mouritzen adds that it is always
difficult to decide whether overt task expansion can be ascribed to conscious
boundary maintenance, or to exogenous factors (or both).
Instrument for Powerful Treaty Member (-group)
James (1976:85-87) in Mouritzen (1990), describes IOs (and hence ICSs and
secretariats) as 'depositories of legitimacy'. This means that they can borrow
legitimacy from being part of a treaty system or acting as its agent in the name
of a treaty system or its decision-making components. The more
controversial the measures, the more eagerly this kind of borrowed
legitimacy will be needed and sought by the IO.
Here a secretariat is used as a tool to serve the general policies of a powerful
treaty member (or group of members), through instruction, anticipated
reaction, or identification. In this capacity, a secretariat's autonomy is
negligible or zero (Mouritzen, 1990).
Mouritzen cites the difficulties that this a role poses for a supposedly
impartial body such as a secretariat when it is perceived by some interests in
the system as being biased in favour of, or against, other stakeholders with
different interests or priorities. In the late 1980s the CITES Secretariat was
criticised by some environmental protection interests in the convention as
being pro-trade. They argued that the CITES Secretariat supported the
industry position on harvesting ivory, and was thus in opposition to the
protection of elephants and the objectives of the convention which prohibit
illegal trade in endangered species of wild fauna, of which the elephant is
one. More will be said about this issue in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Weiss (1986) in Mouritzen (1990:19), also described the dilemma between the
instrument role and that of mediator that the UNCTAD secretariat faced
when its ICS was perceived to be a loyal supporter of the G77 in the North-
South dialogue. As Weiss commented the secretariat continuously vacillated
between being a 'prophet' for development thinking and issues, almost
always taking the side of G77 thinking, while on the other hand, it sought to
be an active and non-partisan broker for negotiations attempting to find the
middle ground for compromise required by developed countries.
However, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that a secretariat
can combine an instrument role on certain questions/issues, with an
autonomous role on another issue. There may also be differences in role
application among the individuals (in particular the boundary-spanning
personnel) who make up the staffing profile of a secretariat.
Substantial Roles
According to Mouritzen (1990), 'substantial' roles are a means of realizing the
treaty's (and the secretariat's), 'substantial' values. If carried out successfully,
these roles can be instrumental in enhancing secretariat prestige, and what he
describes as its own political values of organizational survival, autonomy
and influence capability. For example, the CITES Secretariat performs a
variety of 'substantial' roles to assist CITES members to regulate
international trade in specimens of species of wild fauna and flora. While the
'substantial' roles performed by the Ramsar Bureau are to ensure the
sustainable management of wetlands of international importance. Mouritzen
identifies the following IOs 'substantial roles': treaty identity supporter;
initiator; operator/controller/observer; expert/coordinator; and treaty
representative vis-a-vis non- members.
Treaty Identity Supporter
The purpose of this role is to safeguard the treaty values through a public
relations effort for these values (that is, the treaty's raison d'8tre), including
information dissemination activities in treaty member countries on behalf of
the treaty. Mouritzen suggests that if successful, this should deprive member
governments of 'domestic arguments' for not being enthusiastic treaty
supporters.
The identity supporter role may be carried out by the public relations arm of a
secretariat and by its professional officers and its executive head acting as
boundary-spanners, when they undertake official duties and when they
travel on missions to member and non-member countries. It can be likened
to 'flying the treaty flag'. The fact that secretariat personnel are employed by
the parties collectively serves to underpin the organization's identity as a
supporter of the treaty.
The role of treaty identity supporter and that of conflict preventer are closely
related and both also imply a degree of penetration of the domestic political
systems of member countries which many governments would argue
encroaches on their sovereignty or their national autonomy. It also requires
almost as a necessary precondition, that these political systems are reasonably
pluralistic. This latter point is made by Jonsson (1986).
Initiator
In the role of initiator, the secretariat proposes its own ideas to promote the
substantial values of the convention to member countries' representatives in
the CoPs and various committee such as the Standing Committee; Scientific,
Technical, and Implementation Committees. Mouritzen comments that as
with active mediation, this role requires a considerable amount of creativity,
expertise, or authority by ICSs. As mentioned previously, the CITES
Secretariat is a good example of an activist secretariat whose personnel have
initiated a number of innovative programs to facilitate the implementation
of treaty objectives. The initiation of a joint government-community caiman
conservation project in Venezuela is such an example. See Chapter 6. (Pers.
Com. CITES. 1995).
Other examples include: prescriptions and recommendations of
implementation guidelines for a process that will normally be accepted by
members (Ramsar wetlands management guidelines); the initiation of
agenda setting for meetings, including the identification and collection of
'relevant' information and background material for meetings, such as
writing reports and the invitation of experts to the meetings. Mouritzen
comments that in all these circumstances, the occupation of the Chairman's
post (by the IO) in relevant committees will be a crucial advantage.
In my view, Mouritzen's comments about initiation are closely related to the
role of active mediator, for instance, a meeting agenda may come out of an
active mediation effort by a secretariat representative acting as the chair of the
meeting.
Operator / Controller/ Observer
Operator. Fieldwork in connection with the implementation of assistance
projects in developing countries is an example of an operative role. For
example, Ramsar Bureau missions to Central American countries provide
expert technical, on-ground advice on wetland management projects.
Controller. Where member countries themselves are responsible for
implementing common decisions (as is the case with most environmental
treaties), a Secretariat may function as a controller, that is, it would control
the carrying out of implementation in accordance with treaty aims, decisions,
and procedures. An example of a secretariat with a controlling role is the
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspection of NPT compliance
in member countries.
Environmental treaty secretariats are unlikely to perform controlling roles in
treaty implementation as they have no enforcement authority. However they
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certainly act as advisers on treaty requirements such implementation,
monitoring and compliance processes and procedures.
Observer. Observation occurs when a secretariat simply registers national
implementation, without the willingness or ability to interfere, even if the
implementation is seen to be unsatisfactory. According to Mouritzen
(1990:21), observation is the most common implementation role for an IO
which is then impotent to follow up many CoP resolutions. The CCAMLR
Secretariat's practice of ship-board observations of catch quotas is such an
example.
Expert! Co-Coordinator
Expert. The majority of the professional personnel of environmental treaty
secretariats are employed for their particular expertise which is seen as critical
to protecting and implementing the substantial values of the treaty.
Secretariat expertise typically frequently encompasses the fields of science,
law, policy, administration and economics. As professional experts,
secretariat personnel provide expert scientific and legal advice to member
countries, and they provide independent advice on the design of
implementation processes. The development of wise use plans for wetlands
by the Ramsar Bureau is an example of the latter.
Coordinator. Coordination refers to a particular type of expertise, the aim of
which is to avoid inconsistencies (standardization) and duplication of
activities. All secretariats act as network coordinators to differing degrees and
in different ways depending on the issue-area, the treaty culture, and the role
allocation of the secretariat.
Treaty representative vis-a-vis non-members
A secretariat may be allowed by its members, to represent the treaty vis- a v is
non- members. This only happens in very limited areas, or when a secretariat
is already powerful. For example, a secretariat may be permitted to discuss
treaty objectives and requirements and to conduct exploratory talks with non-
members in an attempt to encourage them to join. Such activity would
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usually be closely overseen by the treaty members via the standing
committee.
Table 2:
Application of Mouritzen's (1990) Roles to Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR Secretariats
Secretariat Roles Environmental Convention Secretariats
Ramsar CITES CCAMLR
POLITICAL ROLES
1. Bridge-building
a. Conflict Preventor
b. Passive/Activist Mediator Passive Activist Nil role
c. Communication Facilitator
2. Boundary Guardian
3. Instrument for Powerful
Treaty member (-group) X X
SUBSTANTIAL ROLES
1. Treaty Identity Supporter
2. Initiator very limited
3. Operator/Controller/Observer operator operator operator
4. Expert/Coordinator expert and expert and expert and
coordinator coordinator coordinator
5. Treaty Representative vis-a-vis
non-members '1 1
I am not aware of any other detailed studies of the roles of secretariat
personnel, and in this respect Mouritzen's role classifications were a helpful
starting point. That they were based on empirical data from interviews with
international civil servants and national delegates was seen initially as an
advantage, as one would hope they had a 'real world' flavour. However, as
with the other scholars of IOs such as Jonsson, Mouritzen concentrated on
large United Nations IOs, in this case NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) as the basis for constructing a general 'issue- area model' to
account for the roles and influence of international civil servants. Like
Jonsson, Mouritzen also does not address the 'nitty gritty' of how secretariats,
acting in these roles, influence policy outcomes, and in particular how they
deal with the interorganizational constraints they face including the
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management of conflicts. Nor does he distinguish between formal and
informal roles and activities carried out by IOs, nor which of the roles are
considered the most effective in terms of organizational performance.
Mouritzen's roles are not, however, mutually exclusive. A secretariat can
perform different roles in relation to different implementation issues and
within one and the same issue. By playing one or more roles, the secretariat
contributes to the modification of actors' behavior. It exerts influence. The
more roles played, the more influence is likely to be exerted, and certain roles
exert more influence than others. For example, all boundary-spanners
perform a wide range of roles, and 'active mediation' is more likely to change
stakeholder behavior than 'passive mediation'. I found that in practice, the
role classifications used by Mouritzen were excessively specialized and that to
apply Mouritzen's classifications to small secretariats where role demarcation
among personnel to the extent suggested by Mouritzen is a luxury, was totally
impractical. I say more about this in Chapter 8.
In many respects Mouritzen's role classification clusters correlate with the
multilateral brokerage clusters identified by Mandell. Mandell (1990:45)
proposes that network managers acting as multilateral brokers mediate the
coordination of a network by facilitating/assisting the linking of its
structures, actors and interactions in the achievement of agreed collective
objectives while not relinquishing, necessarily, individual organizational
objectives. She suggests that the role of broker ranges along a continuum of
shared power depending on the needs presented by the context of the
network in which the manger is operating. At one end is the role of orchestra
leader, a benevolent autocrat, and the orchestra/network basically follows the
directives of the leader. At the other end is the laissez-faire leader she calls a
mediator who merely ensures that two unrelated parties are able to
consummate a transaction. At the center is the role of participative or
democratic leader, the producer. In this role the leader plays a more active
part as a result of having a stake in the outcome. However, this leader cannot
achieve the outcome alone. The producer tries to ensure that all parties are
happy with the process and will continue to support it, and the product must
do this without stepping on the toes of important participants.
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I find Mandell's clusters too simplistic for my purposes. Her activist/passive
roles are insufficiently developed; they seem to refer to the mediated
coordination of a limited number of parties (see above paragraph); they are
untried in an international context; and they are not based on empirical data,
which in my experience is essential in this field of research. They do
however, corroborate Jonsson's, Mouritzen's and my own findings that
network managers, in this case secretariats, perform a range of network
management and brokerage roles on an activist/passive continuum.
The challenge for me now is do I, and if so how do I, adapt and apply these
insights to an analysis of the roles of global environmental treaty secretariats
in a way that will advance the theoretical frontier while at the same time
giving a realistic picture of secretariat policy practice.
Summary
In Part 1 of this chapter I discussed the theoretical constructs which underpin
my examination of secretariat tasks, roles and influence. The first set of
constructs: implementation, performance, effectiveness, activist and passive
secretariats, comes from the disciplinary streams of political science and
international law. The second set of constructs, interorganizational theory
and network management are relative newcomers theoretically (if not
practically) speaking. These interdisciplinary concepts are used primarily by
social scientists working in the fields of intergovernmental management and
public policy. Interorganizational theory appears to have the most promise as
an interdisciplinary framework, however, unlike the first set of constructs, its
'road testing' in the international arena has been limited to Jonsson's
application to the issue-area of international aviation (1986; 1987), and more
recently AIDS and human rights (1992;1993). As noted, Jonsson's framework
for analysing network structures and the organizational performance of
lynch-pin organizations has its limitations for my purposes as I need to look
more closely at the tasks, processes and roles that secretariats, as lynch-pin
organizations and network managers, use to exert influence in
interorganizational networks.
104
I then considered Mouritzen's classification of ICS roles. His work appears to
provide a very useful starting point for examining in more detail the cluster
of roles that Mandell (1990) calls multilateral brokerage. A major limitation
of Mouritzen's classification system is that it derives from his work on the
organizational roles of large IOs, in particular NATO. As I discussed in
Chapter 1, there are major differences of scale between large UN
organizations and treaty secretariats.
A limitation of Mandell's activist/passive multilateral broker continuum is
that it is does not readily translate to international issue-areas such as the
environment. International environmental treaty networks are complex,
multifaceted webs of actors and interactions rather than the vertical,
horizontal or voluntary network structures described by Mandell (1990) in
her US domestic context. In my opinion, her role clusters do not capture the
multiplicity, diversity and complexity of the roles that I discovered in my
previous field work, and that are described by Mouritzen.
From all of the above theory, I have distilled the following areas of
agreement which I consider are the most important for understanding the
impact of international treaty secretariats. First, treaty secretariats are the
lynch-pin organizations of the treaty system and their boundary-spanning
personnel play key roles in linking the organization with stakeholders in the
formal and informal networks of the system. Second, the primary role of a
secretariat is as the network manager of the treaty system. As network
managers secretariats perform a range of multilateral brokerage roles to
coordinate network structures, actors and interactions and to prevent and
manage the conflicts that inevitably occur over the lifetime of implementing
a treaty. Third, in carrying out their substantive tasks, most notably the three
key tasks which are the focus of my study, secretariats appear to have a
potentially significant impact on public policy implementation processes and
outcomes. How they do this, that is exert influence, becomes clear in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3: SECRETARIAT TASKS: TRANSFORMING THEORY INTO
ACTION
Introduction
Understanding the theoretical concepts I advanced in Chapter 2 is crucial to
understanding how international regimes work and why they are, or are
not, successful. However, I also believe that a fundamental piece of the
international effectiveness puzzle has been overlooked. Namely, a detailed
examination of the tasks and network management practices of treaty
secretariats as the organizations that drive and manage treaty
implementation and compliance. Secretariat tasks serve as legitimate
vehicles for policy implementation and secretariat influence, and the roles
that secretariats perform in carrying out their tasks as either activist or
passive organizations, as well as the processes they use to perform their
tasks, are major determinants of the nature, extent and direction of the
influence exerted by them.
For the purpose of this study as explained in Chapter 2, I have divided
secretariat tasks into two categories, although I recognize that they are not
completely separable. The two essential categories of secretariat tasks are:
core tasks and substantive tasks. Core tasks are the executive support tasks
such as servicing the meetings of the parties which are formally identified in
the text. Substantive tasks are tasks assigned to, or acquired by, a secretariat
subsequent to the original treaty text negotiations. Substantive tasks include
the three key tasks which are the focus of this study.
PART 1: CORE TASKS
A secretariat's core tasks are defined in the original treaty text. Core tasks
tend to be very similar across treaties. They are essentially the routine
administrative tasks undertaken by all international secretariats, be they the
secretariats of arms control, human rights, trade or environmental treaties,
or the secretariats of large UN agencies and programs such as FAO,
UNESCO, and UNEP. Core tasks are performed at regular meetings of the
parties, and between meetings, that is, intersessionally.
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Core tasks identified by Sandford (1994) include: arranging and servicing
meetings of the CoP and other subsidiary bodies; the preparation and
distribution of reports based on information received from the CoP and
subsidiary bodies; the preparation of reports on secretariat implementation
activities for presentation to the CoP; ensuring coordination with relevant
international bodies and NGOs; liaison/communication with relevant
authorities, non-parties, and IOs; the compilation of data/information, for
example, scientific, economic, and social data, and the preparation of
associated reports; and giving policy guidance and advice to the parties.
CITES is the only international environmental treaty secretariat whose core
tasks include the power "to make recommendations for the implementation
of the aims and provisions of the Convention" (Article XII).
Intersessional core activities include: attending to routine correspondence;
organizing the preparation and logistics of regular and extraordinary CoPs
and their subsidiary bodies such as meetings of the finance, scientific and
implementation committees; arranging delegate travel to attend these
meetings; booking conference rooms; and preparing meeting agendas as
instructed by the parties are some of the more mundane but fundamental of
the core tasks.
At meetings of the parties, the professional personnel of the secretariat act as
rapporteurs, and the administrative or general staff attend to the collation
and distribution of documents and briefing papers. Professional and
administrative personnel work closely together to ensure that a meeting
progresses smoothly for the delegates. The core duties of all secretariat
personnel, both at meetings and intersessionally, invariably involve much
behind-the-scenes activity, such as the drafting, translation, printing and
distribution of documents and publications; providing interpreting facilities
for negotiation sessions at all hours of the day and night; and assisting
delegates and other official attendees with their conference needs.
Secretariat staff must be unfailingly diplomatic in performing their tasks,
and in dealing with the host of official and unofficial NGO, media and other
participants, such as international, national and local observers, particularly
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if the treaty has a policy of open access to documentation and to most
plenary sessions, as have Ramsar and CITES. However even the
performance of core tasks can be made more difficult where a convention's
processes and decision making procedures are less transparent those of
Ramsar or CITES, as is the case with CCAMLR.
CCAMLR's policy of 'non-Party' access to documents and attendance at
meetings is unusually restrictive for an international treaty dealing with
environmental matters. CCAMLR Secretariat members suggest that this
attitude to 'outsiders' is historical, CCAMLR having its origins in fisheries
(development) rather than in explicitly environmental concerns, in spite of
its ecosystem management model of implementation. This policy of
observer exclusion appears to have been further compounded by the long-
standing, acrimonious relations between some CCAMLR Parties and several
environmental NGOs, in particular, Greenpeace. CCAMLR's distrust of
environmental NGOs may also have been fuelled by convention-NGO
relationship difficulties experienced by two conventions with which
CCAMLR has very close operational and institutional relations, namely the
AT and the ICRW (1946 International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling,). A significant number of CCAMLR members are also members of
the AT and the ICRW.
As a result of this distrust, gaining access to CCAMLR meetings and
documents is virtually impossible for anyone not part of an official
delegation or a representative of one of only two accredited INGOs, that is,
ASOC (Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition) and IUCN. For example, as
a legitimate researcher with MIT affiliation, I was welcomed as an observer
at the 1996 Ramsar CoP6 and the 1994 CITES CoP9, but in 1995, 1996 and 1997
I was refused admission as an observer to the meetings of both CCAMLR's
Commission and its Scientific Committee - even though my academic and
professional credentials and previous research were well known to US and
Australian delegation members, and to the CCAMLR Secretariat whose
members I had already interviewed at length. In situations such as this, the
CCAMLR Secretariat is repeatedly called on to explain (and defend) the
decisions of its parties. Often, this rejection of interested participants
provokes an adverse reaction and negative media coverage of CCAMLR's
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apparent lack of transparency and effectiveness, and the Secretariat risks
being perceived as a blocking bureaucracy.
There is a distinct commonality among international agreements in terms of
secretariat core tasks. Treaties are legal instruments which build on (learn
from) the experiences of other treaty regimes, that is, they set precedents.
Lessons learned from the experiences of earlier treaties are frequently
incorporated in the texts of subsequent treaties, setting precedents and
expanding the base of core tasks so that the clusters of core tasks in
international environmental agreements negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s
are greater than those contained in the environmental conventions of the
1970s. An example of organizational learning is the inclusion of
recommendatory powers for the CITES Secretariat in the CITES text, a move
which built on the meagre provisions for secretariat operations in its
predecessors Ramsar and WHC.
Similarly, drafting errors can be avoided, and omissions can be corrected.
Major implementation problems created by the omission of dispute
resolution and financial provisions from the Ramsar text, were avoided in
drafting CITES, Basel and the Montreal Protocol, all of which include
provisions for resolving disputes among the members, and provisions to
fund a permanent secretariat and treaty implementation processes.
In general, secretariat core tasks are devoid of opportunities for a secretariat
to display its executive initiative and creativity, or to demonstrate fully, the
professional and specialist abilities of its personnel as scientific, technical,
legal, policy, administrative, and financial experts.
Differences among secretariats become more evident when performance of
their substantive tasks is compared. Not only do the types of substantive
tasks differ among secretariats, but there are marked differences in the ways
in which they carry out these tasks. As discussed previously, secretariat
performance of substantive tasks as passive or activist organizations, exerts
an influence on implementation outcomes. Some secretariats exhibit greater
creativity and initiative than others in carrying out their substantive tasks.
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In this way they exert a potentially greater influence on implementation
processes and outcomes than others.
PART 2: SUBSTANTIVE TASKS
Secretariats do a lot more than just perform administrative support tasks. A
significant proportion of organizational time, budgets and personnel, is
devoted to carrying out substantive tasks such as: data collection and
analysis; overseeing national reporting and performance review and
assessment; assisting developing countries with national capacity building;
and working with NGOs in monitoring compliance. The ways in which
secretariats perform these substantive tasks, differentiate them as being
passive 'servants of the parties', or active 'agents of influence'.
Substantive tasks are the implementation responsibilities which a secretariat
is either formally assigned by the parties through decisions taken, or
resolutions passed, in the meetings of CoPs and subsidiary bodies; or they
may be informally acquired by the secretariat over time as a result of
secretariat activities in pursuit of treaty objectives. That is, the repeated
performance of informally acquired tasks by secretariats, establishes
precedents for the ongoing carriage of such tasks and associated
responsibilities, so that the parties, the secretariat and other stakeholders
such as non-state actors, come to expect that the secretariat will continue to
carry out these informally acquired substantive tasks.
My research (Sandford, 1992;1994;1996) indicates that the main points of
secretariat difference on the passivity/activism continuum are found in the
ways that secretariats undertake their substantive tasks of which the three
identified below are arguably the most crucial. It is these tasks which Young
(1994), Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1994) Chayes and Chayes (1995) concur
constitute the basis of convention effectiveness, by providing both the
substance and the means for carrying out and assessing implementation,
performance and compliance.
I have selected 3 key categories of substantive implementation tasks as the
focus of my research. The significance of these tasks in treaty
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implementation, emerged from my earlier research (Sandford, 1992; 1994;
1996), and is supported by the findings of the above authors. The tasks are:
(1) Overseeing (supervising and managing) those sets of tasks or activities
that are the foundations of treaty implementation. They are: data collection
and analysis (data management); national reporting; review of the
performance of member countries in implementing the convention; and
monitoring compliance.
My earlier research identified data management, national reporting,
monitoring, performance review and assessment, and compliance, as the
central implementation tasks performed by the secretariats of all
international agreements in pursuit of an agreement's ultimate objective of
universal compliance. These tasks also correspond with components of the
Chayes' compliance strategy (Chayes and Chayes, 1995).
(2) Assisting developing countries with national capacity building by
providing expert and other assistance enables these countries to meet their
international treaty obligations .
The extent to which parties meet their implementation obligations and
achieve their agreed implementation objectives, depends largely on their
political commitment, and on their national capacity to effectively carry out
the central implementation tasks identified in (1). A country's failure to
fulfil its treaty obligations may not indicate a refusal to comply, rather, it
may be that it lacks the technology, scientific expertise, financial and
management resources, and/or the institutional infrastructure to
implement the measures necessary to achieve its objectives.
(3) Working with NGOs to monitor members' compliance with treaty
requirements has the potential to ensure a more accurate and reliable
monitoring system and improved treaty compliance.
In the interests of achieving treaty effectiveness and organizational survival,
secretariats have finely honed their networking skills with stakeholders. The
value of these skills is especially evident in the mutually beneficial
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relationships which have grown up between secretariats and convention
NGOs. To illustrate. The CITES Secretariat and WWF/TRAFFIC work
together formally and directly to monitor international trade records, and to
uncover illegal trafficking in prohibited species. The CCAMLR Secretariat
relies on the informal transmission of scientific information and catch data
from Greenpeace to monitor country compliance in the remote Southern
Ocean.
By building cooperative relationships and alliances with international and
domestic non-state actors (both environmental and industry NGOs),
secretariats are better able to keep an eye on country implementation and
compliance in situations where more direct forms of in-country
intervention to detect breaches of treaty requirements would be regarded as
overstepping their organizational mandate and as a challenge to national
autonomy. These relationships also act as a form of resource sharing
between two categories of resource-constrained organizations. The mutually
advantageous nature of secretariat/non-state actor relations is discussed in
detail in Chapter 7.
The following three sections outline the variety of approaches taken by
international secretariats in carrying out the substantive tasks listed above.
In so doing, I shall examine the extent to which the secretariats might be
regarded as passive servants of the parties or activist managers of change and
influence.
National Reporting And Performance Review
Data collection and management, national reporting, and performance
review and assessment are as central to compliance systems in international
regulatory regimes, as they are in domestic regulatory programs. The stated
purpose of reporting is to generate information about the policies and
activities of parties to the treaty that involve treaty compliance and regime
efficacy. As Chayes and Chayes (1995:154) comment:
reporting [my italics] is the point at which national bureaucracies are first engaged by
the treaty regime,-----where domestic officialdom begins to translate the treaty into
the daily work of administration and to define the level of commitment to it. Reporting
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thus can be an early warning system for substantive compliance problems. It identifies
parties that have deficits in domestic capability and similar barriers to compliance. It
turns up problems of ambiguity and interpretation. As with North Korea and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or many of the reporting failures under human rights
agreements, the refusal to report is often the first intimation of serious political
resistance to compliance with basic treaty norms, and it begins the mobilization of
counter pressures.
So, what does a national reporting and performance review system look
like? The most common template of such a system consists of a hierarchical
system of reports, starting with the collection of data and the compilation of
assessments and reports at a subnational level. These are then supplemented
and massaged by domestic government agencies (often with NGO input),
into a national report for submission to the central decision making body of
a treaty, usually via its 10 or secretariat.
The secretariat then reviews the data/information contained in the report
against pre-determined (objective) criteria. These criteria constitute the
baseline for performance review and assessment as agreed by the CoP. If the
secretariat considers that a report is inadequate, it contacts the country
concerned, and secretariat personnel advise their bureaucratic counterparts
in that country what is required to bring country performance (as described
in the report), up to scratch. Secretariat staff then work closely with relevant
NGOs, as well as with national public sector officers, to assist the country to
address and overcome its performance deficiencies.
The public face of reporting criteria is that they are developed by direct
formal negotiation among the parties. In reality, reporting criteria are
usually developed by the secretariat in consultation with their national
bureaucratic counterparts and relevant international and national NGO
stakeholders. Secretariat-NGO consultations may be formal and/or informal
depending on the attitude of the parties to NGO input to treaty policy
matters such as this. Where the parties oppose or resist formal NGO input to
policy development, secretariat-NGO interactions are predominantly
informal, even covert. See Chapter 7.
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When a country fails to respond positively to its secretariat's overtures in
this regard, the secretariat notifies its Standing Committee or the CoP which
decides what action will be taken.
National reports are usually public documents, and are available to be
scrutinized by scientific and other experts, NGOs, and the media. National
reports are published in the proceedings of the CoPs. They form the basis for
review and assessment of a country's implementation performance, and
may be backed-up by missions and site inspections by experts, secretariat
personnel and representatives of member countries, especially where there
is concern about a country's failure or inability to perform, or about possible
violations of the terms of a treaty.
Verification procedures and site inspections are frequently used to assess
performance and compliance in arms control treaties. The data and
information collected in national reports may be verified either by the
decision making body of the convention, or by an independent source such
as the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in the case of nuclear
arms control. As Chayes and Chayes (1995) note, in contrast with many arms
control treaty systems such as the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, 1968), verification is rarely included in the reporting
systems of environmental accords.
In environmental treaties, site inspections are quite common, but are
usually couched in more positive language as educational and joint-problem
solving ventures. Ramsar and the WHC use site visits by secretariat staff and
independent experts to assess changes or potential changes to listed sites, and
to work collaboratively with the management and expert personnel in a
country to remedy the situation.
Regular reporting of a country's implementation efforts. as a way to gauge
progress is, therefore, a treaty norm. However, the reporting requirements
and methods of conventions differ and are often cumbersome. Some
examples of reporting systems are given below.
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Nearly all environmental conventions rely on national self- reporting in
one form or another. For example, CCAMLR requires that its members
submit catch records and notify the CCAMLR Secretariat of other (than fish)
species accidentally caught (incidental mortality). CITES requires that its
members submit annual reports of trade statistics in CITES listed species to
the CITES CoP; while Ramsar relies on its parties to report on changes or
impending changes to the ecological character of Ramsar sites listed as
wetlands of international importance.
Trade treaties such as the ITTA (International Tropical Timber Agreement,
1983) also rely heavily on self-reporting. In the case of the ITTA, countries
are required to submit reports on their harvesting and trading via an
import-export trade permit system similar to that of CITES and Basel.
National reports are submitted to the ITTO (International Tropical Timber
Organization), the 10 that acts as the secretariat of the ITTA. The national
reports to the ITTA, are not used to measure implementation but do allow
for an annual overall assessment of the world tropical timber economy,
including environmental aspects (GAO, 1992:3).
Other treaties have similar reporting practices to the ITTA. The GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1946) and the NPT each requires
that its members submit their implementation reports to a central 10. In the
case of the GATT, reports go to the Trade Policies Review Division of the
GATT Secretariat for assessment of parties' trade policies and performance.
In the case of the NPT, country reports on nuclear materials production and
stockpiles are submitted to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
which also accepts reports from members of the Treaty for Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1967. (GAO, 1992:39-40).
The quality of country responses varies considerably, as does the
effectiveness with which data and information are analysed and used.
Failure to report, incomplete and/or late reporting are the chief deficiencies
of international data collection systems (Chayes and Chayes, 1995), which are
in turn the basis of all compliance systems. Evidence available on particular
treaties or groups of treaties indicates that apart from deliberate refusals to
report, as has been the case with the former USSR's massive and systematic
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falsification of reports to the International Whaling Commission (IWC)
from the 1970s to 1990s; and Iraq's failure to disclose the full scope of its
nuclear and chemical weapons programs as required by the Gulf War cease-
fire resolution of the UN Security Council in 1991, the level of reporting will
depend on a variety of actors; the importance of the subject matter; the
effectiveness of the secretariat or other central treaty institutions; and the
capacity and resources of the reporting state. In environmental treaties and
others with a high scientific or technical content, failure to report is
disproportionately high among developing countries, primarily because of
limitations on the financial, scientific, and bureaucratic resources of the
reporting government (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:155-159; GAO, 1992). Treaty-
specific reporting problems are discussed in Chapters 4 & 5.
Information is power in international environmental management where
the issues are complex and interdependent, and scientific uncertainty is the
norm rather than the exception. In this context, institutional systems for
information and data management, national reporting, performance review
and assessment are fundamental to information generation and decision
making. They can be effective instruments of power in the hands of
international secretariats.
Performance review and assessment involves the periodic and systematic
scrutiny and measurement (assessment) of the extent to which a country is
making progress towards achieving its treaty objectives. A country's
performance in relation to its treaty obligations is the focus of these
implementation processes. The objective of the performance review and
assessment phase is to identify performance inadequacies and steps that
might be taken to improve a country's performance, usually within a
prescribed time frame.
Predetermined performance criteria are used to gauge progress, and national
reports are constructed to reflect these criteria. Quantitative objective criteria
are preferred. These are negotiated in a similar fashion to the reporting
criteria. That is not to say that informal or more subjective assessments of
performance are omitted, or are absent from the process. In the interests of
international harmony, and to minimise the risks of conflict and country
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withdrawal from a treaty in protest over the subjectivity of decision making,
every effort is made to adhere to objective criteria in making collective
decisions about a country's implementation performance.
Performance criteria are treaty-specific, although there are similarities
among treaties dealing with comparable issues. For example, a country's
implementation performance may be reviewed in terms of the extent to
which it achieves reductions in its levels of pollutants, or controls the levels
of industrial emissions such as ozone, and Green House Gases (GHGs)
including C02, over a specific period(s) of time. The Montreal Protocol and
the FCCC are examples of conventions whose success is measured against
these criteria. The extent to which members conform with agreed
international trade regulations are other performance criteria. Examples of
this approach are, the international trade in endangered species of wild
fauna and flora (CITES); the international trade in certain hazardous wastes
(Basel); and the global trade in specified tropical timbers (ITTA). Provisions
in each of these trade regulation agreements contain criteria to measure the
extent to which members effectively contain the export-import and re-export
of trade in prohibited substances. The GATT also has its own Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TRPM) which is based on a member's report of its
overall economic situation, a detailed analysis of its trade policies and
practices, and a report by the GATT Secretariat focusing on special areas of
concern (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:245). Other conventions advocate catch
restrictions on certain species. This may take the form of catch quotas or
catch bans in the international public interest. CCAMLR limits the catch of
marine living resources such as fish in order to conserve the marine
ecosystems of the Antarctic; and the ICRW has agreed to a moratorium on
the harvesting of whales as an endangered species. Another group of
international environmental agreements seeks to conserve
environmentally important habitat and/or threatened ecosystems. Ramsar
and the World Heritage Convention each uses a system of listing protected
sites. Members are required to nominate sites for listing and to develop site
management plans. Their implementation performance is then assessed
against their achievement of the goals of the management plans as they
progress towards the achievement of the site conservation objectives.
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The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), requires countries to
compile national strategies, plans and programs to integrate the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into policies and
plans for sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and forestry (Article 6), and the
1994 Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) aims " to combat
desertification and to mitigate the effects of drought in countries
experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in
Africa....... (Article 2 2 (1)), through the use of national, subregional and
regional action programs, scientific and technical cooperation. However it is
too early to evaluate the success of these approaches as they are still being
developed.
Performance review and assessment are fundamental components of a
compliance strategy. They make use of the information contained in
national reports which have, in turn, been prepared in accordance with
predetermined performance criteria against which a country's
implementation progress in fulfilling its convention obligations can be
periodically measured in order to assess the extent to which a country has, or
is, making progress towards achieving the treaty objectives.
Secretariats perform a central and often very active role in data collection,
national reporting, performance review and assessment. They assist
countries to interpret reporting and performance requirements and to
compile national reports where countries lack the resources and expertise to
do so. This relates particularly to developing countries and those with
economies in transition which rely on secretariat assistance to fulfil their
obligations. Secretariat assistance may include direct advice and guidance to
the parties; assisting parties to network with experts and NGOs; and assisting
members to access international financial and scientific resources such as the
CITES Trust Fund, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), WWF, scientific
and academic organizations. All environmental treaty secretariats adopt
these strategies and more will be said about this in the following section.
Secretariats, as seemingly independent bodies within the treaty system, are
regularly asked to analyse incoming national reports and to give advice to
the CoP on action to be taken when a party's performance appears to be
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deficient and/or in breach of its obligations. They also follow-up situations
where no reports are forthcoming or are late. All environmental treaty
secretariats perform these functions to a greater or lesser extent. CITES and
the FCCC Secretariat as repositories of substantial professional expertise,
have formal mandates to conduct analyses of reports and to advise, or
recommend (in the case of CITES), what action might be taken.
These performance review and assessment functions are all part of
monitoring progress and compliance. In these ways, secretariats have
opportunities to shape data collection and presentation, to facilitate
networks of assistance among stakeholders, to monitor performance, and to
identify potential problems in implementation and compliance. In effect,
they serve as an early warning device for anticipating the likelihood of non-
compliance.
Assisting Developing Countries With National Capacity Building
Underpinning the success or otherwise of any convention, is the domestic or
national capacity of members to meet their obligations. The extent to which
countries are able to meet their responsibilities depends to a considerable
extent on their national capacity, that is, on their institutional infrastructure,
and on their financial, scientific, legal, policy, and other national resources.
This includes the availability of expert/trained management and
enforcement personnel. National capacity is of particular importance in
developing countries and countries with economies in transition which are
struggling as members of a global community, to participate in the ever-
increasing number of international agreements (Jacobson and Brown Weiss,
1994). Many such countries require external financial and expert assistance to
fulfil their multitude of international convention responsibilities. It is
understandable that without adequate resources or national capacity, a
country is likely to encounter serious implementation and compliance
difficulties.
In supporting the centrality of capacity building in treaty implementation
and compliance, Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993) argue that assisting
stakeholders to build political and administrative capacity both within the
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state and within civil society, and the establishment of mutually reinforcing
networks and coalitions, are critical; that capacity building is often a
necessary condition for achieving effectiveness; and that compliance is more
likely when capacity is in place. As the case studies of Keohane and Levy
(1995) further demonstrate, "the lack of capacity is a critical source of policy
ineffectiveness", and capacity building, magnifying issue concern, and
facilitating agreement are the most significant roles international
institutions can play (Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993).
A country's failure to meet its treaty reporting, performance and compliance
obligations may not necessarily be due to its lack of commitment to the goals
of the agreement. Rather, it may be a result of that country's inability to
identify and/or mobilize the resources necessary to put into place the
changes and initiatives necessary to carry out these tasks. For example,
CITES, and Ramsar require that members instigate national legislation,
regulations, policies and management infrastructures to implement and
manage these conventions at national and sub-national levels. Many
developing countries are unable to meet these requirements, as they do not
have the legal and bureaucratic expertise to draft such specialized legislation,
nor the funds nor scientific expertise to -implement or enforce programs
considered essential to achieve convention objectives. That is, such
countries do not have the national capacity to successfully implement the
agreement.
In situations such as these a secretariat may enlist the expert and financial
support of an NGO or another member to assist the country in question. The
CITES secretariat is able to use its extensive networks to help match external
funding with a country's needs. In the case of Guyana, funding from WWF,
Japan and the UK was used to help Guyana develop domestic legislation,
and to strengthen the implementation and effectiveness of CITES in Guyana
(CITES Doc.9.11; Sandford, 1996).
Knowledge of, access to, and appropriate use of sources of direct assistance -
financial resources, scientific, legal and policy expertise - and indirect
assistance such as information, data access and exchange, are fundamental to
the effective implementation of all international treaties, not just those
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relating to environmental issues. Chayes and Chayes (1995:234-237) give the
following example of the influence of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) on its members' monetary and fiscal policies, and on directions taken
in capacity building.
The IMF was established under the 1945 IMF Agreement as an organization
for international cooperation in monetary policy, and it exercises "firm
surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members" by conducting
routine consultations (performance reviews) with each member, usually at
18 month intervals. The impact of this Article IV surveillance on national
policy is illustrated in the recent efforts of the IMF (in coordination with the
World Bank) to bring military expenditure into the economic and fiscal
review process. This means that military spending will, henceforth, be
considered an economic as well as a political/strategic issue. As such, it has a
policy influence on capacity building by educating government officials
about the desirability of improved military budgeting practices and
transparent expenditure practices. In countries where the military plays a
strong role in internal politics, this is a very significant move. In providing
capacity building assistance, the IMF has a distinct advantage over most
environmental treaties- it has money - lots of it. It is able to disburse funds to
help members meet agreed targets. IMF funds are paid by instalment, and as
the Chayes' note, the threat of cancellation of instalments can powerfully
concentrate a recipient's mind.
The primary sources of funding for the implementation of environmental
policies are financial mechanisms in a treaty system itself. These are often
known as convention trust funds. Examples of trust funds are: the World
Heritage Fund; the CITES Trust Fund; the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal
Protocol; and the Technical Cooperation Trust Fund of the Basel
Convention. These financial mechanisms consist of contributions from
parties and non-parties to assist countries in need, to implement the
convention. However, convention trust funds are notoriously inadequate to
meet the demands of an increasing number of members, many of which are
from the developing world. Consequently, countries must access external
funding sources, and they frequently rely on secretariat knowledge, guidance
and networks for this.
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Additional sources of financial assistance for capacity building are:
international monetary organizations such as the World Bank and its
subsidiary, the GEF, for those recent conventions dealing with biological
diversity, oceans, climate change and desertification. The older
environmental treaties of the 1970s, Ramsar, World Heritage, and CITES do
not, as yet, have ready access to GEF funds for their members. This has
caused considerable dissatisfaction as many members (and their secretariats)
consider that as well established treaties with proven implementation track
records, they are disadvantaged in the disbursement of global funds to
address critical environmental issues.
Economic development agencies and UN programs and agencies including
UNEP, and The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and UNDP; and
bilateral arrangements with individual (often developed) countries, and less
frequently NGOs, are other major sources of financial assistance. UNEP is
mandated to provide technical assistance through the development of
national legislation, and by enhancing capacity building through training,
information dissemination and education. In fulfilling this mandate the
Environmental Law and Institutions Programme Activity Centre (ELI/PAC)
has been involved in numerous capacity building activities. A joint UNEP,
ELI/PAC, Basel Secretariat mission is assisting the Government of
Bangladesh, at its request, to draft waste management law which will
include provisions for implementation of the Basel Convention. UNEP,
ELI/PAC has also instituted a Training-By-Attachment Programme for
senior government lawyers and policy makers to carry out assignments
related to their work, such as the development of laws and policies. These
Attachment Programs often include attachment to one or more
international environmental convention secretariats to obtain a better
understanding of environmental conventions and mechanisms for
implementing them effectively in their respective countries (Sun Lin,
1995:4). Jordan, Western Samoa and Vanuatu have participated in this
program.
A number of developed countries provide financial and expert advice to
their former colonies, or to countries in which they have a special trade or
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humanitarian interest. France assists with capacity building in the
Francophone countries of West Africa (wetland restoration and endangered
species conservation). The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (PDR) or Laos,
which is classified by the UN and the World Bank as among the least
developed countries in the world, has received assistance from Australia
and IUCN to conduct wildlife conservation workshops to pave the way for
Laos to begin the process of becoming a party to CITES. In addition, Laos has
signed a bilateral agreement with Sweden, the Agreement on Cooperation
for Development, 1995, to provide funding for environmental studies and
the clearance of unexploded ordinances (Bounthong Vongsaly, 1995). The
latter is an interesting example of an environmental-human rights-security
issue linkage
Secretariats and National Capacity Building
The national reporting and performance review activities of secretariats
provide them with an entree to the identification of national capacity
building needs. In many cases, it is the information emerging from these
processes that alerts parties to the implementation difficulties being
experienced by their members, and which can be addressed using capacity
building measures. Secretariats' information collection and distribution
initiatives; their analyses of national reports, and subsequent advice to the
CoP; mobilization and management of their extensive financial, scientific
and technical networks; and the expertise of secretariat boundary-spanning
professionals as international facilitators and coordinators, are the main
mechanisms used to address capacity building deficiencies. In this respect.
secretariats serve a problem identification and problem-solving function in
national capacity building.
Secretariats also perform a range of service delivery roles. The majority of
secretariats act as lynch-pin organizations in assisting their members with
capacity building. They provide direct assistance such as legal and policy
advice; and indirectly facilitate member access to convention and external
sources of funds and expertise, such as those mentioned previously.
Secretariat initiation and/or participation in capacity building activities, is
mutually advantageous for the recipient country and for the convention
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secretariat. In the first place, the country gains access to essential resources
which enable it to meet its international legal obligations. In the second
place, the secretariat gains from the halo effect of providing tangible
assistance to a member. Its organizational credibility as a performer of tasks
and as a service deliverer is enhanced; and its sphere of potential influence
is expanded by networking, and by building alliances or working
partnerships with the country concerned, national stakeholders, relevant
international financial institutions, and NGOs. This in turn further extends
the secretariat's information, knowledge and power base beyond the
confines of its original formal mandate.
Finally, secretariats may play, or be perceived to play, more overtly political
roles in capacity building. Many developing counties and countries with
economies in transition feel disadvantaged in global power politics and
finances, and have tended to regard secretariats as understanding allies in
their attempts to establish a more equal resource and power balance between
the developed and developing worlds. The FCCC and CCD are recent
examples of conventions where secretariats are trying to use capacity
building to minimise the disparity between developing and developed
interests in order to achieve a collective objective. The FCCC Secretariat has
been working closely with Association of Small Island States (AOSIS)
countries, and its INGO advocate FIELD (Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development), to ensure that the larger, developed
country parties, whose priorities are emission targets and timetables rather
than the more direct effects of sea level rise, remain mindful of the concerns
of the AOSIS countries in their decision making and in the allocation of
resources (FCCC Sec. Pers. Com. June, 1995).
Working With NGOs To Monitor Compliance
Integral to success of all environmental accords, is the support of non-state
actors. They include: international and domestic industry and
environmental NGOs, expert bodies such as academic institutions,
professional organizations and associations of experts.
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The cooperation and support of NGOs is central to the success or failure of
effective treaty implementation. Without the active, or at least the tacit
cooperation of industry and environmental NGOs, a convention is likely to
fail where it really counts, that is, on the ground at national and sub-
national levels.
Most NGOs are accomplished communicators and they have extensive
media and public networks. In circumstances where NGOs are critical of, or
actively oppose a government's implementation activities or policies, they
are readily able to marshal negative media coverage of government
activities at both the domestic and international levels, perhaps a reflection
of the adages "Conflict sells, consensus does not", and "bad news travels
fast". Negative publicity generated or aided by NGO comment, can have an
deleterious effect on a government's domestic electoral appeal and on its
survival. An example of this is what is known in WHC circles as The
Tasmanian Dams case (Clth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625, 795-6; Clth v
Tasmania(1983) 158 CLR).
In this instance, domestic and international environmental NGOs
challenged the Tasmanian State Government in Australia, to stop the
construction of a dam and hydro-electric facility proposed for a wild river in
the Tasmanian WHA area, a clear breach of Australia's WHA obligations.
The negative publicity that ensued, fuelled by very active, well-planned and
well-publicized public protests, was coordinated primarily by NGOs, in
particular by the Wilderness Society which originated in Tasmania and is
now an INGO.
All NGOs with an interest in the outcomes of an international agreement
must be considered as valid stakeholders by the parties, regardless of their
size, or the membership and ideology of their organization. It is imperative
that their existence is actively taken into account in the design and
management of implementation and compliance processes and procedures.
Ideally, NGO participation should be encouraged. Should significant NGOs
be overlooked, deliberately or inadvertently in the policy process, they can
become policy major obstacles for national governments. In many Western
democratic countries, domestic-based NGOs have the potential to block or
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stall, policy initiatives at the national level, and often at the international
level through the mobilization of world wide networks of NGOs.
Examples of effective blocking actions by concerned or disgruntled
international and domestic NGOs include: the headline-grabbing, high-seas
exploits of Greenpeace in obstructing whaling in international waters, and
its criticisms of the ineffectiveness of CCAMLR in protecting the Antarctic
krill fishery in the 1980s; and, the relative success of international and
national energy lobbies, such as IPIECA (International Petroleum Importers
and Exporters Association), the Australian coal industry, and the US
industry NGO, the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), which rejects "the use of
rigid targets and timetables as a strategy for meeting the objectives of the
FCCC" (Global Climate Coalition, March,1993:1).
A caveat is warranted here. NGOs tend to be potent force in the more
pluralist, Western style democracies of Northern America, Europe and
Oceania. However, for many Asian, African, Central and Southern
American nations and developing countries, environmental NGOs from
the North are an anathema, reminders of the oppression and exploitation of
European colonialism (Pers. Coms Ramsar, CITES Secs, 1995). In developing
countries whose political regimes and cultures differ from those of their
Northern counterparts, the effectiveness of international environmental
policy implementation may be more directly reliant on national capacity
building than it is on NGO action. For many such countries the solution is
perceived to lie with direct international financial support, preferably
unconditional funding for national capacity building, rather than with the
electoral support of NGOs.
Secretariats , NGOs and Compliance
The relationship between NGOs and secretariats is mutually advantageous.
Secretariats rely substantially on information from NGO domestic
surveillance, communication and other activities to determine the extent to
which national governments are meeting their obligations. Through their
national and grass-roots networks of constituents, domestic NGOs are able to
access data and information out of reach of international secretariats.
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National sovereignty is the defence used by national governments to thwart
secretariat access to internal information, particularly when it portrays a
government in a less than flattering light vis-a-vis its implementation
performance. Arguments such as 'commercial-in-confidence' and 'in the
interests of national security' may be given by governments as reasons for
refusing secretariat access to information
In situations such as this, a domestic NGO has the advantage of national
legitimacy and its members, as individuals, are citizens. It can, if it chooses,
use its in-country knowledge and networks to try and obtain the
information required by the secretariat to review that country's
performance. That is, the NGO helps the secretariat to monitor compliance.
In the WHC Tasmanian Dams case, the constant flow of information from
the Tasmanian Wilderness Society and its NGO colleagues to the WHC
Secretariat, kept the Secretariat (and through it other WHC parties) up to
date on developments in Australia. The WHC Secretariat, acknowledged the
value of this NGO-Secretariat relationship to monitor Australia's
compliance (Pers. Com. WHC Sec. 1993). The case was historically significant
in international law, as it was the first time the WHC had been legally
challenged in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and there was concern
among governments that the outcome would set a precedent, not just for
the WHC, but for other environmental treaties (Pers. Com. WHC Sec, 1993).
The CITES Secretariat has a very close, and by all accounts a very effective
relationship with the WWF/TRAFFIC Network which formally assists the
Secretariat to monitor illegal trade in wild fauna and flora (Sandford,
1994:24). This assistance takes a number of forms from the statistical
correlation of trade reports, to potentially dangerous on-ground NGO
surveillance activities (CITES Sec. Pers. Coms. May, 1995; TRAFFIC Network
Pers.Coms. June 1995).
NGOs also benefit from co-operation with secretariats. The secretariat
coordinates agenda preparation for meetings of the CoP and subsidiary
bodies such as scientific committees, implementation committees, and
policy working groups. In fact, it is often left to the secretariat to draw up the
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meeting agenda which the relevant body then approves as occurred in
CCAMLR (Pers.Com.CCAMLR Sec.1995). The secretariat is thus often in a
position to make recommendations for the inclusion (and exclusion) of
items on the agenda and the ordering of agenda priorities. In this way, a
secretariat is instrumental in bringing the parties' attention to the concerns
of non-parties, NGOs, and the wider public, and in encouraging members to
include these issues as agenda items (Sandford, 1996:7).
Other areas of benefit to NGOs come from the secretariat's roles in treaty
system data/information management. In the former, secretariats have a
formal mandate to receive information from, and distribute information to,
both domestic and international NGOs. This encourages a two-way
information flow, and facilitates NGOs access to information. Information is
the international currency of effective monitoring and compliance.
Informal communications also occur between secretariats and NGOs as their
personnel interact over the years, and even exchange places of employment.
The Ramsar Bureau and CITES Secretariat each contains personnel who
have worked for convention allies such as the IWRB, IUCN, WWF and
Species Survival. Many NGO and secretariat personnel share a professional
and often a personal commitment to achieving the objectives of a particular
treaty, if not the strategies for getting there. Furthermore, they often remain
associated with a specific issue or treaty for long periods of time. These
associations provide plenty of opportunities for information exchange, the
sharing of ideas, the development of problem-solving partnerships, the
formation of professional alliances and personal friendships, and the
exchange of staff on secondment.
The knowledge generated and networks formed as a result of secretariat-
NGO relationships, may also be used to facilitate capacity building activities,
particularly training, technology transfer and species surveys. Secretariats
might recommend NGOs as expert consultants to assist national
governments with capacity building. IUCN and its international network of
domestic NGOs, is a world leader in protected area management, and it has
assisted many developing countries with formulating and implementing
WHA legislation and management plans (McNeeley, 1995). Wetlands
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International, a consortium of international and domestic NGOs, provides
expert advice on- wetland restoration and management throughout Africa
and Asia, and works closely with the Ramsar Bureau. These activities
legitimize NGO activity in a country; they can be used to draw public and
political attention to a treaty issue or concern; and they provide
opportunities for NGOs to advance public understanding of their particular
cause.
Summary
International multilateral agreements such as those of environment, trade,
human rights, and security are characterised by stakeholder diversity and an
interdependence of issues and interorganizational networks. In this context,
secretariats are the organizational glue that holds the stakeholders and parts
of a treaty system together, and it is the tasks performed by secretariats that
legitimize and promote their organizational survival and act as vehicles of
influence.
Of the myriad of core and substantive tasks performed by secretariats, I
believe that the suite discussed in this chapter is the most significant as it is
at the heart of a convention's implementation and compliance strategies.
That is not to say it is all plain sailing. Secretariats encounter several a
number of obstacles or challenges in carrying out their tasks.
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Introduction
Secretariats face a range of organizational constraints. The literature (Young,
1967; Skolnikoff, 1972; McLaren 1980; Pitt and Weiss, 1986; Archer, 1992)
identifies four general categories of constraints faced by international
secretariats in carrying out their duties. They are: political; financial; the
availability of organizational resources - including administrative resources,
time, expertise and technology - and social and cultural considerations
(Sandford, 1994). In addition, I have consolidated several of the elements
identified by Weiss (1975), in a fifth category I call "organizational loyalties
and leadership". Finally, I have added a sixth set of obstacles which have
emerged from my research. I have called these "implementation conflicts".
Political constraints can be the most daunting. They include: obstacles in
secretariat relations with stakeholders, especially governments; the
difficulties of dealing with frequent changes in national governments at the
domestic level which result in changing policy priorities and management
arrangements; tensions in secretariat relations with NGOs; and tensions in
secretariat relations with their partner organizations,
Financial obstacles take several forms. Non-payment and/or late payment of
national contributions leaves a secretariat without the means to carry out
even its core tasks; and a chronic inadequacy of funds necessitates that
professional personnel spend an inordinate amount of time fund-raising
among members and non-state actors. Many professional personnel consider
fund-raising an inappropriate use of their time and expertise. Third,
secretariat acceptance of tied or conditional funding from both state and non-
state actors to supplement inadequate core funding, is frequently criticized by
stakeholders as being prejudicial to secretariat impartiality (Sandford, 1994).
A third constraint is inadequate organizational capacity and resources such as
administrative capacity and time, the expertise and skills of personnel, and
technology. There is a long-standing suspicion of, and resistance to, the
growth of IOs by governments. The degree of secretariat autonomy, the
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nature and extent of their resources, and the centralization or
decentralization of secretariat activities are recurring issues in 10
management where the resource-dependency of IOs on governments leaves
them vulnerable to political whims.
The fourth category is social and cultural obstacles such as external and
internal social and cultural diversity. By that I mean managing national and
regional cultural differences among stakeholders, and achieving and
managing personnel diversity within the secretariat (Sandford, 1994).
Secretariats value social and cultural diversity both in the .treaty system as
well as within their organization. That is not to say that issues such as the
appointment of staff on merit rather than on regional or national affiliation
are not of concern. They are. This is especially important in issue-areas such
as climate change which are scientifically complex, technologically
sophisticated, and where successful task performance requires that secretariat
staff have specialist expertise which is less commonly available in some
developing countries of the South than it is in the industrialized countries of
the North. In this context, the organizational need to recruit personnel for
their specialist skills can clash with the political goal of geographical
representation in the secretariat.
However by 1997, I had come to the conclusion that social and cultural
constraints were perceived by those interviewed, to be lesser obstacles than
were the first three categories of constraints, or managing implementation
conflicts.
A fifth category of obstacles I encountered in my research is what I call
'organizational loyalties and leadership.' This includes attempts by some
national governments to exert pressure on their nationals who are working
in the secretariat; and constraints associated with organizational leadership
which seem to have the potential to be more of a problem that does pressure
from national governments.
Finally, I have created a sixth category of obstacles called 'implementation
conflicts'. Implementation conflicts include tensions, disagreements and
chronic conflict which may be punctuated by episodes of acute dispute and
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which obstruct, or potentially obstruct, successful treaty implementation.
Implementation conflicts which involve secretariats as network managers
and intermediaries occur regularly among treaty members; between
members and non-state actors such as IGOs and NGOs; and the most
politically sensitive (and organizationally dangerous conflicts from the
perspective of a secretariat as a potential intermediary), are in-country
disagreements. These may occur between governments and domestic NGOs,
and among competing national bureaucracies, each of which claims
responsibility for treaty implementation at the domestic level, and the
authority and resources to accomplish this.
While some might argue that implementation conflicts could be subsumed
in the categories of obstacles already mentioned, I contend that they are
worthy of consideration as a category in their own right. Implementation
conflicts are placing increasing demands on secretariat resources, especially
personnel skills, budgets, and time. Managing conflicts is becoming a growth
area for environmental treaty secretariats as the frequency with which
stakeholders request that secretariats formally, and more often informally,
assist in defusing and/or resolving implementation problems, increases. The
apparent success of secretariat conflict management activities is illustrated by
repeated requests from stakeholders for conflict management assistance over
time. Secretariat carriage of these tasks has implications (both positive and
negative), for the organizational mandate, structure, and resources of
secretariats, as well as for successful policy outcomes including compliance.
Political Constraints
The impacts of political constraints on secretariat initiatives are particularly
evident in the implementation 'heartland' of the secretariat - managing
national reporting, performance review and compliance monitoring.
Relations with Members
To be accepted by stakeholders, particularly, member governments,
international convention reporting and assessment processes must be seen to
be transparent, accessible and accountable in pursuit of a convention's
132
objectives. A major stumbling block to informed international decision
making is that the provision of accurate and timely data remains the
prerogative of the members in recognition of their sovereign right to manage
their national resources as they see fit. Self-reporting remains the dominant
method of international convention reporting. This means it is the
responsibility of convention members to provide the information required
of them, so that the CoP can make informed decisions about the present and
future management of the resource, issue or commodity in question.
Examples of a secretariat's reporting tasks in relation to a specific
government might include: ensuring that the member understands what is
required of it in fulfilling its reporting obligations and the penalties for its
failure to do so; advising the member on how it might best approach the task
of reporting; ensuring that the member has the personnel, technological,
financial, and administrative resources it needs to accomplish the task,
accurately and on time; and directly and indirectly assisting the member with
report preparation.
Assistance can take a number of forms. It might include the direct provision
of expert advice by the secretariat's professional staff; the provision of
knowledge about how other countries have approached comparable
reporting or compliance problems; and the facilitation of networking among
countries and NGOs with comparable interests. Other forms of assistance are:
the promotion of dialogue among countries with similar problems; and
supplying information on available resources, for example, advising on the
availability of GEF funds, and international sources of scientific and policy
advice from academic institutions and professional organizations such as
ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions).
In some instances members resent what they perceive to be a secretariat's
intrusion into their domestic affairs. They argue that the responsibility for
overseeing data management and reporting legitimizes secretariat
interference in domestic policy implementation. This resentment may take
the form of delay and obstruction in the transmission of data and reports to
the secretariat for incorporation in treaty decision making, and the denial of
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secretariat access to relevant national authorities, personnel, and
information.
A country may argue that is having difficulty in obtaining the necessary
information to complete its reports; that it lacks the resources to complete the
task, including technology and computers; and that it lacks the necessary
expert personnel. While such reasons for a delay might be true, they can also
be used as camouflage for members who are reluctant to submit to
international scrutiny of their internal operations where the IO or secretariat
is the conduit for external surveillance. The limited political mandate of an
IO such as a secretariat does not permit the organization to exert other than
persuasive pressure on a dissenting member. The secretariat has no power to
sanction a reluctant member, and in circumstances such as this it must draw
the attention of the CoP or Standing Committee to the situation.
So, why is a member's reluctance or refusal to comply with reporting
requirements a problem for a secretariat? First, it means that insufficient
information is available for the CoP (via its secretariat's analytical activities)
to review and assess a party's implementation performance and compliance.
Non-compliance with national reporting requirements is a significant
headache for a secretariat, as considerable time and resources must be spent
on persuading a country to cooperate. Failure of a secretariat to secure a
member's cooperation is likely to be construed by members as organizational
incompetence on the part of the secretariat, an inability to perform a key task.
The secretariat then becomes an organizational scape-goat for a CoP's
inability to 'control' the negative behaviour of one of its members. The
blame is thus deflected from the member onto the secretariat.
It is much less politically costly to direct blame for implementation failure on
to a 'servant of the parties', than it is to risk the alienation or withdrawal of a
party from a convention. No CoP wants to risk the withdrawal of a member
as happened when Iceland withdrew from the IWC in 1991 (Chayes and
Chayes, 1995). It is much easier to 'control' the behaviour of a treaty member
through 'shaming' or peer pressure within the treaty system where it is in
the self-interest of the recipient to reap the potential benefits of issue-linked
cooperation with its fellow members, than it is to endeavour to 'shame' a
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non-member whose non-participation in a particular agreement means that
it is, in practical terms, immune to any punitive measure that a treaty party
may attempt to exert.
Issue-linkage can be both and advantage and a disadvantage for secretariats in
overseeing national reporting and performance. As an advantage, it can
encourage more accurate reporting as it provides a means to cross-check or
verify data. The reporting of trade statistics by ITTA and CITES members
provides a reliable foil for secretariat cross-checking of tropical timber and
international wildlife trade data from economic sources, with conservation
statistics from NGOs and national government bureaucracies.
However, in today's politically, economically, socially and environmentally
interdependent and issue-linked world, all stakeholders (including
secretariats) are aware that a member's hesitation to report on issue A, may
not in fact be related to the subject of the required report itself, but to
negotiation difficulties being experienced with issue B. The issue-linkage of
human rights and trade is example. Here, a country may be denied trading
access and privileges if its human rights record is perceived by another
nation to be at fault, as has been the case in contemporary relations between
China and the USA, and until the 1990s between South Africa and most UN
members which instituted trade bans against South Africa over its human
rights record and its public policy of apartheid.
Obstruction of, or refusal to, report can be quite direct. The refusal to report is
often the first indication of serious political resistance to compliance with
basic treaty norms, and it begins the mobilization of counterpressures. Many
examples of failure and/or refusal to report are evident under human rights
agreements and with North Korea and the NPT (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). A
1992 survey by the UN Secretary-General of reporting under seven human
rights conventions showed that a number of flagrant human rights violators
were among those most seriously in reporting arrears, and suggested that in
many cases the non-reporting was deliberate (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). In
instances such as these, the offending country usually denies a convention
secretariat access to its national bureaucratic colleagues and the management
authorities on whom the secretariat is dependent for the collection of in-
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country information and reports. This denial of access can rebound on the
reputation of the-IO. Both national and international bureaucrats are heavily
invested in the success of their organizations (Chayes and Chayes, 1995), and
public recognition of an ability to effectively and efficiently perform key tasks
is at the heart of an organization's reputation.
Changes in National Governments
As noted in Sandford (1994), dealing with changes in national governments
at the domestic level can be more of a problem for treaty secretariats than
their relations with national governments per se. Changes in national
governments often mean changes in national priorities and in the associated
management authorities. For example, environmental management may be
superceded by economic development, health, or transportation, as a
prevailing national policy priority. As a result of changing governmental
priorities, the bureaucratic infrastructures, programs and budget allocations
that once favoured environmental management, are then replaced by ones
favouring the dominant policy imperative (say, economic development) and
its associated bureaucratic and decision making structures.
Bureaucratic fragmentation and sectoral compartmentalization at the
domestic level create major difficulties for secretariats as when
representatives from different national authorities within a country present
conflicting views on an issue or policy, which each then claims represents its
country's official position on the issue. The WHC (World Heritage Centre)
warned about this in relation to the plethora of policies which were
presented as the "official Australian position", by assorted levels of
government and national bureaucracies to the WHC at the time of the
Tasmanian Dams dispute in the early 1980s (Sandford, 1994).
National and sub-national bureaucracies within a country compete regularly
for official political endorsement of their activities and pre-eminence in the
bureaucratic hierarchy of the government of the day, as well as competing for
budgetary allocations. At any one time, a minister for the environment and
his/her supporting bureaucracy may slide from the top of the pecking order
to a position lower down. It is in the interests of the relevant national
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bureaucracy to protect its minister from such a fate, as in so doing the
bureaucracy ensures its own survival and a higher resource allocation
ranking in the domestic bureaucratic jungle.
So what relevance is this for an international secretariat? Many international
secretariats (including global environmental treaty secretariats), depend on
financial contributions from treaty members for their organizational
survival and growth. It is thus in the interests of an international secretariat
to work closely with its in-country bureaucratic and political counterparts to
ensure their survival, and ideally their political dominance and expansion,
as this then is more likely to guarantee the steady flow of national
contributions on which the secretariat's existence depends. Strong national
counterparts may even be able to use their position to encourage their
governments to provide additional support for capacity building in
developing countries. This helps the convention secretariat by enhancing its
organizational profile and its credibility with developing countries. At the
end of the day, the numbers of parties which support the convention
secretariat are translated into votes in the CoP which, in turn, determine the
secretariat's budget.
However, every time a government changes, incoming ministers and
bureaucrats must be briefed on their country's international treaty
obligations. Mechanisms and penalties for handling non-compliance are also
spelled out. Secretariat staff and their executive heads play a key role here in
ensuring that the country is aware of the need to fulfil its obligations, and the
ways that the secretariat and the treaty machinery might assist. The more
frequently a country's government changes, the more often a secretariat
must be in contact with that country to brief incoming governments and the
bureaucracy. There is substantial down-time for both a new government and
the secretariat in adapting to change. Down-time may involve inadequacies
and delays in reporting; a decline in on-ground performance; an increase in
non-compliance as the country comes to understand its international
obligations; and failure of/late payment of contributions. All these
constraints have an impact on the organizational capacity of a secretariat and
its workload.
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Secretariat missions are the preferred method of carrying out briefings of new
governments as they are particularly effective in overcoming cultural
differences and misunderstandings which may arise from trying to
administer a treaty from a centralized position. Personal contact is considered
essential to supplement written, telephone, fax, and electronic
communication, yet travel budgets are the first items restricted when
secretariat activities are reviewed by the parties (Sandford, 1994; 1996). When
it comes to checking the accuracy of data and assessing implementation
performance and compliance, it is hard to surpass on-site assessments by
secretariats (usually assisted by independent consultants), whose expert
personnel are generally agreed to be more objective than are the personnel of
the country whose performance is being reviewed and assessed. The
reluctance of certain members to have an independent appraisal of their
progress is frequently behind CoP decisions (most of which are consensus-
based), to 'revise' secretariat travel budgets.
Relations with Partner Organizations
In overseeing reporting, national performance and member compliance,
most treaty secretariats work closely with their partner organizations. They
have a mutual interest in fulfilling their organizational obligations and
responsibilities to the parties on whom both are dependent to a greater
degree (secretariat) or a lesser degree (partner organization). Collaboration
means organizational survival and possibly growth. According to
organizational theory, increased power is usually associated with growth -
but not always, as the UNESCO and UNCTAD Secretariats have found out.
(Weiss, 1986; Wells, 1986). In general, however, secretariats and their treaty
partners collaborate on data gathering and analysis, drawing on their
combined organizational expertise, resources and networks.
Relationships between treaty secretariats and their partner organizations are
dynamic. In a number of instances they have become volatile and even
conflict ridden, in a tug-of -war for the 'hearts and minds' of the members, as
each organization attempts to establish its position and even exert
dominance over the other in the treaty system. Budget and resource
allocation matters, rather than tasks such as reporting and performance
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assessment, tend to be at the center of these struggle, and these will be
discussed in a following section.
Relations with NGOs
Secretariats are the standard bearers of an international agreement, that is,
they support, represent, and promote the intent or spirit of the agreement
throughout the world. This can create tension between them and some
NGOs who have a different interpretation of the intent of a convention,
coming as they do from a partisan perspective on the substance of the
agreement. The environmental protection intent of many environmental
treaties is couched in cautious language calculated to appeal to a maximum
number of interests on the economic development/environmental
preservation continuum. While the texts and decisions of many
environmental treaties make reference to 'sustainable development' and
conservation', none refers either to 'unrestricted development' or to
environmental preservation' which sit at opposite ends of the ideological
continuum. Ramsar talks about "wise-use"; CCAMLR about "rational use";
CITES refers to the "regulation of trade" (not the cessation of trade); the
objective of the CBD is the "conservation of biological diversity" and "the
sustainable use of its components" (rather than the "preservation of
biological diversity"); the FCCC refers to "the stabilization (not the
elimination) of GHGs"; and the CCD refers to "combating desertification"
rather than eliminating it.
As the organizational "front-man" for a convention, a secretariat is often in
the firing line from NGOs, each arguing that the secretariat is either
supporting the development lobby, or that the secretariat is biased towards
the environmental lobby. It is an occupational hazard for lynch-pin
organizations which have service delivery responsibilities. The problems
this creates for secretariats relate particularly to criticisms of the credibility of
their information sources, the transparency of their data collection processes,
and the accuracy and objectivity of their data/information analysis. Where
conventions have a history of NGO inclusion (rather than exclusion) and
where secretariats work cooperatively with NGOs, criticisms such as these are
less likely to arise. This has generally been the case with CITES and
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WWF/TRAFFIC International, and wildlife industry groups; Ramsar and
IUCN, IWRB, and duck hunters; the FCCC and environmental and
petrochemical industry NGOs.
NGO cooperation on reporting and related matters in these treaties, contrasts
with those international agreements which are seen to exclude or resist NGO
input from one or both philosophical perspectives. CCAMLR is often
criticised for obstructing environmental NGO attempts to bring data on
overfishing and illegal by-catch to the attention of the CCAMLR Commission
(Pers. Com.CCAMLR Sec.1995). This then casts doubt (by association) on the
credibility and effectiveness of the CCAMLR Secretariat as an impartial body,
in spite of the Secretariat's informal acceptance of well substantiated NGO
information for consideration in the CCAMLR reporting system
(Pers.Com.CCAMLR Sec.1995).
Summary
Political constraints in general are the most potentially negative and
fundamental of all the obstacles confronting secretariats. Without member
support secretariats may as well not exist, members being the source of
organizational legitimacy and funds. It is clearly in a secretariat's interests to
identify the nature and sources of political constraints and to manage them
strategically. The significance or impact of each category of political constraint
on a secretariat varies among the conventions and over time. At one point of
time, tension between a secretariat and its partner organization(s) may be
more of a problem for the organization than its relations with members. At
other times, organizational relations with a particular group of stakeholders
such as NGOs may focus secretariat attention as occurred when
environmental NGOs targeted the CITES Secretariat's management of the
ivory trade issue in 1989. Recurring political problems for all secretariats are
however, the impacts on organizational task performance of frequently
changing national governments, their expectations and policy priorities, and
in-country competition among bureaucracies for resource allocation and the
management of treaty responsibilities.
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Financial Constraints
Late and/or Non-Payment of National Contributions
Budgetary uncertainty is a major problem for all secretariats, be they UN
agency or treaty secretariats. Persuading countries to pay, and to pay on time,
is a recurring chore. As their budgets are extremely small by 10 standards, late
payments can severely hamper a treaty secretariat's ability to plan and to
carry out its tasks (Sandford, 1996). In 1986, the UNCTAD Secretariat had a of
budget $US25 million and the UNSECO Secretariat budget was $US500
million (Weiss, 1986; Ghebali, 1986). The administrative budget of the GATT
Secretariat was SFr.94.1 million and that of its replacement organization the
WTO (World Trade Organization) Secretariat is Sfr.115.6 million in 1996 (The
Green Globe Yearbook, 1996). In contrast, in 1994, the budget of the Basel
Secretariat was $US1.8 million; the CITES Trust Fund was $US3 million and
Ramsar 's administrative budget was Sfr.2.2. million (approximately) (The
Green Globe Yearbook, 1994), and in 1995 the net total of the FCCC
Secretariat's core budget was $US8.3 million (FCCC/CP/1995/5/Add.2).
The impacts of financial constraints on a secretariat's performance are
particularly noticeable in the areas of organizational capacity and the
availability of secretariat resources to carry out specific tasks such those of
related to performance assessment and compliance monitoring. Funds are
required to employ the expert and general staff who oversee the constellation
of reporting and performance activities outlined in the previous section, and
who in turn compile, analyse, and distribute summary reports and
recommendations based on their analyses. For example, at each CoP the
secretariat presents its own report on the performance of treaty members,
based on the information it receives from multiple sources including
national reports, NGO input and advice from scientific experts.
Secretariats employ expert consultants to gather and analyse field data, and to
prepare reports on issues of concern such as changes in the ecological
character of wetlands and inadequacies in site management. Expert
consultants are needed for many specialized tasks, especially those involving
complex data as is the case with the science and economics of climate change.
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Experts do not come cheaply, nor do the professional staff responsible for
overseeing their activities. If parties' financial contributions are late or not
forthcoming, it severely limits a secretariats' ability to deliver the goods (by
way of required expert reports, secretariat analysis, and policy guidance) to the
CoP.
Adequate funds are also essential to purchase technology and/or to purchase
access to technology. These include computers for GIS (Geographical
Information Systems), and the satellite tracking systems which are used for
remote area surveillance, for example, CCAMLR's proposed Vessel
Monitoring System (VMS). These systems ensure the collection of data
which is accurate, timely and objective. Computers are used by the
secretariats of GATT and WHO to collect and collate global trade and health
statistics, and to assess national reports and the performance of countries on
issues such as AIDS (Jonsson, 1992; 1993), and secretariats rely heavily on
increasingly sophisticated technology for the accurate collection of data on
sensitive issues as in the case of illegal fishing in CCAMLR waters.
Satellite technology is now used for a host of reporting and performance
review activities. It is commonly used for tracking fish stocks and collecting
data on fisheries catches; for arms control/security surveillance activities to
detect the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction; the collection of
climate change data; the detection of changes in the ozone layer; the detection
of habitat destruction in the Amazon rainforest, and changes in
desertification in the Sahel, Africa; and most recently, the detection of sites of
genocide in Africa and Europe.
The advantage of using technology for 10 reporting purposes wherever
possible, lies in its accuracy and relative objectivity. However, interpretation
and analysis of the information collected, is usually the responsibility of
national bureaucrats, secretariat personnel, and the expert consultants hired
by the secretariat. These processes are vulnerable to the intrusion of
subjectivity and bias, and can become implementation 'hot spots' for the
secretariat if stakeholders doubt a secretariat's impartiality in data analysis.
More will be said about this in considering secretariat relations with NGOs,
but governments may also question a secretariat's reliability, particularly if its
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data analysis casts a negative light on a county's performance, as happened
with the CITES ivory trade (Pers. Com. CITES Sec. 1995).
Often the technology required is owned by nations which allow 'friendly' IOs
access to their data collection facilities - for a fee. CCAMLR uses the
Australian Antarctic Division's data base. This technology does not come
cheaply. It is self-evident that non-and/or late payment of national
contributions limits a secretariat's ability to plan and to carry out tasks which
depend on the use of sophisticated technological systems, by restricting the
organization's capacity to purchase access to essential data.
Finally, payment problems related to national contributions have an adverse,
ripple effect on all organizational activities, none more so than on reporting
and performance appraisal, which lie at the center of a secretariat's portfolio
of substantive tasks, and which are significant in determining to what extent
a secretariat adopts a passive or a more activist stance vis-a-vis its
organizational performance and reputation.
UN management planning requires that most secretariats prepare a series of
organizational management plans, short-term, mid-range and long-term, to
chart their organizational priorities, resources, and workloads. Budgets are
then negotiated and agreed with the parties on the basis of these strategic
plans. Delays in, and failure to receive, country contributions on which these
plans are based, decrease the ability of a secretariat to orchestrate its plans.
Budgetary uncertainty means that an organization cannot allocate its internal
resources, purchase equipment, or hire the external expertise it requires to
carry out its tasks. In the case of reporting and performance review, the
logical follow-on is that these tasks may not get done, or are not completed to
the satisfaction of the members, resulting in accusations of organizational
inefficiency and laziness. Where a secretariat is unable to carry out
compliance monitoring activities, it may be subject to accusations,
particularly by NGOs, of dereliction of duty or even cover-up of member
non- compliance.
Problems in payments of national contributions are at the core of the
secretariat's budgetary difficulties, and late payments and/or non-payment
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are the traditional means by which parties maintain control over secretariat
autonomy and growth, including to selectively limit those secretariat
activities about which a country has reservations, performance assessment
and compliance related activities being in the vanguard. As noted by Ghebali
(1986:123) in commenting on the difficulties confronting the management
and administration of UNESCO, international budgets constitute a regular
source of political confrontation between the major contributors and the bulk
of the member states which happen to be the direct beneficiaries of
multilateral cooperation. He added that the UNESCO budget was "a regular
bone of contention between the secretariat and the major contributing
states," with the secretariat strongly arguing against the zero program growth
proposed by the major contributors who were concerned about the
secretariat's growth and influence.
Chronic Inadequacy Of Funds
A chronic shortfall of funds often leads to organizational malaise, and over
time, its demise as an effective organization. That is, the impacts of a chronic
funding shortage can go well beyond the inability of an organization to
perform specific tasks. The most obvious case of the difficulties of trying to
perform as an effective 10 in the face of a chronic inadequacy funds, is the
UN Secretariat. This organization's funding problems are predominantly the
result of the withholding of national contributions by the world's wealthiest
nation, the USA. The USA currently owes some $US1.5 billion in dues or
contributions to the UN. The protracted and organizationally destructive
process of bargaining between the US Congress and the UN Secretariat over
the issue of payment of US dues, has now effectively demasted the flagship of
global secretariats. It is a less than subtle reminder of the financial and
political power of powerful members.
I expect that it will take the UN Secretariat some years to recover from what I
gauge to be the organizational destabilization and the loss of credibility
caused by these intensely adversarial negotiations; the down-time and
expense involved as resources were temporarily diverted into a struggle for
organizational survival; the loss of leadership, and the lengthy readjustment
period that will be required as the new leader, Dr. Koffi Annan, works to
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establish his position and management style. It is also possible that the UN
Secretariat might retreat from an activist to a passive stance as it regroups to
work out ways to shore up its financial position and to minimize its
resource-dependence on the US. This could well include the formation of
coalitions or 'working partnerships' with countries from other political
groupings, particularly those from the South, such as the African countries
and Asia.
The replacement of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali with Kofi
Annan in 1997 attracted a lot of media attention. However. similar 'coups'
have happened in many treaty systems. Events surrounding the replacement
of Secretaries-General of the CITES Secretariat, the Ramsar Bureau, the
UNESCO Secretariat (Ghebali, 1986; Wells, 1986) and the UNCTAD
Secretariat (Weiss, 1986), demonstrate that national 'muscle-wielding'
against secretariats is not restricted to the UN Secretariat, nor is it solely the
prerogative of the US. The cases of Ramsar and CITES are discussed in detail
in Chapter 5.
Tied or Conditional funding
Individual countries and international financial institutions such as the
World Bank, IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the GEF, are the main
sources of conditional funding. My research found no evidence of
conditional or tied funding being used for reporting and performance
assessment purposes. It is more likely to be used for capacity building which
is considered a more positive use of funds than is performance appraisal
which may have negative connotations of surveillance. Nations are
understandably reluctant to provide funds which might be used for the
performance assessment of a colleague, as in time, they may be on the
receiving end themselves. Performance appraisal, and compliance
monitoring are viewed as potential threats to national autonomy, unlike
capacity building which is seen as a more positive activity which enhances
rather than erodes confidence and cooperation among nations.
National capacity building is heavily dependent on external or additional
funding. Without this funding many capacity building enterprises would not
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take place, as the costs associated with participation in the ever-increasing
number of international conventions are prohibitive for many smaller
nations such as those in the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) group,
less developed countries, and countries with economies in transition.
Governments have to pay annual contributions for the upkeep and
operation of the treaty infrastructure. Their representatives have to attend
regular meetings of their CoPs and subsidiary bodies (usually in Geneva or
New York), where they may not have a permanent diplomatic presence, to
off-set the need for delegates to travel from their home countries.
Membership of a treaty brings with it a host of legislative, regulatory,
technical, administrative, and enforcement responsibilities which must be
put in place if a country is to fulfil its international legal obligations. Not to
do so, risks sanctions for non-compliance - at best 'shaming', at worst,
economic and military sanctions such as trade bans and, for example, the on-
ground installation of UN peacekeeping forces in a sovereign nation.
Membership of international agreements has thus become an onerous task
for many countries, and without external funding for capacity building many
would not have the funds to meet their treaty obligations.
Traditionally it has been financial support from Northern industrialized
countries which has assisted less developed countries with capacity building.
This has taken several forms: the provision of technological support;
resource, information, and skill sharing; and direct financial aid. The latter
usually comes from the sources mentioned, and traditionally it has been the
role of the secretariat to act a match-maker or go-between, in assisting to
match projects with donors. On some occasions this has caused problems for
all, the donor, the recipient and the secretariat.
The problems that conditional funding poses for a secretariat are: accusations
of preferential treatment in matching donors and recipients, such as
favouring certain counties or groups of countries in the matching process;
and accepting monies from sources of which some stakeholders disapprove.
Some environmental NGOs have been critical of the CITES Secretariat for
accepting funds from wildlife industry groups for use in capacity building in
developing countries. Their concern is that an industry group may attach
restrictions or conditions on how and where its funds can be used in order to
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advance specific industry objectives, rather than those of the convention. To
counter these concerns, CITES has initiated a register of approved donors.
This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
A secretariat needs to maintain its impartiality in the management of all
funding, particularly conditional funding. Failure to do so, can damage the
organization's reputation and credibility. Once the organization has lost the
trust of its stakeholders, it is immensely difficult to restore.
The UNCTAD Secretariat is an example of a global secretariat which lost its
credibility among powerful stakeholders, did not regain it, and in 1995 was
disempowered in the UN system by the withdrawal of the political support
and financial resources of powerful industrialized states. The UNCTAD
Secretariat has been described as a captive of the Group of 77, and it has been
argued that the UNCTAD Secretariat has fostered G77 interests at the expense
of those of other stakeholders, such as the United States and other western
countries (Weiss, 1986). As a result of the Secretariat's intimate links to the
Group of 77, it allegedly suffered from role confusion and lack of credibility,
was heavily criticized (Weiss 1986), and its growth and influence in the 1990s
declined dramatically, in parallel with the emergence of new IOs which also
represent developing country interests, and now compete with the UNCTAD
Secretariat for developing country funds.
Summary
The most serious financial problems for a secretariat are securing regular and
adequate funding. The alternative is financial uncertainty and an
organizational inability to perform substantive tasks, or even core tasks as in
the case of Ramsar's failure to provide institutionally for funding its CoP.
Supplementary or conditional funding from individual members and non-
state actors, while essential for successful treaty implementation, is
unreliable and variable. This means that all secretariats which wish to
develop and maintain proactive network management roles in
implementation and compliance have no alternative but to allocate (what
seems to be) a significant proportion of the time of their executive heads and
boundary-spanning personnel, to 'persuading' parties to pay their
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contributions on time, and in identifying additional sources of external
funding for essential implementation projects
Organizational Capacity And Management
Treaty implementation is resource-intensive although the pattern of the
resources needed for implementation may vary over time. As Young (1967)
notes, the extent to which a secretariat's functions can be diversified depends
on its organizational skills, resources (physical, personnel, scientific and
technical), and time. NGO and government representatives equate secretariat
success with the quality of its output, which in turn depends on the expertise
and skills of its leadership and personnel and the availability of resources
(Sandford, 1996). Where a secretariat, is unable to expand, diversify and
regularly update its resource base, its range of skills, and its tasks, the
organization's opportunities to grow and to exert influence can be severely
restricted.
Implementation requires a wide range of organizational resources: skilled
professional and support staff; extensive specialist and interorganizational
networks; increasingly sophisticated communication and information
technology (IT); and the often forgotten resource, time. In addition, the
implementation process contains a number of built-in organizational
management and administrative hazards, including surety of finance, staff
recruitment, training and continuity, and strategic planning (Sandford, 1994).
Personnel- Mix, Skills and Networks
Personnel Mix
Key obstacles in personnel planning, are the lack of budgetary certainty, and
difficulties among the parties in reaching agreement on strategic planning
priorities for the secretariat. The budget and the strategic plan are
instrumental in determining the mix of personnel required by a secretariat to
accomplish the tasks identified in the strategic plan. An inappropriate or
outdated personnel mix means that the secretariat will have difficulty in
delivering quality outputs and in achieving its organizational goals.
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There are two types of personnel employed by secretariats, professionals who
have expertise in law, public policy, science, economics, or technology; and
general or administrative support staff who act as translators and
interpreters, and are responsible for a myriad of administrative and public
relations tasks, the distribution of publications, and organizing the logistics of
international meetings and satisfying delegates requirements. One of the
most important resource management tasks of a secretariat is getting the
right personnel and skill mix, such as the number of professional to support
staff and within those categories, the types of personnel and the range of
skills needed to perform specific tasks at a given point of time in the treaty's
implementation history.
The number of generalists among secretariat professionals has diminished in
the 1990s and there appears to be increasing dependence on specialists who
are experts in specific aspects of an issue such as in the science or economics
of climate change, forestry, biodiversity or hazardous waste management.
These areas of specialization can then be narrowed even further. For
example, a climate change scientist may be an expert in atmospheric physics
or oceanography, but rarely both. The disadvantages of a generalist-specialist
imbalance in an IO lie in the breadth of skills that personnel bring, or do not
bring, to the organization.
Trends in favor of greater professional specialization over the past 15 years,
most noticeably in the more reductionist disciplines of science and
economics, seem to contradict the global need for a more interdisciplinary
approach to resource management, a greater focus on issue-linkage, and an
emphasis on improved interaction and collaboration among international
institutions. These are all areas which rely on well-developed negotiation
and communication skills which are characteristic of international
generalists who are experienced in international public sector management
and diplomacy. They are skills which are apparently lacking in many
scientific and economic experts. In 1995, this point was made by the executive
heads and senior personnel of the Ramsar Bureau and the secretariats of
CITES, CBD and the FCCC. Professional personnel in IUCN, IWRB and
UNEP made similar comments. They all commented on the need to obtain
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more generalists on staff in order to maintain a better balance of skills
(Ramsar Bureau;- CITES Sec; CBD Sec; FCCC Sec; IUCN; IWRB; UNEP, 1995).
In their opinions, the personnel balance in some treaty secretariats has, in
recent years, been weighted too much in favor of specialists. Their comments
relate to the question: What is the best mix of generalist and specialist
personnel to optimize secretariat output and effectiveness?
Personnel Skills
Another constraint facing some secretariats is keeping personnel skills up-to-
date. Advances in information technology (IT) have been extremely rapid
and it has been very difficult for many secretariat personnel to keep up to
date with technological developments, especially in the smaller treaty
secretariats. It appears to be less of a problem in large IOs with greater task
diversity, larger budgets, and regular in-house training programs.
Furthermore, access to sophisticated IT skills is less readily available in some
developing countries than it is in industrialized countries. This poses a
recruitment dilemma for secretariats where selection on the basis of
geographical distribution is not always compatible with the organizational
need for personnel with sophisticated IT, scientific/technical or data
management knowledge and skills. The dilemmas of internal social and
cultural diversity will be discussed later. On the other hand, IT processing
skills can be rapidly learned whereas cultural sensitivity, negotiation,
diplomacy, conflict management skills are less speedily acquired.
Personnel Networks
Personnel recruited to a secretariat bring with them a wide range of pre-
secretariat experience and professional networks in national bureaucracies,
industry organizations, environmental NGOs, partner organizations and the
UN system at large. These experiences and networks can be treaty system
assets (Sandford, 1996), but they may also be regarded as liabilities, as when
secretariat personnel are accused of succumbing to pressure from their
national governments or from NGO colleagues. Extensive and diverse
personal relationships and networks built up over years of service in IOs, are
also important sources of information, but are similarly subject to criticism.
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Another aspect of potential liabilities or obstacles created by organizational
networks, is the relationship between a treaty secretariat and its partner
organization. This relationship has a profound effect on the resources
available to a secretariat, especially where the partner organization is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the allocation of resources to the
secretariat. The secretariats of CBD and Basel are wholly dependent on the
largesse of UNEP for resource allocation, and the CITES Secretariat partly so.
These secretariats are firstly dependent on contributions from their parties,
who they have to constantly harass to pay, and to pay on time. The
contributions then go into a trust account held by UNEP, which deducts 10%
for overheads, before distributing funds to the secretariat. This aspect of
secretariat-partner organisation relationships has been a perennial source of
tension, between UNEP and its secretariats, especially the CITES Secretariat
(Pers Com CBS; Basel to CITES Sec, 1995).
Where the CITES Secretariat differs from the other two UNEP secretariats, is
that although the CITES Secretariat manages its own trust fund, UNEP still
claims a 10% share for administrative expenses associated with being a
partner organization. CITES member contributions are thus a de facto source
of revenue for UNEP (UNEP/ELI Coord. 2/7 9 May, 1995; Pers. Coms. CITES
Sec. 1995). The UNEP secretariats are therefore in a double jeopardy situation
with respect to receipt of organizational resources.
Data Management and Technology
Secretariat information acquisition and distribution have been accelerated by
developments in electronic transmission and computer and
communications technologies over the past 20 years. Information technology
has been a mixed blessing for secretariats. On the one hand, it facilitates more
extensive, accurate, rapid acquisition of the vast amounts of increasingly
complex scientific and other information required to implement a
convention. The down-side is that greater, and frequently more unrealistic,
stakeholder expectations of secretariat output have accompanied this surge in
global communications and information technology. Identifying data and
information needs, obtaining the information, processing, analysing, and
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turning it into reports and briefings for CoP and public consumption takes
time. In spite of the multitude of IT innovations, there have been no
comparable innovations in the concept of time. There are still only 24 hours
in any one day. As Skolnikoff (1993:217) sums up,
The increasing generation and flow of information worldwide creates major problems for
policy makers. Handling and assimilation of information will, as a result, continue to be
a growing problem for all governments.
In my opinion, information overload is an increasing problem for IOs as the
managers of international information flows. Political expectations,
information demands and the pressures brought about by IT developments,
lack of personnel, inadequate funding and organizational resources, and the
limited amount of working time available, all contribute to stakeholder and
media catchcries of organizational inefficiency.
Workloads and Time Management
Working in a secretariat can be a thankless task. The workloads and
deadlines can be punishing and in treaty secretariats, unlike many UN
agency secretariats, professional staff are not permanent employees, but are
usually on short-term contracts (Sandford, 1996). Chronic understaffing of
treaty secretariats is a significant contributor to stakeholder criticisms of poor
time management by personnel. However, a more objective examination of
the nature and volume of organizational workloads, reveals the pressures
created by an increasing number of parties and unrealistic political deadlines,
and the demands of processing enormous volumes of data and information.
The amount of secretariat time consumed by data and information
processing has become a major organizational constraint. In all
contemporary conventions, there is a veritable deluge of regular and
extraordinary meetings of CoPs, Standing Committees, subsidiary bodies, and
a multitude of ad hoc working groups, to say nothing of inter- and intra-
secretariat meetings and meeting with stakeholders and partner
organizations. Secretariat personnel must be present at all of these meetings.
In addition, all the participants in this smorgasbord of sessional and
intersessional meetings require agendas, briefing papers, technical reports
and minutes, to be prepared, amended and distributed before, during and.
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Secretariat staff, must be on hand at all times to answer questions, locate
missing (or forgotten) information, and advise members as needed. Then, as
a result of resolutions, recommendations, and decisions taken in these
meetings, secretariats are assigned further substantive tasks. So time flies.
Staffing levels in environmental treaty secretariats are demonstrably
inadequate to handle the volume and complexity of information that surges
across secretariat desks on a daily basis. While the UN Secretariat had over
500,000 staff in 1995 (New York Times, October, 1995), in the same year, the
Ramsar Bureau had a total of 17 staff (including 6 professional) to assist 85
parties; the CITES Secretariat had a total of 22 staff (14 professional) to service
128 parties; the Basel Secretariat had 4 professional staff to deal with 83
parties; and the FCCC Secretariat had 19 professional staff and a total
organizational complement of 31 personnel to service 118 parties (Sandford,
1996). In 1995 CCAMLR had 4 professional personnel and a total
establishment of 14 full and part-time staff (including translators) to service
28 parties.
Certainly, the UN Secretariat deals with multiple issue-areas, unlike global
environmental treaties which are limited to dealing with one issue-area.
However, generalizations of unrestricted and unwarranted bureaucratic
expansion by many governments and authors in reference to the latter
group, cannot be justified, based as they are on government criticisms of the
UN Secretariat and UN agency secretariats such as those of UNESCO which,
in October, 1995, had 1,105 staff and 727 professionals at Headquarters, plus
283 professionals and 329 support staff in the field. The UNDP Secretariat had
5,500 staff in November, 1995, of which 85% were in UNDP country offices;
and the most recent global 10, the WTO (World Trade Organization)
Secretariat which replaced the GATT Secretariat, had 420 staff at November,
1995 (The Green Globe Yearbook, 1996).
Information overload poses problems of time constraints. Wealthy Northern
nations such as Japan and the USA are well ahead of other nations in the IT
race. This creates information production and processing expectations that
other countries cannot hope to meet. Most nations are now members a huge
number of international conventions, not just environmental conventions
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(Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1994). This means that their delegates and
political representatives spend inordinate amounts of time scurrying around
the globe from one meeting to another, trying to keep abreast of the relentless
flow of information they need to make decisions - decisions that will
eventually impact on their domestic constituents as well as on their
relationships with other nations. While secretariats are overworked, they
have the relative luxury of a single treaty focus, say RAMSAR or CITES or
CCAMLR. For national governments, the volume of work and the
complexities of implementing environmental Treaty A, can be multiplied
many times, as these countries are also signatories to multilateral and
bilateral security, human rights, and commodity treaties. They do not have
time to analyse and absorb the enormous amounts of information being
produced with the help of modem technology.
Information overload and management is a major problem for smaller
countries and less developed countries. Not only is information physically
overloading the international system, but lot of counties have neither the
time, nor the resources to read it, let alone digest it, as a basis for sound
negotiations and decision making. This then creates problems for secretariats
to whom these countries turn for direct assistance in managing and
interpreting the information flow itself, and for assistance in obtaining the
resources necessary for capacity building.
Summary
The organizational capacity and management of a secretariat has a direct
bearing on its effectiveness, efficiency and its ability to influence policy
outcomes. It seems there is no optimum size, personnel mix nor
information management system. However chronic under-resourcing,
excessive workloads (including increasing information and data loads) and
often unrealistic time limitations for task accomplishment, are common
obstacles confronting environmental treaty secretariats. The problems faced
by these secretariats in juggling stakeholder demands and expectations and
insufficient organizational resources to ensure successful output delivery, is
acknowledged by many state and non-state actors. However such
acknowledgment does not necessarily translate into improved funding or
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more staff and equipment. It remains for secretariat heads and managers to
'manage creatively'.
Social And Cultural Diversity
While the secretariat personnel I interviewed in 1993 may not have viewed
either external or internal social and cultural diversity as constraints
(Sandford, 1994), there is sufficient indication from the literature and from
my 1995 field work interviews, to indicate that diversity both within and
outside the organization can be problematical in several ways. It is important
for convention equity and harmony, that geographical representation is
acknowledged in operational terms, for example, in decisions about
secretariat work priorities, resource allocation and service delivery, as well as
in the composition of the staffing profile of the organization.
The centralization or decentralization of service delivery is a politically and
organizationally sensitive issue. The parties of many UN agencies,
conventions and their IOs, such as UNESCO, UNCTAD, FAO, ILO, UNHCR,
WTO, NPT, CWC, ICRW, and the environmental conventions of WHC,
Ramsar, CITES, Basel, the London Convention, MARPOL (International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships), FCCC, CBD, CCD
are all located in Europe. Few, notably UNEP and the Montreal Protocol
(Kenya), and CCAMLR (Australia), have headquarters in other than New
York or Europe. UNDP is a hybrid. Its headquarters are in New York, but its
operations are decentralized and service delivery is coordinated from its
numerous country offices. See the UNDP staffing profile mentioned
previously.
Institutional centralization stems from the days when Europe and New York
were the centres of international relations and diplomatic activity, but times
have changed. G77 countries are now a potent political and increasingly, an
economic and military force, in global politics. It is understandable that they
would prefer to see these changes reflected in the infrastructure and
implementation of international agreements. However, Northern countries
(and frequently their IOs) have generally resisted decentralization or
regionalization of their structures and activities, preferring to operate from
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their headquarters in Europe or the USA, in spite of growing pressure from
developing countries for a more decentralized approach.
International precedents and UN recruitment formulae tend to be used to
resolve the issue of geographical distribution in recruitment. However, the
need for a more regional emphasis in the implementation of all global
treaties has now become an international norm, spurred on by the growth of
G77 power in international politics; an increase in the number of regional
economic and cultural alliances such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Conference), and the EEC (European Economic Community); and the
pragmatism of bureaucrats and NGOs who are primarily responsible for
managing treaty implementation at the sub-regional level.
Managing External Diversity: Social, Cultural and Geographical
Decentralization of convention implementation structures and activities is
therefore a practical manifestation of the recognition of social, cultural,
political, economic, and military differences among countries. Treaty success
ultimately depends on the construction and delivery of resources and
programs/projects that recognize and appreciate these differences. Structures
and projects that are effective in terms of achieving on-ground results in the
USA or Europe are unlikely to work in Africa or Asia, where history, social
and cultural structures, values, and priorities are vastly different from those
of western Europe and North America.
These differences must be taken into account by secretariats in brokering the
changes necessary to achieve treaty goals. Western abhorrence of the
consumption of wildlife body parts in the traditional medicines and cultural
practices of some Asian countries must be understood and addressed in the
context of those cultures. The CITES Secretariat has to tread a delicate path on
such issues. It has to honor the values underpinning the objectives of the
convention and encourage relevant member countries do likewise. It must
also assist the parties to change attitudes and practices that have been going
on for centuries. At the same time, the CITES Secretariat has to counter the
impatience of many Northern environmental NGOs which are outraged by
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what they perceive to be the unnecessary and inappropriate consumption of
endangered and vulnerable wildlife by these cultures.
Although the importance and sensitivity of issues such as this are well
documented in CITES' and WWF correspondence and reports and media
releases (WWF FOCUS, 1996;TRAFFIC Bulletin, Vol.15, no.1, 1994; Nowell,
Chyi and Pei, 1992), the apparent high level of concern does not appear to
have been translated into organizational practice. In June, 1995, responsibility
for overseeing CITES implementation in the Asian region was carried out by
the Deputy-Secretary General who was also responsible for CITES
implementation in the Northern American region, plus was second-in-
charge of the Secretariat, a full-time job in itself. To a very limited extent he
was assisted in his Asian region work, by a junior staff member and recent
recruit, who was on a 2 year secondment as a Junior Program Officer GPO)
from a country in the region which was paying her salary. National
environmental budgetary constraints meant that the officer's term of
secondment to the CITES Secretariat was unlikely to continue beyond one
term as her government wanted her to return (Per.Coms. CITES Sec. 1995).
Dealing with such issues from secretariat headquarters in Geneva, rather
than from a permanent management presence in the Asian region, raises the
question: How effective can a convention such as CITES really be, if its
organizational structures and management practices fail to appreciate the
enormity of the task of dealing with social and cultural beliefs which appear
to run counter to the spirit of the treaty?
The sands of time are running out for many CITES endangered and
threatened species. Tigers, whose body parts make up a major segment of the
illegal traditional medicine trade in Asian markets, may be extinct in the
wild by 2000 (WWF FOCUS, 1996; TRAFFIC Bulletin, Vol.15, no. 1, 1994;
Linden, 1994) This would seem to be a sufficiently sound argument in favor
of decentralization of CITES operations to support an on-ground presence in
CITES' Asian region and the provision of additional secretariat resources, if
the parties were seriously committed to respecting and dealing effectively
with the social and cultural differences which constrain the achievement of
treaty objectives.
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When conventions and their IOs talk about the significance of recognizing
social and cultural diversity in treaty implementation, the focus is squarely
on 'diversity' as it applies to national entities. The UN has developed a
formula based on regional rotation among its geographical regions
(geographical representation), which ensures that each region is represented
in a convention's decision making forums and in the staffing profile of its
secretariat. The intent of this policy is to ensure equality of representation of
all regions. An example of this policy is in the appointment of the UN
Secretary-General. The incumbent is selected from among nominations put
forward to the UN Security Council by each UN region. Each region takes it
in turn (rotation) to nominate a candidate(s) for selection. At present an
African nominee holds the post.
Geographical (political) representation is not the same as social and cultural
diversity, and recognition of the status indigenous peoples has been a glaring
omission from discussions of geographical representation, in spite of the
adverse impacts of international economic development and environmental
conservation initiatives on their cultural survival. International political
recognition of indigenous peoples is threatening for most national
governments. In many countries, claims for indigenous land rights conflict
with legal and political concepts of individual private property rights or state
ownership of land. After water, land is the resource most fundamental to
human survival, and attempts by indigenous and tribal peoples to exert
ownership and management control over areas of land, are interpreted as
threats to state control and even as a national security risk. "Threats to
national security" are commonly used by national governments as a
rationale for a country to exert control over minority groups which, it
perceives, may threaten the status quo.
In countries such as Indonesia and Sarawak where there is a long tradition of
management and control of forest resources by the State, there is resistance
towards recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples and to granting them
some degree of control over these resources (Sweptson and Tomei, 1994).
Indigenous peoples in the Amazon River catchment including the
Yanomami of Brazil and Venezuela, also have to deal with the often armed
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opposition of national governments and international corporations, in their
attempts to preserve their cultures, in the face of the adverse impacts of
economic developments such as forestry and mining (Ramos, 1993; Centeno
and Elliot, 1993).
The issue-linkage of economic development (forestry, mining), human
rights (indigenous peoples), environmental management, and (purportedly)
national security, raises potential difficulties for the implementation of
treaties such as the ITTA. International concern about the violation of the
rights of indigenous peoples is gathering momentum in consumer countries
of the North, particularly those of Europe and North America. However the
current reality is that in spite of issue-linkage and Northern concerns for the
rights of indigenous peoples, the cultural and social significance of their
traditional practices are recognised by few international trade, security, or
environmental conventions or their IOs, with the exception of the CBD.
Indigenous peoples often seek the assistance of IOs such as those of UNDP,
UNEP, ILO, environmental treaty secretariats, international NGOs and the
media, to put their views, to canvass international political support, and to
seek financial assistance for their causes, particularly where national
governments are not responsive to their appeals for equity, social and
economic justice, and access to resources and decision-making. However, I
am not aware that indigenous minorities are represented in the staffing
profile of international treaty secretariats, as for these organizations to
actively encourage such representation would be politically risky. It could be
construed by governments as a direct intervention in domestic politics, and
in any event it is governments which nominate secondees to a secretariat. I
am also not aware of indigenous peoples being nominated for secretariat
secondments by NGOs
Managing Internal Diversity
The tension between the appointment of personnel on merit or as required
by the UN geographical representation formula (known as 'geographical
distribution' in UN personnel policy), is a perennial problem for all
secretariats. This tension is evident in the implementation and resource
159
allocation decisions taken by the parties, and in the politics of staffing and
managing a secretariat. The situation has been exacerbated in recent years by
developments in technology and science where Northern countries are the
primary sources of the expertise and skills needed to implement treaties on
complex security issues such as nuclear and chemical weapons, and
environmental issues such as climate change.
The problem for secretariats is how to put into practice the UN's geographical
distribution formula, and at the same time recruit the expertise needed to
deliver the quality secretariat outputs expected by the parties and on which
treaty and secretariat survival depends.
Much has been written about these difficulties as experienced by the
secretariats of UNCTAD (Weiss, 1982: 1986) and UNESCO (Wells, 1986),
during a period that Wells describes as the "decolonization" of UNESCO,
where appointments to senior management and professional posts in
UNESCO, clearly mirrored the shift in the power balance of global politics,
from Northern to Southern dominance. The concerns expressed by both
Weiss and Wells, relate to the inadequacy of the personnel skills and
expertise recruited to the secretariats where appointments are made on the
basis of geographical loyalties rather than on merit.
For most secretariats, recruitment is not just a tussle between geographical
distribution and merit. They have to simultaneously juggle organizational
size and heterogeneity. It is impossible to optimize organizational
heterogeneity without increasing the size of an organization, or sacrificing
personnel and skills. The bulk of the world's economic wealth, scientific,
technological and economic expertise is controlled by Northern countries,
which understandably wish to be well represented in IOs as a means of
keeping an eye on their own interests. Historically, most UN secretariats
have been dominated by personnel recruited from these countries. However,
with the acceleration of decolonization since 1945, Southern countries have
achieved improved representation in secretariat staffing profiles consistent
with the UN's geographical distribution policy.
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The UN Charter Article 101.3 makes the geographical quota an elementary
principle of filling organizational posts, and the ratio of member states'
financial contributions determines the approximate number of posts that
each member will obtain in the organization. Justification for geographical
quotas is based on two arguments. Quotas are thought to be politically
necessary as international institutions must reflect universal membership,
and an international administration and its decision-making should profit
from the advantages of organizational heterogeneity (Weiss, 1982).
It is a Catch 22 situation for secretariats. For many secretariats, they cannot
increase in size to accommodate geographical interests without forfeiting
organizational quality, which in turn is a risk to organizational survival,
dependent as secretariats are on national contributions. Alternatively, to opt
for merit at the expense of representativeness, is also tempting fate, as if
parties take offence at being excluded, payment of their contributions is likely
to be 'delayed'. It can seem a no-win situation for a secretariat.
Organizational Loyalties And Leadership
The organizational loyalty of a member of the ICS should be, first and
foremost, to his/her employer, the 10. However as Weiss points out, "a
person recruited, hired, and promoted according to his or her national
origins would normally hesitate to ignore them" (Weiss, 1982:293). The
tension between national loyalty and loyalty to the ICS with its tenet of
impartiality, creates a dilemma for the person who takes an oath of allegiance
to the ideals of the ICS, but whose long-term career probably lies in his/her
home country, rather than with the ICS. When a national government
attempts to exert pressure on its nationals to use their position in the
secretariat in the national, rather than the international, interest this can
create a conflict of loyalties for staff.
Problems of National Government Influence
The difficulty here is in reconciling international loyalty and international
efficiency with the desire of member states to control their nationals in
international service (Weiss, 1982:294). A number of comments made by
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secretariat staff, government delegates and NGOs during my 1995 interviews
suggest that national government pressure varies among nations, some
having a reputation for attempting to exert pressure on their nationals, both
inside and outside of their office hours, and quite blatantly at times. In
addition to putting pressure on staff, as Weiss (1982:294) notes, and my
interview data supports, "[some] governments increasingly exert significant
pressure for all professional posts no matter how junior".
In his comments on Soviet and US techniques for exerting pressure on
nationals in international civil service, Weiss (1982) notes that it was widely
known that Soviet international civil servants were dependent on their
government for initial appointments and for subsequent promotions, and
that the United States' position towards the international civil service has
always been ambivalent. He makes it clear that the US has no compunction
in using its political and economic power to influence UN staff
appointments. The 1997 replacement of the UN Secretary- General, Dr.
Boutros-Ghali (apparently in response to US concerns), seems to lend weight
to this argument. Weiss concludes that: UN personnel policies reinforce the
primacy of national interest in international decision-making; the
acceptability of this practice is almost unquestioned; and it certainly has a
negative impact on organizational integrity. In this way, actions such as those
of the former Soviet Union and the USA sanction the legitimacy of national
interests and the acceptability of influencing organizational decision-making
through national representatives in an international administration. Weiss
(1982:298)
Organizational Leadership as a Constraint
The role of leadership in the performance of international regimes is
contested in academic circles, many political scientists arguing that it is of
little importance or is exaggerated in analysis of regime politics (Weiss, 1982).
Young (1991) argues to the contrary. In his opinion, leadership is a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for success in efforts to reach agreement on
constitutional contracts at the international level, and it "looms large" in the
context of institutional bargaining. Young identifies three forms of
leadership: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual
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leadership. Structural leaders are experts in translating the possession of
material resources into bargaining leverage. They act as agents of the parties
in bargaining processes. Entrepreneurial leaders rely on negotiating skill to
frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and put together deals.
Intellectual leaders are individuals who rely on the power of ideas to shape
the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the
issues at stake and to orient their thinking about the options available to
come to terms with these issues. Hall's (1994) case study of the evolution of
leadership in the Antarctic Treaty System confirms Young's hypothesis that
political leadership is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which plays a
critical role in regime formation. Hall suggests that entrepreneurial,
structural and intellectual leadership are necessary for regime formation to
occur. However neither author deals specifically with the leadership of IOs in
regime implementation, nor leadership as an 10 constraint.
To study leadership as an 10 constraint is a research topic of its own, and it
has not been a major focus of my research. However, my 1993 and 1995
fieldwork indicate that organizational leadership can, and does, make a
difference to organizational success. The executive head of a secretariat can be
an asset or a constraint for the following reasons. First, the way in which the
executive head views the organization's role and organizational potential in
treaty implementation, is a major determinant of the extent to which the
organization pursues an activist or a passive path. This is confirmed by the
substantial literature on UN secretariats as outlined in Chapter 1. Second, the
formal leader or executive head of a secretariat personifies the organizations
values and its raison d'etre in the external environment, in this case the
treaty system, and may argue for and protect (or not protect), the organization
from 'plunder' by states in the 'resource wars' over budgets and
organizational responsibilities.
Third, the performance and leadership style of the executive head has an
effect on organizational loyalty. A leader who protects organizational values
and resources is more likely to have the support of his/her employees than
one who does not, as s/he acts as a buffer between them and the parties. In
protecting organizational interests, the executive head is also seen to be
protecting the individuals who make up the organization. Conversely,
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organizational membership also provides an executive head with a mantle
of protection. There is, after all, safety in numbers. It is a reciprocal
relationship.
In event of a conflict of interests or goals between the secretariat and the
parties, it is the leader rather than the staff, who will be sacrificed first in a
gesture of appeasement to the most powerful stakeholders. A former
executive head of CITES was reputedly asked to resign to pacify powerful
environmental NGOs in the USA who had been vociferous in their criticism
of his alleged pro-ivory trade stance (La Pointe, 1992; Pers.Coms. CITES Sec;
Pers.Com, La Pointe, 1995; Pers.Com.WWF 1995)
Where a leader does not appear to put the organization and its personnel
ahead of his/her personal ambitions, such a leader will not protect the
organization from external pressures nor inspire loyalty. Any resulting
internal dissatisfaction has a way of 'becoming known' to parties, who can
then act on behalf of secretariat members to remove the leader.
Summary
In conclusion, attempts by national governments to influence secretariat
practice via pressure on their nationals within the secretariat appear to be less
of an organizational management problem than does leadership. In any
organization, the style and strength of its leadership has a significant bearing
on both organizational performance and how the organization is perceived
by its stakeholders and by staff. Although leadership was not a specific focus
of my study, my research indicates that leadership is a important
phenomenon in successful treaty implementation, as it is in regime
formation. While all secretariat executive heads (and their staff) provided
intellectual leadership, the leaders of activist secretariats were primarily
entrepreneurial leaders who also exerted structural leadership in resource
acquisition. This could well be an area for further research.
Implementation Conflicts
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Conflicts are costly. They take their toll on secretariats politically, financially
and organizationally. The difficulties of predicting conflict emergence create
strategic planning, network management and resource allocation problems
for a secretariat, especially for those secretariats with small budgets and few
personnel relative to their members expectations and their organizational
functions. Implementation conflicts are thus major consumers of
organizational resources.
My research has identified three groups of conflicts in which secretariats are
regularly involved. They are conflicts: between and among treaty members;
between members and non-state actors such as IGOs and NGOs; and in-
country disagreements between governments and domestic NGOs, and
among competing national bureaucracies.
In this section I merely seek to outline the nature and some of the
implications of implementation conflicts as organizational constraints.
Considerable detail will follow in subsequent chapters. I have chosen to
structure the dissertation in this way so as to optimize the attention given to
what I contend to be significant obstacles to the implementation of
international agreements, but which have been largely unrecognized in both
scholarship and practice, namely 'implementation conflicts'.
In the chapters that follow this one, I give numerous examples of conflicts
and disputes in which personnel from the Ramsar Bureau, the CITES
Secretariat and to a lesser extent the CCAMLR Secretariat, have been
involved as intermediaries. In Chapter 5, I outline why these obstacles,
(among others) have emerged in each convention. In Chapter 6 I examine
how each secretariat has dealt with the conflicts and disputes that have
emerged during implementation. In Chapter 7 I analyse a key, unexpected
research finding, - that secretariats have used, and continue to use, conflict
management processes unwittingly to overcome the implementation
difficulties they encounter. It is my belief that this finding offers
opportunities for secretariats to turn implementation conflicts as obstacles,
into opportunities for organizational development.
165
Conflicts among Members
The unwritten lore of network management and treaty implementation is
that conflicts are inevitable, yet when they emerge they are greeted, at least
publicly, with surprise. Perversely, conflicts can often be foreseen by
secretariats. Through the formal and informal activities associated with the
performance of their three, key substantive tasks, secretariats often act as
instruments of early warning of conflict emergence. Secretariats, as the
impartial and trusted confidants of many stakeholders and as the lynch-pin
organizations in information flows, are extremely well placed institutionally
to prevent and manage conflicts that might emerge at any stage during an
implementation process.
In anticipation of such events, secretariats need to have an organizational
policy on if (and how), they might be involved in conflict management and
dispute resolution. In arriving at a decision on a secretariat's stance in
relation to conflict management, much will depend on the leadership given
by the executive head of the secretariat, the advice that the executive head
receives from the parties and the extent to which s/he is prepared to support
treaty objectives in the face of political opposition from some parties. A
passive secretariat will go to almost any lengths to avoid being involved or
implicated, directly or indirectly, in conflict (Archer, 1992). A passive
secretariat tends to view conflict as a mortal threat to organizational
survival. This certainly seems to be the attitude adopted by the CCAMLR
Secretariat which operates in a state of 'conflict denial' as discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6.
In contrast, an activist secretariat such as the CITES Secretariat takes a more
positive attitude to conflict and sees it as an opportunity to use its
considerable conflict management expertise and skills, and to demonstrate its
credibility as an impartial ICS. It therefore sees conflict management as a risk
worth taking, as a means to enhance its organizational reputation and
(potentially) its resources. In taking such a stance, an activist secretariat
usually justifies its actions as being in the interests of achieving the
objectives of convention.
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Sometimes, of course, calculated risks such as these do not succeed. Former
UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was heavily criticized for his
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Somalia (The Australian 22-23 June,
1996). Overall, the opportunities appear to outweigh the risks. After all,
governments come and governments go at fairly short intervals, but the
survival of secretariats, in one form or another, is more enduring.
In Country-Conflicts
In-country conflicts in which environmental treaty secretariats become
involved either directly or indirectly in their capacity as network managers
and multilateral brokers (MLBs), often concern advising the national
environmental management agencies responsible for implementing and
enforcing in-country convention compliance, on how they might handle
resource allocation conflicts among competing national agencies. In fact,
conflicts among government departments within countries are perceived to
be more of a problem for the Ramsar Bureau than are conflicts among
parties. The Ramsar Bureau regularly assists with managing conflicts that
develop among stakeholders within a country over issues such as
monitoring (Pers.Coms. Ramsar Bureau, 1995).
Problems relating to inconsistencies in CITES domestic implementation and
compliance measures, are the most frequent sources of conflict both within
and among CITES member countries (Pers.Coms. CITES Sec,1995).
In CCAMLR's case, little information was forthcoming from either the
secretariat or delegates. There was considerable reluctance by these
stakeholders to acknowledge, let alone to discuss with an outsider, any
problems CCAMLR might experience, even though the media and
environmental and fishing industry NGOs regularly highlighted the
difficulties for CCAMLR of monitoring and enforcing CCAMLR
requirements in such a remote area. Incidents of illegal fishing are the most
frequently publicized of the conflicts. CCAMLR enforcement is carried out by
member governments some of whom are criticized by NGOs for their
apparent lack of political will to prosecute their own nationals for fishing
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illegally. Some countries also appear to lack the capacity to enforce
compliance.
Conflicts and NGOs
Conflicts involving NGOs and Ramsar parties, and between the Bureau and
NGOs, appear to be rare. Nor are conflicts always viewed as negative
phenomena. For example, NGOs use conflict to draw public and political
attention to an issue such as changes in the ecological character of a
transboundary wetland. In situations such as this, a stakeholder, usually an
affected member, may ask the Bureau to act as an 'honest broker'. In this
capacity, the Bureau helps both the members and the NGOs to reach
agreement on how such a problem might be addressed in a way that ensures
compliance with Ramsar requirements.
When tensions and conflicts develop between members and NGOs, the
CITES Secretariat is often called on to provide expert advice and to act as an
informal intermediary as occurred in negotiating the 1994 Lusaka Agreement
to manage African wildlife. Unfortunately, the historically-sound relations
between the CITES Secretariat and some environmental NGOs were soured
by NGO allegations in the late 1980s, that a former CITES Secretary- General
was biased in favor of ivory trade interests. I discuss this conflict in detail in
later chapters. However, the Secretariat's reaction was to keep the channels of
communication between the organization and NGOs open, regardless of this
incident.
The CCAMLR Secretariat's response to chronic conflict between several of its
parties and environmental NGOs, particularly Greenpeace, appears to have
been passive. The Secretariat sees no point in challenging party hostility to
these organizations, nor has it ever been asked to act as an intermediary in
this conflict. There do not appear to be comparable problems with CCAMLR
members' relations with fishing industry organizations.
Intraorganizational Impacts of Conflict
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The resource demands of conflicts extract a heavy toll on secretariats which
are chronically underfunded and under-resourced. The difficulties
commence with the lack of attention given to conflict prevention and
management in an organization's mission statement and strategic planning.
Mission statements and strategic plans are, in themselves, sporadic and
recent innovations in the case study secretariats.
First, parties are wary of extending treaty texts and secretariat management
guidelines to specifically include references to conflict prevention and
management as organizational goals or tasks in a secretariat's mission
statement. This stems from the reluctance of the parties to cede any form of
organizational self-determination, let alone control, to secretariats, and it is
expressed in criticisms of organizational excess which are not justified in the
case of environmental treaty secretariats (Sandford, 1994;1996). Failure to
formally acknowledge secretariat conflict management activity in a mission
statement or a statement of organizational objectives, precludes its inclusion
in strategic planning, or as a justification for resource acquisition and
resource allocation. The result is, that when conflict surfaces as it inevitably
must given the diversity of conflicting stakeholder interests over the time it
takes to implement a treaty, a secretariat is ill-equipped both in terms of
political endorsement and the availability of organizational resources, to
tackle the problem. Yet it is expected by most stakeholders that secretariats
should use their expertise and institutional position to deflect, defuse or 'sort
out' those issues that are causing such angst, and possibly militating against
the successful implementation of the convention.
In spite of the failure of parties to formally acknowledge the reality of
conflict, they nevertheless expect that when it emerges, the secretariat is
likely to be the first port-of-call for disaffected interests. The attraction of the
secretariat as a potential intermediary is: it has a global as distinct from a
partisan, perspective on convention issues; it is generally trusted by most
members; it is the institutional repository of information, knowledge, skill
and experience in treaty matters over time; and it has a more intimate
understanding of the positions and problems of all stakeholders than does
the CoP. The organization's professionalism and perceived impartiality are
also valued.
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Political caution and national saving face are important elements of
international diplomacy. For example, even when conflict is not a problem,
it is sometimes difficult for a country to negotiate bilaterally on an
environmental matter with a neighbouring country, when it may be in
dispute with that same country over a trade issue. In circumstances such as
this, providing that both parties are members of at least one common treaty,
the party concerned about the conflict, can seek the assistance of the
environmental treaty secretariat to approach the neighbouring country
and/or the trade secretariat on its behalf (Sec. Pers. Coms. CITES, Ramsar,
FCCC, CBD, WHC, Basel, 1995). In this way the secretariat 'manages' the
conflict by acting as an intermediary.
The problem for the secretariat is that conflict management tasks, while
crucial for maintaining convention harmony and positive policy outcomes,
cannot budgeted for as they do not officially exist. Scarce organizational
resources including the use of the expertise and time of professional
personnel and support staff, and travel budgets must be deployed to meet this
challenge. This takes away resources from other recognized activities.
Secretariats find it very difficult to explain publicly their apparent diversion
from officially sanctioned activities to less formal but critical ones, especially
where party confidentiality is involved.
Conflict management is a stressful task for even trained and experienced
intermediaries. It calls into question the professional conflict prevention and
management skills and competencies of secretariat personnel, and the
qualities of acceptability to the parties, sensitivity, patience and creativity,
which together arguably constitute key credentials of an accomplished
conflict manager or intermediary (Susskind and Babbitt, 1992; SPIDR 1995).
Professional expertise in a traditional discipline such as science, economics or
law, does not automatically equip a secretariat employee with effective
conflict management skills.
Pre-empting and dealing with conflict requires specific expertise and skills,
training, stamina, a sense of humor and a preparedness to be a scape-goat for
everything that could go wrong in assisting the participants to arrive at a
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mutually acceptable resolution of their difficulties. Intermediaries in
international public policy conflicts deal with multiple and complex issues, a
multitude of stakeholders with diverging interests and priorities, and
considerable issue and institutional uncertainty. Many secretariat staff would
argue that they are innately suited to the job of intermediaries and that they
perform as such in their day-to-day-work in the secretariat. The merits of this
argument have been touched on earlier and will be discussed in more detail
in Chapters 6 and 7.
Impacts on Secretariat Personnel
What has not been discussed, is the impact of conflicts on the personnel and
on the morale of these organizations. As conflict management tasks are not
formally acknowledged as additional tasks, personnel receive no recognition,
nor remuneration for performing personally and organizationally high-risk,
and stressful duties. High-profile intermediary activities generally fall to the
more senior and experienced professional personnel, and the executive head.
While senior staff are so engaged, their daily tasks must be delegated to
already overworked more junior and less experienced personnel. This may
result in a backlog of work and criticisms by members of organizational and
personal inefficiency (Pers. Com. CITES, FCCC, Basel Secs 1995).
Professional personnel perform as intermediaries in less conspicuous ways.
The implementation of most treaties and UN programs now has a regional
focus. This means that responsibility for successful implementation processes
and outcomes in a region is assigned to a particular staff member (in each
secretariat. This officer becomes the first point of contact for regional
stakeholders. It is usual practice to assign responsibility for a region to an
officer from a country in the region, as the secretariat and the parties can
benefit from his/her regional contacts, language skills and understanding of
the social and cultural diversity of the region. The officer thus has a personal
as well as a professional investment in regional policy outcomes. S/he is
therefore subject to more intense stress associated with potentially competing
organizational and national loyalties, and career and personal repercussions
which result from being perceived by the home country as 'taking sides' in a
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dispute in which the home country feels disadvantaged, and in which the
officer acts as an intermediary.
Official acknowledgment of intermediary activities as a legitimate additional
task for secretariats would ameliorate these partisan reactions and decrease
the stress and the possible career repercussions experienced by secretariat
personnel acting as intermediaries.
Impact on Organizational Resources
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, expenditure of organizational
resources in assisting stakeholders with conflict prevention and
management, has to be weighed up against resource availability (and political
and financial support). It may mean a re-ordering of organizational policies,
priorities and resources. Formal acknowledgment of a secretariat's
involvement in conflict management activities may also fuel treaty
members' concerns about the 'unfettered expansion' and influence of the
organization. This in turn may give the parties an excuse to down-size the
organization.
When it comes to global environmental treaty secretariats, down-sizing is a
completely unsatisfactory notion, given their minuscule resources and size,
relative to the number of parties and their parties' expectations of them. It
should be more a case of working out how and where secretariats can be most
effective in delivering treaty outputs, providing that members sincerely want
the treaty to be a success. It may well be that it is more effective for treaty
secretariats to act as conflict managers, than to perform some other roles and
tasks such as direct assistance with capacity building which, might for
example, be contracted out to other organizations.
The key to organizational survival for an activist secretariat in these
circumstances, is to turn conflict management as a constraint, into conflict
management as an opportunity. The precedent for secretariat involvement
in intermediary activities such as negotiation, mediation, good offices and
other conflict management activities is endorsed in Article 33 of the UN
Charter. Article 33 urges Parties (and by inference secretariats) to seek pacific
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settlement of disputes; and in Article 98 which instructs the UN Secretary-
General to bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which
in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security". Environmental management conflicts are one such matter, and as
Alheritiere (1985:701) notes, "among the very many sources of international
conflict, conflicts involving natural resources may claim, from an historical
perspective, to be the most numerous".
Summary
In summary it is clear that implementation conflicts must be considered as a
constraint before they can be considered as the opportunity that I believe they
are, for the more effective and efficient deployment of secretariat resources.
In the eyes of some nations, implementation conflicts may stretch, and even
exceed, the organizational mandate of the secretariat. In addition, they have
the potential to 'chew up 'organizational resources of time, funds, and
personnel. Both these factors have the potential to threaten organizational
survival. Paradoxically, the successful management of conflict is a growth
area for secretariats as network managers, in that by successfully managing
the conflicts and resolving disputes that emerge as an inevitable part of
implementation, they not only facilitate the success of the treaty, but ensure
their organization's survival and potential growth - providing that the
organization's contribution is recognized and valued by the parties.
Summary
My assessment of the relative significance of each category of obstacles
confronting secretariats, is that political and financial constraints and
implementation conflicts, are the ones which potentially have the most
adverse effects on secretariat performance and impacts. Social and cultural
diversity, organizational loyalties and leadership appear to be lesser
constraints, while an adequate organizational capacity and effective
management are fundamental to secretariat successful task performance and
influence.
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Relationships with members and NGOs are frequently sources of tension, as
is the strain of having to deal constantly with funding irregularities and
delays. The scarcity of organizational resources of personnel, technology and
time has become particularly acute as IT demands increase, and as parties
join an increasing number of international agreement which compete for
their attention and national contributions. Secretariats also have to deal with
the difficulties of meeting political requirements for a more decentralized
approach to implementation in spite of reduced organizational resources.
Balancing recruitment and staffing needs for skilled and experienced
personnel with international demands for improved organizational
heterogeneity without compromising the quality of organizational output, is
an ongoing problem for all IOs. Conventions which fully recognize global
social and cultural diversity, including the needs of indigenous peoples, still
seem some way off.
Underlying all of this are internal organizational issues such as the
potentially conflicting loyalties confronting members of the ICS. However,
this issue seems to be a lesser constraint than does organizational leadership,
or the lack of it, as evidenced in Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR.
Finally, treaty implementation is never without conflicts. Some are small
and easily resolved, while others may escalate and risk spilling over into
other issue-areas, thus compounding implementation problems in both. It is
impossible for secretariats to avoid some degree of involvement in the
difficulties that arise during the implementation of a convention. This raises
several questions for them. Of particular difficulty for secretariats is: What
should or could their role(s) as network managers be in the prevention and
management of implementation conflicts? Conflict management already
occurs but is not officially recognized by the parties who view official
secretariat involvement in such issues with considerable disquiet.
Other questions for secretariats are: How to 'do more with less', given the
parlous state of their current organizational resources? and, What impacts
will their involvement in conflict management have both on treaty
outcomes and on the internal dynamics of the organization?
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In analysing these constraints, it is important to consider why these problems
have emerged, and then examine how global environmental treaty
secretariats have turned these challenges into opportunities. In these
resource-stressed times, more than ever before, the success of treaty
implementation will depend on the creative use of limited resources,
including those of treaty secretariats.
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CHAPTER 5: WHY PROBLEMS EMERGE
Introduction
Chapter 4 outlined the factors inhibiting secretariat task performance. Political
and financial constraints; organizational capacity and management; social and
cultural diversity; organizational loyalties and leadership; and conflicts that
emerge during the implementation process, all create barriers to
implementation success. This chapter examines why these constraints
emerge. Understandably, there are differences in the nature, severity and
impacts of the problems facing each organization. Each requires a different
solution. What works for one treaty system may not work for another.
However, there are a number of constraints experienced by all of the
secretariats, and there are lessons to be learned about what works, from those
which have been successful.
CASE STUDY 1: RAMSAR
Problems Of Institutional Evolution
The initial call for an international convention on wetlands came in 1962
following concern in Europe about the rate and scale of 'reclamation' or
destruction of marshes and wetlands and the resulting decline in the
numbers of waterfowl.1 Over the next eight years and primarily under the
auspices of IWRB, a convention text was developed at a series of
international and technical meetings. Eventually, Ramsar was signed in 1971
at Ramsar, Iran and entered into force in 1975 (Davis, 1994).
Ramsar had few predecessors from which to learn in establishing its
institutional infrastructure. It was the first convention devoted to the
conservation of a specific ecosystem (Mathews, 1993). It was an 'enthusiasts'
convention. Dan Navid, a former executive head of Ramsar, in commenting
on the differences between Ramsar as one of the first environmental
1 The MAR Conference which launched the concept of Ramsar, was organized jointly by IUCN,
the International Waterfowl Research Bureau (IWRB) and the International Council for Bird
Preservation (ICBP).
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conventions and more recent conventions, said that Ramsar was created by
scientists and technical people, whereas the more recent conventions were
created by politicians and activists. In his opinion this explained the lack of
attention to institutional and administrative detail in the original Ramsar
text, as politicians and activists fall naturally into looking at administrative
structures, budgets, power and authority, whereas scientists do not. Another
reason Navid gave for the haphazard beginnings of Ramsar was that it
developed via other organizations, namely IWRB and IUCN, as those
involved with negotiating the convention had hoped that Ramsar might not
need to set up its own bureaucracy. This proved not to be the case (Pers. Com.
Navid, 1995).
Many of the constraints the Bureau has experienced and still experiences, can
be traced back to what in today's world we would regard as an extraordinary
lack of foresight in drafting the text and in establishing the institutional
infrastructure of the convention, especially the implementation provisions.
In this respect, Ramsar is still playing 'catch up'.
The original text had no provisions for: amendment of the text or correcting
any subsequently perceived inadequacies; the establishment of a permanent
secretariat; funding the administration and implementation of the
convention; and, dispute resolution (Mathews, 1993). These problems have
now been rectified, but only relatively recently. Another fundamental flaw
was that English was the dominant official language. This created
considerable international disquiet particularly among Francophone and
Spanish speaking governments and their former colonies in Africa and
South America, these continents being the location of many internationally
significant and vulnerable wetlands. Many of these countries refused to join
Ramsar until French and Spanish were adopted as working languages of the
convention. This oversight was not corrected until the Paris Protocol entered
into force in 1986.
Further key adaptations in the Ramsar Convention since 1975 (in addition to
the amendment clause and the addition of two official languages) have
included: the establishment of a Standing Committee and a permanent
secretariat, the Ramsar Bureau; the establishment of a budget and the
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Wetlands Conservation Fund; and the 1996 adoption of the Ramsar Strategic
Plan 1997-2002. See Appendix 1 for additional information.
Political Constraints
Relations with Members
Changes in Membership and Policy Directions 1975-1997.
According to the Bureau's longest serving member who was an instigator of
Ramsar's creation and who has been with the Bureau in all its forms since
1971, the Bureau has very good relations with its Contracting Parties (CPs)
(Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
Ramsar's most difficult task now, and the source of many of the Bureau's
contemporary problems, is how to manage the changes inherent in Ramsar's
coming of age, particularly the increasing politicization of wetlands. Where
once wetlands were seen as the province primarily of biologists and
birdwatchers, now they are hotly contested as agricultural and commercial
development sites especially in developing countries. That Ramsar is
becoming more politicized "is sign of growing up and being taken seriously"
(Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995). The changes resultant of this, have caused and
continue to cause, tensions to emerge among the parties and between the
Bureau its stakeholders.
There has been a sea change in global politics since Ramsar entered into force.
Developing countries have now become a significant force in international
politics and many of them do not share the same political traditions, nor do
they have the same economic, social nor political goals and priorities of the
developed countries which established Ramsar. Yet it is the wetlands of
developing countries that are under enormous pressure from population
growth and development. Like the parties, the Bureau has had to adapt to
changing times, and this is reflected in part in the change of Bureau
leadership from an executive head from the North to one from the South.
Even though merit still leads officially in the selection process, symbolism
also counts.
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Although Ramsar was one of the pacesetters for global environmental
treaties, its institutional inadequacies mean that in 1997 Ramsar still lags
behind environmental treaties of a comparable age including CITES and the
WHC. However, the parties and the Bureau have recognized the need for
institutional transformation if Ramsar is to survive among the proliferation
of multilateral and bilateral treaties that now dominate international life. By
CoP 6 in 1996, the parties had corrected and strengthened most of the
problems in the original text and the treaty's structural deficiencies. They had
also identified the need for strategic changes, such as the need to adapt to
changing government and community perceptions of wetlands management.
Over the past 25 years, Ramsar has evolved from a narrowly focused nature
conservation convention concerned primarily with habitat preservation for
waterfowl, to a more broad-ranging wetlands management convention with a
resource management/land-use planning focus. This change in focus is
reflected in an informal name change adopted at CoP6 in 1996. Ramsar is now
known simply as 'the wetlands convention'. In 1997, Ramsar had 103 parties
and 889 sites on its List of Wetlands of International Importance. Membership
has thus expanded and diversified substantially since its distinctly European
beginnings
Ramsar formally recognizes the importance of developing countries in world
affairs, and the need for these Ramsar members to gain access to the capacity
building resources of international financial institutions especially the GEF
and the World Bank if they are to meet their treaty obligations. Access to
global financial institutions poses a problem for conventions such as Ramsar
and CITES which came into existence before the creation of the GEF and
whose objectives are not formally included in the list of conventions which
the resources of the GEF are pledged to support. More will be said about this
under financial constraints.
Historically, politics has played second fiddle to science in Ramsar's
negotiation and implementation. As some Bureau members acknowledge,
they and many of the parties and the partner organizations which were the
instigators of Ramsar, are reluctant to relinquish the scientific and technical
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emphasis of the convention which has been so successful in creating
international networks of support for Ramsar objectives. They see politics as
muddying the waters and decreasing the friendliness of convention (Pers.
Com. Bureau,1995).
A reluctance to let go of the scientific and technical emphasis of the
convention and Bureau reflects the professional expertise of the officials who
brought Ramsar into being. Many of them are now retiring and they are being
replaced by officials who although they have relevant scientific backgrounds,
are more politically aware and more strategic in their approach to managing
implementation. They are generalists rather than specialists, a recruitment
trend which is evident in most of the early secretariats except CCAMLR.
Impacts of Regionalization
Another example of management adaptation to changing times and
membership needs was the move from a thematically structured approach to
implementation to a regional focus. Ramsar's original four themes were:
wise-use; the Ramsar List (of sites); international cooperation; and training.
As membership grew, it became apparent that thematically based
management from a centralized headquarters was becoming unworkable, and
parties and the Bureau saw a need for regionalization which recognized vast
differences in implementing the convention in different regions.
In 1987, Ramsar established a system of regionalization, and in 1994 the
Standing Committee formalized the replacement of the thematic approach
with a regional one. Ramsar now has 7 regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
Western Europe, Neotropics (South and Central America and the Caribbean
region), North America and Oceania. Each Technical Officer in the Bureau is
individually responsible for a particular region. Their work involves:
developing close liaison with individual Contracting Parties; encouraging the
creation of Ramsar National Committees which provide a national focus for
Ramsar implementation; organizing and servicing regional meetings; and
assisting with regional activities and the development of regional action
plans (Davis, 1994).
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According to Bureau officials, the obstacles encountered by the Bureau vary
among the regions and among the Contracting Parties. For example, there
have been few Contracting Parties and few Ramsar sites in Asia until recently,
and Ramsar is less well-known and less well-developed in this region than in
Europe. IUCN personnel commented that Ramsar needs to recruit more
parties in Asia, Africa and South America as it is [still] very visibly a
developed country convention (Pers. Coins. IUCN, 1995).
Other constraints related to the adoption of a regional approach are: that not
all countries have national Ramsar Committees to act as a focus for Ramsar
promotion and implementation, and some countries have only one official
in the entire country who has Ramsar responsibilities. Situations such as
these strain the already limited resources of the one Bureau official assigned
to facilitate implementation in each region, as in many regions the
Contracting Parties' expectations of the Bureau's task performance are
unrealistic.
The speed and extent of implementation varies among countries and regions.
In mid-1995 Ramsar was trying to get Nigeria to join the convention and it
was proving difficult as the parties were talking about boycotting Nigeria's
military government, and within Nigeria, joining Ramsar was the last thing
on anybody's mind (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995). In situations such as this,
parties tend to be unrealistic and contradictory in their expectations of the
Bureau's role and performance. On the one hand, the parties have stipulated
that the Bureau must work towards increasing membership and actively
encouraging the formation of national Ramsar Committees and policies,
while on the other hand they are the first to criticize the Bureau for moving
slowly or for intruding in domestic political affairs.
The Growth of Convention Bureaucracy
The so-called Ramsar bureaucracy has grown rapidly in an effort to keep up-
to-date with membership expansion and diversification and international
developments in wetlands management since 1975. Dealing with the
frustrations of an ever increasing avalanche of paperwork, hierarchical
181
decision making and the delays caused by both of these in the administration
of the convention, remains a problem for many Bureau personnel.
Bureau frustrations with bureaucracy (which officials see as detracting from
valuable time spent on the technical aspects of on-ground implementation),
are not limited to difficulties with the centralized bureaucratic requirements
of the convention itself. They refer also to the expansion of national
bureaucratic requirements. As one Bureau member explained,
Bureaucracy is the biggest problem, not just in the Neotropics. As Ramsar membership
expands and gets more formal about its strategic plans and funding requirements, so
bureaucracy expands, for example, more forms [paperwork] and more hierarchical levels
for signatures. It's not that the people you deal with are bureaucrats, but sometimes
people just hit bureaucracy [as an infrastructure] and cannot progress. (Pers.Com. Bureau,
1995).
These sentiments were echoed by IUCN wetlands personnel who voiced
similar opinions about bureaucratic delays. The following example tells of the
difficulties of getting a diplomatic note about a crucial meeting from the
Bureau to field personnel 'on-the-ground' in Mauritania.
The letter goes from the Ramsar Bureau to UNESCO [as the Ramsar depository], from
UNESCO to Mauritania's ambassador, from the ambassador to the Minister for Finance
[as the government's senior portfolio holder], then to the Minister for Rural
Development/ Environment [the Ramsar management agency in Mauritania], and
eventually to the relevant field operative. By then the important meeting is over and
the damage is done. If the Bureau sends a copy directly to person responsible on the
ground it takes 3 days. So the Bureau sends a copy directly to relevant person on the
ground, as well as the official diplomatic note. Law is important , but it is not the only
thing (Pers. Com. IUCN, 1995).
Several Bureau members identified relations between Bureau officials and
their counterparts in national governments as a problem in the sense that
their counterparts are often low level officials in wildlife agencies. This is a
double disadvantage for Ramsar's profile in the political and resource
competition stakes. First, the low status of these individuals means that they
have difficulty getting Ramsar issues considered as departmental priorities in
order to facilitate their inclusion on the national political agenda. At the
organizational level, wildlife and nature conservation agencies rank low in
national governmental hierarchies (the political pecking order for resource
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allocation), and they are not heard in rough and tumble of in-country
bureaucratic competition for resources.
If the Bureau is working at a very specific or junior level with official contacts, there is a
limit as to how far the Bureau can intervene [in setting up national committees]. The
Bureau spends lot of time and effort to see how Ramsar concerns can be pushed higher up
the decision making tree within governments (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
Wildlife and nature conservation agencies are regularly out-competed by
ministries of economic development. Bureau members argued that this was a
good reason for changing the name of the convention from an emphasis on
waterfowl to one on land-use, and for ensuring that the Strategic Plan's focus
was on resource management rather than on nature conservation per se.
A final factor which contributes to misunderstandings and tension in the
Bureau's relations with its parties, is the discrepancy between the need for
national Ramsar Committees as agreed by the Contracting Parties, and the
lack of committees and/or opposition to setting them up within many
countries. This discrepancy is compounded by the lack of leverage of the low
level, Ramsar officers in domestic bureaucracies.
The difficulties facing the Bureau in its relations with its members can be
summed up as follows. First, the diplomats and lawyers who negotiated the
treaty and who attend Ramsar meetings differ from the officials who are
subsequently responsible for the implementation of Ramsar on-the-ground.
Second, because the Bureau needs to observe the formal channels of
communication and interaction expected by diplomatic protocol, it very hard
for Bureau personnel to directly contact the in-country personnel responsible
for implementation. The ways in which Bureau officers deal with this
constraint are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Changes within National Governments
Changes of national governments and changes in the individual officials
with specific convention responsibilities within domestic infrastructures, are
a perennial problem for secretariats at both the political level and at the
technical or scientific level. With each change of government or Ramsar-
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relevant part thereof, the Bureau has to start afresh, educating the new
officials about the country's responsibilities and obligations as a signatory of
Ramsar. One of the biggest network management problems the Bureau has, is
how to help create and maintain a critical mass of support within national
bureaucracies in order to increase Ramsar's profile and thus its chances of
success.
Frequent changes in national governments have always been a headache for
the small Bureau. They were less of a problem when treaty membership was
restricted to primarily European countries whose governments change less
frequently, where travel distances are small, and whose NGOs and expert
networks were close knit.
Further problems have emerged with the influx of Asian, African, Central
and South American parties into Ramsar. As one Bureau officer commented
in relation to the Neotropics region, many of the national and subnational
Ramsar officials with whom the Bureau deals, are direct political appointees.
This means that with every change in government, these officials change.
That is, systems of political patronage aggravate politically-driven changes in
national governments. As a result, Bureau officers are forever educating
incoming officials about Ramsar and its projects. It is a lot of work for
Ramsar's regional officers. It is time consuming, repetitive, and frustrating
(Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
When changes to in-country personnel occur and the Bureau is not kept
informed, it can affect the Bureau's credibility. To illustrate. One week before
an important regional meeting, the Bureau regional officer checked to
confirm that a country's representative (who was very competent and a key
person in the region) was coming to the meeting, only to find that he had
been unexpectedly and suddenly removed from office. His absence
significantly and adversely changed the dynamics of the .scheduled meeting
and the Bureau official was chastised by other members for not ensuring his
presence (Pers. Coins. Bureau, 1995).
Finally, personnel turnover problems associated with changes of government
may be further aggravated by the lack of resources allocated to Ramsar
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national offices, particularly in less affluent countries. Many Ramsar offices
consist of one small office and have no computers or computers that don't
work, and they [national officials] have to deal with a lot of matters other
than Ramsar. Ramsar may be only one out of twenty-five international
conventions with which a national official has to deal (Pers. Com.Bureau,
1995). As one Bureau officer said,
it's fine to talk to all levels of government, members of Congress, members of parliament,
middle and senior management, but we need to have a core of knowledgeable people in
the bureaucracy so that when the higher levels change, at least some stay behind who
know about Ramsar (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
To sum up. Changes in national governments are a recurring problem for
Bureau officials, and in some regions these changes are further aggravated by
systems of political patronage. Changes in national government personnel
continually erode gains made by the Bureau in establishing a critical mass of
in-country Ramsar expertise, officials who are knowledgable about Ramsar
who are sufficiently senior in the domestic bureaucratic and political
hierarchy to successfully negotiate for resources on Ramsar's behalf. The
education and re-education of incoming officials is repetitive and frustrating
for the Bureau's regional officers and ties up organizational resources which
could otherwise be deployed in monitoring compliance and capacity building.
Relations with IWRB and IUCN
Tensions that emerge from the Bureau's relations with its partner
organizations include financial and administrative management issues; role
differentiation problems; and what are described by the Bureau and IUCN as
'personality clashes'. In Ramsar's case, the Bureau interacts with two partner
organizations, IWRB and IUCN on virtually a daily basis. IWRB in the UK, is
responsible for managing the Ramsar Database which is the hub of the
Ramsar monitoring system. The Bureau is co-located in the same building as
IUCN in Gland Switzerland to which the Bureau subcontracts responsibility
for personnel and financial management.
Relations with IWRB
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IWRB runs the Ramsar Database. It is a costly but essential arrangement. All
Bureau personnel agreed that it saves the time of Bureau staff. As many of
the Bureau's technical staff did their 'apprenticeship' with IWRB, they have a
very comfortable working relationship with IWRB staff, and there is a lot of
information exchange and communication between the two organizations
(Pers. Com. Bureau, IWRB,1995). IWRB's role in data management is
discussed in a later section.
Relations with IUCN
Co-location with IUCN has its difficulties. My observation was that co-
location was a source of (probably) unavoidable tension between the Bureau
and IUCN. On the negative side, close proximity creates tensions and reduces
the Bureau's autonomy in organizational matters such as recruitment and
financial management. IUCN runs the convention bank accounts, organizes
personnel contracts and pays salaries. It charges Ramsar a fee for these
services. In the words of a Bureau administrator, "Ramsar plays second fiddle
to IUCN, especially regarding finances" (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995). IUCN's
oversight of the Bureau's administrative and financial affairs remains a sore
point as it is perceived by many in the Bureau to be an erosion of the
organization's autonomy. On the positive side, co-location cuts costs for the
Bureau through sharing overheads, and it saves valuable Bureau time and
resources. If the Bureau were to attend to all these administrative functions
itself it would have to appoint more staff.
According to all the professional personnel and the current and past
executive heads of the Bureau, they are relieved to be under IUCN's
umbrella, rather than UNEP's. This comment was made in the context of an
accelerating dispute between the CITES Secretariat and UNEP over the terms
under which UNEP provides common services (the UNEP equivalent of
IUCNs services to the Ramsar Bureau) to the CITES Secretariat.
One Bureau member who had worked for both IUCN and the Bureau, noted
that a substantial number of past tensions were due in part to what he
described as personality clashes between the first Secretary-General of the
Bureau and the former Director-General of IUCN, in spite of an MOU
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between IUCN and the Bureau which identified IUCN as a Ramsar service
provider to which the relevant (financial) authorities were delegated. With
the replacement of these leaders, relations between IUCN and the Bureau
now appear to have improved. It was generally viewed as an opportunity to
start afresh.
Personality clashes occur occasionally in most interorganizational
interactions. In the case of Ramsar and IUCN, out of the multitude of
relationships and interactions between the two organizations, only one such
clash was described. The general view of both organizations was that while
confrontation between their leaders obstructed to some extent the day-to-day
flow of communications it was of nuisance value only, rather than a major
operational obstruction.
Another area of IUCN/Bureau tension is role differentiation in the field.
According to Bureau staff, IUCN field staff think Bureau personnel should
not go on monitoring missions. The Ramsar Bureau disagrees. According to
IUCN, the Bureau is enthusiastic but not professional, and it needs to devote
itself more to management of the convention, leaving the field-work to
partner organizations, NGOs and their networks. This is a tall order for the
Bureau's Technical Officers whose expertise is in field work and who
particularly enjoy being out in the field.
Role differentiation tensions in the field appeared to be a result of failure of
the Bureau and IUCN to clearly delineate organizational functions and
objectives in the field and to convey these decisions to personnel. There also
seemed to be a degree of rivalry between the technical personnel of both
organizations for the 'hearts and minds ' of recipient countries. Cynically, the
bottom line is that such countries are potential donors to both IUCN and
Ramsar coffers, and although both organizations are striving towards the
common goal of international wetland conservation, each also needs
financial resource to achieve its individual organizational objectives which
may differ. In this respect they are in competition for the limited financial
resources available from Ramsar member governments. The organization
that is more favorably thought of in the field by the constituents of a
particular country, is the one more likely to attract funding.
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In order to address this tension, relations between the Bureau and IUCN
wetlands operatives are now more formalized with regular meetings
scheduled between Bureau personnel and their regional/program
equivalents in IUCN. Prior to the appointment of a African-region Technical
Officer in the Bureau in 1995, there had been predominantly informal and
often tense interactions between IUCN and the Bureau over the management
of African wetlands. Now there are regular meetings between IUCN and
Ramsar, and the Bureau Technical Officer works closely with IUCN's African
Coordinator.
A final perspective on Bureau/IUCN relations comes from the longest
serving member of the Bureau who commented that,
IUCN never interferes with the policy or running of the convention. It provides a
tremendous amount of technical assistance from the range of IUCN programs, but it puts
an inhibition on the administrative side of things. However, of all the [environmental]
conventions. Ramsar has the closest links with its partner organization (Pers.
Com.Bureau, 1995).
In summary, the relationship between the Bureau and IWRB appears to be
more harmonious than that between IUCN and the Bureau. From my
observations there appear to be several reasons for this. First, science, and in
particular data management, is the clearly defined focal point of relations
between the Bureau and IWRB. As wetlands scientists they share common
beliefs and values, a professional culture, in pursuit of a common goal,
international wetland conservation. Peter Haas would probably describe these
scientists as an epistemic community (Haas,1990;1992).
In contrast, the majority of day-to-day interactions between the Bureau's
Technical Officers (TO's) and IUCN, are with IUCN's administrative
personnel as they negotiate budgets, recruitment and personnel management
issues. Their professional cultures differ. The Bureau's TO's are more
concerned about, and expert in, technical matters, and frustrated with what
they see as the excessive bureaucracy required to manage financial and
personnel systems. Far from sharing common beliefs and values, these two
groups speak different languages. Miscommunication is thus not surprising.
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Bureau Relations with NGOs
On the whole the Bureau has excellent working relationships with NGOs.
Most Bureau personnel have had experience working in or with,
international and national NGOs, and they regard NGO involvement as
absolutely crucial to the successful functioning of the convention. For
example, when the Bureau writes letter to a country regarding problems with
site changes and it then sends a copy to the relevant NGO. NGOs make
excellent allies for the Bureau and very active strategic alliances are formed
between the Bureau and NGOs. Bureau alliances with non-state actors are
discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
Ramsar has a history of informality in its expert/NGO/Bureau networking,
which remains reflected in its image as the 'user-friendly convention'. NGOs
have always participated in informal structures of the convention, and since
the Regina amendments established the formal structures of the convention,
NGOs have participated in Standing Committee meetings as observers, in site
inspections, and they are invited to comment informally on the Bureau's
annual work program. There is very close formal involvement of NGOs at
the international level. At the national and regional level it is more
informal, although the parties actually encourage the Bureau to work with
NGOs if they have a problem.
Ramsar Contracting Parties generally support the close working relationship
between the Bureau and NGOs. Bureau officers attribute this support to the
on-going personal contact that Bureau personnel have with representatives
of the Contracting Parties, and the transparency of Bureau interactions with
all stakeholders (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995).
Bureau technical experts and scientists, and the technical and scientific experts
who make up the nucleus of environmental NGOs such as IWRB, share
common values and goals. In contrast, the technical and scientific experts in
the CITES and CCAMLR Secretariats do not necessarily interact as closely with
their environmental NGO colleagues. CITES experts are divided between
those who support species conservation and those who support species trade;
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while in CCAMLR the experts also divide up along fisheries (trade) and
environmental protection lines. These tensions are reflected in relations
between these two secretariats and 'their' NGOs which are not nearly as close
or collaborative as are the relations between the Ramsar Bureau and 'its'
NGOs.
Furthermore, unlike CITES, Ramsar is what Jonsson (1986) would categorize
as a low-politics issue-area. Until recently there was little money in wetlands,
unlike the lucrative CITES trade in endangered species, and this insulated
Ramsar from the hostilities experienced in CITES. Wetlands have been
traditionally regarded in many cultures as wastelands unfit for human
habitation. However population and urban development pressures in both
developed and developing countries are changing public perceptions of the
value of wetlands as an economic resource. As this trend continues, it is
probable that the Ramsar's Bureau's historically excellent and mutually
supportive relationship with environmental NGOs will come under
increasing pressure. Contracting Parties are likely see environmental NGOs as
obstructing development. On the other hand, NGOs might become
increasingly concerned about the Bureau's resource-dependency on its parties
and its consequent vulnerability to pressure from members to pursue a less
rigorous monitoring procedure in order to sustain an effective level of
funding
Financial Constraints
Chronic Inadequacy of Funding
Like the majority of environmental convention secretariats the Bureau
suffers from a chronic inadequacy of funds. The Bureau has to persuade
counties to pay their contributions and pay them on time. If they fail to do so,
the Bureau then 'persuades' (harangues), the members until they pay up.
From all accounts, Ramsar parties have apparently been fairly prompt in their
payments, although the largest contributor, the USA, has its own unorthodox
arrangements. 2
2The USA, in contrast with all the other parties, refused to agree to mandatory contributions.
Instead its contribution of 25% of the annual Ramsar budget takes the form of voluntary
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In 1995, Ramsar's Interim Secretary-General, Jim McCuaig, noted that
collecting country contributions was not a problem in Ramsar; that Ramsar
had received 98% of its contributions in 1994; and on average, it receives
between 80-90% of the contributions each year. However cash flow is always a
problem. He further commented that Ramsar could borrow if it had to, and
that the worst thing that could happen is that it might have to delve into the
voluntary funds that had been earmarked for projects. The money would
then be replaced when the mandatory contributions arrived (Pers. Com.
McCuaig, 1995)
Global financial markets also have an impact on the convention's budget.
Fluctuations in the exchange rates mean that governments withhold their
contributions until the exchange rate (in Swiss francs) is favorable to them.
This may adversely affect Ramsar's financial situation, particularly its cash
flow. To 'force' payment, McCuaig had to resort to sending a letter to the
parties in 1995 advising them that as a result of late payment of contributions,
the convention was facing bankruptcy if members did not pay up promptly.
As a result of this correspondence, countries that had never paid before did
so, including their back-log of payments (Pers. Com. McCuaig, 1995).
While the lack of reliable funds has meant that the Bureau has not been able
to plan for the medium and long-term, most Bureau members would agree
that Ramsar been more successful than most treaties in getting payments,
although chasing them up takes up a lot of professional officer time at the
expense of promoting wetlands conservation.
Another funding challenge for the Ramsar Bureau and most other treaty
secretariats is to try and identify opportunities to obtain additional financial
resources, some countries being more politically and financially supportive
contributions which are used primarily to fund projects, training, organizing meetings and
bringing people to meetings. For a period of 12 months in 1994-1995 it paid the salary and
overheads for the position of Technical Officer, Neotropics. This position is now funded from
core funds. The size of the US contribution makes it indispensable to Ramsar, but the voluntary
nature of the contribution means that the convention is always at the mercy of the USA's
preparedness to pay. So far there have been no problems, but if the US Congress's reluctance to
pay its UN debt in 1995-96 is any indication, Ramsar would be well advised to diversify its
funding base.
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than others. Fund raising takes a lot of networking and 'leg work' by
professional officers. There is no magic formula.
In one respect, however, the Ramsar Bureau differs markedly from both the
CITES and CCAMLR Secretariats in that still no provision has been made for
funding Ramsar CoPs. Hosting an international convention is an expensive
undertaking for a country. This means it is virtually impossible to hold
Ramsar CoPs in developing countries, unless the Bureau uses personal
contacts to get governments to pay for conferences, as happened in 1996 in
Australia (Pers. Com. Bureau,1995). The initiative for seeking financial
support for CoPs has historically been the province of the Bureau. The 1999
CoP7 will be held in Costa Rica, the first CoP to be held in a developing
country. The USA has agreed to underwrite the costs of this meeting (Blasco,
1997).
Allocation and justification of the Bureau's core budget is a source of concern
both for the Bureau and the CoP. A large part of the budget goes on salaries
and the cost of running the Ramsar Database,
We need new money for consultants to write reports on a wetland and to organize a CoP in
absence of core funds for these things. The Bureau has been quite successful in getting
additional financial support from individual governments. Wise-use is totally funded by
the Netherlands government; and [in 1995] the position of Technical Officer for the
Neotropics is funded by US to do wise-use training in South America. I think the tendency
in future will be that its going to be very difficult to expand the core budget (Pers. Com.
Bureau, 1995).
The lack of funding for core activities such as monitoring leaves the Bureau
vulnerable to unfounded accusations of ICS extravagance. The Bureau
considers that communications and training are essential activities which
should be covered from core funds, a move opposed by the CoP which
considers these activities important but financially endless. It seems to me
that in the wake of Koshiro, the CoP remains wary about supporting funding
for activities which appear to increase the leverage of the Bureau and its
control over the determination of the funding priorities of the convention.
The Ramsar Bureau is no different from most treaty secretariats in its struggle
to reconcile Parties expectations of Bureau task performance with a chronic
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financial shortfall. Like all environmental treaty secretariats, a considerable
amount of professional officer (and executive head) time is taken up in
personally persuading parties to pay their contributions on time, and in fund
raising among both state and non-state actors to raise additional, voluntary
funds to meet the difference between the capacity building projects and
activities that need to be carried out, and the funds available for this.
Project Funding
Projects funds are at a premium. The Ramsar Small Grants Fund (SGF) is
Ramsar's primary source of voluntary funds to help countries with capacity
building. Although the SGF is small and Bureau avoids promoting its
existence, the existence of the SGF is becoming a very powerful tool in
persuading non-Contracting Parties to join the convention. In this respect it is
used as a membership incentive, a sweetener. A further incentive to join the
convention is that the Bureau is able to link developing countries in need of
technical, scientific and financial assistance with Ramsar partner
organizations.
In Ramsar's case its institutional linkages with international financial
institutions such as the GEF are yet another valuable resource for member
governments. With this in mind, national wetland management strategies
must now be designed to dovetail with the GEF's biodiversity eligibility
criteria if Ramsar members are to have any chance of accessing the GEF's
financial resources.
While wetland protection is ostensibly the primary reason governments sign
up to Ramsar, opportunities for financial benefit are powerful membership
incentives. Bureau officers try to target project funds at countries in which
there are wetlands under serious development pressures from population
growth and domestic development policies, as in Asia. Through formal
contact and informal networking via other IOs and non state-actors such as
Wetlands International, Bureau personnel endeavor to persuade these
governments that it is in their economic as well as in their longer-term
environmental interests to care for their wetlands. According to the Bureau,
Ramsar's wise use concept has been well received in regions such as Africa
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and South America as it does not prohibit wetland use. In effect it carries the
message, "you can use your wetlands sustainably if you manage them wisely"
(Pers.Com. Bureau,1995).
Ramsar needs project funds of $USD 50,000-100,00 per annum. This sum is
too small to be considered by the GEF and similar bodies, and it is
insignificant compared with the demands from big agencies such as UNDP.
However, the Ramsar Bureau considers it has vital role to play here as a
catalyst here, and that this level of funding is enough to solve some technical
and site specific problems.3
Although the presence of a financial mechanism is an incentive for many
new and developing countries to join Ramsar, it seems that they are often
disappointed when they realize how little money there actually is in the SGF
to assist them to meet their obligations. One Technical Officer commented
that the Bureau never had enough money to go around and that it spends an
extraordinary amount of time deciding where the money goes and which are
the most deserving projects. "Project funding allocations get very political,
and sometimes 'political' means that the funds don't go to the best projects."
(Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
The frustration of governments in search of capacity building assistance is
compounded by the convention fatigue of parties - so many conventions, so
many countries, and so little money. In the opinion of many Bureau officers,
the bureaucracy of financial management takes away from valuable
operational time.
It seems there is a point between having no money and being a major
funding agency. There has to be certain level of funding for the Bureau to
3According to a Technical Officer, the big agencies like to have big dollar projects and the
Bureau's technical staff can play a very valuable is assessing large projects, although we need
to put a limit on this as you can get masses of EIA information to assess for large projects and our
organizational capacity is very small. The aim is to establish the standing of Ramsar members
and the technical expertise of the Bureau with the World Bank and the GEF, so that when
countries approach the Bank for assistance, the Bureau will be called on to evaluate projects for
wetlands consideration on behalf of the Bank. To this end, there is regular and growing contact
between the Bureau and the GEF and World Bank Secretariats (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
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work organizationally, and beyond that to offer technical advice and to advise
on special site management problems that may exist in a country.
It appears that the difficulty for the Bureau is working out the organizational
threshold between being resource-poor, and not having enough money to
effectively perform the organizational tasks in a way that meets the parties'
ever-expanding and changing expectations. The Bureau is dammed if it does
and dammed if it doesn't.
Impacts of Corruption
Corruption can be an obstacle for Ramsar implementation in some regions.
While culturally sanctioned as a usual way of doing business in some
countries, many European countries are extremely critical of such practices.
Corruption can also make in-country field work very dangerous for Bureau
officers as local interests have exerted direct pressure on Bureau personnel to
make project recommendations in their favor. CITES Secretariat professional
staff and WWF/TRAFFIC field staff have encountered similar risks in the
field. It is especially dangerous for domestic NGO workers as their families
have been threatened. Bureau members are protected to some extent by their
UN affiliation, even though they do not have official diplomatic status.
Fund Raising
The Bureau has taken an explicit stance not to directly fund raise for projects
as fundraising takes up too much professional officer time and organizational
resources. The new Strategic Plan it is looking at a catalytic role for the Bureau
in linking potential donors with recipients and building relationships with
international financial institutions such as the GEF, the World Bank and
other conventions, particularly the CBD, FCCC, CBD (whose members are all
eligible for financial support from the GEF and the World Bank under the
terms negotiated at Rio). In this capacity, the Bureau will help its member
countries to write project applications to these international financial
organizations, as the African Technical Officer did in securing GEF funding
for the multilateral management plan for Lake Victoria. See Chapter 6.
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For tasks such as these, the Bureau recognizes it needs technical people with
administrative skills in order to act as brokers between the financial
institutions and developing countries. The aim is to marry good projects with
money in order to advance Ramsar's goals. Disappointingly, although the
Ramsar Strategic Plan designated a special position to perform this go-
between or liaison role with the World Bank, GEF, UNDP and private sector
interests, the proposal was rejected at COP6 as being superfluous to
organizational needs.
The funding of specific projects tends to be from tied or conditional funding
sources. The issue of conditional funding is a controversial one in many
quarters, especially among NGO stakeholders. Project funds may come from
industry, environmental NGOs or individual government sources.
Conventions undoubtedly need funds additional to national contributions in
order to assist countries with capacity building. While recognizing the need to
accept funding from such sources on behalf of the convention, the Bureau
remains concerned that by accepting tied funding it may be perceived to be
captured by donor interests.
Unlike CITES which has a list of CoP-approved donors from which the
Secretariat may accept funds for projects. Ramsar has no such list, nor has it
had a comparable mechanism for approving donors. It seems that
management of voluntary/project funds has been very ad hoc. However, the
Strategic Plan identifies project and project donor approval as a role for the
newly constituted the Finance Committee. This recommendation was to take
effect following approval of the Strategic Plan at CoP 6 in 1996.
Bureau personnel raised three concerns about the implications of conditional
funding for the convention. First, aid is only given by governments to their
own nationals to carry out work in a recipient country rather directly to the
country itself. In addition, tied funding might not be geared to what the
country needs, but to what the donor needs. An example given was the
provision of Macintosh computers to Kenya. When the computers broke
down, there was no one for 1,000 miles who could fix them. Technology can
be invasive, as the same countries which provide the money to buy the
technology, supply the technology (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
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In an effort to head off these problems as they emerge, capacity building by
Bureau personnel takes several forms. Bureau officers make
recommendations regarding what might happen on a site; they provide tools
and information; they help link together projects and personnel; they prepare
projects so that local interests learn how to manage their land; and they
transfer some of that knowledge, skills and information to people on the
ground. The Bureau provides funds through projects designed to transfer
knowledge, skills and technology. If the Bureau did not help countries with
capacity building, it would adversely affect Ramsar's overall objective of
protecting wetlands. The problem here is, that it is a race against time -
between the loss of wetlands and the designation of them. To be successful in
this venture, Bureau officers have to deal with diverse interest groups - land-
use planners, finance departments, and conservation interests. In-country
coordination facilitated by the Bureau is part of a country's capacity building
education.
The second focus of Bureau concern is that there is still too much 'gringo'
research. That is, an academic or a scientific expert, comes in from a 'gringo'
(developed country) University does research, takes the data and knowledge
back to the University in his/her country of origin, and the benefits of the
research are not fed back into the recipient country.
The third area of Bureau concern about the implications of tied funding
relates to traditional NGO suspicions about a convention receiving funds
from the private sector whose interests are perceived to be at odds with those
of the convention. Responding to NGO concerns about the Bureau receiving
project funding from the private sector interests, McCuaig dryly commented
that there is no such thing as perfection, in government, corporate or NGO
performance. He commented that he would rather accept money from a
company that had environmental problems and in so doing convert it into a
good corporate citizen, than leave it 'out in the cold' where it had the
potential to do more [unmonitored] damage (Pers. Com. McCuaig, 1995).
In summary, there is chronic tension between the Contracting Parties'
expectations of the Bureau's performance and the funds the organization
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receives from its parties to resource convention activities. Unfortunately, the
organizations' credibility as a financial manager was damaged at Koshiro, but
the CoP must also bear some of the responsibility for this. Until Koshiro there
had been no financial mechanism for overseeing the Bureau's management
of convention funds. The CoP reaction at Koshiro to what it perceived as
excessive funding demands from the Bureau, has resulted in the
appointment of a Finance Committee to oversee the Bureau's management
of Ramsar funds. Management responsibilities and parameters for financial
management are now contained in the Strategic Plan, and they clearly shift
primary responsibility for management of convention funds from the
Secretary-General to the Finance Committee. (Doc. 6.14 (Rev.1))
Organizational Capacity And Management
A number of the internal organizational problems of the Bureau emanate
from the lack of strategic planning, and problems with resource allocation
and management, particularly the management of time, personnel and
funding. According to Navid, the Bureau's major problem is lack of
organizational capacity and the main resource needed is money. Funds are
needed to support projects and capacity building and travel money for Bureau
boundary- spanners (Pers. Com. Navid, 1995).
There are several other problems which stretch and even overwhelm at
times the capacity of the Bureau to perform successfully and efficiently. They
are: managing the rapid and wide ranging policy and organizational changes
that have occurred since 1975's (See Appendix 1); the issue of personnel
management; negotiating the budget; data management; and leadership
issues. These are all organizational capacity and management problems.
Managing Policy and Organizational Change
Problems in managing change have to a considerable extent, been caused by
the rate and scale of change in the convention in the 1980s and 1990s,
including the rapid expansion of Ramsar membership and the often
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unrealistic expectations of its members.4 The Bureau is required to service the
needs of all the- members, but the influx of developing countries with
substantial capacity building needs has now outstripped the Bureau's
organizational capacity to deliver services.
A second set of factors putting stress on the Bureau's already overextended
organizational resources is the change in direction of the convention from
nature conservation to land-use planning and management, coupled with
the change in its management thrust from a thematic to a regional focus. Any
organization facing changes in its management and operational regime on
the scale confronting the Bureau, will take time to adapt. Unfortunately for
the Bureau, time is one luxury it does not have, and has never had. The
impact of regionalization on the workload of Bureau over the past 5 years has
meant that a huge amount of officer time has been taken up in the
preparation and holding of meetings and in follow-up in the regions. It is it
one of Ramsar' largest activities and is expensive of staff time - but it has also
been one of the Bureau's most successful strategies (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
It is thus a Catch 22 for the Bureau. Regional meetings raise both the
convention's regional profile, and that of the regional Technical Officers and
the Bureau. In addition, regional meetings are invaluable: as sources of
information; for networking; to consolidate the Bureau's organizational
reputation as a service deliverer; to promote its credibility as an honest
broker; and to broaden its constituency support base, through the
development of informal alliances with state and non-state actors.
Personnel Management Issues
4Some of the members' expectations of the levels of service from Bureau personnel are
extraordinary. One officer when explaining to me what was involved in organizing a regional
meetings, told of how he had to organize accommodation for national delegates, book their air
travel, arrange transportation to and from the venue, plan the menu and order food to cater for
all mannner of religious and cultural preferences, as well as preparing all the documentation
and acting as rapporteur during the meeting. After the meeting is over, the Bureau officer then
had to write up and distribute the minutes and supporting documents. Remember, it is one person
doing all of this! In developed countries such as Australia, considerable assistance would be
given by the local Ramsar bureaucrats.
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The changes in Ramsar's policy emphasis, infrastructure and management
have meant that the Bureau's personnel requirements in 1997 are rather
different from those of earlier days. Generalists with people management and
problem-solving skills, political and cultural sensitivity, and sound technical
knowledge, are now being sought in preference to wetlands technical experts.
This contrasts with the dominance of scientific and technical professionals in
the Bureau until now. A change in the organization's personnel profile will
substantially change the culture of the Bureau. It also raises interesting
questions about the organizational personality, future roles, and
organizational credibility of the Bureau, given that Bureau personnel,
national delegates and NGOs representatives all commented that the
Bureau's professional reputation and leverage have been based on its
technical capacity.
The transition from a specialist unit to a more generalist one is causing some
tension among the professional officers in the Bureau. The view of one
member more disposed towards a technical staff emphasis, was that the
Bureau wanted young enthusiastic scientific and technical field people. The
alternate view was that the Bureau needed generalists - lateral thinkers who
were sympathetic [to wetlands], who cared beyond themselves - people who
had been 'called' to Ramsar rather than international careerists.
Several Bureau boundary-spanners spoke about the need for environmental
treaty secretariat staff to have a 'calling'. McCuaig expressed it this way,
People are called to conservation and then they are called to Ramsar, not the other way
around. It is this commitment that gets you past the obstacles because you won't be
deterred by the little failures here and there. If you didn't have the commitment to get
around them [obstacles], they would stop you. Sometimes you just back off---sometimes
you just wait. There are a multitude of ways to get around these things and sometimes you
have to wait years. If you didn't have a personal commitment to it, you probably
wouldn't do it. It is too much trouble, and doesn't make you friends in some quarters, but i t
can make you friends in other quarters (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
5From my observations, a 'calling' is probably the single most important distinguishing feature
of the personnel of the 1970s environmental treaty secretariats. This same reference to the
importance of a 'calling (Weber, 1968) or a deeply held personal and professional commitment,
was mentioned by personnel in the CITES and WHC Secretariats. It was not mentioned in the
CCAMLR Secretariat. It also constrasts with the post-Rio (FCCC, CBD, CCD) Secretariats
whose ICS personnel come predominantly from the UN career civil service mainstream where
the goal is to 'make every post a winner'.
200
What all Bureau staff did agree on, was that individuals bring their networks
with them from their 'home base' be it an NGO or a national government.
The networks of professional officers are indisputably one of the Bureau's
most valuable and valued assets. Personnel, especially boundary-spanning
personnel such as Technical Officers, continue to develop and expand their
networks during their time with the Bureau. Networks are to a large extent
based on the trust and respect developed among individuals working
together on shared problems over a period of time. When individuals leave,
this creates problems for the Bureau. While multiskilling and team work can
overcome many of the problems associated with the loss of specific expertise,
when a staff member departs, an individual's networks are lost. They are not
'backstoppable' and have to be rebuilt by each new recruit.
1995 to 1997 was a period of intense change for the Ramsar Bureau. Its two
longest serving professional officers left; Strategic Planning was introduced;
and a new Secretary-General, Delmar Blasco, was appointed. Inevitably
networks were lost, but others were gained. I can speculate that the networks
lost have been predominantly those of Ramsar pioneers many of whom have
retired or have moved on. On the positive side, perhaps the benefits of the
networks gained in terms of new personnel and a new Secretary-General
from a developing country may be better suited than some of the networks
lost, to assist the Bureau to manage the realities of a vastly expanded Ramsar
membership and the changes in policy direction mooted previously.
The chronic lack of Bureau personnel stems largely from the Contracting
Parties' reluctance to acknowledge that additional and different sorts of
personnel in the Bureau are now required to deal with changing policy
emphases; an expanding membership; and increasing and changing
stakeholder demands. The bottom line is money. As already noted, countries
do not like having to pay contributions, let alone have their contribution
levels raised to pay for what they see as expanding bureaucracy, particularly
now that governments are all having to deal with the costs associated with
membership of numerous international agreements, not just Ramsar.
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There is clearly too much work for the present personnel of the Bureau, and
too little time in which to do it, subject as they are to impossible deadlines
including the demands of organizing regional and CoP meetings for a much
larger membership. For Technical Officers, there is always the tension
between being out in the field, and doing bureaucratic work such as writing a
work plan, a framework document, or a strategy.
Surprisingly perhaps, Bureau members did not advocate a significant increase
in the size of the Bureau. Instead they commented that with the addition of a
Development Assistance Officer and the Regionally-based Liaison Officers,
the size of Bureau is "about right." In their opinion, there comes a time when
expanding the size of the Bureau starts to decrease the benefits of the
expansion because it increases the need for more time to be spent on internal
communications.
Negotiating the Budget
A lot of dissension in the convention has emerged over budgetary matters. At
Koshiro in 1993 the convention budget went from 1 million to 2 million
Swiss francs. The Bureau asked for more technical staff and funding, and the
contracting parties protested that the budget had doubled6 .
Getting the right balance of staff and funds has always been a problem for the
Bureau and it is obvious that the Bureau will always be fighting an up-hill
battle to find that balance. Unfortunately the Bureau's tactical blunder at
Koshiro has severely dented the organization's financial management
credibility and it will probably take some years for the Bureau to regain the
confidence of its parties on this matter. In the meantime, it is highly unlikely
that the CoP will agree to allocate additional funds to the Bureau.
6
"One million Swiss francs in an international environmental terms is nothing-We could very
well use a doubling of the budget again, but we won't get it, because they've got this thing about
it [any increase] shan't be more than inflation. Unfortunately, there were hard feelings towards
the Bureau in the Finance Committee at Koshiro as they felt the secretariat pushed them too
far to get an increase in the budget. So at Koshiro, the Bureau asked for a strategic plan which
would set measurable goals to allow the Bureau to decide on a 3 year program and a budget to f it
it." (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
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An example of the CoP's perhaps unwarranted reluctance to increase the
Bureau's budget, can be seen in CoP6's rejection of funding in 1996 for the
new position proposed by the Bureau, that of Development Assistance
Officer. It can be argued that this position is essential if Ramsar is to have any
chance of competing against more recent treaties for its 'share' of funds from
international financial institutions, especially those of the GEF. Of equal
importance to Ramsar's effectiveness as a convention is capacity building if
developing countries are to meet their Ramsar obligations. Yet at CoP6 the
position of Development Assistance Officer which was designed specifically to
target both these issues was rejected as being 'unnecessary' (Doc.6.15 (Rev.1)).
Data Management and Technology
Databases and their management are universally accepted as essential
implementation tools for contemporary environmental treaty secretariats.
Secretariats are the data and information hubs of international treaty
networks. They have formal data management functions and responsibilities
but many treaty secretariats, including those of Ramsar and CITES, also
perform an active role in monitoring compliance in the treaty system, and
data collection and analysis is an important element of compliance
monitoring.
By the end of the 1980s the number of sites on the Ramsar List was increasing,
and it was more and more difficult to keep track of them and what was
happening to them. This highlighted the need for a comprehensive Ramsar
database. In the division of tasks and responsibilities between IUCN and
IWRB in 1987 and consistent with each organization's expertise and
resources, the CoP decided that IWRB should establish and maintain the
Ramsar Database. 7
7The Ramsar Database acts as a ready reckoner of sites and site problems. The database is the
mechanism that produces the formal listing of Ramsar sites, and site directories act as a ready
reference an a regional basis. The Ramsar Database consists of the List of Wetlands of
International Importance and the Montreux Record. The Montreux Record is a register of
wetland sites on the List of Wetlands of International Importance where changes in ecological
character have been occurred, are occurring, or are likely to occur as the result of technological
develoments, pollution or other human inerference. Among other uses, the database facilitates
frequent updating of the List and enables the Bureau to respond rapidly to reports of changes in
ecological character at listed sites, as well enabling the preparation of briefs for Bureau staff
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Ramsar's policy was that the database should be accessible and straight
forward, so that developing countries could both contribute to it and benefit
from its products. Database policy stressed that any such database should not
be so technically complex that only specialized members of the IWRB staff
and the Bureau could use it (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1997).
Ramsar's data access policy is in direct contrast with CCAMLR's philosophy
on access to and management of its database. Even access to the CITES
database is restricted to designated Bureau and NGO officials. However, all
the databases contain information which individual governments
periodically try to argue is pertinent to issues of national security and so
should not be released. The CCAMLR and CITES data bases also contain
commercial-in-confidence information. It is this category of information in
particular, that has been used to argue for restricted data-access policies in
CCAMLR.
Interestingly and in spite of Ramsar's open-door policy on database access,
according to both IWRB and the Bureau the majority of database inquiries
have come from the Bureau. It could be that Ramsar's general transparency,
its accessibility, its informality and the generally good relationships among
stakeholders, mean that most site information is readily available from other
sources such as documents, reports, and records of meetings and via informal
networks. Alternatively it could mean that stakeholders do not know how to
access the information they require, or that stakeholder access is not as easy as
Ramsar claims.
Data is collected from multiple sources: national reports; field and scientific
reports from NGOs; reports from international networks of birdwatchers, and
from scientists working on wetlands issues. Of particular significance is data
on changes in the ecological character of listed wetlands: hydrological
information; species and habitat inventories; identification of existing and
anticipated development pressures from sectors such as agriculture and
forestry; and estimates of local population growth and projections of urban
and consultants engaged in application of the Monitoring Procedure (Davis, 1994)
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development. IWRB then transmits the data collected to the Bureau for
analysis in the context of the Bureau's preparation of site management
reports for the CoP; notification of infractions; and identification of the
capacity building needs of individual countries. The Bureau is adamant that
the Ramsar Database is an essential tool for monitoring compliance.
The technical capacity of the Ramsar Bureau including its data management
capacity was acknowledged by all stakeholder interests as the Bureau's main
strength and the source of its leverage. Bureau personnel are equally certain
that staff time is the organization's most precious resource, and that locating
the database at IWRB in Slimbridge rather than in the Bureau has been a
relief for Bureau staff as it saves staff time. The general feeling among Bureau
personnel was that while the data base is pivotal to Ramsar's success, it has
been resource and time intensive to develop and maintain. However, the
counterargument is that they are an efficient way to use limited staff, and the
database is an essential Bureau resource for monitoring and compliance
work.
The location of database functions and responsibilities with IWRB also mean
that the Bureau Technical Officers who would much to prefer to be out in the
field rather than stuck in an office, are able to more productively focus their
energies, knowledge and skills on site management issues, rather than being
less productively tied to data base in-put and management which would not
take full advantage of their technical expertise. By formally delegating data
management responsibilities via an MOU to IWRB as part of its partner
services to Ramsar, Bureau officers are thus released to the field leaving data
issues to the IWRB data management experts employed expressly for this
purpose - a win-win result.
While Ramsar has enthusiastically embraced emerging technologies such as
the database and use of the Internet as means of communicating with its
stakeholders and promoting Ramsar activities, not all environmental treaty
secretariats are as enthusiastic.' The expansion and diversification of data and
' Paradoxically it seems, the CCAMLR Secretariat which has more sophisticated data needs
and technologies for assessing and managing migratory fish stocks in remote oceans, does not
permit stakeholder access to its database and nor does it have a web page an the Internet. The
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information management by activist secretariats such as the Ramsar Bureau
raise a raft of questions which must be addressed by all IOs and CoPs. They
include questions of what data to collect? Who collects it? How is this done?
and Who has access, and who is responsible?
As long as IWRB and the Bureau retain a sound working relationship
founded on mutual trust (and the Ramsar CoP retains control of the data base
funding allocation to IWRB), the CoP's delegation of data management
responsibilities to IWRB poses no threat to the Bureau. On the other hand,
should the relationship between IWRB and the Bureau deteriorate, the
Bureau could conceivably be 'held to ransom' by IWRB as the controller of
the essential information which the Bureau requires to perform both its core
and substantive tasks.
From a management standpoint, the administrative and functional
separation of the database from the Bureau appears to have been very
effective. It has optimized the use of the financial resources and professional
expertise of each organization and shielded Bureau personnel from the
demands of maintaining a database, thus enabling the Bureau's Technical
Officers to spend more time on their key substantive tasks.
Social And Cultural Diversity
Managing External Diversity
Regionalization, as distinct from decentralization, has been heartily endorsed
by the majority of Ramsar stakeholders. Regionalization recognizes the
political, social and cultural diversity of members, and that it is operationally
unwieldy to try and manage an expanded treaty base from Switzerland. The
CCAMLR Secretariat attributes this to its Parties' refusal to allocate funds for the purpose. It
also argues that the development and maintenance of a web page would require a dedicated
staff member. In contrast, the Ramsar Bureau's web page is user-friendly, it is updated
regularly, and additional personnel have not been required for this purpose. CITES also has an
extensive database to monitor trade via its permit systems, and contracts data management
tasks out to WWF/TRAFFIC. This is similar to the IWRB/Ramsar arrangement. Like the
Ramsar Bureau, the CITES Secretariat, works closely with its partner organizations in
monitoring and analysing the data collected.
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main constraints associated with this mode of operation concern operational
logistics and organizational resources.
Although the concept of regionalization was introduced in 1987, it was not
until 1992 that regional Technical Officers were recruited and appointed in
the Asian, African, Neotropics and Oceania regions. Officers are appointed
from countries within the region for which they are responsible, and
experience has shown that it increases the credibility of the Bureau to have
technical experts with regional understanding and networks
(Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995).
The Standing Committee was originally very wary of regionalization because
it thought that a regional officer might try and overrule the region for which
s/he was responsible. This has not happened and in 1995 the Standing
Committee formally agreed to a regional approach by Bureau staff. As far as
Bureau staff and personnel from partner organizations are concerned, the best
thing the Bureau ever did was to appoint technical officers to work with the
regions (Pers.Com.Bureau, IUCN, IWRB,1995).
As Ramsar cannot afford to establish regional offices, the travel budget is a
major line item to get the Bureau's Technical Officers (TOs) out-and-about in
their regions. However the value of working from a centralized base is that it
promotes the cross-fertilization fertilization of ideas and information on the
return of the TO's in a way that would not happen if each were based in a
regional office. In this way, the Technical Officers as the key boundary-
spanners of the Bureau, retain a global perspective rather than becoming
restricted to a regional focus or captured by national or partisan interests in a
specific region. Regionalization benefits both the Bureau and the regions.9
It is psychologically very sound for people in a region to have a regular on-ground, Bureau
presence in the region as they gain a sense of ownership of Ramsar and its objectives in the
region. However, if the Ramsar office were located in a particular region (as distinct from what
has been accepted historically as a central location such as Switzerland), then Bureau
personnel fear they would lose contact with what was happening in rest of world for the reasons
mentioned above. It is essential that the Bureau's regional officers keep a global perspective as
well as assisting countries in their region (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995). Fortunately, global and
regional communication has been assisted in more recent times by contemporary communications
such as telephone, email and fax. According to the Technical Officers these less formal means of
communication help a lot as they save time and travel costs.
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Internal Diversity and Organizational Credibility
There is no doubt that having Bureau members from countries in the regions
for which they are responsible has added to the Bureau's credibility. It helps
address the problem of Ramsar's image as a European convention which
gives preferential treatment in resource allocation to its Northern members.
Many of the inter-regional tensions that were developing in Ramsar as its
membership expanded beyond Northern countries, are being softened by
having Bureau personnel with regional affiliations and knowledge acting as
advocates for their region. They present the regional perspective in the
context of the global forum. Had Ramsar remained dominated by Northern
interests, its reach and success in fulfilling treaty objectives might have
deteriorated.
In 1996, CoP6 agreed to appoint Regionally-based Ramsar Liaison Officers. The
aim of these appointments is to facilitate expansion of the Convention's
membership and enhance the level of general support available for Ramsar
activities being undertaken in Africa, Asia, the Neotropics and Oceania,
Regionally-based staff, in addition to those already funded from the core
budget [existing Technical Officer positions] are highly desirable (Rec. 6.6,
CoP6, 1996). However, these positions will not be funded from either annual
contributions or from project funds. To resource these positions the
convention has called on its members to "consider contributing ongoing
[additional] resources" and on its partner organizations to "facilitate this
initiative through co-location of these staff within their regional offices" (Rec.
6.6, CoP6, 1996). It remains unclear how precisely these positions will be
funded and to whom the incumbents will be accountable.
In spite of these uncertainties, what is clear is that there is solid support for
the Bureau's regional emphasis from Bureau members, partner
organizations, delegates and NGOs. The value of having technical officers
from the regions in the Bureau, means that they bring with them insight
about regional problems and their resolution, including knowledge of
fundraising sources and the use of advocacy to promote a region's interests
within Ramsar.
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Interestingly, Ramsar's regional emphasis appears to be changing the patterns
of communication between Bureau personnel and their regions in that an
increasing proportion of all communications is informal. A lot of
information is unsolicited and is received informally - by phone and personal
contact - from local or national NGOs. Technical Officers develop huge
networks of contacts in a region and they use their informal contacts to check
out whether formal intervention is warranted, wanted, whether it would be
useful, or could be mistimed. On the basis of the information they receive the
regional officers are well placed to advise the CoP and the Standing
Committee on the status of an issue or site, and to assist regional members to
develop and implement a strategic management plan for their region.
Developing a cultural and geographical mix of Bureau personnel remains a
difficult balancing act. A cultural mix is desirable, but it is not an
organizational objective in and of itself. The organization is concerned that if
a specific cultural mix becomes an objective, then merit and all the other
recruitment criteria might fall by the wayside. This would then create
credibility problems for the Bureau whose reputation is founded on its
professional competence. The recruitment emphasis is on the best person for
the job.
It will be interesting to track the impact of regionalization on convention
outcomes and on the Bureau's performance. Regionalization is currently the
'flavor of the month', but I have no doubt that managing regionalization is
going to prove a taxing exercise for the very limited resources of the Bureau.
Regionalization may well see the emergence of yet other organizational
constraints, unless the plans for Regionally-based Ramsar Officers can be used
to good effect, and the Bureau's organizational resources and strategic
planning are reviewed accordingly.
Organizational Loyalties And Leadership
National Government Influence
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According to the Bureau and NGO personnel I interviewed, conflicts of
interest between national loyalties and ICS norms have rarely been a problem
for the Bureau. However, one country is known to exert direct pressure on its
national in the Bureau to pass on information and to influence policy in
favor of the official's home country. When this occurs, the officer contacted
notifies the Secretary-General. This same country is known to exert similar
pressures on its nationals in other secretariats including the CITES
Secretariat. 10
A Ramsar Bureau member commented that s/he regularly received faxes and
telephone calls from Country X about the need to 'defeat conservation
NGOs'. It was explained to me that in the country concerned, a lot of
government people hold NGOs in contempt as amateurs. They do not like
them involved in conservation issues, nor does the national government
want to have NGOs present at Ramsar conferences (Pers.Com. Bureau, 1995).
The Bureau officer helped NGOs informally as s/he would help any other
stakeholder, but was regularly the target of serious criticism from national
and regional government officials. In the home country's annual report, the
government formally reported that a Ramsar monitoring report was
'unprofessional' because it allowed the NGOs to have their views included in
the report. The officer had participated in the monitoring team as the TO for
the region, and had facilitated the inclusion of experts and NGOs in that
team, consistent with Ramsar's policy on the composition of Monitoring
Teams.
The Bureau official also assisted the national environment agency. As one of
weakest in agencies in the country, the agency has a limited budget and few
staff. As the national organization responsible for implementing Ramsar, the
agency is well placed to request additional organizational resources to ensure
10For the reasons I give in Chapter 1, and reiterate in Chapters 6 and 7, I am not prepared to
name the country involved, as to do so would reveal the identity of the individual Bureau
officer concerned who fears repercussions an return home. I gave this assurance to all the
secretariat officers so affected. Had I not done so, I doubt whether I would have been told of
these incidents. In my view, not revealing their identity does not detract from the point I wish
to make about national government influence.To protect the identity of the Ramsar officer
involved, I have therefore removed the name of the country and its region from the following
interview extract.
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that the government is able to meet its international implementation
objectives. By assisting the environment agency to enhance its capacity, the
Bureau official also assists the national government to meet its international
obligations - not that her/his assistance is viewed in a sympathetic light by the
more powerful industrial development and finance ministries of the country.
Based on assertions in the IR and 10 literature about the influence of national
governments on international civil servants, I had expected to find more
evidence of the national government influence in secretariats such as the
Ramsar Bureau than I did. It may be that other Bureau officials were more
circumspect, and/or by other governments were less flagrant in their attempts
to exert influence.
Leadership Constraints
The position of executive head of an environmental treaty secretariat is not
for the faint hearted if the experiences of the executive heads of the Ramsar
Bureau and the CITES Secretariat are anything to go by. More will be said
about CITES later, but as Dan Navid noted, that the Secretary-General is
caught between three camps: the Contracting Parties (the Secretary-General
serves the Contracting Parties, and in turn is looked to by them for leadership
in policy guidance); the Standing Committee (the Secretary-General is
officially a servant, but is expected to provide ideas leadership); and, as
executive head of the Bureau s/he must provide leadership to her/his own
staff. Here again, the Secretary-General both serves the staff by representing
and defending their interests to the CoP and the Standing Committee, and by
acting as a buffer between the staff and the Contracting Parties (Pers. Com.
Navid, 1995). The executive head also provides intraorganizational
leadership, and represents the staff to stakeholders inside and outside the
treaty system.
The role of the Secretary-General is a contradiction in terms in that the
incumbent is expected to provide policy and ideas leadership to the decision
makers of the system, and organizational leadership in the Bureau, while
formally being a 'servant of the parties'. The position is analogous to that of
the Managing Director of a private corporation who has to manage upwards
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to the Board of Management and downwards to the stockholders. A
Managing Director also represents the corporation to the external
environment as does the executive head of a secretariat.
Perhaps the three main differences between the two positions are: the
divergence of positions among the stakeholders in an international
agreement is major factor predisposing to conflict emergence; employment
and salary packages - few managing directors would be prepared to work
under the conditions of employment and for the level of remuneration that
Secretaries-General do; and the overt political dimension of a treaty where
the ICS code of practice prohibits a disgruntled Secretary-General from
publicly criticizing the CoP. This makes a Secretary-General's position more
vulnerable than that of his private sector counterpart. In this respect it can be
argued, there are more risks and fewer rewards involved in being the
Secretary-General of an international treaty secretariat than there are in
heading a private corporation.
Criticisms of the Bureau's leadership can arise from any quarter. They are
likely to reflect changes in the CoPs preferred policy direction which may
conflict with those suggested by the Bureau, or suspicion that the secretariat is
becoming too strong or independent. In these situations, it is the executive
head who takes responsibility for the Bureau's performance and may become
the scapegoat of the CoP. The Koshiro financial management incident
mentioned previously, is an example of a situation where the substance of
the issue (doubling the Bureau's meagre budget) was not necessarily the
problem. It seems more likely that the manner of the budget's presentation
was a tactical error by the then Secretary-General.
A cynic might also suggest that this error of judgement coincided with the
coalescence of several other political factors which together contributed to the
recommendation that the Secretary-General resign. These factors were: an
influx of new members from the South; general disquiet among these new
members that Ramsar was a Northern-dominated convention; the long-
serving Secretary-General was from the USA; Koshiro in 1993 was the first
CoP to be held in Asia; and no governments like to think they are being run
by a civil service, however competent it might be. It was a explosive
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combination. Perhaps the financial management issue which triggered the
Secretary- General's departure was an opportunistic device to achieve the
policy and management changes that the governments wanted?
Between 1995 and 1996, the Bureau experienced three leadership changes. Dan
Navid, the first Secretary-General (1990-1995), an American, departed. He was
replaced by Jim McCuaig as the Interim Secretary-General (from the Canadian
national delegation). This appointment was made by the Standing Committee
expressly to oversight the management reorganization of the Bureau and the
development of the strategic planning process. The current Secretary-General,
Delmar Blasco (from Argentina), took up his appointment late 1995, in time
to present the Ramsar Strategic Plan to the 25th anniversary COP in 1996. His
appointment was well received by Bureau members to whom he was already
well known through his work with IUCN and NGOs.
These leadership changes, while unsettling, could well have been even more
destabilizing for the Bureau staff. In practice, it seems that when personnel
have a 'calling' it helps substantially in maintaining staff cohesion and
commitment to organizational goals during times of upheaval. However, it
will be instructive to see the extent to which the implementation of the
Strategic Plan changes the dynamics of Bureau leadership.
McCuaig's assessment of possible implications of the Ramsar Strategic Plan,
was that the [Bureau] leadership component of Ramsar had been very strong
until 1995 because the Conference had been basically establishing its directions
under the original treaty; focusing on acquiring new members; building up its
technical capacity; and working on the monitoring procedure and the
Montreux Record of sites which identifies where ecological changes have
occurred. This meant that the Contracting Parties had little time to worry
about the pros and cons of Bureau leadership. However the Standing
Committee emerged from Koshiro charged with developing a 6 year plan for
the period 1997-2002 which effectively reconstituted the Bureau's former
leadership role. In McCuaig's view, although the leadership role of the
Secretary-General had been very strong, if the leadership were taken over by a
strategic plan run by the CoP and Standing Committee, then the Bureau's
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leadership role would inevitably change, become lower in profile and its
influence might be significantly diluted (Pers.Com. McCuaig, 1995).
I agree that such a scenario is highly likely, but not necessarily solely because
of the implementation of a new strategic plan. First, McCuaig, was brought in
by the Standing Committee - to provide managerial leadership and to drive
the strategic planning preparation phase. Second, he was not a permanent
member of the ICS, but a national delegate on short-term secondment from
his national government to do a very specific job, namely, to reorganize the
Ramsar Bureau in a way that ensured it did not 'get out of hand again, 'that
is, become too independent, as it was seen to do in the Koshiro budget
negotiations. His critical comments on Bureau leadership must therefore be
seen the context of member self-interest.
Another leadership problem that emerged in Ramsar was that until the 1993
'crisis', the Secretary-General had been appointed for an indeterminate
period. This made it extremely difficult to remove an executive head with
whom the CoP was not satisfied. The problems this created emerged at
Koshiro in 1993, when the CoP wished to dismiss Navid. The lesson learned
from Koshiro is that future executive heads of the Ramsar Bureau will be
appointed for one three year term. Only one extension will be allowed, and
the Secretary-General's position will be regularly reviewed by the Standing
Committee.
A further issue which complicated the Koshiro decision and the timing of the
executive head's departure, was that no provision had been made in the
convention's budget to cover the costs of paying out a Secretary-General
departing before his term had expired. The CCAMLR Secretariat had similar
problems when its Executive Secretary, Darry Powell retired, as did the CITES
Secretariat when Eugene La Pointe was dismissed and successfully claimed
unfair dismissal and sought compensation from Mustafa Tolba who was
UNEP's executive head at the time (Pers.Coms. CCAMLR Sec.; La Pointe,
1995).
Ramsar leadership to 1995 could be described as primarily ideas-generating
rather than decision-making leadership. Until 1994/95, leadership had also
214
been very independent financially because there had been little control over
the convention's financial management by the CoP or the Standing
Committee. The Koshiro incident has been a pivotal event in the Bureau's
leadership history, and I anticipate that the current leader's mandate may well
be less broad than his predecessors as the members try to reign in the
operational independence of the Bureau via the Strategic Plan.
Implementation Conflicts
Conflicts between and among the Parties over Ramsar issues are reputedly
rare. Ramsar's reputation as 'the friendly convention' is, however, likely to
be seriously tested over the next ten years or so as the convention moves
from a focus on nature conservation to land-use management. This shift in
focus will raise the political profile of the convention, and the political, social
and economic stakes of wetlands management as the economic value of
wetlands as a national and international resource is more fully understood.
This combination of factors is almost guaranteed to increase the incidence of
conflict at both national and international levels, and it will make wetlands
conservation more expensive for all interest groups by raising the stakes to
conserve it.
Differences among political regimes in their attitudes to the management of
wetlands are already starting to intensify. Governments which are either
dictatorships, semi-dictatorships, newly-fledged democracies or politically
undecided, have very different ideas about community and NGO
involvement in wetlands management from more pluralist polities such as
the USA and Australia.
The active involvement of non-state actors such as IWRB, IUCN, ICBP, and
Wetlands International in wetlands management and monitoring has
historically been a hallmark of Ramsar. From my observations of CoP6 and
meetings of national delegates, the questions most frequently raised by
delegates were: How am I going to explain "that" to my Finance Minister ? or,
How am I going to explain "that" to my government? where "that" was the
convention's expectation of active NGO involvement in Ramsar's
implementation.
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Conflicts Among Parties
The nightmare for Bureau personnel is that delegates will use Ramsar to
push other issues such as human rights. This nearly happened at the Regina
CoP in 1987. In this context, the Ramsar conflict that was recalled most
frequently by those interviewed, was a dispute between Iran and Iraq over the
contamination of Iranian wetlands by the use of Iraqi toxic chemicals during
the Iran/Iraq war. Iran is a Ramsar member, Iraq is not. The issue was brought
up by Iran at the CoP but was defused by keeping Iran focused on the technical
aspects of wetlands damage and its remediation, rather than on the political
implications of the issue, including the death of Iranian civilians from the
use by Iraq of internationally- banned chemical weapons
(Pers.Com.Bureau,1995).
According to a Bureau official, another factor that helped to scale down the
Iran/Iraq dispute so rapidly was that politically 'high-ranking' people were
not present (for example, US State Department diplomats). Instead, the
Ramsar delegates were scientists. The conflict demonstrates the types of
dilemmas Ramsar will face in the future. The convention needs 'high-
ranking types' (such as the foreign affairs officials who attend CITES' CoPs), to
raise Ramsar's international profile, but these 'high-ranking types' are more
likely to subscribe to subjective political norms as the basis of decision
making, an approach which might not be as objective or as acceptable as the
scientific norms used traditionally by Ramsar to reach consensus.
As a senior Bureau manager and scientist commented, conflicts between
parties have generally been handled on a consensus basis, and conflict
management has not been a problem because,
Ramsar's roots are in science, therefore people who represent a country to Ramsar are
people who have some knowledge of the science and use objective criteria against which
to assess conflict. This is how the Iran/Iraq skirmish was resolved (Pers. Com. Bureau,
1995).
A more recent situation involved Croatia and Yugoslavia. Croatia wanted
Ramsar to monitor wetlands in an area occupied by Yugoslav troops.
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However Ramsar declined as it would have required undue force, to say
nothing of the risk to the Ramsar Monitoring Team.
To 1995, transboundary wetlands management had not been a significant
problem for Ramsar. Countries like the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark
have a joint ministerial declaration for the management of a major
transboundary wetland involving all three countries. They have put a lot of
funds into it and it is being managed under the Ramsar wise-use principals.
An African example of transboundary conflict prevention in wetlands
management is Lake Victoria which spans Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania. The
management problem is water hyacinth eradication. Three governments
have come together to form a commission and sub-committees that are
addressing the issue, even though Tanzania is not a Contracting Party. This
case is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Another area where tensions have emerged among parties, is the selection of
the location for the CoP. Countries compete to hold the triennial CoP as it
confers international status on the host country and there is an economic
multiplier effect from having hundreds, even a thousand, international
visitors in a city. However, CoPs cannot be held in countries that won't give
visas to certain nationals. Until recently South African delegates were refused
entry to many countries and Israeli delegates were not permitted entry to
some Middle Eastern countries. This created tensions among parties which
the Bureau had to help smooth over. A related area of tension has been
Ramsar's failure to hold a CoP in a developing country. This imbalance will
be addressed when the CoP is held in Costa Rica in 1999.
A final area of potential tension among parties is the disbursement of WCF
funds to members. Developing countries were concerned that the Wetland
Conservation Fund would be opened up to European countries. They were
concerned that if this happened, the money would be given specifically to
Eastern Europe, and the rest of the world would lose out. "
"As a former executive head commented, they were probably right. Canada and USA were
reorienting their aid programs to give more help to Eastern Europe so that places like Kenya
and East Africa fell off the list. This was partly related to the domestic political pressure
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Conflicts between Parties and the Bureau
The majority of interactions between the Contracting Parties and the Bureau
are harmonious and when differences of opinion occur, they are rarely public.
Two issues that developed into open conflicts between the Parties and the
Bureau were the 1993 budget negotiations and the 1995 selection process for
Delmar Blasco who was appointed Secretary-General late 1995.
Negotiating the budget is always a conflict situation. It is essentially a case of
how are the delegates going to explain a budget increase (and so an increase in
national contributions) to their finance ministers back home. It tends to be
backward planning based on how much money a country has, rather than the
Bureau being asked what the job is. The conflict usually occurs in the
Standing Committee because most of the countries on the Standing
Committee are the ones concerned with budgetary matters
(Pers.Com.Bureau,1995). As discussed in detail elsewhere, the budget was big
problem at Koshiro as the Bureau asked for 100% increase. This caused a
major conflict.
It was one of the biggest conflicts we've ever had in Ramsar because paying countries
couldn't swallow a 100% increase. They kept asking, How am I going to explain to my
Finance Minister a 100% increase? (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
This conflict appears to have emerged as the result of a tactical error by the
Bureau. The Bureau had prepared the budget itself. However, the Budget
Committee had not approved the budget before it went to the CoP, so neither
the Budget Committee nor the Standing Committee would defend the
Bureau's budget proposal at the CoP. This left the Bureau isolated. Members
of CoP then succumbed to their traditional suspicions about bureaucratic self-
interest and growth, opposed the Bureau's requested increase, and sought the
resignation of the Secretary-General.
The selection of the new Secretary-General in 1995 developed into a conflict
among the Parties for which the Bureau formally took responsibility. This
exerted by the many North Americans of Eastern European origin on their national governments
to support the economic restoration of their countries of origin (Pers. Com Bureau, 1995).
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was an effect of the lack of strategic planning by the convention. Ramsar had
never before selected a Secretary-General. Dan Navid had been appointed via
IUCN, and Jim McCuaig, as the Interim Secretary-General, had been directly
appointed by the Standing Committee. So, there were no procedures or
guidelines for putting together a panel to select a new Secretary-General.
There was lot of squabbling among the Parties to get right mix of regions,
languages, expertise and personalities. They were also concerned about cost of
bringing a representative from each region. Australia and New Zealand
(Oceania) declined to participate on the grounds of cost, and a last minute
replacement for a panel member had to be found by the Bureau at short
notice (Pers.Coms.Bureau, Delegate, IUCN, 1995)
It appeared that everyone was looking for someone to blame for the
'incompetence' of the process. For a member (or members) to have accepted
responsibility for the debacle would have meant a loss of face. So, the Interim
Secretary-General, Jim McCuaig, took the blame on behalf of the Bureau. He
issued a formal apology to members (although he had nothing to do with the
incident). McCuaig's explanation for his action was that taking the blame and
saying "sorry " even though it was not the fault of the Bureau or the
executive head is a way of sorting out a conflict, and conflict resolution is
ultimately the responsibility of the Secretary-General (Pers.Com.Mc
Cuaig,1995).
"It's almost like our life is built on conflict prevention" (Pers. Com. McCuaig,
1995). According to McCuaig, there is often conflict between the Bureau's
goals and objectives and what governments are telling it to do. Bureau
personnel are there because they want to do something for wetlands
conservation and endangered species in wetlands, so they try and put
pressure on governments to ensure they comply.
The Emergence of In-Country Conflicts
In the experience of Bureau staff, conflicts are more likely to occur between
and among government departments within a country, than between
countries. As Ramsar matures, and moves increasingly into land-use
planning issues and further away from its historical roots in bird habitat and
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conservation, tension is likely to increase as a greater range of government
departments will be involved, not just Ramsar's traditional allies - parks,
wildlife and conservation agencies.
According to Bureau Technical Officers, the Contracting Parties are generally
good at cooperating in managing wetlands, except when they run into conflict
within their own governments. Government agencies frequently collide in
the competition for resources. The Ministries of Environment and Wildlife,
the Forestry Department, the Finance Department, and the Planning
Commission often compete within a country for the same funding sources. In
situations such as this, the Bureau encourages all agency representatives with
Ramsar responsibilities and interests to meet in fact-finding and problem-
solving forums. These forums are often convened and facilitated by Bureau
officers on missions to the country concerned. In this capacity, Bureau
boundary-spanners act as catalysts at national and subnational levels to
advance Ramsar 's interests and prevent further conflicts emerging
unnecessarily.
The following site delisting threat by Belgium demonstrates how wetlands
management conflicts emerge within a country, and how they have been
handled by the Bureau. The Belgium government announced that it
intended to delist a very important Ramsar site in the national interest, and
that it would compensate for this delisting of part of the Ramsar site by
allocating a larger replacement area elsewhere. In effect it proposed to cut out
27 hectares of the Ramsar site to build a container port near Antwerp for
purely commercial reasons. It listed 200 acres somewhere else instead. The
government then tried to repeat the exercise a second time.
In response to this threat and the resulting public outcry, the Bureau wrote a
rather 'stiff letter' saying it could not see how these actions could be in line
with Belgium's international Ramsar obligations. The letter said that serious
consideration should be given by the Belgium government to delisting the
site and thus becoming the first Ramsar nation to delist a site. As a Bureau
representative said, "That's about as big a threat as the Bureau can make"
(Pers. Coms. Bureau, 1995).
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The Bureau's letter was then sent to the 'right people,' including the
environment minister, relevant government agencies, and NGOs, and was
used as ammunition by opponents of the delisting proposal to prevent it
from happening.
In Finland, the Bureau was asked by the Finnish environment minister to
write a similar 'firm but polite' letter to deter reclamation of an inner city
area for commercial development purposes. The letter was then used by the
environment minister to counter in-country pressure to develop the site.
A third example of in-country conflict was in Uruguay where an enormous
Ramsar site of between 250 and 40000 hectares was designated by the military
government, in consultation with the Bureau, to increase its political
popularity. The exact size of the site was hard to determine as there was no
map and the boundaries were unclear. Now that the political regime has
changed and a democratic government is in place, it remains to be seen what
this will this mean for the Ramsar site and for the Bureau's role in assisting
national stakeholders to define and manage the site.
Understandably, in-country conflicts can be very touchy, but the Bureau has
found that by providing information and trying to be impartial, it can help.
As reported by a Bureau official (Pers. Com.1995), in a conflict between the
Australian federal government and the Western Australian state
government, the Bureau visited the site in question and made a report which
strengthened the hand of the state conservation department in its
negotiations with other state and federal agencies. This action could have
been controversial. Instead it was very constructive for several reasons.
There was stakeholder respect for the expertise and professionalism of the
visiting Bureau officials. The Federal environment department (which was
then very strong politically and resource-rich) was also supportive of their
conflict management efforts. This combination of factors gave the Bureau's
site report and recommendations considerable political leverage. The
Bureau's mission essentially provided the organization with an opportunity
to convene a meeting of all stakeholders in an impartial forum where the
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stakeholders felt able to table their positions and to discuss both the issues in
dispute and possible solutions in problem-solving forums.
As a Bureau participant on the mission pointed out, the Bureau normally
deals with conservation departments, and having external experts (the
Bureau) make a recommendation strengthens the hand of the conservation
department in the context of its domestic negotiations. It does not mean the
conservation department is going to win, but it is often better to have outside
experts without a vested interest, to assist with domestic turf battles. What
Ramsar does is to provide a constructive forum for these issues to be raised
and discussed, and it certainly appears to have helped in many cases (Pers.
Com. Bureau, 1995).
In practice, the Ramsar Monitoring Procedure is an exercise in conflict
management. The presence of a Ramsar monitoring team in a country is an
acknowledgment by that country that there is an ecological threat to a listed
site. The country may request a site inspection by a monitoring team, a non-
state actor may inform the Bureau of emerging problems, and/or site-
management problems may come to light in national reports. An external
monitoring team of appropriate international experts and a Bureau
representative is then set up by the Bureau to visit the country in order to
undertake a monitoring procedure (a site assessment). The Bureau and the
Ramsar Monitoring Team then prepare a report for the national government
and the Ramsar CoP with recommendations for remediation and future site
management.
In anticipation of increased conflict emergence as human pressures on
wetlands increase, the Bureau is now getting involved in wetland issues
before they become fully-fledged site conflicts. In Mexico, the Bureau was
asked to help set up a monitoring team for a site which is as yet unlisted. This
posed a problem for the Bureau and the Mexican government as there was no
funding available to monitor sites that were not yet listed. The Mexican
government would have had to pay for the monitoring exercise, or obtain
external funding or partnership funding from another source such as the US
government or an international NGO.
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The political and conservation value of the Mexican case for the Bureau, was
that it gave the Mexican Ministry of the Environment political ammunition
to protect a waterway from a proposed development by using a team of
external, international experts to draw attention to the issue.
Almost any wetlands site or potential site, where the dual objectives of nature
conservation and economic development are at odds as witnessed in the
above cases, have the potential to develop into conflicts. In this context,
Ramsar's concept of wise-use and the application of the wise-use guidelines is
a useful starting point for conflict management initiatives by the Bureau.
NGOs and Conflicts
As far as the NGO, Bureau and government stakeholders I interviewed were
concerned, conflicts between NGOs and parties rarely come up at the CoP
level. The explanation I was given by Bureau staff was that Ramsar NGOs are
not the kind of NGOs that specialize in publicly embarrassing governments.
Instead, they specialize in working with governments, rather than against
them (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
Where conflicts emerge between NGOs and parties in their own countries,
the Bureau watches developments very closely to see that the NGOs, when
being critical of their government, are not representing their views as those of
Ramsar.
This is for their good and for Ramsar's good. For their good so they don't damage Ramsar,
and for Ramsar's good so that when the NGOs say something that makes the government
angry, it does not backfire on Ramsar (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
I obtained little evidence of NGO-government or NGO-Bureau conflicts. The
majority of NGO-government conflicts seemed to occur in-country when
NGOs supported environment and wildlife agencies in their struggles for the
resources to manage and monitor Ramsar. Bureau-NGO tensions were
discussed in relation to the Bureau's relations with its partner organizations.
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There was no additional evidence of Bureau-NGO tensions at the domestic
level. 2
To sum up this section. From all the accounts of conflict emergence that I
received, it appears that disagreements among government agencies over the
leadership of and responsibility for Ramsar implementation processes and
policy, arise primarily from competition among agencies for the resources to
implement and manage Ramsar.
Although all those interviewed were at pains to assure me that Ramsar lived
up to its reputation as 'the friendly convention', and that the stakeholders
were all one big happy family, I found sufficient evidence of conflict among
the parties and within countries to reassure me that Ramsar was not perfect,
nor as conflict-free as many stakeholders would like to believe
Summary Of Problem Emergence In Ramsar
Ramsar's initial development has, in many ways, been a series of mostly
avoidable omissions, errors and incidents originating from a poorly crafted
text which have in turn provided valuable object lessons for secretariats
following in the footsteps of the Ramsar Bureau. Subsequent secretariats,
particularly the CITES Secretariat, were thus able to anticipate how, where
and when problems might emerge and so put in place strategies and
mechanisms to minimize the potential of similar problems occurring in the
implementation of their conventions.
Of particular note in Ramsar's case are the recent changes in policy direction
from a habitat conservation treaty to one focusing on land-use management.
This will introduce another suite of political pressures which will seriously
challenge Ramsar's reputation as 'the friendly convention'. I predict that the
2The Bureau seemed understandably reluctant to be drawn into disputes between domestic
NGOs and their governments. However, the Bureau often has indirect contact with domestic
NGOs in conflict situations, in that environmental NGOs usually support the environment and
wildlife departments (Ramsar management agencies) to monitor ecological changes in wetlands
for inclusion an the Ramsar database and to assess the environmental impacts of proposed
developments on listed wetlands. Environmental NGOs also tend to support Ramsar
management agencies in their resource-allocation struggles with competing government
agencies.
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incidence of implementation conflicts will rise as the competing pressures of
economic development and population growth and wetlands conservation
collide, especially in developing countries which contain some of the world's
most significant and threatened wetlands of international importance. In this
scenario, the challenge for the Bureau as the network manager of the
convention will be how to prevent and manage these conflicts to ensure that
Ramsar's objectives are achieved and sustained.
CASE STUDY 2: CITES
Institutional Evolution
The growth in CITES membership from twenty-one countries in 1973 to one
hundred and thirty four countries in 1996 (Green Globe Yearbook,1997), can
be attributed at least in part, to the activism of the CITES Secretariat in
promoting the benefits of membership of a politically and economically
influential, global network for both developed and developing countries with
common trading interests and environmental concerns. For developing
countries there has been the added incentive of access to the CITES Trust
Fund to assist members with capacity building as well as with institutional
links to global financial institutions such as the World Bank.
CITES has always been more politically and economically 'hard-nosed' than
Ramsar. The trade component of CITES means historically that it has been
playing for higher economic and political stakes than has Ramsar. CITES is
also directly concerned with domestic and international trade regulation and
enforcement, and only governments can enact and enforce regulations.
Although conservation NGOs and IUCN played a prominent role in CITES'
evolution, the influence of governments in CITES has always been much
more pronounced than in Ramsar.
In Jonsson's terms, CITES is an issue-area of high politics as well one of high
technical complexity. In contrast, Ramsar has been an issue-area of low
politics but high technical complexity.
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Both CITES and Ramsar are scientifically complex. CCAMLR is also an issue-
area of very high technical and scientific complexity but mostly low politics,
although this fluctuates depending on the level of conflict between NGOs
trying to conserve the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean, and
the market value of the fish catches in developed countries such Japan, the
USA and Europe. See Appendix 3.
CITES was able to benefit from the earlier treaty negotiation experiences of
Ramsar and the WHC, and the convention clearly learned from the mistakes
made in drafting Ramsar. In the light of Ramsar's experiences, CITES made
sure to include provisions for: an amendment of the convention clause
(Article XVII); a permanent secretariat (Article XII); and by CoP2 in 1979 a
financial mechanism, the CITES Trust Fund had been approved. Both the
CITES convention and the CITES Secretariat had a head start on Ramsar in
that the treaty text and its implementation provisions had been more
carefully crafted.
Other pieces of the 'CITES machinery' that have been vital to its continued
success are: the CoPs; the institutional apparatus for managing trade in
threatened and endangered species, including the criteria for adding species to
the CITES Appendices; and the system of national trade records and reports.
Together, these elements constitute a comprehensive and coherent global
sustainable management regime which, in contrast with Ramsar, have
minimized the emergence of institutional problems in CITES.
CITES also added what has become a CITES-unique clause, the power of the
CITES Secretariat to formally "make recommendations for the
implementation of the aims and provisions of the present Convention,
including the exchange of information, of a scientific or technical
nature"(Article XII (h)). This power has been used by the CITES Secretariat to
make recommendations to the Standing Committee and. the CoP that trade
bans be invoked against members which have been persistently in breach of
their CITES obligations. Neither Ramsar not CCAMLR gives its secretariat
formal powers of recommendation.
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To this day the CITES Secretariat remains the only global environmental
treaty where the secretariat has been formally endowed with such a power.
From my interviews with secretariat and NGO personnel and delegates, it
seems to me that in subsequent treaties including CCAMLR, WHC, Basel,
CBD, CCD and the FCCC, the absence of comparable clauses may indicate that
governments, alerted to the implications of such a formal power in
strengthening the hand of the secretariat, and wary about the very activist
(and, most would argue, very effective) roles assumed by the CITES
Secretariat in assisting its members to achieve the treaty's objectives, reacted
against the inclusion of a comparable clause in any of the above conventions.
However, I was unable to locate documentary evidence to support this
supposition.
Political Constraints
CITES dynamics and outcomes are strongly shaped by the constantly changing
relations between international trade and environmental policies and
priorities. In this general context, North-South relations are particularly
influential. Southern nations constitute the majority of the range states
(exporters), while the Northern countries dominate as importers and re-
exporters of CITES species and products. This North-South dichotomy reflects
a philosophical divide between Western developed country or Northern-style
notions of nature conservation and preservation, and the development ethos
of Southern or developing countries with rapidly expanding populations.
Since CITES entered into force in 1975, the North-South dimension in global
politics has increased in importance, and global trade protocols and
procedures have been formalized in the mechanisms of the GATT and the
World Trade Organization (WTO). These trade instruments pose a real threat
to CITES as the GATT and the WTO promote trade while CITES restricts trade
(Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
Conservation/trade, and North/South tensions are permanent
undercurrents in CITES, and they emerge regularly in convention forums
such as CoP9 in 1994 in the USA where the issue of re-opening the ivory trade
was raised by African nations and heatedly debated along North-South lines.
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Unable to reach agreement, a decision on the matter was put off until CoP10
in 1997 in Zimbabwe. The locations of the two CoPs undoubtedly swayed the
timing (if not the substance of the final outcome) of the debate. A decision to
re-open the issue of elephant 'culling' would have been greeted by storm of
media, NGO and public protest, and domestic electoral backlash had the
decision been taken in 1994 in the USA.
To delay taking this unpopular (in the North) decision until the next CoP was
held in a Southern location, meant that the host country Zimbabwe stood to
gain support from its domestic constituency and its African neighbours, while
media coverage of the decision was lessened by the relative isolation of the
location, plus the fact that since 1994, environmental issues had slid well
down the international political agenda as memories of UNCED faded in the
global political consciousness.
Relations with Members
The ivory trade issue is without doubt the issue which has caused, and
continues to cause, the most ongoing tension between the Secretariat and the
Parties and it erupts periodically as occurred in 1994 at CoP9.
At CoP9 in 1994 in Fort Lauderdale, USA, the secretariat advised the countries
that if they felt they could not implement the convention regarding the
protection of elephants, then they could enter a reservation until they were in
a position to adequately protect their herds. Some Southern African countries
were concerned that if South Africa were permitted to cull its elephant herds,
this would send the wrong message to neighbouring countries which did not
have the infrastructure to prevent poaching. The concern was that the
poachers would choose to interpret the culling of South African herds as a re-
opening of the ivory market, when the intent of the CITES strategy was to
restrict trade to elephant products other than ivory, for example, hides and
meat.
The Secretariat's suggestion that undecided parties might enter a reservation
was based on the Secretariat's firm position that, if a country does not comply
with what is in the resolution, then the Secretariat has no choice other than
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to recommend to the party that it not to accept the document. The Secretariat
is not bound by CoP resolutions, but Parties are (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
According to the Secretariat, in 1995, the undecided parties were still not
convinced of the Secretariat's argument and remained combative.
The Secretariat was understandably nervous about how this suggestion
would be received for two reasons. First, when the ivory conflict was at its
zenith in 1989, the Secretary-General of the day bore the brunt of
international environmental NGO anger at what these NGOs construed to be
the preferential treatment of ivory traders by members. of. the Secretariat,
particularly the Secretary-General, Eugene La Pointe. In fact some NGOs
accused him of receiving payments from traders. These accusations were
hotly denied by La Pointe who remains angry about what he argues was a
totally unwarranted attack on his integrity and professionalism. This incident
cost him his job. In response, he accused US environmental NGOs of
orchestrating his dismissal for their own ends, namely to bolster their
flagging domestic constituencies and organizational coffers, the plight of the
elephant being a major funding drawcard (La Pointe, 1992; Pers. Com. La
Pointe, 1995).
The second reason for Secretariat hesitation about suggesting concrete action
to members, relates to the dislike of the formal recommendatory powers of
the Secretariat by some parties. They resent the power this gives the CITES
Secretariat. Parties may then seek out opportunities to criticize Secretariat
recommendations. By definition, "recommendations" cannot not neutral. It
was an attack on Secretariat recommendations at the Lausanne CoP 7 in 1989
in relation to the African elephant management issue that resulted in
dismissal of the Secretary-General (La Pointe, 1992; Pers. Com. Sec., 1995).
Many of the personnel I interviewed in the secretariats of Ramsar, CCAMLR,
Basel, Montreal Protocol, CBD, FCCC, WHC and the CCD, envied the CITES
Secretariat its formal recommendatory powers, arguing that they
strengthened a secretariat's bargaining power in its relations with the parties.
No other environmental treaty secretariat has these powers. But these powers
have their drawbacks as the CITES Secretariat and the former Secretary-
General found out.
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There are, however, many instances where the Secretariat's
recommendations are accepted and acted upon by the Parties. The most well
known is the Secretariat's recommendation to the Standing Committee that
the members should take action against Italy for its violation of CITES trade
regulations. There is no formal provision in the convention text for
sanctions, in effect 'sanctions' are silent, but trade bans were imposed on Italy
by CITES members and Italy soon complied. In such a situation, a decision to
suspend trade is taken under Article XIV,1. This article allows governments
to take stricter domestic measures (than the CITES provision) regarding trade
- including its complete prohibition.
That the Standing Committee acted on the Secretariat's formal
recommendation to institute a trade ban against Italy for non-compliance
adds weight to Secretariat's international reputation as a strong and activist
organization whose advice should be taken seriously and respected. The
organization should not be dismissed as just a 'servant of the parties'.
Re-export has created problems in Secretariat-member relations. Some
countries have accepted imports they thought were acceptable, yet were illegal
as only a small proportion of permits are able to be checked by the Secretariat.
Sometimes a country has genuinely accepted the document [CITES permit], to
allow re-export even though the origins of the goods were illegal. There is
now a resolution that the CITES Secretariat should recommend against re-
export (Pers.Com.Sec,1995).
Constantly adjusting to political shifts in the regions, particularly the rise to
prominence of new nation states and their changing expectations of service
delivery by the Secretariat, can be a source of tension in Secretariat-member
relations. An example of how this can occur is found in an unpublished
paper by Moulson (1995) where she comments on the political coming of age
of Zimbabwe as a force to be reckoned with in CITES. According to Moulson,
Zimbabwe has learned how to change the CITES system from within to both
reflect domestic economic and political goals and to maintain popular
support in the international community by appearing to play a leading role in
a conservation regime. Moulson argues that Zimbabwe has gone from
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protesting, but begrudgingly going along with CITES requirements, to
working subtly from within the CITES power structure to alter the nature and
goals of the regime, particularly in relation to the ivory trade ban. It is a case
of regime membership actually enhancing national sovereignty.
The results of Moulson's study indicate that CITES as international regime
does make a difference in the policy decisions and behaviour of its member
states. Her comments on Zimbabwe are supported by representatives of
international NGOs including the Humane Society. Of particular concern to
the Humane Society was the delisting of the white rhino which was cited as
an example of how vocal parties can change the course of a CoP (as Zimbabwe
did in CoP9) and bring other parties with them. This comment referred to the
shifting balance of political power in CITES, as the developing nations of
Africa, Asia and Southern America are now becoming the vocal leaders of the
convention when once the leaders were the USA, Australia and New
Zealand (Pers. Com.Sec., Humane Soc.,1995).
In 1994 tropical timbers such as mahogany and marine species, including
shark and turtles, were added to the CITES Appendices for the first time. The
fishing and timber industries are very powerful forces in world trade,
politically and economically. As with most CITES issues, there is a North-
South dimension in both these cases. The timber producing countries are
predominantly Asia and South America, and the consumer countries are
Europe, North America and Japan (timber); and Japan and East Asia (shark
and fish).
In responding to CoP9 resolutions to include timber and fish species on the
CITES Appendices, the Secretariat has also changed its policy emphasis. It sees
a need to address the lop-sided image of CITES as a 'megafauna fauna
convention' (elephants, rhino and tigers), as plants outnumber animals
seven to one. Plants and timber is where the CITES Secretariat is now putting
its effort (Pers.Com.Sec., 1995).
This change of policy direction redirects limited organizational resources
away from the high-profile species which have been the focus of NGO and
media activities and which take up the bulk of Secretariat time and energy. I
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estimate that this policy shift is likely to offer the Secretariat a temporary
reprieve only. It is just a matter of time until timber and marine species are
'discovered' and taken up in earnest as drawcard issues by environmental
NGOs. Fisheries and timber trade concerns will probably be the next
environmental policy frontiers, once the 'megafauna' species become extinct
in the wild. It has been predicted that this will be the fate of the wild tigers by
2000 (Pers. Coms. SSC, 1995).
To quote a senior Secretariat member, "the real money in wildlife is not in
rhino but in timber" (Pers. Com Sec, 1995). Timber is a relatively easy issue for
CITES to manage as Secretariat members claim CITES provisions can
overrule those of timber trade treaties which promote an unsustainable
global timber trade. Marine species are much harder to manage. Many marine
species including fish, are highly migratory and their stocks are extremely
difficult to assess. CITES Art XV, Para 2(b) on marine species requires that the
Secretariat consults with intergovernmental bodies such as FAO, ICRW and
the International Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna (ICCAT), to obtain scientific data and coordinate conservation efforts.
The inference is that it will be particularly difficult for the CITES Secretariat to
manage the conservation of these species because of the overlapping
jurisdictions, the existing involvement of multiple IGOs, and the economic
and political strength of industry/trade interests.
Relations with Non-Members
The Secretariat spends a considerable amount of time explaining to non-
members the benefits of joining CITES. It promotes the value of membership
of a network of influential countries; peer support in managing illegal
wildlife trading problems; and access to the CITES Trust Fund. In this
mission, the Secretariat has been spectacularly successful. More recently
however, small island developing nations such as Micronesia have expressed
concern about the costs of belonging to multiple international agreements of
which CITES is one. If CITES is to be successful in its future monitoring of
marine species such as turtles, shark and corals, it is imperative that
incentives be found to persuade these nations join CITES.
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Changes in National Governments
Changes in national governments were not regarded as being as much of a
problem for the CITES Secretariat as they were for the Ramsar Bureau. The
reason for this appears to be that the well-established CITES infrastructure has
acted to offset, at least to some extent, the implementation dislocations caused
by changes in officials in CITES management authorities and political
regimes. The CITES infrastructure includes Committees such as the Animals
Committee and the Plants Committee; CITES' national legislation
requirements; and national and regional capacity building initiatives, in
particular the Secretariat's extensive regional training programs.
The majority of difficulties occur where there is a lack of CITES
implementing and enforcement legislation in member countries and where
competing policy demands within countries have led to decreased interest in
environmental issues. Internal changes cause problems of continuity in
information dissemination, and in the transfer of knowledge, skills and
technology.
The CITES Secretariat coordinates and/delivers training and retraining
programs in the field as often as possible, as an antidote to changes in
national governments. 3 Secretariat personnel responsible for the African and
South American regions commented that they expected people to change
every 4-5 years, and so there is a constant search by Secretariat personnel for
innovative solutions to this dilemma. In the South American region, the
Scientific Officer, Obdulio Menghi, recommended to governments that in
changing governments and officials, they not change the head of the CITES
Management Authority as this is a critical position. In this way at least a
nucleus of senior managers with authority and CITES expertise would be
13 The following example was given of how Secretariat personnel responded to disruptions in
CITES implementation progress and compliance caused by changes in the government in Mexico.
As formal communications take a long time to be re-established after a change in government,
the Secretariat officer responsible for the region maintained communications with his Mexican
networks both, state and non-state actors, by fax and telephone. He also offered the incoming
Mexican officials field-based training courses. The Secretariat's view is that is best to train
people in field so they can learn to track illegal trade from its source through the CITES system.
However, every time government officials change, the Secretariat has to go back out and start
again (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
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retained to ensure continuity and a more rapid rebuilding of a critical mass of
CITES expertise in the management authority (Pers. Com. Menghi, 1995).
Changes in national governments appear to less of a problem in Europe as
even when government change, the CITES bureaucrats do not change as
frequently (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
Time delays in communication and implementation activities are another
problem which have been caused by changes in national and subnational
government bureaucracies. This echoes the Ramsar Bureau experiences in
Mauritania and the Neotropics. Time delays can be critical and the severity of
their impacts tends to be issue-dependent. A delay may make the difference
between species extinction and its survival. Inaction can occur in both
developing countries where communications are slow, and in developed
countries which deliberately 'mislay' faxes to stall for time in responding to
Secretariat investigations into incidents of non-compliance.
That changes in national governments appear to be less of a problem for the
CITES Secretariat than for the Ramsar Bureau, appear to reflect the differences
in the viability of their treaty infrastructures. The CITES' infrastructure of
committees, national legislation and training programs, ensures that even
when national governments change, there is a sufficiently stable
infrastructure and a critical mass of CITES knowledge and expertise in place to
guide incoming officials. The existence of national implementing legislation
ensures that governments cannot turn a blind eye to their CITES
responsibilities as they are legally required to enforce CITES with the country.
Relations with UNEP
Relations between UNEP and the CITES Secretariat have a chequered
history." At its first meeting in 1976, the CoP adopted Res. Conf. 1.8 which
"CoP7 (1989) saw a review of the Secretariat following the dismissal of La Pointe. Several
significant changes resulted. Future Secretaries-General of the Secretariat were to be appointed
by the Executive Director of UNEP in consultation with the Standing Committee, rather than
by the CoP as had been the practice previously; and the Executive Director was to ensure that
the Secretary-General implemented the policy guidance given by the CoP (rather than
providing policy leadership). However, the Standing Committee retained its control over
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noted that the effectiveness of the Convention depended largely on the
effectiveness of the Secretariat, and the Conference resolved that a strong
Secretariat was essential to the proper implementation of the Convention.
The CoP recognized, even then, that the Secretariat did not have sufficient
resources to meet its full responsibilities under the Convention, and
proposed a reinforced Secretariat as a matter of high priority (Wijnstekers
1992:144).
From 1974 to 1984, IUCN based at Gland, Switzerland, performed the CITES
Secretariat services under rolling contracts with UNEP. In 1984, the CITES
Standing Committee reviewed the relationship between UNEP, IUCN and
CITES, and identified deficiencies in administrative and financial
management, staff relations and accommodation arrangements. The
Standing Committee recommended that the Secretariat staff members be
taken over as a functional unit by UNEP, as not all CITES parties were
members of IUCN. In December, 1984, the CITES Secretariat moved from
IUCN to a separate location at Lausanne.
In the 11 years the Secretariat was associated with IUCN, it had problems
negotiating the issue of common services with IUCN, and relations with
IUCN deteriorated because of these problems. It is deja vu that the Secretariat
is now experiencing the same problems with UNEP. In fact IUCN, SSC and
WWF personnel commented that CITES left its original relationship with
IUCN because IUCN's financial management had been "appalling", but that
since then the Secretariat's relations with UNEP have been a "nightmare for
staff" (Pers. Coms. IUCN, SSC, WWF, 1995). Secretariat staff commented that
although the relationship with UNEP had improved in the years up to 1994,
co-location with UNEP offices in Geneva had aggravated tensions and slowed
down work. The Secretariat felt that UNEP was trying to dictate to some
Secretariat budgetary decisions and allocations from the Trust Fund (Wijnstekers 1992:147).
In 1994, still under UNEP direction, the CITES Secretariat was again relocated, this
time to Geneva where it shared accommodation and administrative resources (Common
Services) with several other environmental treaty secretariats - Basel and the CBD (UNEP);
the FCCC; and the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD). Another reason for the co-
location of environmental treaty secretariats was that a Geneva location made it easier for
national delegations to obtain information from the secretariats, while delivering increased
efficiencies of operation. (Pers. Com. Delegate, 1995) By 1996, the secretariats of the FCCC,
CBD and the CCD had all been relocated to other countries.
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extent what the CITES Secretariat required in relation to personnel needs,
numbers of staff, and classification levels.
Specific points of tension between the CITES Secretariat and UNEP that have
emerged are the disparity of classification and salary levels among the UNEP
secretariats; the issue of common services; and control of the CITES budget.
There is a clear disparity of classification and salary levels between the new
UNEP Secretariats of Basel and the CBD, and CITES which is causing
resentment in the CITES Secretariat. For example, classification levels for the
executive head and professional personnel of the new Secretariats were
allotted at D1 and D2 (director) levels. The CITES Deputy-Secretary General is
only a P5 (professional officer) although he has been working for CITES since
its beginnings, is extremely competent and is internationally very highly
regarded by all stakeholders as became obvious during my interviews with
NGOs, governments and traders. Interorganizational disparities such as these
cause dissatisfaction among CITES Secretariat staff in their relations with
UNEP, although in this specific case the individual himself said nothing to
me about any disappointment he might have felt. Nevertheless, it was
obvious that there were definite tensions between the CITES Secretariat and
UNEP on this issue.
A key source of conflict between UNEP and the CITES Secretariat is the issue
of common services and the costs (to the Secretariat) of being located in an
expensive office block in Geneva. Putting it in its historical perspective, in
1995 the Secretary- General, Izgrev Topkov, commented that IUCN had
apparently not understood the importance of CITES and so did not put
sufficient effort into making the CITES-IUCN partnership work better. The
parties therefore decided that the CITES Secretariat would to move from
IUCN to UNEP. However, the views put to me by many Secretariat personnel
were that the Secretariat now wishes it were in Ramsar's position, as the
Ramsar Bureau has fewer problems with IUCN than the CITES Secretariat
does with UNEP. Topkov concluded that the reason the Secretariat was
fighting UNEP so strongly on the common services issue was that it had been
through this before with IUCN and understood the implications for
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organizational independence of capitulation to the partner organization, in
this case UNEP (Pers.Com.Topkov, 1995).
Consolidating the presence of international secretariats in Geneva helped the
FCCC and CBD as the bargaining stakes were high for countries to host these
conventions, and their partner organizations UNEP (CBD) and the UN
Secretariat (FCCC) stood to gain from negotiating good personnel and
accommodation deals with the Swiss government. However, both have now
gone - the FCCC to Bonn and the CBD to Montreal, as Germany and Canada
offered better deals to their CoPs than did Switzerland. As summed up by the
CITES Secretary-General, CITES is now taken for granted, while governments
continue to fight to get the more recent conventions (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
A longer-term, potential complication for UNEP is that according to several
delegates and NGOs representatives, UNEP is seen to have lost ground to
UNDP in the competition for organizational credibility and constituency
loyalty among developing countries." The CITES Secretariat is watching
closely the UNEP/UNDP situation very closely, CITES members are also
members of trade treaties with access to UNDP's (larger) capacity building
resources. The significance of this for UNEP-CITES Secretariat relations is that
it lessens Secretariat confidence in UNEP's ability to assist the Secretariat
financially, thus compounding the Common Services problem.
The Secretariat's difficulties in its relations with UNEP have a significant
intraorganizational impact as they divert staff time and energy from
substantive tasks. They are also potentially a 'chink in the armour' of the
organization which could be exploited by self-interested stakeholders in
1 The points made to me by Secretariat personnel, NGO representatives and some delegates,
were: UNEP's prime constituency is essentially developed country environmental NGOs and
other stakeholders with an environmental conservation mission. UNDP's constituency is more
focused on economic development. UNDP has a high-profile presence in developing countries
through its system of regional offices and local advisers. When countries come up with capacity
building proposals, UNDP has the program budget to assist, while UNEP's budget is much more
limited. It seems that UNEP can never compete financially with the resources of the World
Bank and UNDP, and UNDP's high profile on the ground in the regions, enhances its
credibility. In contrast, UNEP's credibility rating is low because of the negative reactions of
range state to what they regard as interference in their domestic affairs by Northern
environmental NGOs as the base constituency of UNEP. CITES range states are therefore more
likely to turn to UNDP for support, rather than to UNEP, in the trade/conservation debate.
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playing off UNEP and the Secretariat, particularly when it comes to obtaining
project funding.
Attempts by UNEP to establish control and management of the CITES'
contributions (the regular budget) are another source of tension. In other
UNEP conventions such as Basel, country contributions are managed by
UNEP which then controls the Secretariat's budget allocation from these
contributions. The CITES Secretariat is determined to avoid this scenario. To
accomplish this, the CITES Secretariat makes sure it retains sound working
relations with both its parties and non-state actors in support of the continued
organizational independence of the CITES Secretariat. Developing country
support for the Secretariat's position in its relations with UNEP carries
considerable weight. It also capitalises on their apparent preference for UNDP
assistance over that offered by UNEP in what appears to be a competition for
constituency contributions between the UN programs.
Relations with NGOs
CITES has formal relations with two NGOS, WWF/TRAFFIC and WCMC
(World Conservation Monitoring Centre). WCMC, formerly the IUCN
Conservation Monitoring Centre, has provided data management services,
wildlife trade statistics and technical advice to CITES since 1980. It enables the
CITES Parties to implement the convention, and allows the impact of trade to
be monitored (WCMC, 1995). 16
While the Secretariat's relations with environmental NGOs and professional
trader/industry organizations are generally sound and productive in terms of
implementing CITES, not all parties react positively to NGO activities in their
160On behalf of the CITES Secretariat, data on world trade in wildlife is collected and analysed
by the Wildlife Trade monitoring Unit (WTMU) which is part of WCMC's centre in the UK.
Apart from trade statistics submitted by governments in compliance with CITES' reporting
requirements, WTMU also receives information from IUCN/WWF TRAFFIC offices in several
countries. Its information is universally regarded as reliable and vital to effective
implementation.
TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis Of Flora and Fauna In Commerce) is a WWF
instrument. It has a network of operatives on the ground in all CITES regions, who are in regular
contact with domestic NGOs. By monitoring trade closely, WTMU and the TRAFFIC network
are able to assist the Secretariat in spotting problem areas and prompting remedial action
(CITES, Secretariat, 1989).
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countries, particularly when it comes to monitoring CITES trade and assisting
the Secretariat to identify infractions. In situations such as these, the
Secretariat plays a crucial but informal and low-key role in smoothing
relations among the stakeholders.
Northern environmental NGOs are particularly disliked in many of the
countries of Asia and Africa. However, the intensity of government dislike of
environmental NGOs is probably more pronounced in the case of CITES
(than in Ramsar). The reason is that environmental NGOs have drawn
massive, adverse, international attention to illegal wildlife trading activities
in these countries, thus projecting to the rest of the world a very negative
general image of these governments and their political and cultural practices.
As an African representative said, NGOs have a contribution to make, but the
real problem is that a lot of countries do not have the capacity to control
poachers. Furthermore, many Northern environmental NGOs are more
interested in making money [for their own organizations], than in
conservation per se (Pers. Com.Sec,1995). The traditional medicine trade of
Asia which obtains many of its products such as ivory and rhino horn from
African range states, is a classic example of traditional cultural practices being
heavily criticized by Northern environmental NGOs. These are not easy
issues to resolve. One of the problems with the traditional medicine issue in
Asia which was identified by environmental NGOs and then formally taken
up by Standing Committee, is that exporting range states are easy to identify,
but identifying the importing and re-exporting consumer countries is more
difficult (Pers. Com.Sec.,NGOs,1995)
The Secretariat certainly supports the view that environmental NGOs play a
very important role in assisting CITES to achieve its wildlife conservation
objectives. However there are differing views among non-state actors
regarding the 'use' of wildlife. The Secretariat seeks to find a balance between
the extremists on both sides (environmental preservation versus
uncontrolled use). The intensity of the ivory dispute is probably the classic
example of the degree of difference between the position of the proponents of
environmental preservation (non-use) of elephant herds for their intrinsic
value, and the position of trading interests in support of free-trade. The latter
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group advocates that the market should be allowed to determine the volume
of trade.
The balance between these two perspectives is defined in the convention as
'sustainable use'. Defining 'sustainable use' in a convention text is vastly
easier than trying to achieve and monitor it in practice. As a Secretariat
member commented, the difficulty lies in trying to explain conservation to a
developing world with an increasing population. CITES has an obligation to
be anthropocentric in its focus, and an anthropocentric approach is the only
way to convince G77 countries to implement and enforce CITES
(Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
The WWF perspective on NGO-Secretariat relations, is that NGOs and the
Secretariat work together well if there is mutual interest, and when conflicts
emerge they don't let conflict get in way of talking afterwards. They
(WWF/TRAFFIC and Secretariat personnel) take the view that conflict is a
problem for diplomats not for technocrats (such as environmental NGOs and
Secretariat operatives), who are supposed to be able to deal with conflict and
who accept it as part of doing business (Pers. Com. Sec.,NGOs1995).
The Humane Society's comments are in the same vein. Its representative
followed on by saying that the CITES Secretariat is very influential. The
Humane Society confirmed that it relied on the Secretariat to provide trade
data; to detect infractions; to do the hard work with the parties; and that the
Secretariat gives sound and reliable advice to parties and to management
authorities. "The Secretariat makes recommendations and what they say
really matters a great deal and carries a lot of weight" (Pers. Com. Humane
Soc.1995).
Formal relations between the Secretariat and non-state actors have generally
been mutually supportive. The data collection and monitoring service
provided by WWF/TRAFFIC is an indispensable implementation tool.
Secretariat relations with trading interests are also sound. These
organizations provide financial assistance for capacity building and
monitoring, as well as providing a valuable informal means of monitoring
illegal trading via trading networks in both range and importing states. It is in
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the long-term economic interests of traders to ensure that CITES' trade
remains sustainable.
Unfortunately for Secretariat-environmental NGO relations, the actions of
some Northern environmental NGOs in pushing for the dismissal of La
Pointe in 1989, have left a legacy of caution and even a distrust within the
Secretariat. This reaction is understandable as an organization's survival
instinct is very strong and there remains a sense among the Secretariat
members who were present at that time, that La Pointe was probably
unjustifiably scapegoated and sacrificed for US domestic environmental
interests. The US environmental movement was particularly strong at that
stage. and was pursuing a very active agenda of domestic lobbying (Pers.Com.
Sec., 1995).
Financial Constraints
The CITES Budget is divided into two parts, the regular or core budget and
'external funding'. The regular or core budget covers the Secretariat's basic
running costs such as operational costs and salaries. As it is a labour intensive
secretariat, salaries are the main expenditure from the regular budget which is
financed entirely by mandatory contributions from the parties. Country
contributions are calculated in accordance with the UN's scale of
contributions. External funding is used primarily for specific projects such as
capacity building and training.
Regular Budget
The Secretariat's main convention maintenance expenses are organizing and
running the CoP - and the production of publications and communication
costs (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995). Unlike Ramsar, expenditure for the CITES CoP is a
line item in the regular budget. CoP 8 in Kyoto in 1992 cost approximately
$USD 800,000 (Pers.Com.Sec., 1995). There is even a delegates fund to facilitate
the participation of developing countries at the meetings of the CoP. The
CITES Trust Fund is the main source of money for these activities.
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In 1983, regular member contributions replaced UNEP as the sole source of
CITES finance. That CITES collects and manages its own contributions (as
distinct from UNEP collecting them on behalf of CITES), has helped with its
success as it gives the convention more control over its own finances.
The CITES Secretariat advised that 70-80% of contributions were paid up by
end of each year, although no countries pay on time. The main parties
provide over 50% of budget with the USA, Japan and Germany being the
largest contributors. The US plays a significant role in budgetary terms. It
contributes 25% of the CITES budget, approximately $USD 1 million per year.
CITES is thus financially vulnerable to a capricious US Congress, as is
Ramsar. See Table 3 below on the following page.
In collecting members' contributions, it seems that one of the biggest
difficulties of the international system is that the same governments speak
different languages in different forums. For example, the representatives of
Ministries of Forestry, Environment, Finance and Trade are all
representatives of the same government, and their governments are often
members both of the GATT and CITES. In the CITES forums these
governments take decisions supporting conservation via trade regulations,
and yet 3 days later in same town, at a GATT forum, the same governments
are likely to overrule or contradict the decisions they took 3 days before at the
CITES forum (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
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Table 3
Selected Sample of CITES Scale of Contributions for Triennium 1993 - 1995
Party UN Scale Yearly Total
Contributions Contributions
% US$ US$
Argentina 0.57 22,367 67,101
Australia 1.51 59,253 177,759
Austria 0.75 29,430 88,291
Botswana 0.01 392 1,177
Brazil 1.59 62,392 187,176
Canada 3.11 122,038 366,113
China 0.77 30,215 90,645
Denmark 0.65 25,506 76,519
France 6.00 235,442 706,327
Germany 8.93 350,417 1,051,251
Honduras 0.01 392 1,177
India 0.36 14,127 42,380
Indonesia 0.16 6,279 18,836
Japan 12.45 488,543 1,465,629
Kenya 0.01 392 1,177
Malaysia 0.12 4,709 14,126
Mexico 0.88 34,532 103,595
Namibia 0.01 392 1,177
Saint Lucia 0.01 392 1,177
Seychelles 0.01 392 1,177
South Africa 0.41 16,089 48,266
Switzerland 1.16 45,519 136,556
United Kingdom of Great 5.02 196,987 590,961
Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America 25.00 981,010 2,943,031
Zambia 0.01 392 1,177
Zimbabwe 0.01 392 1,177
Source: Wijnstekers, Willem
Lausanne, Switzerland.
(1992) - "The Evolution of CITES", 3rd ed. CITES Sec,
In 1995, the CITES budget was in the best shape in its history, and the
Secretariat had money for 1 whole year before it was due to be paid, that is, it
had the 1995 contributions due by 31 December, 1994 (Pers.
Coms.Topkov,1995). The Secretary-General is responsible for the budget.
Ensuring contributions are paid on time is a personal crusade as CITES may
lose money on the convention's investments in the financial markets if
contributions are late.
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According to Topkov, the measure of the convention's success financially is
that the budget is now at a point where the Standing Committee is trying to
make persuade the Secretary-General to spend, forgetting that the UNEP
Governing Council has commented that UNEP is in a precarious financial
position and it not going to be able to lend to CITES at beginning of the year.
Historically any shortfall [caused by late payment of contributions] been
covered by UNEP, but now CITES can cover its own shortfall. CITES pays its
own way, plus $USD 500,000 to UNEP for 3 officers. Thirteen percent (13%) is
paid to UNEP to cover 'overheads' incurred in employing these officers.
Apparently UNEP has suggested that these 3 officers go to Common Services
and serve other conventions in addition to CITES, without the other
conventions having to pay the 13% paid by CITES. If that happens CITES will
effectively be subsidizing these other secretariats which have been less
successful than the CITES Secretariat in collecting their members'
contributions (Pers. Com Topkov, 1995).
Frustrations with UNEP on the Common Service issue and UNEP's
persistence in trying to extract funds from the more financially solvent CITES
Secretariat, were shared by all Secretariat personnel who felt that UNEP was
not entitled to CITES contributions. Their view was that CITES contributions
should be used to further CITES objectives, not to pay for expensive
accommodation and overheads for other UNEP secretariats.
External Funding
External funding covers the costs of scientific and technical activities (for
national capacity building), training programs, and specific projects.
Voluntary contributions come from the Parties (60%), IGOs (9%)
environmental NGOs (15%), and professional organizations such as traders
whose activities are related to CITES (15%), and private donations (1%)
(CITES Secretariat, 1993). The Convention ensures that the voluntary
contributions from nature conservation organizations and trade
organizations are equal as it minimizes the risk of backlash about the
Secretariat favouring one interest group over another as happened in 1989
when the former Secretary-General came under fire as mentioned.
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CITES 'external funding' is the equivalent of Ramsar's 'project funding'.
Contributions are made on a voluntary basis for projects, especially for
capacity building in developing countries the majority of which are range
states. Decisions about what projects to fund are made by the Standing
Committee on recommendations from the Secretariat, and the projects
themselves are usually developed at the request of recipient Parties.
In spite of the optimism about the Secretariat's success in collecting members'
contributions, the Secretariat's most significant operational constraint is a
lack of money for capacity building and training which are sourced from
external funds. These activities are the Secretariat's key, substantive
implementation activities, and they are arguably the cornerstones of much of
CITES' success. Several Secretariat personnel commented that there was
never enough money to train people and to build national capacity, a point of
view reiterated by NGOs.1"
There are two basic types of Secretariat-sponsored capacity building. They are:
development of infrastructure such as national CITES legislation, data
collection and management systems; and the training of government officials
at different levels of the national bureaucracies.
Capacity building projects such as the development of national implementing
legislation, compilation of species inventories and the training of
enforcement officers and national management authorities, have been
fundamental to CITES' success. These projects are particularly important in
developing countries where the bulk of the species traded is located. Many
developing countries are endeavouring to reconcile conservation objectives
with the impacts of increasing populations and the need to develop their
economies. These domestic factors place considerable pressure on their
governments to restrict, or oppose, any activities which might be seen to
" As one NGO noted, the CITES Secretariat does not have the organizational nor financial
capacity to deal with current issues, let alone with the new, emerging issues such as timber and
fish which will need a lot of money to counter the funds injected into timber and fisheries
exploitation by the international timber and fishing industries. In fact, CITES' problem is that
it has limited trade control and cannot deal with the [current] demands placed an it, let alone
the anticipated demands of monitoring trade in timber and marine species (Pers. Com.
WWF/TRAFFIC,1995).
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jeopardize opportunities for national economic growth. Consequently, CITES
needs to be able to encourage such countries to develop realistic alternatives
to illegal wildlife trading as a primary source of income for local
communities.
Lack of money is the main obstacle to implementation and enforcement
training. The Secretariat conducts and coordinates in-country and regional
training programs for management authorities, scientific bodies, Customs
officials and the police. Conservation NGOs and traders also participate on
occasion (Pers. Com. Gavitt, 1993). CITES has to train people, and it needs to
build national and Secretariat capacities specifically to do that. To advance an
understanding of CITES in local communities, the Secretariat encourages the
participation of community representatives and local NGOs in many of its
training activities.
The problem is that there is often no specific funding for training, and CITES
implementation success is limited by training and time constraints.
Secretariat personnel firmly believe that training is definitely a key to
successful implementation, however more personnel are needed to improve
and expand the training programs The Secretariat gets around the problem of
inadequate training to some extent by getting American nationals to do the
training especially in the Central and South American region as they have
the money to do it. From the Secretariat, American trainers learn what is
required and what is most useful for the stakeholders. Secretariat staff
participated in and supervised the first US-conducted workshop. These
workshops show what CITES is about, and what it is doing in a country and a
region. It is vitally important that countries have training to build up a
critical mass in each country. This takes time and it cannot be done in 3-4
sessions. Follow up sessions are required as are workshops to train the
trainers in their own countries (Pers. Coins. Sec.,1995).
To achieve its capacity building objectives, the Secretariat needs external
funding to overcome the gap between the parties' needs and expectations and
the inadequacy of their contributions for other than basic regular budget
items. External funding has been used to bridge this gap, but its availability is
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unpredictable. In the 1990s this gap widened as a result of cuts in national
budgets and a serious decrease in the money available to CITES."
External funding for projects is mostly conditional funding to cover specific
activities. When a country voluntarily contributes $USD 10,000 for projects, it
can stipulate the nature of the specific activity for which this money is
intended. This is usually done in consultation with the Secretariat and the
Secretariat is advised of the donor's intentions in advance. The Secretariat
seeks funding from national governments, and approved organizations and
associations. A donor list is approved annually by the Standing Committee,
and includes environmental NGOs such as WWF, and trading associations
such as the Fur Traders Association (Pers.Com.Sec., 1995).
International environmental NGOs are mainly implementing agencies
rather than funding agencies and their resource input is more often found in
on-ground activities such as assisting countries to design enforcement
mechanisms and to draw up legislation.
Over the years, the Secretariat has received considerable project funding for
enforcement and implementation activities. It has also received funding for
scientific studies of species; and to fund specific Secretariat positions such as a
specialist botanist, for a period of 12 months; and Japan has paid the salary
and overheads to support a Junior Program Officer (JPO) for the Asian region.
However, the Secretariat still faces a dilemma, if at the end of the funding
year, funds for positions such as these are not accepted into the regular
budget. If good officers disappear and projects cease [because funding dries up]
this creates a conflict as parties' expectations have been raised and the
Secretariat cannot deliver (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995).
Environmental NGOs and traders expressed concern that CITES enforcement
is linked to the availability of resources and money. Effec.tive implementation
18 It has become more difficult to get contributions, and with certain members it is difficult to see
ways to improve or save money, because the Secretariat is are often dealing with different
departments and people. In addition, CITES is now competing with the CBD (Pers.
Com.Topkov,1995).
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is thus totally dependent on the availability of financial, personnel and other
resources, the lack of which are major obstacles to capacity building.
Competition with the CBD
The CBD is an emerging problem for CITES funding sources and thus for the
Secretariat. There are problems determining the relationship between the
CBD and other environmental conventions. CITES and Ramsar are
potentially on a collision course with the CBD. At this stage CITES has the
more to lose financially, than does the CBD which is still ramping up.
The advantage of the CBD to its members (most of whom are members of
CITES), is that they are automatically eligible for funds from the GEF. This a
powerful incentive for countries to join the CBD. For countries that are
members of both CITES and the CBD, they have to pay two sets of annual
contributions. From a members' point of view it could be argued that it is less
onerous to meet CBD requirements than it is to meet those of CITES. The
CBD has fewer enforcement 'teeth', and its Secretariat has no
recommendatory power and so cannot bring pressure to bear on non-
compliant members as easily as the CITES Secretariat.
As CITES pre-dates the CBD, CITES members are not eligible for GEF funding
unless biodiversity (as distinct from a specific species) is at stake. Comments
were made to me by CITES Secretariat personnel that biodiversity is a serious
obstacle to CITES, and it will probably take time to sort it out.
In an attempt to achieve closer coordination with the CBD, senior CITES
senior managers met regularly with their CBD, Ramsar and Basel equivalents
in a series of 'synergy' meetings called in 1995 by the former executive head of
the CBD Secretariat, Angela Cropper. Cropper's intention was to determine
the 'turf' of potentially overlapping environmental conventions, particularly
those of Ramsar and CITES, and so avoid duplication and replication of
activities (Pers.Com. Cropper, 1995).
However, it was the feeling of CITES personnel attending these meetings, that
the CBD was intended to be an umbrella convention for all the others
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including Ramsar, CITES and the WHC - an approach which appears to have
been strongly resisted by the secretariats of these conventions which fear
being subsumed by the CBD.
Organizational Capacity And Management Constraints
The major organizational management constraints are personnel issues. All
the CITES Secretariat personnel interviewed commented on the need to
improve the organization's resources and its capacity to cope with a
constantly expanding membership, an increasing diversity of issues, and the
specific challenges posed by the intersection of trade and environment issues
particularly the emerging issues of timber and marine species.
Personnel Issues
Employment uncertainty has been a perennial feature of CITES Secretariat
working conditions. It speaks to the dedication (the 'calling') of the staff that
they have continued to work for long periods of time under less than
optimum workplace conditions: less pay, relative to other UNEP Secretariats;
huge workloads; long hours, on average 12 hours per day; and employment
contracts have been as short as 2-3 months. These problems have emerged
largely because, in theory, there can be no permanent Secretariat positions.
Legally, the CITES Trust Fund has a limited life, so it cannot be assumed that
the Secretariat itself will survive indefinitely, hence in 1995 personnel were
on contracts of between 2 and 5 years on average.
Until 1995, some staff were on 2 and 6 month contracts as the contributions
flow from the parties which fuels the regular budget (from which salaries are
taken) was erratic. 19
19 In 1995, Secretariat staff were working contrary to UN rules. They were getting less for travel
than the UN travel conditions dictated, and CITES translating/interpreting teams were getting
lower salaries than personnel in more recent secretariats because of funding uncertainties. When
Topkov took up his position in 1990, contracts were for 3-6 months for most professional
personnel and 1 year at best. Personnel even went an missions without contracts and so were not
covered by insurance. By 1995, everyone had a contract of up to 5 years. Topkov's philosophy
appeared to be that if he did not look after 'the system' (the staff), then 'the system, would be
reluctant to defend him if needs be.
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Many personnel commented on the need for employment stability and
continuity to ensure staff commitment, especially the commitment of
younger staff who did not appear to have the 'calling' of members of the
previous generation who had been with CITES since the 1970s. IUCN and
NGO representatives commented that short term contracts made it difficult to
build up and sustain a critical mass in the Secretariat.
As several national delegates, environmental NGOs, traders and Secretariat
staff commented, one or two people (notably the Deputy Secretary-General,
Jacques Bernay and the Scientific Officer, Obdulio Menghi) were invaluable to
the Secretariat. However, unlike Ramsar's 'backstoppable positions', there is
no organizational succession plan in the CITES Secretariat. The official
position I was given is that no one is indispensable. However when several of
the more senior officials including Bernay and Menghi, retire over the next
few years, the Secretariat will lose valuable organizational assets. In the
absence of succession planning and an internal mentoring system, these two
officials are the core of the institutional memory of the convention and their
professional and personal networks are extensive and extremely influential
after some twenty years of working on CITES issues.2 A new generation of
officers is being recruited, largely on short-term contracts or secondments
from their national bureaucracies. It takes time and experience for incoming
personnel to build up their professional credibility and networks, and the
confidence of stakeholders.
From my observations, workload demands on the Secretariat are substantial.
Twelve hour days in the office are commonplace and contradict the public
misconception of lazy bureaucrats. It is the same at Ramsar, the personnel of
both secretariats demonstrating a professional and personal commitment
above and beyond the call of duty.
20 I am certain that their loss will be keenly felt. They are charismatic individuals whose
CITES expertise, professionalism, integrity and accessibility were freely acknowledged and
respected by all stakeholder interests, governments, environmental NGOs and traders. It
general terms, it was frequently said that they inspired confidence in the convention, always
listened with an open mind, and gave very sound advice. At the time of my field work they was
no indication of how and by whom they would be replaced.
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Personnel recruitment is another source of tension between the Secretariat
and UNEP. Recruitment is handled in the first instance by UNEP. The
Secretariat considers that UNEP's recruitment management practices are
unwieldy and result in a loss of control of the process by the CITES Secretariat.
The Secretariat decides what personnel it wants and then the positions are
advertised globally at UN and UNEP offices and distributed to the parties.
There are predictable time delays in and frustrations with, this process as the
CITES Secretariat is located in Geneva while the UNEP recruitment
bureaucracy is in Nairobi. Because of the delays caused by a complicated UN
appointment process and the backlog of work that piles up while the
Secretariat is waiting for the process to run its course, the Secretariat tends to
appoint from within.
Junior Program Officers (JPOs) who initially come into the Secretariat on
twelve month secondments from national bureaucracies or from TRAFFIC,
WCMC or IUCN, are a convenient source of internal appointments.
Secondments are bilateral agreements between a government and the
Secretariat. They are of mutual benefit to the Party and to the Secretariat: the
member government gets young, UN-trained personnel; and the UN gets
their services paid for. Secondees have priority in the recruitment process.
This helps short circuit the UNEP process.
The conflict between UNEP and the CITES Secretariat appears to be an
interorganizational tussle for control of arguably the most powerful and
wealthy of the UNEP conventions, fuelled by UNEP's reputedly waning
financial situation and political clout, and the apparent ascendancy of UNDP
in the regions.
Data Management
Although the Secretariat has formal responsibility for monitoring trade
permits, the primary data management task and statistical compilations
which are the core of the CITES monitoring and enforcement processes are
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contracted out to WCMC, IUCN and NGOs in recognition of their technical
capacity to handle data management tasks. 21
Information from the CITES database is the convention's primary source for
determining what action should be taken in the event of infractions. For
example, when Europe and Indonesia disagreed over the export of reptiles
from Indonesia to Europe, the Significant Trade Report was the starting point
for discussions. IUCN reviewed the report, but it was left to Secretariat to
recommend to the Standing Committee whether or not it should suspend
trade (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995)
Time
Insufficient time to accomplish all the organizational tasks is an eternal
problem for all secretariats, a case of too few personnel and organizational
resources to service the ever increasing expectations of the parties. The CITES
Secretariat identified training as perhaps the Secretariat task most essential to
effective implementation. While it was agreed that training paid dividends in
educating countries and officials about CITES requirements and promoting
compliance, it was also agreed that training was resource intensive and that it
took considerable Secretariat time and energy to organize, including enlisting
the cooperation of numerous international organizations such as Interpol,
environmental NGOs and traders, and national enforcement and CITES
management agencies. In budget allocation decisions time spent on training
thus has to beweighed up against other task priorities such as monitoring
compliance.
21Data management tasks include the compilation of: trade information (Significant Trade
Program); scientific information (Nomenclature Project); and the national legislation project.
The Significant Trade Program is a data system for identifying species which are subject to
significant levels of trade vis a vis species numbers. The CITES Animals Committee identifies
the target species via contracting the work to WCMC and IUCN. The Animals committee then
analyses the data and makes recommendations to the range states about the need to apply trade
restrictions; and the Secretariat recommends to the Standing Committee what actions should
be taken if there is a serious problem and a Party is not complying.
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Problems of Social And Cultural Diversity
Managing External Diversity
The 1995-97 Strategic Plan identifies the main work of the Secretariat as being
in the regions. However, senior personnel advised that contrary to popular
belief, there is more work in the importing states of developed world, than
there is in the range states of developing world, if 'work' is measured in the
volume of trade. A CITES regional presence makes sense for political reasons,
but it creates logistical and personnel management difficulties for the
Secretariat.
A professional officer is responsible for each of the 7 CITES' regions. In
addition each officer has a thematic responsibility. The Scientific Officer
covers Latin America; the Enforcement Officer is responsible for North
America; the Plants Officer covers Eastern and Western Europe; the Quota
Officer oversees Africa; and the Deputy Secretary-General is responsible for
Asia and Oceania. Professional staff considered that regional work was very
important for the Secretariat's credibility as well as to optimize service
delivery.
From all accounts, CITES representatives are well accepted in the regions
through the CITES system of committees. The Secretariat has representatives
on each CITES committee. The Secretary-General is on the Standing
Committee; Scientific Officer is on the Animals Committee; and the Plants
Officer is on the Plants Committee. Secretariat participation on these
Committees enhances the Secretariat' s reputation and profile in the regions,
and the organization benefits considerably from the networks and alliances it
forms with stakeholders.
Within the regions, capacity building problems emerge for a range of reasons.
In the African region, national agencies are faced with a lack of personnel in
management authorities and the Secretariat cannot do anything about it
except to suggest that governments try to keep a small 2-3 person team in
place for several years to build up a critical mass of in-country CITES expertise
and provide continuity of service. There are also difficulties in ensuring that
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project and treaty implementation advice given by the Secretariat is taken on
board by the parties; and there are the inevitable time delays in
communications between the Secretariat and the parties, similar to those
experienced by the Ramsar Bureau in its communications with African
countries. In some developing countries, even if CITES management agencies
have a fax machine to communicate with Geneva, there may be no paper
available locally.
No money is the underlying problem in the African region. Many
management authorities have insufficient funds to carry out essential
surveys and monitoring, and many of the parties in the region do not meet
(even when a forum is available) as they need external funds to attend. The
costs of attending regional meetings are high, as Africa is more decentralized
than Europe or North America and CITES is a low priority of many African
governments (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995).
The development of a regional presence has been a valuable political strategy
for CITES implementation and for its Secretariat. It improves understanding
of CITES' obligations and requirements and the opportunities afforded by
membership of the convention. In addition, it facilitates access to convention
expertise via Secretariat specialists with regional knowledge and networks.
Regionalization of Secretariat tasks and responsibilities has helped enhance
the presence of CITES as a UNEP flagship in regions traditionally 'occupied'
by UNDP. Cynically, it might be argued that regionalization is just another
colonizing strategy. However, the feedback from all stakeholder interests
involved in Secretariat regionalization initiatives, was positive. They were
especially appreciative of direct advice and service delivery such as training
programs (Pers. Coms. NGOs, Traders, Delegates, 1995).
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Organizational Loyalties And Leadership Constraints
National Government Influence
The same country that put pressure on its national in the Ramsar Bureau,
puts pressure on its national in the CITES Secretariat. This was the only
example given of tension between a commitment to ICS norms and national
loyalty. It appears that there are individual differences in the ways these
situations are handled by the officers concerned, depending on the life
experiences, political ideology, personal philosophy, and ambitions of the
incumbent. The CITES Secretariat incumbent appeared to be less outraged by
pressures from the home country than the official's Ramsar equivalent.
Leadership Constraints
The CITES Secretariat has had its share of leadership crises, in particular the
dismissal of the Secretary-General in 1989 over his alleged mismanagement
of the ivory issue. La Pointe was the Secretary-General of CITES from 1982 to
1990 when he was dismissed under controversial circumstances. That the
Secretariat received some financial support for projects from ivory traders,
merely served to add fuel to the fire to remove La Pointe as US
environmental NGOs put pressure on the US government to encourage his
dismissal (La Pointe, 1992; Pers.Coms. Sec., NGO Reps.,1995).
Some of the international NGO representatives I interviewed appeared
personally sympathetic to La Pointe's position, but their organizational
position was to support their NGO colleagues (Pers. Coins. WWF, Humane
Society, 1995). Others remained critical, saying it was the lot of the Secretary-
General to take responsibility for such situations, and that La Pointe should
have been more careful in his selection of funding donors. These respondents
were seemingly forgetful of the fact that NGOs such as WWF also donate
financial and in-kind assistance to the CITES Secretariat for use in projects.
Many of CITES Secretariat staff present at that time this issue erupted in the
CoP and the Standing Committee, were clearly critical of the decision to
dismiss La Pointe (Pers. Coins. Sec., 1995), and still kept in touch with him.
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His dismissal definitely had a profoundly negative effect on Secretariat
morale, and the organization is now more cautious in its relationships with
environmental NGOs.
CITES has always been a treaty to regulate international trade. It was never
intended to end trade per se. However, the growth of domestic
environmental NGOs (especially in the USA) in the 1970s and 1980s as a
potent political lobbying force had gathered considerable momentum by the
time the ivory debate with its much publicized images of butchered elephant
carcasses was televised around the globe. Public outrage over this situation
and the apparent lack of international political will to do anything about it,
reached a crescendo at CoP7 in 1989. La Pointe became the scapegoat in an
unwinnable political issue - an unpleasant, occupational hazard for a
Secretary-General. Certainly, La Pointe's departure from office was more
public than that of Dan Navid, Ramsar's Secretary-General to 1995, whose
request to the CoP to double the Bureau 's budget was the catalyst for his
departure.
The difference between the ways in which the two situations were handled
reflects the differences in the political gamesmanship and the stakes involved
in each set of circumstances. Stakeholders in the ivory issue which resulted in
La Pointe's departure were playing for very high political and economic
stakes, whereas the circumstances leading to Navid's forced resignation were
more to do with the internal management of the Ramsar Bureau which
reached a head at the Koshiro CoP in 1993. Unlike La Pointe's situation,
Navid's departure (although known in Ramsar circles) was not the highly
political and publicized affair faced by the CITES' Secretary-General.
The departure of these Secretaries-General heralded the end of an era of
secretariat leaders who were inspired by the environmental fervor of the
1970s and UNCHED, as was Darry Powell, the first Executive Secretary of
CCAMLR who retired in 1990. Their replacements appear to be a different
breed of international civil servants, ones whose leadership and management
focus is on achieving organizational efficiencies.
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Implementation Conflicts
The CITES Secretariat was less forthcoming with information about conflicts
than the Ramsar Bureau, although conflicts among CITES parties, and
between Parties and NGOs and over 'charismatic megafauna' species such as
tigers, rhino and elephants have received more publicity than the conflicts
that have occurred in Ramsar. I suggest that the caution of the CITES
Secretariat in discussing treaty system conflicts might be an understandable
reaction to its earlier sense of betrayal by environmental NGOs. According to
NGOs and the Secretariat, the majority of conflicts are among parties, and
between parties and NGOs, but rarely between NGOs and the Secretariat, or
between parties and the Secretariat, the exception being the 1989 incident
involving the Secretary-General.
Delegates interviewed were extremely reluctant to acknowledge the existence
of conflicts either among members or between governments and the
Secretariat, the exception being some very general comments on the much
publicized ivory issue. When I raised questions about conflict management
within the treaty system, delegates generally made efforts to avoid responding
directly. However, some were less hesitant to comment on the difficulties
that many developing country governments have experienced with
environmental NGOs.
Conflicts among the Parties
The most persistent conflict in CITES has been the ivory conflict. It has
become increasingly political and emotional, and it reflects a conflict of two
philosophies. The first wants to sell ivory as a means of increasing
environmental budgets in range states. The opposing philosophy says that
selling ivory will encourage poaching and the decimation of the elephant
herds. The Secretariat has been pressing for innovative solutions to present to
the Standing Committee and the CoP. In 1995 officials commented that the
issue would have to be resolved by CoP10 in 1997, else countries might leave
CITES (Pers. Coms. Sec.,1995).
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The tiger and rhino have also been the focus of conflicts among parties and
NGOs, and the Secretariat has been deeply involved in these (Pers. Com.
Sec.,1995).
In describing the status of conflicts in the treaty system, a senior Secretariat
staff member suggested that conflicts among CITES' parties have never quite
got to the point where the arbitration article in convention has had to be
used, and there most certainly had not been any conflicts referred to the ICJ.
The most serious cases had been resolved by negotiations some of which had
been facilitated by senior Secretariat personnel, usually the Secretary-General,
the Deputy Secretary-General or the Scientific Officer. Conflicts which have
emerged in the treaty system have mostly been about problems raised by the
implementation of the treaty's domestic measures. I was unable to obtain
from Secretariat officials, examples of actual disputes between governments
in which the Secretariat had been involved.
The problems of implementing the domestic measures required by CITES
have been raised on a number of occasions, and particularly by countries
complaining that they have not been informed or consulted about domestic
measures that have been taken in other countries. When a class proposal was
submitted by some African countries which tried to get approval for less
rigorous domestic measures than were stipulated in treaty text, the answer
was clearly 'no'. It is clear from the text that countries may take additional
domestic measures as outlined in Article XIV. It is a case of "you cannot be
less strict [than CITES], but you can be more strict" (Pers.Com. Sec., 1995). An
example of conflict emergence was described by a Secretariat official as
follows:
this was mainly a conflict between some Southern African countries and the European
community. European countries complained about an African county exporting to Europe o
regular basis, a supply of reptile skins. Then someone in the European community(EEC)
decided to put a ban on importing these skins without first consulting with the exporting
country. Someone else in the European community then claimed that the species did not
even exist in the exporting country. The trader was surprised, and the exporting country
asked," Why this provocation? What can be done? The Secretariat then wrote to the
EEC asking it for information. It received information that the African country had been
exporting skins to Europe for many years; that there had been problems, but the species
definitely existed in the range state. This information was received by the Secretariat
from the EEC and it was then passed to the exporting country, which agreed to revise its
export limits. In this case, there was only one trader involved in Europe, and he accepted
258
the concerns expressed. He then agreed to provide money for a study of the species and
the sustainability of the trade. The study was carried out by the European Union and
coordinated from the Secretariat. The study found that the country could export up to
80,000 skins, and a ban was not imposed (Pers. Com.Sec.1995).
This kind of conflict has occurred a number of times in the 25 years of the treaty. I believe
that the main, serious conflicts have occurred between [exporting] countries and
consumers. Smaller conflicts have occurred relating to the re-export of specimens from
Europe through Switzerland--- but everyone is very afraid of serious conflicts and wants
to avoid them (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
"The only conflict of any size is the tropical timber issue" (Pers. Com. Sec.,
1995). Curiously this comment was made by a Secretariat official at the time
when stakeholders were preparing their strategies after the reopening of the
ivory debate at CoP9 in 1994. However, the person concerned had only been
in the Secretariat a relatively short time, was not a "megafauna fan", and the
official's professional interests lay in the flora field which probably explains
this partisan perspective. However, it is fair to say that many Secretariat
personnel and stakeholders confirmed that they see the new listings of timber
and marine species as being the potential areas of CITES' conflicts in the
future.
The potential for conflict appears to be increasing. CITES parties are now
discussing how CITES might be used to regulate illegal trade in endangered
species of tropical timber such as mahogany. As far as fisheries are concerned,
CITES has not been involved in managing these species before. Traditionally,
other organizations such as FAO, have dealt with fish and forests. However,
CITES Parties are realizing that, as CITES has had success with other flora and
fauna issues, then CITES might well be a way to tackle timber problems.
At same time, resistance can expected from parties with timber trade and
commercial fisheries interests because they fear the power of the CITES
Secretariat to recommend that trade in certain commodities and species be
stopped. In the opinion of a senior Secretariat official, " a lot of conflict is
building among countries in relation to giving CITES the power to look at the
international timber trade and fisheries "(Pers, Com. Sec.,1995).
In anticipation of conflicts in the regulation of the global timber trade, the
Secretariat is taking measures to minimize a potentially negative backlash
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from the timber industry. The Secretariat Plants officer has attended
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) meetings to explain CITES
procedures; ITTO representatives have decided not to set a course against
CITES; and the Secretariat has taken ITTO criticisms to the Standing
Committee for its consideration.
As a result of CITES Secretariat negotiations with the ITTO Secretariat, and
the reciprocal participation in ITTO and CITES meetings by relevant officials
from each organization, the CITES Secretariat recommended to the CITES
Standing Committee that a Timber Working Group (TWG) be established in
CITES. In the interests of trust building with a very wary timber industry, it is
a small, closed working group, although true to CITES style as a transparent
convention, four NGOs are represented. The TWG consists of representatives
from CITES, ITTO, TRAFFIC, IUCN, and a US trade NGO as well as the usual
national representatives. The aim is to create a structure to evaluate timber
proposals put by the parties. The TWG provides a cooperative forum from
which to set guidelines. It has been agreed that ITTO meetings will run
parallel to TWG meetings and that the CITES Secretariat Plants Officer will
attend both (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
In- Country Conflicts
Secretariat interventions in in-country conflicts among competing domestic
bureaucracies were not a priority issue. The Secretariat's concern with
conflicts was more focused on those that occur among parties, and between
parties and NGOs. However, the Secretariat expects in-country concerns to
become more of a problem in the future as competition over funding for
CITES implementation increases. This competition is likely to be fuelled by
increased tension between conservation and trade as trade issues regain
centre stage on the international agenda, as memories of UNCED fade, and as
the influence of GATT and the WTO grows.
Developing Countries and Environmental NGO Conflicts
Tension and overt conflicts between environmental NGOs and developing
countries tend to revolve around their different philosophies, political
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priorities and objectives. Environmental NGOs in CITES are primarily
concerned with nature protection and species preservation. In contrast,
developing countries are primarily concerned with encouraging economic
growth and dealing with the implications of population growth. Range states
argue that selling ivory legitimately may help decrease poaching as it injects
money into the local economy. It also provides money to employ
enforcement staff, and to increase personnel in CITES management agencies.
Putting it simplistically, the environmental NGO response has been that any
selling of ivory, legal or illegal, sends the message that it is alright to kill
elephants for ivory and by inference, all other wildlife.
As mentioned by Ramsar Bureau staff, being an environmental NGO in a
range state can be very risky and life threatening. CITES is definitely a higher
stakes game than Ramsar as prized wildlife specimens attract high prices on
the international black market. High politics and high economics are
characteristic of CITES more so than Ramsar, and field work is potentially a
lot more dangerous for international (and especially local) NGO
representatives working on CITES' issues. TRAFFIC and SSC representatives
tell stories of people being threatened, disappearing, and being killed
(Pers.Coms. SSC, TRAFFIC, 1995). Many environmental NGO operatives are
forced to work 'undercover' to track illegal trade from its source to its
destination. This has not prevented the NGOs from persevering, but it has
attracted opposition and earned them enemies in some range states which
resent what they regard as a new form of cultural/environmental
imperialism by the developed world.
Not all regions are totally opposed to assistance from environmental NGOs.
In Africa, environmental NGOs were instrumental in the evolution of the
Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora which was signed by 6 African nations in 1994
to combat the smuggling of wildlife out of the African continent (TRAFFIC
Bulletin, 1994). However several Southern African countries were most
reluctant to agree to sign, because of NGO involvement.2 2
2 "Many of the range states hate [environmental] NGOs and unfortunately extremism always
seems to help the adversary. If your government is being continually criticized, probably
unjustifiably, by certain NGOs, even if some NGOs come up with good ideas you are going to be
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According to several NGO and Secretariat sources, members of the Secretariat
were instrumental in assisting to relieve the tension among the parties and
NGOs negotiating the Lusaka Agreement. Their intervention contributed to a
successful outcome. Unfortunately neither NGO nor Secretariat sources
would permit me to discuss these negotiations further as tensions were still
running high between some environmental NGOs and some governments.2 3
The CITES Secretariat remains wary of becoming involved in conflicts among
parties, and between NGOs and parties for the same reason as the Ramsar
Bureau. It is all to easy for a secretariat to get unfairly scapegoated by
disgruntled stakeholders. The CITES Secretariat claims that it rarely initiates
an intervention, that it waits to be asked by a stakeholder before it agrees to
intervene. The organization then confirms that Secretariat intervention has
been agreed by a majority of the stakeholders, and that the general terms of
reference for Secretariat intervention have also been agreed by all interests.
Summary Of Problem Emergence in CITES
The institutional feature which distinguishes CITES from Ramsar and
CCAMLR is that CITES is very clearly a high-politics issue-area. The
convention is characterised by undercurrents of tension between the
diverging philosophies of environmental preservation and economic
development as it seeks to strike a difficult balance in implementing the
largely theoretical concept of sustainable trade. Emotions run high in CITES
with barely controlled conflicts among parties, and between parties and NGOs
over the illegal and lucrative international trade amongst other things, ivory,
tiger and rhino products, and most recently in tropical timbers and fish.
North/South relations have undergone a metamorphosis since CITES
entered into force in 1975. The producer states of the South have gained
considerable influence in the treaty system, and now exert significant leverage
suspicious about them. This is what happened with Lusaka [the 1994 Lusaka Agreement]"(Pers.
Com. Sec.,1995).
23It seems that most non-state actors view Secretariat assistance with conflict management
between NGOs and governments as helpful. The Secretariat is generally respected and trusted
as an impartial intermediary by all stakeholders - government and non- government. In
addition, the organization carries a degree of authority derived from its professional expertise,
experience and its formal power of recommendation.
262
in CITES decision making. It is a volatile milieu in which the Secretariat has
to operate.
Like most environmental treaty secretariats, the CITES Secretariat suffers
from a chronic inadequacy of project funds, inadequate personnel, too little
time and too much work. Relations with its parties are generally positive,
bolstered by its formal powers of recommendation which are unique to the
CITES Secretariat. Relations with UNEP, its partner organization, have always
been difficult and in 1995 tension was at a peak over the issue of Common
Services. Secretariat relations with some environmental NGOs have cooled
following the 1989 leadership crisis which saw the dismissal of the Secretary-
General, although relations with other environmental NGOs remain sound.
By all accounts the CITES Secretariat is unmistakably an activist Secretariat
whose leverage in the treaty system is aided by its formal powers and the
authority this bestows.
CASE STUDY 3: CCAMLR
Institutional Evolution
The origins and evolution of CCAMLR differ substantially from those of
Ramsar and CITES. Ramsar and CITES developed primarily from
environmental NGO concerns and actions, while the negotiation of
CCAMLR was initiated directly by governments (the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties (ATCPs)) following reports of scientific studies
expressing concern that unregulated fishing of Antarctic species (especially
krill which form the basis of the Antarctic food web), could result in
irreversible damage to the populations of other species in the Antarctic
marine ecosystem (CCAMLR, Basic Docs. Preface,1993). Following a number
of diplomatic and scientific conferences, negotiations for a treaty to conserve
these marine resources were concluded in 1980 when 15 countries signed the
Convention. CCAMLR entered into force on 7 April, 1982 and the CCAMLR
Commission commenced operation in July, 1982. In 1995, there were 22
Member States and 7 Acceding States. Any State interested in research or
harvesting in relation to the marine living resources covered by the
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Convention can become a party to the Convention. The Australian
Government is the depository for the Convention (CCAMLR, 1991:10).
Yet CCAMLR's geographical scope is not neatly defined by national
boundaries. The perimeter of CCAMLR's application is chosen to
approximate as closely as possible, the Antarctic convergence. In practice
CCAMLR's perimeter is rather irregular, the waters it covers are very remote
and its implementation is extremely difficult to monitor and enforce.
The objective of CCAMLR is the conservation of Antarctic marine living
resources with conservation defined to include rational use. The principles of
the Convention embody what has been called the ecosystem approach to
living resource conservation. It is this approach that sets CCAMLR apart from
other marine resource management regimes.
Although CCAMLR is an autonomous international convention, it is
formally a part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a suite of international
agreements of which the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (AT) is the centrepiece. In brief,
the AT regulates relations among nations active in the Antarctic, prohibits
military activity, and fosters cooperation, particularly in scientific research
(CCAMLR, 1991)
Other legal instruments in the ATS include the 1972 Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) which entered into force in 1978; and
the 1993 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic treaty (known
24The Antarctic Convergence is a natural oceanographic boundary which is formed where the
circulation of cold waters of the Antarctic oceans meet the warmer waters to the north. The
Convergence forms an effective biological boundary: few species migrate beyond it. It is thus a
natural boundary within which to manage the resources of the Antarctic oceans. The Convention
therefore applies to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60 degrees South
latitude and to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area between that latitude and the
Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem (CCAMLR
Articlel.1).
2
1Management of fishing in Antarctic waters, must not only aim to conserve the targeted species
but take into account the impact of fishing an those animals that prey on and compete with
targeted species. In its broadest interpretation, the Convention requires that management action
should take account of the impact of activities on all living organisms in the Antarctic
ecosystem or subsystems (CCAMLR 1991). Antarctic marine living resources means populations
of fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans, and all other species of living organisms, including birds, found
south of the Antarctic Convergence (CCAMLR Art.1.2). All Antarctic fauna is marine.
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as the Madrid Protocol), which entered into force in January, 1998. A
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA) was negotiated between 1982 and 1988, but did not enter into
force, having been opposed by several ATCPs (US Department of State, 1994).
This complex network of relationships among the international agreements
in the ATS and their parties is institutionally supported by the Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), and relations between SCAR and
the ATCPs (Jorgensen-Dahl and Ostreng, 1991). SCAR's influence in the
implementation of the ATS is largely attributable to its pivotal role in
Antarctic science.2 6
CCAMLR also has a close working relationship with the 1935 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) although it is outside the
ATS. Other issues with which CCAMLR is directly linked relate to migratory
species such as albatross and other sea birds which are increasingly, accidental
by-catches of fisheries practices.
26 SCAR is a scientific committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)
charged with the initiation, promotion, and coordination of scientific activity in the Antarctic,
with a view to framing and reviewing scientific programs of circumpolar scope and significance
(US Department of State, 1994:259). Among other activities, SCAR may provide scientific and
technological advice to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), or to other
international organizations (both governmental and non-governmental). SCAR also keeps under
review scientific matters pertaining to the integrity of the Antarctic environment, including the
conservation of its terrestrial and marine ecosystems (SCAR Constitution, in US Department of
State 1994: 259). The ATCPs, in acknowledging the priority of science in the implementation of
the treaty, note that they "are fully committed to scientific research in Antarctica which has
been effectively coordinated by SCAR since the 1950s" (Extract from Report of XVIth ATCM,
Annex:30th anniversary of entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, in US Department of State,
1994:17).
In the years preceding CCAMLR, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR) had been influential in bringing to the attention of the ATCPs, its concerns about
Antarctic ecosystem vulnerability, especially once distant-water fishing and experimental
krill harvesting got underway in the 1960s and 970s. For example, by 1982, the commercial krill
fishery of 500,000 tonnes annually was the largest crustacean fishery in the world. As
conservation of krill is fundamental to the maintenance of the Antarctic marine ecosystem, the
uncontrolled growth of the krill fishery could undermine the entire Antarctic marine ecosystem
as it would be disastrous for krill predators which occur at all levels in the foodchain
(CCAMLR 1991).
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CCAMLR's administrative structure consists of the Commission, the
Scientific Committee, and a permanent Secretariat which supports the work
of the Commission and the Scientific Committee. See Appendix 3 for details.
The mandate and functions of the CCAMLR Secretariat as outlined in the text
are extraordinarily brief in comparison with those of the Ramsar and CITES
secretariats. CCAMLR merely states that the Executive Secretary and
Secretariat shall perform the functions entrusted to them by the Commission
(Article XVII, 3). Unlike Ramsar and CITES texts, there is no elaboration of
Secretariat core tasks in the treaty text, although in the information booklet
released by CCAMLR in 1991, it noted that function of the Secretariat is to
support the work of the Commission and Scientific Committee, including the
organization and support of meetings and programs, the operation of the
Commission's data centre"2 , and the production and distribution of its
publications (CCAMLR, 1991).
As with other conventions, the core functions of the CCAMLR Secretariat
have been supplemented by decisions, resolutions and recommendations
taken in Commission meetings and based on advice from the Scientific
Committee.
The Secretariat's relations with its members have also been strongly
influenced by several factors: the impact of the Cold War; CCAMLR's
institutional dependence on the AT; CCAMLR's "culture of exclusion" as a
developed nations 'club'; what are usually called 'the divisions between
Anglo-and non-Anglo interests' in the treaty system; the influence of
scientists; and the inherently conflictual nature of CCAMLR's conservation-
fisheries mandate2s. These factors have been instrumental in shaping the
27The CCAMLR Data Centre is the information hub of the convention whose success is heavily
dependent on the collection and analysis of catch and ecosystem data and statistical data, much
of it gathered using satellite and other sophisticated technology. In this context, the CCAMLR
Secretariat maintains databases containing commercial catch and fishing effort data,
information on the age and structure of commercially important species, data on birds and seals
accidentally taken during fishing operations or found entangled in discarded fishing gear or
other marine debris. This information is essential to the regulatory role of the Commission and
is intended to provide a complete record of all commercial fishing activities conducted in
Antarctic waters from the time data began to be assembled in the 1969/70 fishing season
(CCAMLR, 1991:24).
28In the words of a delegate, CCAMLR is more akin to fisheries and whaling conventions than i t
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structure, functions and roles of the CCAMLR Secretariat and its relations
with its parties and environmental NGOs. CCAMLR has no partner
organization. See Appendix 3 for more detail on individual factors.
Most CCAMLR parties are also members of the AT. As more than one
CCAMLR Secretariat member and delegate put it, CCAMLR deals with the
scientific issues of the convention, while the political issues get 'kicked
upstairs' to the AT. Historically, there have been ambiguities in the
relationship between the AT and CCAMLR, examples being the attendance of
CCAMLR at ATCM meetings and the management of human impacts on
Antarctica. 29 The idea of CCAMLR representation at ATCMs emerged at a
time when NGOs like Greenpeace were seeking representation as observers at
treaty meetings. The ATCPs were concerned that CCAMLR's presence at the
ATCM would set a precedent of external observers. Not only was CCAMLR
not officially invited to attend treaty meetings, but the ATCM was not
represented at CCAMLR meetings, and it was not clear which treaty was
responsible for what issues. 30
is to other environmental treaties. It is a convention of contradictions (Pers.Com. delegate,
1995).
29 "Although CCAMLR existed from 1982, it was not until about 1989 that it was officially
represented in a treaty [ATCM] meeting. Even though there was no visible argument about it,
the attitude was that there were so many of the CCAMLR delegates attending Treaty meetings,
that CCAMLR was effectively represented as it were and there was an even overlap. They
argued that CCAMLR did not need separate representation as it was already represented. It
wasn't so much that these people were unofficially or informally in some way assuming a
responsibility to represent CCAMLR, it was that the ATCPs didn't even invite representation
from CCAMLR at their meetings.The Treaty system was just something that grew. No one at
any time made any decision that there was a vehicle called an "Antarctic Treaty
System"(ATS) and that CCAMLR was part of it. The branch office idea [of CCAMLR being a
"branch office " of the AT] just evolved over time" (Pers. Com., Powell,1995).
3 0For example, "when as issue came up that somebody thought was a CCAMLR issue, such as
marine pollution from the sinking of the Argentina vessel which poured oil all over the
Antarctic peninsula, I, and others thought it was an issue that CCAMLR ought at least to be
noting it in its report as we are supposed to be concerned with marine ecosystems. But it was
treated very gently by the CCAMLR Commission and left as something that the treaty would
deal with. This was picked up by CCAMLR because the Treaty parties' delegations thought
that they had more control over what happened in the Treaty, and they weren't so sure how
CCAMLR would handle it-even though they were members of both treaties. Another example
is ozone, the depletion of the ozone layer and the possible impact of the subsequent increase in
ultraviolet radiation an the marine ecosystem. The French got very upset that CCAMLR was
even talking about it. They saw it as a Treaty issue and that it was not really CCAMLR's
business I remember the French delegate getting quite heated at that thought. I couldn't think
of any ulterior motive, he just decided it wasn't an issue".(Pers.Com.Powell, 1995).
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Even though Cold War hostility and suspicion are diminishing, there appears
to be a residual culture of 'them and us' in both the AT and CCAMLR. This
attitude to has been transposed to CCAMLR's relations with countries
external to the convention. It is particularly evident in CCAMLR's dealings
with the UN.
In 1997, CCAMLR's political isolation from the UN system has effectively
insulated it (and its Secretariat) from the changes in North-South politics
experienced by CITES and Ramsar. However, the discovery of large stocks of
the Patagonian Toothfish in CCAMLR waters may change this. The Toothfish
(about which very little is known biologically), brings premium prices in the
luxury food markets of Japan, the USA and Europe. I believe that it will not
be long before pressure is brought to bear to widen the membership of
CCAMLR to facilitate developing country access to fish stocks in CCAMLR
waters, even though the use of sophisticated fish tracking technology and the
lack of species-specific biological knowledge, make the species vulnerable to
overfishing.
CCAMLR is characterized by what I term a "culture of exclusion". It shares the
AT resistance to any notion of inclusion in the United Nations system, so
that CCAMLR, unlike Ramsar and CITES, exists outside the UN system. It
also differs from CITES and Ramar in that it has no partner organization(s),
and its formal relations with environmental NGOs are at best, strained.
Typical of its culture of exclusion, is its very restrictive policy on the
attendance of observers at meetings as discussed in Chapter 1. CCAMLR's
policy of exclusion contrasts with the approaches adopted by Ramsar and
CITES which encourage the inclusion of potentially disruptive or non-
compliant nations on the basis that membership of the convention is the
only way that illegal activities might possibly be contained. CCAMLR cannot
take action against non-members. 3
31 CCAMLR's effectiveness was sorely tested in 1997 by illegal fishing for Toothfish in the
Southern Ocean and the pressure exerted by legitimate fishing interests on their national
governments for the poachers to be prosecuted. Australia apprehended and then escorted two
illegally fishing, foreign-flagged vessels back to Australia. where they were prosecuted for
illegal fishing. The vessels were caught fishing for Toothfish in Australia's sub-Antarctic
waters. The ships' masters faced catch and vessel confiscations and large financial penalties.
This apprehension took place the week before CCAMLR nations were scheduled to meet in
Australia for their annual CoP in November, 1997. It was then held up as challenge to other
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According to Powell, the main problem of implementing CCAMLR initially
was that it had been negotiated by the delegates to the AT meetings
(diplomats and foreign affairs personnel) acting as individuals, not as
representatives of the countries which were involved in the negotiation of
the treaty. Immediately the convention came into force, many of these
negotiators stepped back and allowed the fisheries ministries to take over the
role of representing the country in the CCAMLR meeting (Pers. Com. Powell,
1995).
The problems caused by this change of personnel from the diplomats and
lawyers involved in the negotiation stage, to the fisheries scientists and
technocrats responsible for global and national implementation in the long-
term, are very similar to those experienced by Ramsar. In CCAMLR's case it is
argued by Powell and long-serving CCAMLR scientists and delegates, that the
conservation ethos inherited from the AT was submerged by the emergence
of fishing as the dominant CCAMLR ethos.3 2
The other key feature of CCAMLR and one which has significantly affected
the Secretariat's roles and functions, is the influence of science and scientists.
Antarctic science has remained a driving force behind CCAMLR, supporting
its value as an international agreement even when its effectiveness and
continuation have been questioned. As suggested by a number scientists,
relationships among CCAMLR members largely revolve around
relationships among individual scientists. Several delegates and scientists
commented that CCAMLR has been very much a "Cambridge old boys club",
national representatives being predominantly associated with Scott Polar, the
British Antarctic research center."
CCAMLR countries to take similar action against illegal fishing in CCAMLR waters and the
national waters of countries with sub-Antarctic and Antarctic territory.
32 When CCAMLR came into force, fisheries ministries in the large fishing nations, the
USSR,France, West Germany, East Germany and Japan became involved. Of the 23 countries in
CCAMLR, Secretariat personnel advise that there is a small core of active members. These
countries take the lead and the other countries follow. Japan, Korea Russia are regarded as the
major pro-fishing bloc, with Australia, the USA and New Zealand taking the conservation
lead.
3 In the somewhat cynical opinion of one scientist, "in the early days, CCAMLR was of full of
difficult people and personalities who were Antarctic biologists and diplomats with little
experience in fisheries management---CCAMLR was the Holy Grail for bird and seal biologists,
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CCAMLR science is not without its difficulties. The fisheries/conservation
tension inherent in CCAMLR parallels the development/ conservation
tensions experienced by Ramsar and CITES. CCAMLR emerged from the
conservation concerns of scientists involved with the AT (Pers.Com. Powell,
1995). Subsequent international recognition of the potential economic value
of Southern Ocean fisheries such as krill and more recently the Toothfish,
have inevitably provoked tensions between fisheries and conservation
interests in CCAMLR. The compromise has been the CCAMLR ecosystem
monitoring system. However, ongoing conflict periodically peaks on issues
such as the incidental bycatch of seabirds and the seemingly excessive
exploitation of an uncharted fishery, the Patagonian Toothfish.
Scientists have retained their dominant influence in CCAMLR and tension
between the political and the scientific objectives of the convention
continues. Managing this tension constructively is a major role for the
Secretariat. The relative lack of scientific knowledge about the nature, size
and sustainability of fisheries in the CCAMLR region almost guarantees that
scientific discovery and management advice will continue to drive CCAMLR.
However, as has happened with the science of global warming and the FCCC,
politics is rapidly overtaking science in CCAMLR, although more slowly in
CCAMLR's case because of the low-politics nature of the issue-area. This
could change as illegal fishing of the lucrative Toothfish stocks gains media
prominence, in which case the Commission's apparent inability to enforce
the convention (including the lack of political will to do so by some
members), may raise CCAMLR's international profile and bring it into
conflict with other treaty systems such as those of UNCLOS. Even with
political commitment, the remoteness of the region poses real enforcement
difficulties for CCAMLR nations. It would not be surprising if in spite of
scientific disquiet about the mismanagement and exploitation of yet another
global fishery, the Patagonian Toothfish disappears before CCAMLR members
agree on what action to take.
and the public drawing power of these fauna was the political reason for it to continue. In fact
CCAMLR started with the wrong group of people, the AT crew, except for the Japanese and
USSR fisheries people. They [AT delegates] were good negotiators but had no fisheries
management experience and they were up against the hard nosed USSR fisheries folk" (Pers.
Com. Scientist, 1995).
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Finally, divisions among CCAMLR members are not only along
conservation/fisheries lines but also along Anglo-Saxon/non-Anglo-Saxon
lines. English is the dominant language of the convention and the
international language of science. Non-Anglo members and scientists
understandably feel excluded by the Anglo dominance of both CCAMLR
politics and science.
Collectively, these factors paint a picture of a rather closed treaty system
whose residual paranoia from Cold War days has spilled over, or is a
convenient excuse for, the maintenance of the CCAMLR culture as described.
My assessment of the interdependent and cumulative impact of these factors
on CCAMLR and thus on its Secretariat is: First, CCAMLR remains
significantly intertwined with the AT, politically and scientifically. In fact it is
arguably politically subservient to the AT. Second, the pervasive influence of
Cold War mistrust among members of the AT, and its "culture of exclusion"
has spilled over into the operations of the CCAMLR Secretariat as a distinctly
passive organization which is very much a servant of the parties. Third,
although the conservation ethos of the AT strongly influenced the evolution
of CCAMLR science, CCAMLR's focus has now ostensibly shifted from
ecosystem conservation to fisheries management.
The institutional culture of CCAMLR thus contrasts sharply with the
transparency of CITES and Ramsar and their relative informality. Both
Ramsar and CITES admit observers to meetings; encourage developing
country membership; directly assist developing countries with capacity
building; are generally far more accessible than CCAMLR; and are certainly
less suspicious of 'outsiders'. The Ramsar and CITES Secretariats and
personnel were also much more helpful in facilitating researcher access to
information. For example, the executive head of CCAMLR was the only one
of 10 executive heads, past and present, and the only one of 100 interviewees,
who refused permission for me to tape the interview.
In my opinion, CCAMLR's institutional and political subservience to the AT,
an apparent lack of political commitment by key nations to the conservation
goals of the convention, the complexity and interdependence of science and
policy, coupled with an organizationally weak and passive Secretariat does
271
not auger well for a successful outcome for CCAMLR in terms of the
convention achieving its objectives
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Relations with Members
From the limited information I was able to obtain, I suggest that many of the
problems experienced by the CCAMLR Secretariat are derived from the
political and institutional factors outlined above and the organization's
passivity, which may, or may not, be attributable to the influence of these
intense political factors. The Secretariat has not always been regarded as a
passive organization. I suggest that the organization may well have changed
from a more activist mode of operation under the leadership of the inaugural
Executive Secretary, Darry Powell, to its present distinctly passive form after
the current Executive Secretary, Estaban de Salas, took office. However, I have
insufficient evidence to substantiate this suggestion.
From the evidence available, CCAMLR members' unequivocally view their
secretariat as the 'servant of the parties'. They keep it starved of resources;
give it little scope to demonstrate initiative even in areas where it clearly has
a formal mandate such as data management and monitoring compliance; and
the organization is caught in a pincer movement between the science and the
politics of the convention.
Data management is a legitimate task which an activist Secretariat might
have used to better effect than the CCAMLR Secretariat seems to have done.
The CCAMLR Secretariat has certainly been responsive to parties
requirements and needs (Pers.Coms Delegates, Scientists, 1995). While the
secretariat has a formal mandate as data manager of the convention and
undertakes the requisite data collection and analysis, it appears to approach
this role in a mechanistic rather than an entrepreneurial way. Unlike the
CITES Secretariat, the CCAMLR Secretariat rarely seems to have
demonstrated a proactive approach to data management initiatives, and
where these have occurred they have been the instigated by specific
individuals in the organization such as the former Data Manager.
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Inspection, observation and reporting as the main components of CCAMLR's
compliance strategy are areas of activity where an activist secretariat might
seek to influence both processes and outcomes. In CCAMLR's case, greater
Secretariat involvement in monitoring inspection and observation in pursuit
of compliance, might enhance the convention's credibility as an international
agreement with 'teeth', and thus its the chances of success.
To ensure compliance with conservation measures, general principles for an
observation and inspection system are set down in the convention and
procedures for on-board inspection have been in place since the 1989/90
fishing season.3 4 Governments have taken up the CCAMLR observation and
inspection system to differing degrees. In-country political factors, including a
lack of political commitment and the inadequacy of domestic infrastructure
are the primary implementation and compliance problems confronting
CCAMLR. It seems that up to 1990, the Secretariat tried to encourage countries
to be more enthusiastic about enforcement, but without much success, so the
Secretariat introduced a report outlining the measures (or lack of measures)
each country had or had not taken before each annual meeting. The countries
were named in the document. The former Executive Secretary commented,
the parties were very uncomfortable, and it was probably the most significant
accountability document that we ever had. In subsequent years we introduced an
implementation report which detailed the measures that each country should take back
home after each meeting, to include in their domestic law in order to implement
CCAMLR. Generally the response was unsatisfactory (Pers. Com. Powell, 1995).
The naming of countries in the Secretariat's annual infractions report has
now been discontinued, although the Secretariat still submits an incident
report (Pers Com. Sec.1995).
In more recent times, the Secretariat has also been asked by the Commission
to make comparisons of national education and compliance systems and to
suggest the most appropriate system for CCAMLR implementation.
"The CCAMLR System of Inspection is nationally operated. Inspectors are appointed by and
report to their governments which in turn report to the Commission. Inspections may be carries
out by an inspector from one outcry on fishing or research vessels of other countries. Prosecutions
or the imposition of sanctions for violations of measures adopted by the Commission are the
responsibility of the flag state of the offending vessel and are reported via the Secretariat to
the Commission (CCAMLR,1991).
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In the observation and inspection process, the Secretariat acts as a traffic
warden, guiding the information and paper flow. However, the Executive
Secretary can speed up the reporting system, and use the Secretariat's
experience to help countries sort out 'grey areas'. When a country gives
information regarding infractions to the Secretariat these are then forwarded
to the flag state and to SCOI. The Executive Secretary introduces the issue of
infractions at Commission meetings, and the country may be named. For
example, Uruguay told the Commission about infractions by a Panamanian
vessel. However, infractions are rare, 2 cases in 2 years (Pers. Com.Sec.1995).
Infractions are dealt with in-country.35 It is up to the individual countries to
fine offenders and the Executive Secretary is not able to follow up countries
directly. For example he cannot ask Korea directly about possible violations,
but Korea can be asked by a member country in SCOI.3 6
Throughout CCAMLR decision making, and particularly in the area of
enforcement, pressure for compromise is great. There has been no case where
agreement has not been reached, but brinksmanship is considerable. Legally
there is a 180 day objection process for a country to object, although it has
never been used except on technical matters such as when a country is unable
to report in the time allowed and requests additional time. I was unable to
obtain evidence to confirm that the Secretariat played an active role in
problem-solving in the area of achieving compliance or in managing
" For example, country A inspects country B's vessels; A then reports to B, and to CCAMLR. If
infractions are noted, B is expected to institute procedures for non-compliance against its own
nationals. These bilateral arrangements for inspections are usually made between countries
with comfortable relations, which begs the question of the objectivity and value of the reports
in a world of compromises and trade offs
36 Illegal fishing and enforcement are major problems for CCAMLR, not the least of which is
defining 'fishing'. Vessels actually have to be caught in the act of 'fishing', but there is no
agreed definition of 'fishing' in the convention. Does a vessel have to be caught hauling in
catch? or, is it enough to have gear set, or even gear hauled but wet? Vessels caught illegally
'fishing' deploy all manner of tricks and arguments in their defence to avoid being convicted of
an infraction. As one delegate noted, Chile was having trouble enforcing CCAMLR as it was
argued by the defence that tampering with evidence was not a breach of CCAMLR's
conservation measures per. se., and it was the breach (not the tampering) that had to be proven
if the vessel was to be found in breach of CCAMLR (Pers. Com. Delegate 1995). It is the opinion
of the Secretariat that the definition of 'fishing' will be resolved in the context of a higher UN
formal system such as UNCLOS which is superior to CCAMLR in international law
(Pers.Com.Sec.1995).
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tensions and conflicts that inevitably arise as a result of brinkmanship. This
contrasts with the CITES Secretariat which makes a distinctly positive
contribution towards facilitating problem-solving to achieve compliance.
Another difficulty confronting the Secretariat is that in spite of the
professional credentials of the Secretariat's boundary-spanning personnel,
they seem be regarded as 'second-rate' scientists by their peers external to the
Secretariat, the majority of whom are also employed by public sector
organizations such as government agencies and academic institutions. These
'external' scientists appear to have an elitist view of the value of their own
contributions to CCAMLR science relative to what they assume to be the
outputs of the Secretariat scientists (Pers. Coms. Scientists, NGOs, Sec.,1995).
Many of the (national) scientists I interviewed appeared to lack an
appreciation of the breadth, complexity and extent of the work undertaken by
the (under-resourced) Secretariat personnel, regarding them somewhat
disparagingly as civil servants rather than scientists. Curiously, these national
scientists also seemed to have overlooked that fact that they, too, were civil
servants.
The overt political pincer exerting pressure on the Secretariat is represented
by the Commission for whom the Secretariat is very much a servant. The
Commission does not appear to have recognized the potential influence of
the Secretariat in its performance of core tasks such as: agenda preparation
and prioritization; acting as rapporteurs of meetings; drafting documents and
preparing reports; data analysis and interpretation; and the provision of
briefings to the Chair of the Commission and national delegates. Had the
Secretariat been an activist organization it may have been able to use these
core tasks to exert more influence than it has on members and so counter
some of the political pressures it faces.
While the organizational risks of a more entrepreneurial approach to task
performance are acknowledged, the lack of success of CCAMLR as a
convention to conserve marine living resources is hard to overlook. In these
circumstances the convention needs policy leadership and I would argue that
the Secretariat is well placed at the nexus of CCAMLR science and policy to
provide the necessary policy guidance - even leadership. Many of its officials
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including the executive head, are scientists with extensive international and
national policy experience and networks. Their science and policy knowledge,
expertise and skills are a significant organizational resource and an asset to
the convention and should be formally recognized as such. That this does not
seem to have occurred is not just the responsibility of the members. It is also
up to the Secretariat to raise its profile with the parties and make them aware
of the extent of its expertise and experience as the network manager of the
system, and the contribution it could make to implementation success.
Changes in National Governments
Two key in-country problems identified by the CCAMLR Secretariat are: the
education of citizens of member states who fish in CCAMLR waters; and, the
in-country handling of infractions. The management of both issues varies
considerably among convention members.
As the former Secretary-General noted, the Secretariat's suggestions for how a
country might handle education and enforcement domestically rarely
translated into action37 and no country ever sought assistance from the
Secretariat nor consulted it on observation and inspection issues (Pers. Com.
Sec., Powell, 1995).
Since then, suggestions such as practical fishing techniques to minimize
albatross as long line by-catch have been made by independent scientists and
promoted by CCAMLR and the Secretariat to mixed effect. Some countries are
insisting that their nationals comply. Others have paid scant attention to the
recommendations. The problem of monitoring and achieving the compliance
of reflagged vessels remains.
37 In his opinion, the closest the Secretariat came was when the Data Manager and he went to
Moscow in the mid-1980s to talk with them about data collection and the submission of fishing
data. They aimed to get some indication of how much data was collected by the USSR, how i t
was stored, to understand their processes and how difficult or easy it might be for them to
submit that data. The mission was not regarded as sucessful as the USSR did not want to reduce
or cease fishing In contrast, in the 1980s all USA citizens those who applied for a permit to fish
for crabs in CCAMLR waters had to go to Washington, DC for a CCAMLR training course.
However, the Secretariat was more worried about compliance by the Russians and Japanese
Pers. Com. Powell, 1995).
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Changes in national governments and bureaucracies have been less of a
problem for CCAMLR than for Ramsar and CITES. Until 1995, CCAMLR
delegates and bureaucrats at the national and international levels were
relatively stable, and everybody knew everybody else. CCAMLR has operated
as the 'developed-country club' that its critics claim it is, reinforced by what
Haas (1990) might describe as an epistemic community of Antarctic
scientists3". The generation of bureaucrats and scientists which helped create
and shape CCAMLR, is now fast approaching retirement. Gaps are starting to
appear in their ranks and changes in roles and jobs in national bureaucracies
are starting to occur. As one Secretariat member said, "You can't rely on
people being around long-term any more" (Pers. Com. Sec. 1995).
Long-term delegates and scientists (the majority of whom are also
bureaucrats), have considerable influence. Their scientific expertise
constitutes the backbone of the convention; they are politically knowledgeable
and experienced in working with international agreements; they have well
developed formal and informal networks; and they comprise a significant
portion of the institutional memory of the treaty system. If, as suggested, a
general exodus of a generation of CCAMLR expertise may be pending, then
CCAMLR as a convention will face institutional memory problems similar to
those confronting Ramsar and CITES. The CCAMLR Secretariat has made no
provision for succession planning (Pers.Com.Sec,1995). but it does not seem
particularly concerned about anticipating and planning for the potentially
negative impacts of these changes on the organization. As a passive
organization it responds to problems if and when they occur.
Relations with other IOs
The CCAMLR Secretariat acknowledges good relations with the IWC
Secretariat and the Secretariats of other fisheries' conventions and IOs
including those of the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Convention for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), and FAO. This networking is considered very
important, perhaps because of the geographical isolation of the CCAMLR
3 Epistemic communities and communities of common interests are examined in Chapter 7.
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Secretariat from what it sees as the 'action' of the Northern Hemisphere.
From the Secretariat's point of view, 10 relationships consist predominantly
of data and information exchange. There is no resource sharing, although
representatives of IWC and CCSBT attend CCAMLR meetings, and the
CCAMLR Executive Secretary represents CCAMLR at FAO and IWC
meetings.
Relations with NGOs
CCAMLR members and environmental NGOs have had an uneasy and at
times hostile relationship since CCAMLR entered into force. Relations with
fishing industry organizations seem to have been relatively trouble free.
Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace brought with them into CCAMLR,
a history of adversarial politics and campaigns from their battles to conserve
whales in the IWC. Greenpeace is represented at CCAMLR by the umbrella,
international environmental NGO, ASOC (Antarctic and Southern Ocean
Coalition).
As noted previously, CCAMLR has a history of confrontation with and
exclusion of, environmental NGOs from its decision making, although IUCN
(as a nature conservation IGO), and ASOC attend CCAMLR meetings as
formal observers and participate in some Working Groups. It was this
minimal NGO participation that caused a senior Secretariat official to remark
that "conflicts with NGOs do not happen in CCAMLR because NGOs are
included in working groups" (Pers. Com. Sec., 1995). In the same vein, a
scientist commented that CCAMLR was not major battleground for NGOs, as
"fish treaties are not glamorous" and "nobody comes for krill"(Pers. Com.
Scientist, 1995).
These comments seem to fly in the face of history and the relative absence of
conflicts is more likely to be due to the lack of fishing in CCAMLR waters
following the collapse of the krill fishery and the withdrawal of former USSR
vessels as a major fisheries presence in the region. However, the increase in
illegal fishing of the Patagonian Toothfish in 1997 may well re-ignite
environmental NGO concerns about the lack of success of CCAMLR's
ecosystem management model following as it does on the heels of the
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incidental by-catch issue. It is also likely to fuel legitimate fishing industry
concerns about the loss of potential profits to unregulated poachers.
Until 1992, Secretariat's approach to working with environmental NGOs was
described by the former Executive Secretary as follows,
If I got a telephone call from an NGO I would talk to them and answer their questions up
to a level that I thought was confidential. There was very little confidential stuff as
everything has been discussed and decided at the meetings and put in the Commission's
Report. I did not, however, describe which countries took a particular view an a matter,
for example, which country opposed the admission of observers. If an NGO asked how I
thought they should handle a problem, I would make suggestions to them how they could
handle it and how to make more progress with Commission members. I would set up
meetings with the Chairman for them, then discuss with the Chairman before they
came, how the he might handle the meeting. Generally, I thought that the NGOs were
useful to have around, and there was no future at all in confrontation with them. Issues
such as the distribution of documents and the leaking documents both in the region and
outside the region, have been debated among members, but they have never directly
addressed the issue of NGO-Secretariat relations (Pers. Com, Powell, 1995).
This description contrasts with the information I was able to extract from
Secretariat personnel in 1995 which indicated that Secretariat relations with
environmental NGOs have been more restrained since 1992 and appear to be
actively discouraged by the current executive head.
In terms of specific Secretariat interactions with NGOs, there are formal and
informal interactions between the Secretariat and NGOs. The Secretariat's
relations with ASOC are formally sanctioned in the text, and its relations with
Greenpeace are informal and even covert. In 1995 ASOC was the umbrella
organisation for over 172 organizations in 35 countries. Although the
Secretariat does not have a formal relationship with Greenpeace, a former
Secretariat official noted that: Greenpeace submitted accurate scientific reports
to the Secretariat including its Gwandaland cruise report and a report on
Southern Atlantic fishing; a lot of useful data from Greenpeace investigations
goes to the Scientific Committee; and Greenpeace data is used by individual
delegations (Pers.Com.Sec.1995).
Difficulties of access to CCAMLR data is a frequent criticism of the convention
and the Secretariat by environmental NGOs. ASOC can get data if it is not
reserved information'. Other NGOs get information by going through their
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own governments. Their request for data and information is then put to the
Commission by their government. (Pers.Com. Sec., 1995). While Australia,
New Zealand and the USA have NGO representatives on their delegations
(which facilitates their access to data), not all countries assist NGO access to
CCAMLR data. Even ASOC's presence at meetings poses a problem for some
members as Greenpeace is a member of ASOC and several countries
particularly fishing nations, are vehemently opposed to Greenpeace.3 9 In
situations such as this, the Secretariat remains passive, supports formal
interactions between NGOs and governments, and discourages the less
formal interactions between Secretariat personnel and NGOs of Powell's day.
Financial Constraints
The CCAMLR Commission operates on an annual budget. Each member
contributes to the budget. Contributions consist of two components. One is
calculated according the levels of exploitation of marine living resources and
is paid by those Members harvesting above a certain threshold. The
remainder of the budget, after subtracting the first component, is divided
equally among the Members irrespective of GDP. In 1991, the contribution of
a non-harvesting Member was around $AUD 45,000. The threshold has been
set so as not to penalise exploratory fishing and not to discourage research on
the fisheries (CCAMLR 1991:23). No individual country is required to pay
more than 25%, and the contribution per country averages approx $AUD 40-
50,000 per annum. It is not an expensive treaty to finance.
39The tight restrictions an the attendance and participation of observers of any kind and
interactions with NGOs make CCAMLR very different from most environmental treaties.
CCAMLR members' opposition to Greenpeace and others becoming observers, particiupating
meetings and obtaining access to data, goes back to the early days of the IWC. The whaling
nations argued that the trust established among whaling and non-whaling member nations in
the IWC had been virtually destroyed by NGO and Greenpeace activism.
the IWC experience really influenced CCAMLR enormously, especially the Russians and the
Japanese. The Japanese, as a whaling nation, believed they had bent over backwards to gather
and present data to the IWC which, they understood, was to be used in a scientific manner as
the basis for decision making. So they [the IWC] assigned the information to a committee to
deliberate and provide advice to the IWC. However, a decision was taken cn the basis of
political and social factors rather than an the basis of the scientific deliberations. Japan
regarded this as very poor form. They saw the whole exercise used against them and they
believed it was initiated and propagated by NGOs, so they didn't want the same thing to
happen in CCAMLR (Pers. Coms. Powell, Sec., 1995).
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Budget decisions are by consensus, and each member is responsible for its
own expenses arising from attendance at meetings of the Commission and
the Scientific Committee (Article XIX). The formula for calculating Members'
contributions is currently under review. The intention was to bring it in line
with the UN scale of assessments. This move was, however, rejected in 1996
(CCAMLR XIV:3.27). It seems that on many occasions, CCAMLR members
resent any semblance of parity with the UN, however symbolic, although
they have aligned the salary and employment conditions of Secretariat
personnel with those of the ICS.
For the CCAMLR Secretariat, working within its budget is a significant
problem.4 The Secretariat 's financial resources are very limited. In 1995, the
Secretariat's budget was $A950,100. In 1996 it was the same. In 1997 the
organization's budget increased to $A1,031,500, and in 1998 the forecast budget
was $A1,064,000. In each year Secretariat salaries and allowances comprised
over $A600, 000 - well over 50% of the total allocation for Secretariat costs.
Data management remained a separate line item, as did Meetings and
publications (CCAMLR XV, Appendix 11). In Ramsar, there is no provision
for meetings, although publications are a line item in the Bureau's budget.
In fact if you index the cost of living, the Secretariat's budget is the same as it
was 13 years ago (Pers.Com.Sec,1995). The Secretariat argues that it has
compensated for resource scarcity by getting more efficient. Using computers
and modem technology, the Secretariat's use of information is more efficient
and it has a greater capacity for data analysis. It is, however, a Catch 22
situation as stakeholder access to the data base has led to an increased demand
for data and information from the Secretariat. (Pers.Com.Sec.1995). In
addition, the chronic budget shortage makes it hard for the Secretariat to
implement the more expensive technological changes the convention
requires such as a VMS (Vessel Monitoring System) (Pers. Com, Delegate,
1995). It has been proposed that the VMS will be located in the Secretariat as a
neutral institutional base.
* CCAMLR runs on such a tight budget that it was not financially equipped to pay out the
retirement package for the former Executive Secretary, in the same way that the CITES
Secretariat and UNEP had not budgeted for the unexpected departure of its former Secretary-
General (Pers.Com.Delegate,1995). In both cases this caused some embarrassment among the
parties and a rapid calling in of outstanding dues.
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The CCAMLR Secretariat was established soon after UNESCO was held up as
an example of mismanagement in international organizations (Wells, 1986;
Ghebali, 1986).These revelations adversely affected CCAMLR's members
perceptions of the roles and organizational requirements of their newly
established IO. According to the former Executive Secretary,
Members were all going through a Thatcherism period of zero growth in budgets and
discussions were quite protracted as we argued about $3 or $4. [This level of debate on the
nitty gritty of financial trivia continues]. They [Commission] emphasised that there
would be no growth in Secretariat budgets, and right through the ten years of my
[Powell's] leadership of the Secretariat (1982-1992), the Secretariat budget remained
below the inflation level, yet the organization did everything the Commission required
it to do. There certainly weren't any free rides. Staff were not taken overseas to
workshops, translators were hired from local people; and local Hobart administrative
and secretarial staff were employed. Translators have been an ongoing problem. Finding
the range and quality of translators needed in Tasmania is impossible and they are also a
costly budget item (Pers. Com Powell,1995).
While the current executive head claimed that securing national
contributions was not a problem, Powell said he had made it a personal goal
to make sure that countries paid their contributions. His tactics were very
similar to those of the executive heads of Ramsar and CITES who also made
contribution-chasing a personal crusade.
The Secretariat's Administrative Officer commented that collection of the
members' annual payments takes time and much persuasion. It is further
complicated as different countries have different budget years. CCAMLR
payments are due on 1 January each year. If payments are late, the Secretariat
reports it to the Commission meeting in November each year. Countries
which are late paying are not actually named by the Secretariat or
Commission in the meeting, though late payments or failure to pay are
officially acknowledged publicly by the party itself in the meeting as Brazil did
when it had a hung parliament and could not pay (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
In a rule unique to CCAMLR, if a member's payments are 2 years late it
cannot take part in decision making. It can participate in meetings and receive
publications, but it cannot join in decision making. This has never actually
happened although countries have come close to being excluded from
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decision making. It is a diplomatic incentive to be 'part of the club'
(Pers.Com.Sec.1995).
Unlike Ramsar and CITES, the CCAMLR Secretariat is not engaged directly in
seeking external or additional funding, although limited project sharing
occurs with organizations such as SCAR. Special contributions have been
received from individual countries for specific purposes. Norway gave
additional monies at the outset to encourage non-parties to join. More
recently, the Australian Antarctic Foundation gave money for a report
prepared by an Australian national to be translated into Spanish. The report
detailed practical ways to mitigate seabird mortalities. It is also possible that
other contributions may be forthcoming (from the USA) for specific projects
such as translations and the cost of installing a VMS unit on each vessel
fishing in CCAMLR waters (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
CCAMLR differs from most environmental treaties in that it has a greater
proportion of countries that can afford to pay their contributions. It does not
have developing country members with low GDPs, and the huge costs of
scientific research in Antarctic and the technologically sophisticated vessels
required to fish in such dangerous seas mean that fishing in CCAMLR-
controlled areas is very costly. Only wealthy countries can afford to be
members of CCAMLR, hence its reputation as a developed-world club.
Financial starvation of the Secretariat seems to be the members' creed. They
seem oblivious of the potential value to the convention of a more activist
secretariat with a sound resource base. Alternatively, they are determined to
maintain the secretariat as a passive servant of the parties. A negative impact
of this passive Secretariat role is that CCAMLR is unlikely to be successful in
achieving its objectives as the Secretariat has primary responsibility for the
critical convention functions of data management and monitoring
compliance. In fairness to the CCAMLR members it must also be noted that
the Secretariat and its current leadership do not appear to be in a hurry to
change from a passive stance to an activist one.
Organizational Capacity And Management Constraints
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Information on current organizational constraints was difficult to obtain as
the Executive Secretary declined to answer questions on organizational
constraints, responding "Let's just say the work gets done on a tightrope"
(Pers.Com. Sec.1995). In contrast, the former Executive Secretary was eager to
talk about the challenges and frustrations he had experienced. For the
inaugural Executive Secretary, the biggest challenge was actually working out
what the job was, how to do it and then get on with it. However, both he and
the present Executive Secretary agreed that "the secretariat is CCAMLR"
(Pers.Coms.1995).
The CCAMLR Secretariat under Powell went through period of expansion
from 1982 to 1992 as the Secretariat was getting established. The major
problem facing the CCAMLR Secretariat today is one of limited resources. It
has to work to maintain its credibility and to be seen as an active fish-
management organization (Pers.Com.Sec.1995) but its budget, its personnel,
their workloads and their time are stretched to the limit. This is unrealistic if
the Commission expects the organization to be proactive and take a lead role
in monitoring the recent spate of illegal fishing for Toothfish.
Personnel Issues
In 1996, the Secretariat had 4 professional staff and approximately 17 support
staff (fulltime and parttime) including an administrative officer, clerical staff
and translators (French, Spanish and Russian), 5 fewer clerical support staff
than when it started in 1982, in spite of a significant increase in the demand
for CCAMLR documentation and publications (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
According to one national delegate, because of the parties' continuing
opposition to Secretariat requests to increase its budget and personnel
establishment, the Secretariat has remained small. This limits its
organizational capacity to be innovative and to move things forward. The
Secretariat puts up a budget each year and the Commission's reaction is
always very negative when the organization requests extra money, for
example, for a receptionist. Like any public service, the Secretariat is always
looking to see where can cut costs, but it has got to a point where cost cutting
is eroding efficiency (Pers.Com. Delegate, 1995).
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The majority of the professional personnel, including the executive head,
Scientific Officer and Data Manager have fisheries backgrounds with an
'environmental ecosystem outlook'. In fact, the CCAMLR Secretariat is more
like a traditional fisheries secretariat than a conservation secretariat and the
first priority of the convention and the Secretariat is fisheries management,
then conservation (Pers.Com.Sec.1995). This reflects the philosophical divide
between environmental conservation and fisheries development mentioned
earlier, and helps explain criticism of the Secretariat by some environmental
NGOs. These organizations claim that CCAMLR has failed to achieve its
conservation objectives, and that the Secretariat is not as assertive as it could
be in promoting conservation, rather than fishing objectives (Pers.Coms.
Humane Society, 1995).
The Secretariat's organizational credentials rest on its scientific expertise. The
organization needs professional personnel with both fisheries and ecosystem
expertise for data management and analysis. "The difficulty is, how to recruit
and retain top scientific people and the best technology, and be on the ball at
the bottom of the world" (Pers.Com.Sec.1995). The location of the CCAMLR
Secretariat means that for many of the younger scientists, time spent in the
CCAMLR Secretariat is time out of the European and Northern Hemisphere
career loop and they are concerned that this may adversely prejudice their
careers. It was for this reason that the former, highly-respected Data Manager
resigned.
Relations between Secretariat personnel and the Scientific Committee can
also be a problem in that the Scientific Committee is still an "old boys
network" whose members are used to long-term scientific research. In
contrast, the [political and economic] demands are now for shorter-term
research projects which the Committee is resisting on the grounds that these
changes impact negatively on research quality (Pers. Com.Sec.1995). This
tension creates problems for Secretariat personnel in trying to communicate
these changes to external scientists and reconcile the scientific and political
objectives. Secretariat personnel understand the scientific arguments, but they
are also more cognisant of the political realities than many scientists.
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In other respects, the scientific expertise of Secretariat personnel helps the
organization to be proactive in its relations with the Scientific Committee and
the Commission. The Secretariat put together the standards for ecosystem
monitoring, and it prepared the first draft of the ecosystems monitoring
paper. The Commission accepted it and acted on it, although the Secretariat's
contribution was not formally acknowledged (Pers. Com.Sec.1995).
On the positive side, the value and significance of the institutional memory
of the Secretariat is at last being recognized, especially now that changes are
coming with a generation of CCAMLR and AT scientists approaching
retirement. When problems of continuity of expertise and knowledge are
experienced in the Committee or the Commission, parties now fall back on
the Secretariat for advice and guidance (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995). It has taken time
for the Secretariat to build trust with its stakeholders and develop its
organizational credibility. After all, the CCAMLR Secretariat was only
established in 1982 and for several years had little to focus its attention on as
the krill fishery did not develop as anticipated. In the words of a former
Secretariat member,
I think an organization has to exist for about 3 years before it settles into a state where i t
has a problem to solve. Having to solve a problem gets them working together. They
have to decide something so the organization feels like it has made a decision and is
moving ahead. The precautionary catch limit was the problem that got CCAMLR's
ecosystem monitoring underway and gave the Secretariat a major role (Pers. Com.
Sec.1995).
Translation costs and resources, and the organization's translating capacity are
significant organizational constraints. CCAMLR translators and interpreters
must have the skill and experience to deal with scientific jargon. There are 4
official languages. It is important that they are seen as having equal status and
that the Secretariat has an ongoing capacity to deal equally with each
language. However, there remains the problem getting suitable translators
and interpreters in Tasmania.
Another more unusual problem is that the bulk of CCAMLR meeting work is
done in 2 weeks of the year at the Commission and Committee meetings in
Hobart. This uneven workload for translators means that the Secretariat tries
to recruit translators who can be used intersessionally for other tasks such as
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data processing. In 1995, the Secretariat had a sufficient quantity of translators
and interpreters 'in-house' to respond immediately to parties' requests,
though this in turn decreased amount of time they could spend on other
matters including data processing (Pers.Com.Sec.1995).
It is therefore of concern that the already stretched resources of the Secretariat
will become stressed to the point of dysfunction if CCAMLR decides to
increase its monitoring capacity to take action against the illegal fishing of
Toothfish. As the delegates mentioned, the CCAMLR members'
preoccupation with cost efficiencies is now eroding organizational
effectiveness.
Data Management and Technology
The Secretariat monitors compliance by analysing the convention's catch and
ecosystem data and the national and NGO reports received, and the onus is
on the Secretariat to shut fishing down when the catch limit is reached
(Pers.Com.Sec.1995). Contrary to original predictions by stakeholders that the
Secretariat would be required to process vast amounts of data as the Southern
Ocean fisheries of krill, crabs and finfish came on line, the quantity of data has
not proved to be a problem. In fact the amount of data has decreased as
fishing in the region has declined.
Instead, the Scientific Committee's data analysis demands have increased and
the Secretariat needs more computer equipment do deal with these demands.
Predicably, the Commission is resisting Secretariat requests to purchase
additional equipment on the grounds of 'unnecessary expense' (Pers. Coms
Sec. and Delegates, 1995).
Data and information management underpins successful implementation of
the convention. While there are no problems of overlapping information
with other conventions as the CCAMLR data base is unique, there is
increasing pressure from some stakeholders (particularly environmental
interests), to make the data and information accessible and available to
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stakeholders other than the parties (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995). Some stakeholders
are less enthusiastic about an open-access policy."
A recurring and related data management problem is that CCAMLR data is
not publicly available until after individual scientists publish their own work.
It is the work of individual scientists that forms much of CCAMLR's database.
This material is often not published until 3 years after the field research, and
although CCAMLR decision makers have access to it in meantime so that
implementation is not delayed, there is the constant risk of plagiarism by
other scientists, modern scientific research being a highly individualistic,
competitive and adversarial enterprise. The Secretariat as custodian of the
data, treads a fine line in determining how these issues of data access and use
can and should be addressed.
The unresolved issue of managing technological change, in particular the
installation of VMS, was discussed previously. The intention to base this
system in the Secretariat, would require an increase in the organization's
technological, personnel and budgetary capacity - a notion that has already
been opposed by some parties (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995). It is understood that
some parties are resisting the idea as they are concerned about the
surveillance aspects of such a system. How it would be used and by whom.
There is also concern in the legal fishing industry about the loss of
commercial advantage from disclosure of the location of fish stocks, were
VMS units installed on all vessels. Predicably, many parties are concerned
about the additional financial implications for their governments.
Time
The Secretariat's workload is set by Commission. According to several
delegates, the workload is too much for the small staff. Annual Commission
and Committee meetings mean that several months of each year are taken up
4 As the Secretariat is located in Australia and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) pays
for CCAMLR to use the AAD's computer, this raises questions in the minds of some stakeholders
(particularly fishing nations), of data confidentiality. In particular, they are concerned about
(unrestricted) access by the host country to commercial-in-confidence and fish stock data. They
are also concerned about NGO access to data, Australia being one of the few CCAMLR members
which includes industry and environmental NGOs on its delegation (Pers.Com.Scientist,1995).
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with the core tasks associated with preparation for these meetings. This leaves
very little time to deal with other implementation issues (such as monitoring
non-compliance) that arise, and to facilitate and service Working Group
meetings.
According to one Secretariat official, there have not been a lot of difficult
issues in CCAMLR in which the Secretariat might be involved. However, the
Secretariat's organizational capacity and performance is likely to be tested
further with the need to monitor developments in illegal fishing for the
Patagonian Toothfish. With its present limited resources and a new Data
Manager who is still getting up to speed, I expect that over the next few years
the Secretariat will come in for some criticism of its inability to deliver a
quality product on time.
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Travel and Location
Travel costs and down-time getting to and from CCAMLR's headquarters in
Hobart are a problem for delegates and for Secretariat personnel who need to
attend working group meetings in the Northern Hemisphere several times a
year. The Hobart location is good for Australia as the critical mass of its
Antarctic research, policy and supply initiatives are located in Tasmania, and
ships from CCAMLR countries dock there. However, a Northern hemisphere
location might improve CCAMLR's international profile.
Social And Cultural Diversity Constraints
Managing External Diversity
Unlike Ramsar and CITES, centralization/ decentralization, North/South
tensions, and regionalization are not constraints experienced by CCAMLR. In
CCAMLR, Anglo-Saxon/non-Anglo-Saxon, and the conservation/ fisheries
debate are the key institutional issues confronting stakeholders and the
Secretariat. The Anglo-Saxon/non-Anglo-Saxon issue can be traced back to
the sovereignty disputes between the UK and Argentina in the South
Atlantic, and the conservation/fisheries divide which reflects professional
differences among Antarctic scientists. The problems these issues create for
the Secretariat are perceptions of bias in the personnel profile of the
organization, in the equitable dissemination of data and advice to the parties,
and in the interpretation of data.
Nor is capacity building an issue in CCAMLR. As a senior Secretariat official
commented, highly developed fleets and highly trained crews are required to
fish in such a remote area. Countries which cannot afford these costs do not
belong to CCAMLR, and CCAMLR does not help countries with capacity
building (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995). As one scientist/delegate noted, "the issue of
developing countries has not happened yet with CCAMLR, but the AT is
coming under scrutiny following more interaction with Malaysia, Pakistan,
and it may just be a matter of time before this happens with CCAMLR"
(Pers.Com.Sec.,1995). I agree. Increasingly, developing countries are insisting
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on their right to participate in decision making about the management of
international resources such as fish.
Managing Scientists In CCAMLR
Three phases of scientific growth were identified over the first ten years of
CCAMLR's existence. They are: the Start-up phase 1982-1990;4 2next, the
Scientific Committee 'discovers' the idea of precautionary catch limits, in
approximately 1989. This was a watershed as it gave science a focus and a
problem to solve. The third phase was the consolidation of the place of
science in the convention (Pers.Com.Powell, 1995).
I would suggest CCAMLR science is now entering a fourth phase, the
politicization of science which revolves around the question of fisheries
enforcement, given that one limitation of CCAMLR's observation and
inspection system is that countries cannot use scientific reports and data as
the basis for a prosecution (Pers. Com. Sec.1995).
The CCAMLR scientific community has consolidated the 'outsider-insider'
culture inherited from the AT. Antarctic scientists act as a club in that they
present a cohesive front to fend off outsiders although they compete fiercely
among themselves. They also constitute a series of interrelated formal and
informal networks.
There are, however, differences between Anglo scientists who have had a
university-style education in the UK, the USA, or Australia and non-Anglo
scientists. This educational background serves as a scientific bridge
internationally as they tend to have similar view points, while non-Anglo
42In the Start-Up phase, the Secretariat took a very active role in building a scientific
community focused on CCAMLR. An important Secretariat job was to foster the growth of this
science family, to get them together and make sure they were valued. It was a nurturing role.
They have to feel like a family with a task; they come as individuals but once you get that
'family' established they behave like a family; they don't behave like a bunch of
nationalities, and they mix at a far greater social level than Commission delegations do.
Scientists are working on a common job. That is not to say are not any politics involved, that
depends on the delegation, bu in the 6/7 years before 1992, the Secretariat had established a
very tight scientific family that was working well and still is from all accounts. The
establishment of scientific confidence was an important development in the growth of CCAMLR
(Pers. Com. Powell, 1995).
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scientists such as those from Eastern Europe hold differing points of view
especially when it comes to conservation. These differences are aggravated by
the language gap and the fact that the most prestigious international scientific
publications are in English (Pers.Com. Scientist, 1995).
The Secretariat has to work strategically to overcome feelings of bias against
non-Anglo interests within the convention. It seems that resentment of the
'Anglo club' has diminished somewhat since the appointment of de Salas as a
non-Anglo executive head in 1992. Secretariat scientists also publish joint
papers with external scientists, a strategy which can assist non-English
speakers to have their research published in English language journals.
The importance of the professional scientific organizational and individual
networks in both the AT and CCAMLR should not be underestimated.
Scientific networks in CCAMLR foster year around intersessional
communication in a way the AT does not have - in the AT, science is
secondary to politics. Scientists also actively promote CCAMLR within their
own countries which raises CCAMLR's profile and thus its chances of
collecting national contributions. Finally, as many CCAMLR scientists have
been interacting for a long period of time, they constitute an effective political
lobby group both domestically and internationally in support of CCAMLR.
Managing Internal Diversity
In the wake of Anglo/non-Anglo tension, there has been an effort to balance
the nationalities in the secretariat. When the Secretariat was first established
and until 1992, there were only Americans, British, Russians and Australians
working there. The Secretariat's stated recruitment policy is now the
geographical distribution of personnel (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995). However, Anglo
interests are still disproportionately represented among the professional
personnel, partly due to the need for Secretariat boundary-spanners to
communicate fluently in English as it is the language of the international
scientific community.
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Organizational Loyalties And Leadership Constraints
The Secretariat resists having an organization made up of people from
member states on a quota basis. One Secretariat official in commenting on
geographical representation, commented that a quota would be a disaster. In
his words,
You have to leave the boss free to choose if you want an efficient organization, and the
Secretariat would only take on secondments as technical assistants at lower level where
it would not expect them to wield political influence (Pers. Com.Sec.,1995)
National Government Influence
During the Cold War when suspicions were running high in CCAMLR, one
government was accused of putting pressure on its national in the Secretariat
to pass on fishing data. This was confirmed in an interview with the national
concerned. He stated that he resisted home-country pressure and informed
the Executive Secretary. Pressure from this government no longer exists
(neither does the government). No other reports of similar activities were
received from Secretariat members or stakeholders.
Leadership Constraints
CCAMLR has had two Executive Secretaries with contrasting management
styles. The first Executive Secretary, Darry Powell, was variously described by
delegates, scientists and NGOs as a person who believed in CCAMLR and was
wholly committed to the job. He was perceived as an excellent facilitator, an
honest broker, and a person with a sense of ownership of CCAMLR, which is
probably not surprising as he set up the organization and guided it for the first
formative ten years before retiring.
His replacement, Estaban de Salas, had spent 10 years as Chairman of the
Scientific Committee before taking on the Executive Secretary's position. His
background is in Spanish fisheries management and his management style is
described by himself and his staff as being more autocratic than his
predecessor's 'laid-back' style of participatory management. For the incoming
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Executive Secretary, it was an opportunity to get things going after years of
frustration watching from the sidelines (Pers. Com. de Salas,1995).
Criticisms leveled at the current Executive Secretary revolve around his
management style as described and (seemingly unsubstantiated) allegations of
poor office management. Admittedly, there may be room for scepticism in
relation to these criticisms, as most were made by 'Anglos'. However, de
Salas' appointment was generally viewed as a victory for scientists over
diplomats, the diplomats having won with Powell's appointment.
The activist leadership exerted by the first Executive Secretary was reputedly
considerable. This impression was reinforced by the remark of an Australian
scientist that Australia had undue influence in CCAMLR when Powell was in
power. Although this influence may be somewhat diluted with a new
executive head, the leadership role of the Executive Secretary remains very
significant in CCAMLR's consensus-based decision making process. A reason
for the potential influence of the Executive Secretary is that s/he is in a
position to suggest creative solutions; to act as a third party; and to stress
common ground between the parties rather than focus on differences.
Implementation Conflicts
One of the more interesting aspects of the CCAMLR text is the breadth of its
dispute settlement options in comparison with those of earlier conventions.
4 The CCAMLR provisions contrast with the complete absence of a dispute
settlement mechanism in the original Ramsar text; and the meagre
provisions of the CITES text which state that if negotiation between the
Parties is not successful, then the dispute by mutual consent, may be
submitted to arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague,
and the Parties are bound by the arbitral decision (CITES Article XVIII).
1 3Article XXV states that in the event of any dispute arising between two or more of the
Contracting Parties, concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, the
Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved
by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other
peaceful means of their own choice. If such a dispute cannot be resolved, it is then referred to
the International Court of Justice( ICJ).
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This expansive clause notwithstanding, like Ramsar and CITES, CCAMLR
members have avoided using the dispute settlement provisions of the
convention.
Conflicts among the Stakeholders
There was general agreement among delegates, NGOs and Secretariat
personnel that conflicts among the parties tended to play themselves out in
the AT as sovereignty issues. As one Secretariat staff member cynically said,
"we don't have conflicts or disputes in CCAMLR as they become sovereignty
issues below 60 degrees S"(Pers. Com. Sec.1995). Disputes such as those
between UK/Argentina which may affect CCAMLR are thus "shunted
upstairs" to the AT.
The AT handles the political issues and its delegates make the decisions. That is, the
bosses of the CCAMLR representatives attend the AT meetings or go to both CCAMLR
and the AT meetings. This helps keep CCAMLR for the scientists (Pers. Com. Sec., 1995).
According to Secretariat officials, CCAMLR has never had to invoke the
dispute provisions of the Convention, nor has it had a dispute about
conservation measures because the parties respond positively to the threat of
an Extraordinary Meeting. Their 'positive' response relates directly to the
costs and logistics of organizing an Extraordinary Meeting in Hobart.
"Parties find Extraordinary Meetings a real headache" (Pers. Com. Sec., 1995).
Although stated somewhat ironically, this remark by an experienced member
of the Secretariat illustrates the resistance of members to financial outlays and
their reluctance to tackle political issues, preferring to stick to what they
perceive as their scientific home turf.
A Secretariat officer commented that conflicts (if there is one) go to the
Commission and are resolved there. For example, Poland did not want to
implement conservation measures [low-cost practical measures of poles and
streamers to deter seabirds] because of the cost, even though there was only
one vessel involved. Australia objected to Poland's position because of the
escalation in seabird mortality caused by unmodified vessels. Australia
directly negotiated the issue with Poland and the conflict 'disappeared'. The
295
officer went on to say that had Australia not been able to resolve the
disagreement bilaterally, the Secretariat could have been brought in to assist
as a intermediary. He further commented that the Secretariat would have a
role to play [in conflict resolution] if brought in, as there was no case where
the recommendations of the Secretariat had not been accepted (Pers. Com.
Sec., 1995). This was the only acknowledgment by any CCAMLR interviewee
that CCAMLR experienced conflicts in its implementation.
The 'absence' of conflicts in CCAMLR seemed too good to be true. It
contradicts media and documentary evidence and the many illustrations
given by interviewees of tensions and outright conflicts among convention
stakeholders including: the much publicized conflicts between
environmental NGOs and parties; conflicts between Anglo and non-Anglo
stakeholder interests; conflicts among competing scientists; and between the
Commission and individual member nations over states' denials of
infractions by their fishing nationals and the distinct reluctance of some
countries to prosecute violations.
Formal denial of the existence of conflict to outsiders such as myself and the
presentation of a public face of solidarity are consistent with the convention's
defensive culture. If being able to admit to imperfections and implementation
difficulties is a guide to the maturity of a convention, then CCAMLR and its
Secretariat have a long way to go before they reach the maturity of Ramsar
and CITES.
Intraorganizational Impacts of Conflicts
The fisheries/conservation debate that divides the convention also divides
the Secretariat. It is an argument about principles and values not scientific
facts, and parallels the conservation/sustainable use debate in CITES and the
conservation/wise use debate in Ramsar. What distinguishes the situation in
the CCAMLR Secretariat from the other two secretariats, is that the
philosophical divisions among the parties seem to have spilled over into the
Secretariat itself. This did not appear to happen in the Ramsar Bureau or the
CITES Secretariat where both organizations were clear about convention and
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organizational goals and each organization presented a united front to its
stakeholders.
The distinction made between science and politics in CCAMLR is artificial
and unrealistic. While this dichotomy might be rationalized on the grounds
of role differentiation between scientists and national delegates, in practice
national delegates are frequently scientists. It is thus often left to the
Secretariat to link the science and the policy of CCAMLR in its reports and its
briefings of governments and the Commission. This is a substantial risk for a
passive, highly resource-dependent organization.
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Summary Of Problem Emergence in CCAMLR
In contrast with Ramsar and CITES, CCAMLR is not part of the UN system; it
discourages outsiders particularly environmental NGOs; it has no partner
organizations; and the Commission severely restricts its Secretariat's
resources. CCAMLR members seem to have less understanding of the
potential value of their Secretariat to convention success, than do the parties
in either of the other conventions. CCAMLR-affiliated NGOs were more
aware of the potential influence of the Secretariat.
In spite of the tensions and conflicts that inevitably emerge from time to time
among convention stakeholders in CITES and Ramsar, all of the major
stakeholder interests in each of these conventions acknowledged the
importance of their secretariats as an indispensable institutional resource.
This does not appear to be the case with CCAMLR which treats its secretariat
very much as a servant of the parties.
The CCAMLR Secretariat remains an enigma, an image fostered by its culture
of exclusion, an apparent discomfort with organizational transparency, and I
suspect, a lack of direction or sense of purpose as a servant of its parties. It is
undoubtedly a passive secretariat. The organization's 'identity crisis' appears
to come from trying to carve out an identity for itself as the secretariat of
CCAMLR, an independent convention, while living in the shadow of the
Antarctic Treaty. The other aspects of the organization's identity crisis relates
to its apparent inability to convince its members of its network management
value to the successful implementation of the convention, and its own
reluctance to assume a more activist stance in the system.
Summary of Chapter 5
Fundamental to the success of any international agreement is the legal and
institutional adequacy of the agreement itself, including its capacity to adapt
to changes within and external to the treaty system over the lifetime of the
agreement. Foresight in crafting the text to incorporate provisions for
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adapting to change (such as amendments), financial mechanisms and a
permanent administrative infrastructure, are critical to a convention's
organizational efficiency and effectiveness. These points are amply
demonstrated in the problems experienced by Ramsar's failure to incorporate
these provisions in its original text and the delays and implementation
difficulties that resulted. CITES and CCAMLR learned from Ramsar's
omissions.
Political and financial constraints including a lack of political commitment to
successful implementation, and a concomitant reluctance by members to
ensure that a secretariat has the organizational resources it needs to carry out
its core and substantive tasks effectively and efficiently, have emerged as
major inhibitors of secretariat performance. These factors directly affect the
organizational capacity and management of the secretariat by restricting
resource availability and mobilization, workload and time allocation and
prioritization. To compensate, secretariats develop alternative networks and
sources of support. In particular, they develop informal networks and
alliances with state and non-state actors, in pursuit of external or project
funding to fulfill their tasks and responsibilities.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, national government influence on
secretariat personnel appears to be less of a problem for secretariat
performance than does organizational leadership. Organizational leadership
is perhaps the major determinant of whether a secretariat assumes an activist
or a passive stance as a network manager. Leadership style, including a
preparedness to delegate, directly affects whether boundary-spanning
personnel are encouraged to take initiatives and risks in the interests of
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achieving treaty objectives. Secretariat leadership is an area for future
research.
Finally, implementation conflicts are clearly a treaty norm. They are also
impediments to successful implementation and compliance. In response to
this phenomenon which is not formally recognized by members, secretariats
as the lynch-pin organizations and network managers of the system, have
developed an ad hoc and informal repertoire of conflict management and
dispute resolution skills and approaches to contain these problems as
obstacles to treaty success, thus ensuring (as far as possible), organizational
survival, and ideally, growth. How secretariat initiatives in managing
implementation conflicts and disputes are put into practice, are discussed in
detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 6: OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS: TURNING OBSTACLES
INTO OPPORTUNITIES
Introduction
This chapter examines how the Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR secretariats
dealt with, or sought to deal with, the emergence and management of the 6
categories of organizational constraints identified in the previous two
chapters. I show how these bureaucracies as the lynch-pin organizations of
complex multilateral networks, use their primary role as network managers
to overcome the limitations of resource dependency, and to manage the
conflicts that are an inevitable part of any treaty implementation.
Overcoming Political Constraints
Treaty Adaptation
All treaties require the capability to adapt to changing global political,
economic, social and environmental circumstances and to correct deficiencies
in the original treaty text, some of which only become apparent over time.
The lack of an amendment capacity to change the treaty, severely limits a
convention's ability to adapt as world events and members' needs change.
By 1995, Ramsar had been able to overcome many of the problems in the
original text associated with drafting errors and omissions including the lack
of provisions for: amendments; financial and administrative infrastructures;
and dispute resolution. These deficiencies were overcome using formal
negotiating procedures such as those which resulted in the Paris Protocol
(1982); the Regina Amendments (1987); and the implementation of CoP
decisions on these matters. However a considerable time elapsed (1975-1987),
before the majority of these changes entered into force. To minimize
confusion in the interim, the Parties agreed that they would act as if these
changes/amendments were in force from the date that the CoP agreed to
them.
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CITES avoided the drafting problems experienced in Ramsar by ensuring that
provisions for amendments, budgetary and financial mechanisms (including
funding for CoPs), a permanent secretariat, and a dispute resolution clause
were contained in the original CITES text.
The drafting of CCAMLR benefited from the experience of its ATCP
negotiators who had also drafted the Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals (CCAS). In addition, CCAMLR's negotiators had learned from
Ramsar's errors and they made sure that similar mistakes were not made in
drafting CCAMLR. Consequently, the original CCAMLR text included
provisions for a permanent secretariat and a dispute resolution clause.
However, as far as financial matters were concerned, members were expected
to pay their own way to Commission meetings and in 1997, there is still no
provision for the CCAMLR equivalent of a CITES Trust Fund or a Ramsar
Wetlands Conservation Fund. I was told by secretariat officials and NGO
representatives, that as CCAMLR membership is effectively restricted to
wealthy, developed nations which can afford to deploy the large and
expensive vessels required to undertake scientific research and to fish in the
Southern Ocean, the parties have seen no need for a trust fund or its
equivalent (Pers. Coms. Sec., NGOs, 1995).
The formal powers and functions of the CCAMLR Secretariat are minimal in
contrast with those of the Ramsar Bureau and the CITES Secretariat. It seems
that the governments negotiating the CCAMLR text were determined that the
authority and power of a CCAMLR bureaucracy would be minimal. CCAMLR
Secretariat personnel commented that CCAMLR members were concerned
about the potentially negative impacts (on members), of the recommendatory
power of the CITES Secretariat and made sure it was not included in the
CCAMLR text.
Convention negotiators (lawyers and diplomats) are not the officials (civil
servants and experts) who will implement the convention. The concern here
is that those who negotiate the text do not have to live with it, and they have
no idea how the language and structure that they negotiate will work in
practice. In Ramsar's case, what presumably appeared to be a reasonably sound
text to the negotiators, proved to have serious deficiencies in practice. A
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financial mechanism was required to assist developing country members
with capacity building; a permanent secretariat was needed to coordinate and
manage treaty implementation; and funding was essential to underwrite the
triennial CoPs.
To implement an agreement, secretariat officials, national managers and their
personnel interpret the language of the text and the decisions of the CoP and
its Committees, in ways that ensure the intent of a convention is carried out.
There is a considerable 'grey area' as the Ramsar, CCAMLR and CITES
Secretariats pointed out, between black letter law and policy practice. These
'grey areas' provide activist secretariats with windows of opportunity to
demonstrate initiative in policy guidance and policy leadership. In contrast,
passive secretariats are more likely to confine themselves to a narrow
interpretation of the black letter law. In Ramsar, although governments may
request a formal written interpretation of some aspect of an agreement that is
troubling them or appears ambiguous, on a day-to-day basis, requests from
stakeholders for interpretations of text are done verbally and informally over
the telephone, in meetings, and in informal conversations with national
bureaucrats and NGO colleagues. An example of secretariat policy guidance
given to parties is in the organization's interpretation of key convention
phrases such as 'wise-use' (Ramsar); 'sustainable use' (CITES): and
'ecologically sustainable management' (CCAMLR).
Secretariats have to abide by the intent of the treaty so that it can be
implemented in ways that ensure convention objectives are met, while at the
same time the organization must interpret complex legal language in ways
that 'make sense' to the practitioners responsible for its implementation.
While secretariats are ever mindful that they are formally 'servants of the
parties', they are also mindful that governments change and that
conventions are intended to span generations, not just the 3-4 years of the
average domestic political term. National governments come and go in
relatively rapid succession. However, domestic civil servants are usually
involved in policy implementation for protracted periods of time, in one
government agency or another. As civil servants move among national
bureaucracies and/or are seconded to IOs such as treaty secretariats, they take
with them their networks and the knowledge and skills they have gained
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from previous postings. In these circumstances, ICS knowledge, expertise and
networks are not lost, they are just redistributed. It is this adaptability of
practice that enhances the capacity of secretariats and their conventions to
adapt to changing global environments
Relations With Governments
Dealing with the rate and scale of changes in convention membership, policy
directions, national and international bureaucracies, resource allocation and
organizational management, have been organizational challenges for all
secretariats. While there are a number of commonalities among the case
study secretariats in the constraints they face and the ways in which they seek
to overcome them, there are also differences in the approaches they use to
overcome obstacles. The approaches adopted are shaped by differences in
external, interorganizational and intraorganizational factors confronting the
organization.
Ramsar
In Ramsar's case, task prioritization introduced with the new Ramsar
Strategic Plan 1997-2002 and overseen by the Standing Committee, is intended
to overcome these problems. The Strategic Plan will put more emphasis on
land-use planning and policy work rather than on traditional on-site
technical work. It will press for national Ramsar committees and policies and
training in community-based management. The goals of the Strategic Plan
are: wise use; training; providing the technical and especially the financial
resources; and ensuring the Bureau has the means to do these things (Pers.
Com.Bureau, 1995; Ramsar Doc. 6.15 (Rev.1); Blasco, 15 May, 1997).
This change of emphasis in the Bureau's approach appears to complement,
rather then duplicate, IUCN's community development fieldwork thrust,
and IT increases opportunities for on-ground collaboration between the
Bureau's Technical Officers and IUCN field operatives. It should also reduce
the likelihood of role overlap in site work which has been a source of tension
between IUCN field operatives and the Bureau's Technical Officers.
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Ramsar Bureau members hope that their frustrations with increasing
bureaucracy resultant of increased membership and changing expectations of
the Bureau's functions, attendant delays in hierarchical decision-making and
an avalanche paperwork, will be overcome by the implementation of a flatter
structure within the Bureau. All technical, administration and
communications officers now report directly to the Secretary-General, and
multiskilling is actively encouraged by senior management.
Organizational restructuring cannot, however, overcome delays in national
bureaucracies. Wherever possible it appears that Bureau personnel and their
counterparts in national governments and NGOs use informal telephone and
electronic communications including e.mail and fax, in preference to more
formal means of correspondence such as diplomatic notes and written
correspondence, to speed up communications and minimise delays in
traditional chains of command. Informal modes of communication and
dialogue sit very comfortably with Ramsar's relatively informal culture. The
increase in informal communication is a matter necessity, rather than one of
subterfuge, if the Bureau is to accomplish its tasks and deliver quality policy
products on time.
A related problem is that government and public awareness and the
influence of Ramsar within countries, are further hampered by the low level
and limited administrative authority of Ramsar officials in national
bureaucracies and thus the low level at which most Bureau correspondence is
directed and received.
To deal with these problems, Bureau missions are undertaken several times
each year to countries where these difficulties are occurring, to educate and
facilitate the linking of all levels of government: legislators, politicians,
senior managers, technical officers and field workers, non-state actors and
local communities. Through working with national officials, NGOs and
international experts on monitoring domestic and transboundary Ramsar
sites, Bureau personnel endeavour to lift the level of technical expertise and
knowledge within a country. Coordinating training courses; providing direct
advice; and facilitating on-the-job training are examples of approaches used.
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Bureau personnel consider that encouraging collaboration and
communication in this way is important for several reasons. First, politicians
and senior officials are often more likely listen to representatives from the
Bureau (who they perceive as representing the convention and thus a higher
[international] authority), than they are to lower level internal operatives in
their own bureaucracies. Second, unlike Bureau personnel, lower level
Ramsar national and subnational officials are frequently restricted from direct
access to senior political and bureaucratic officials by the civil service norms
of employment in their home country. Third, it is often more effective, at
least until a critical mass of in-country convention expertise has been built
up, for external experts such as the Bureau's Technical Officers to facilitate
meetings among competing interests (including government agencies)
within a country, than it is for low level bureaucrats from one of the
competing agencies to arrange such meetings. Senior and more influential
officials are more likely to attend a meeting organised and facilitated by a UN
official than they are one organised by their own lower status staff. Fourth, for
Bureau personnel as Ramsar representatives there is a certain status
associated with being UN employees, especially in developing countries,
where there appears to be a presumption that such officials have, or can
facilitate, greater access to international resources (especially funding) than is
possible for individual domestic agencies or countries acting alone.
CITES
Nature conservation/trade, and North/South tensions have been permanent
undercurrents in relations among CITES stakeholders since the convention
entered into force. These underlying tensions are now being exacerbated by
the changing relations between global trade and international environmental
policies and priorities. Within this macro-context, the issue that has created
the most tension among the parties and between the Secretariat and the
parties, has been the ivory trade issue.
The Secretariat has dealt with this perennial problem by being studiously
impartial and consistent in the advice its gives all stakeholders. It has also
been extremely careful to take as its point of reference, the CITES' resolutions
governing a Party's rights to enter a reservation in circumstances where it
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feels unable to meet its CITES obligations such as enforcing domestic and
international compliance with the ivory trade ban. The Secretariat has been
understandably cautious in this regard since the 1989 crisis when the
Secretariat was criticized for being too "pro-use" (as distinct from "pro-
conservation"), in the eyes of some environmental NGOs and some Parties,
notably the US government and several North American NGOs (Pers. Coins.
Sec, La Pointe, 1995; La Pointe, 1992).
The formal recommendatory powers of the CITES Secretariat have also been a
periodic source of tension and resentment in Secretariat relations with some
parties. This power is a source of considerable authority and leverage in the
Secretariat's relations with stakeholders and is unprecedented among
environmental treaty secretariats.
The CITES Secretariat is well aware that some Parties' resent this power, and
the organization uses it judiciously. In general, the Secretariat's
recommendations have been accepted and acted on by the Parties, based as
they are on thorough research, and extensive consultation with all the
relevant stakeholders including traders and environmental NGOs. In
situations where the Secretariat makes a specific recommendation, it is also
careful to provide alternative approaches or courses of action from which the
Parties can choose, but which will all reach the same end result, that is,
different roads to the same destination. The case of the trade ban on Italy is
such an example.
For those Parties which were reluctant to support trade sanctions against Italy
fro non-compliance, the Secretariat made it clear that although the Secretariat
recommended a CITES-wide ban on trade with Italy (all other possible courses
of action having been exhausted), it suggested that Parties had the option of
suspending trade as agreed under CITES, or alternatively, suspending trade
under their own domestic legislation. Several parties were apprehensive that
if they took multilateral action under CITES, at some later date other parties
might decide to take multilateral action against them for non-compliance. In
contrast, unilateral action by an individual country is less politically and
economically threatening.
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Re-export has been a source of problems among CITES Parties and between
the Secretariat and CITES members. The Secretariat has dealt with this issue
by a periodic review of trade permits among countries where illegal trade is
suspected of occurring, and spot checks. The formal CITES surveillance
network is global, complex and interlocking. It comprises Interpol, domestic
and international NGOs such as WWF/TRAFFIC, as well as CITES
management authorities, customs, and law enforcement officials in each
country. Additional surveillance is of necessity often underground or covert
as there are huge profits to be made in smuggling wildlife and substantial
personal risk is involved for those doing the surveillance work, whether they
be law enforcement officials, concerned local citizens, or NGOs.
Unfortunately the Secretariat does not have the personnel to check every
import, export and re-export permit. According to Secretariat officials this is
the only way to counter documentation forgeries and other illegal practices.
The CITES CoP resolution that the Secretariat should recommend against re-
export is an attempt to overcome this weak link in the Secretariat's
organizational monitoring capacity. (Pers. Com. Sec., 1995; Resolution Conf.
8.5).
The Secretariat has to continually adapt to political shifts in regions; changing
policy emphases and directions in the convention (for example, from
'charismatic megafauna' to flora, timber and marine species); and the
changing expectations of Secretariat performance by CITES' members.
Secretariats must be adaptable to survive. The acknowledged credibility,
authority, expertise, and ultimately the success of the CITES Secretariat in
increasing global awareness, membership and implementation of CITES
under intense and competing pressures from governments and NGOs at
various stages in its history, appears to provide evidence of its organizational
capacity to adapt and survive. So how does it adapt?
In response to changes in the organizational environment of the CITES
system, the Secretariat regularly reviews its Strategic Plan which is then
presented to each CoP for its approval, together with the Secretariat budget.
Unlike the Ramsar Bureau, which formulated its first strategic plan some 25
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years after it entered into force, the CITES Secretariat has worked with
strategic plans for some years. The formulation of the Strategic Plan, together
with policy redirection and the budget, are the responsibility of the Secretary-
General.'
Management practices of the CITES Secretariat are more formalized than are
those of either the Ramsar Bureau or the CCAMLR Secretariat. It is also the
largest organization as far as personnel numbers and budgets are concerned,
so it is probably to be expected that its management arrangements are more
coherent and structured. This is not meant to imply that the CITES Secretariat
is less inclined to use informal mechanisms and networks to achieve its
objectives. On the contrary, as the CITES Secretary-General noted, informal
processes are part of the nature of a secretariat, and the way it gets things
done. In commenting further on the value of informal networks in
implementation, the Secretary-General advised that it is the people in charge
of implementation [the Secretariat and national management authorities]
who look to the 'grey area' of the law to overcome contradictions in the
original law [text] it would be impossible to proceed (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995). As
the Secretary-General pointed out, CITES has adopted one amendment and it
took 10 years for it enter into force. The second amendment, the Gabon
Amendment, was adopted in 1983 and [in 1995] still needed 40% more parties
to ratify it before it could enter into force. As the Secretary-General noted,
"how are you going to implement anything if you don't have that grey area
and use informal as well as formal contacts" (Pers.Com. Topkov, 1995).
Informal networks help the CITES Secretariat to keep up to date with changes
in policy directions in the regions and in stakeholder expectations of the
Secretariat. The organization can make provision for these changes in its
Strategic Plan by tapping into informal networks and keeping network
linkages open. From its global vantage point, the secretariat is able to
anticipate and directly advise national scientific and management authorities
on probable changes in CITES policy directions, including the new listings of
1 In 1995, the Secretary-General of CITES advised that he, personally, wrote the Strategic Plan. He
described his organizational management style as very consultative of Secretariat personnel, but was not
specific about at what stage he sought their input to the Strategic Plan. I gained the impression that he
developed the plan personally, then sought feedback from Secretariat members especially from the very
experienced Deputy Secretary-General.
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marine and timber species in 1994, and the proposed changes in elephant
harvesting in 1997. It also develops and/or coordinates additional training
courses to bring stakeholders up to speed on issues such as how to identify
newly listed timber species.
The Secretariat is recognized by parties as being very influential in CITES
implementation (Pers. Com. Delegate, 1995), although Trexler (1989)
disagrees. The CITES Secretariat appears to be respected for its initiative,
expertise, professionalism and impartiality (the 1989 incident not
withstanding). In 1989 it seems that the CoP had to find a scapegoat, and the
Secretary-General was the ideal target, having been perceived to be
"excessively pro-use" (Pers. Com. Delegate, 1995).
The risk of being scapegoated, rightly or wrongly, is an occupational risk that
executive heads accept in taking on the job, even if they do not like the
personal fall-out when it happens. There is no recourse for international civil
servants to overturn the decisions of sovereign nations, and even if they
were successful in such an action, having lost the confidence and respect of
the members it would jeopardize the Secretariat's credibility and stature for a
'discredited' Secretary-General to stay on.
Far from adversely affecting their own future employability, executive heads
so dismissed may well to go on to become successful international
consultants, as have La Pointe (CITES) and Navid (Ramsar). It appears that
the private sector, NGOs and individual governments have a far greater
appreciation of their insider-knowledge and international networks than do
their do their former convention colleagues.
CCAMLR
In its day to day operations and relations with interests outside the parties, the
CCAMLR Secretariat remains constrained and influenced by the residual
effects of the Cold War, and the AT culture of the exclusion of 'outsiders' and
domination by the Antarctic scientific elite. It also appears that the original
conservation ethos of AT which inspired CCAMLR has been submerged by
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fisheries interests whose catch and data management demands now
dominate the workload priorities of the Secretariat.
In contrast with the secretariats of Ramsar and CITES, the CCAMLR
Secretariat is primarily reactive to its parties' requirements. It is a classic
example of a passive 10. It does not play a leadership role in convention
policy matters; it provides advice as and when requested; and in the area of
data management where it has clear responsibilities for the coordination,
management and analysis of convention data inputs, its actions remain
conservative and it rarely takes the initiative.
Any initiatives taken by CCAMLR Secretariat personnel appeared to depend
more on the personalities and expertise of individual boundary-spanning
personnel, than on an organizational philosophy. For example, the former
Data Manager actively facilitated the management and resolution of
troublesome issues in several Scientific Working Groups. His positive
contribution was clearly appreciated by working group members including
environmental NGOs (Pers. Coms. NGOs, Scientists and Delegates, 1995).
Overall, the CCAMLR Secretariat's relations with governments appeared to
be innocuous and responsive rather than innovative and proactive. Given
the Executive Secretary's reluctance to discuss these matters, it is difficult to
find evidence to the contrary. Certainly the opinions of environmental
NGOs, some fishing organizations, and delegates, seem to bear out my
observations that the Secretariat is rarely proactive.
The lack of organizational initiative also appears to reflect differences in
leadership attitudes. Stakeholders commented that under the previous
Executive Secretary, the Secretariat had been less suspicious of outsiders and
more prepared to take a policy leadership role.
Managing the chronic tension between science and politics causes problems
in relations between the CCAMLR Secretariat and the Scientific Committee.
The Secretariat's network management role and functions combine political
and scientific elements. The Secretariat is the organizational nexus between
the politics and the science of CCAMLR. The professional officers, including
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the Executive Secretary, all have scientific credentials and their functions and
responsibilities have both political and scientific management components.
The value of this combination of organizational capacity and expert skills is
probably undervalued by CCAMLR as a whole. In fact the organization
appears to be under-utilized both by the Commission to whom the Secretariat
is very much a 'servant', as well as by the Scientific Committee which, from
my observations, appears to regard Secretariat personnel as 'lesser scientists'
than those engaged in full-time research at key international scientific
establishments and academic institutions.
In this regard it seemed to me that the CCAMLR Secretariat had an identity
crisis as its personnel not been able to carve out a niche as a technical experts
as the Ramsar Bureau has done, nor as policy experts as the CITES Secretariat
has done. This lack of a clear organizational identity and strategy means that
the Secretariat's responses to tensions between the scientific and policy aspects
of CCAMLR's implementation tend to be ad hoc. To compensate, it "plays
safe" by being primarily reactive to the requirements of the Scientific
Committee and/or the Commission.
Compliance with CCAMLR is dependent on in-country action by member
countries. Compliance is not consistently enforced by CCAMLR members,
and it depends on the political will of each CCAMLR member to enforce the
compliance of its nationals, and to provide in-country education of its
domestic fishing industries about responsibilities under CCAMLR.
The CCAMLR Secretariat has, on a number of occasions since 1980, suggested
the need for standardization of training courses and in-country compliance
measures to ensure more uniformity of education about CCAMLR
requirements and more consistency of penalties for non-compliance. There
appears to have been little progress made on either issue. Furthermore, the
1990 Secretariat innovation of actually naming non-compliant parties in the
Secretariat's annual infractions report to the Commission, had been
discontinued by 1995, although the Secretariat continued to submit an
incident report. However, in recent times, the Secretariat has been asked by
the Commission to make comparisons of national eduction and compliance
schemes and to suggest the most appropriate system for CCAMLR
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implementation (Pers. Com. Sec., 1995). How much notice members take of
their secretariat's suggestions, remains to be seen.
Dealing with Non-Members
Considerable Ramsar and CITES Secretariat time and resources are put into
the recruitment of non-member countries. Some countries are hesitant to
join because of the financial costs of membership of international
conventions The AOSIS countries are examples of non-members with fragile
economies which are reluctant to incur the costs of joining CITES, but whose
inclusion is vital for the protection of migratory and marine species such as
turtles.
The CITES Secretariat has been particularly effective in encouraging countries
to join CITES. It has been able to capitalize on the media coverage engendered
by NGO concerns about the loss of 'charismatic megafauna' and most recently,
marine species such as turtles. As the number of CITES' members has
increased, so too has global peer pressure on governments to join. The
underlying political argument is that governments stand to lose more by not
belonging to CITES, than they do by belonging. In marketing the convention
to non-members, the CITES Secretariat enters into formal communications
including various forms of correspondence and informal communications
such as personal discussions with key government officials to promote the
benefits of belonging to an international 'club' with beneficial linkages to
other potential trading partners and financial institutions. The possibility of
financial assistance from the CITES Trust Fund is also a drawcard.
The CITES Secretariat is assisted directly and indirectly in these promotional
efforts by domestic and international NGO networks and contacts. These
networks put domestic pressure on countries join the convention, as the only
universally accepted way to regulate and monitor illegal trade is via the
cooperation of CITES members. There is no way for either the Secretariat or
NGOs to monitor, let alone regulate, the trade of non-member countries
except by persuading members not to trade with them. This is not an easy
objective to achieve, as governments have a well known aversion to being
told what to do, or what not to do, by NGOs and civil servants.
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Changes In National Governments
Frequent changes in national governments mean changes in national
bureaucracies, in the individual officials responsible for convention
implementation, and the subsequent loss of a critical mass of in-country
expertise. All the conventions I studied experienced these problems to
varying degrees.
Ramsar
A key aim of individual Ramsar Bureau personnel is to build up a critical
mass of legislators, national officials, NGO and community interests who are
knowledgeable about and committed to assisting Ramsar to achieve its
objectives in each region and country. Bureau officers achieve this by: visiting
individual countries on missions to educate legislators, politicians,
bureaucrats, technical experts, NGOs community groups, academic
researchers and other networks about Ramsar; conducting site inspections to
monitor changes in ecological character; giving technical advice on site
management problems; facilitating meetings of relevant stakeholder interests
within a country or a region to build up Ramsar support and networks which
can help sustain commitment to the convention even when resources are
low; and encouraging resource and information sharing within and among
countries, as occurred in the management of Lake Victoria in Africa.
In these ways, the development of a critical mass of in-country Ramsar
expertise can help compensate for in-country personnel dislocations and the
loss of institutional memory caused by changes in national governments.
However, network construction and maintenance such as this takes time.
There appears to be no substitute for direct personal contact, as distinct from
more formal and indirect contact via telephone and written correspondence.
It is this regular and direct face-to-face contact between Bureau personnel and
in-country colleagues that builds the trust and networks that sustain
conventions such as Ramsar, and that determine the ultimate success of all
international accords over the longer term.
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Another Ramsar Bureau concern relates to in-country corruption, threats and
personal risks to the safety of Bureau personnel and their local colleagues.
CITES personnel and their local colleagues also experience comparable but
frequently more extreme threats in carrying out implementation tasks.
CCAMLR Secretariat personnel did not appear to face these types of threats,
but then the CCAMLR Secretariat plays a more passive role than does the
Bureau or the CITES Secretariat.
Ramsar personnel deal with these threats by using the in-country and
international networks of Bureau personnel. In situations where Bureau
personnel are concerned for their safety or that of their NGO and community
colleagues, they take advantage of their networks with senior government
and political figures in that country to bring their concerns to the fore
domestically in the context of capacity building negotiations. Bureau
personnel can also use their international networks and those of convention
stakeholders including NGOs, to ensure that peer pressure can be brought to
bear on national governments in the context of regional meetings, the
Standing Committee and the CoP, should, capacity building initiatives and
funds be misused and the achievement of Ramsar objectives be threatened.
CITES
Changes in national governments are not as much of a problem for the CITES
Secretariat as they are for the Ramsar Bureau, as CITES international and
domestic infrastructure is more comprehensive and well established. The
introduction of domestic legislation to implement CITES is a requirement of
CITES membership. Where countries have difficulties in putting this in
place, Secretariat personnel offer direct expert advice, and the Secretariat may
assist the country concerned to obtain project funding to employ expert
international or national consultants to help prepare the legislation and/or
make recommendations about infrastructure development as occurred in
Guyana when NGO funding was used to help Guyana develop appropriate
domestic legislation (Sandford, 1996).
CITES also requires that each member country identifies a government
agency which acts as the CITES management authority within the country.
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This CITES' management authority, in conjunction with the national CITES
scientific agency, has primary responsibility for CITES implementation in the
country. The management and scientific agencies are expected to work closely
with relevant national law enforcement and customs agencies to monitor
implementation and compliance, and to keep the Secretariat informed of
progress as well as of incidents of non-compliance.
CITES domestic legislative and implementation infrastructure requirements
appear to have been reasonably effective buffers against the erosion of CITES
knowledge and progress which can occur with changes in governments. The
effectiveness of these implementation mechanisms has been further
reinforced by regular local, national and regional training courses run and/or
coordinated by the Secretariat, and by the support of well-organized CITES'
NGO networks and their effective use of the media to advance awareness of
CITES' objectives and actions.
The Secretariat's active role in the oversight of national implementation is
pivotal. It keeps abreast of changes in governments and their implications for
CITES implementation and it provides direct advice to incoming
governments on their CITES responsibilities and obligations. Secretariat
personnel endeavour to visit a country as soon as possible after a change of
government to facilitate this information exchange, and to identify potential
problems areas. The Secretariat is also continually organizing training
programs to train incoming, in-country officials and operatives to ensure that
a critical mass of in-country CITES expertise is retained at all times and that
there is a minimal loss of continuity of CITES knowledge.
Time delays in submitting essential documentation such as trade permits to
the CITES Secretariat, are another problem that can arise when governments
change. The case of "lost" faxes can hinder Secretariat monitoring and
compliance tasks. Persistent contact in various written and verbal forms and
documentation of all these contacts, are the ways the Secretariat lays down a
paper trail of communication with governments and stakeholders and in so
doing it also protects itself from allegations of poor performance, inefficiency
or bias in enforcement.
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CCAMLR
Changes in national governments have been less of a problem for the
CCAMLR Secretariat than for either the Ramsar or the CITES secretariats, and
emerging problems have generally been offset by the close and long-term
relations among individual scientists and their organizations. Although the
scientific 'old boys club' atmosphere of Antarctic science may discourage
outsiders, by its very nature it is protective of the scientific research goals of
CCAMLR. By protecting CCAMLR, the scientists also protect their
organizational and individual research and funding interests. It is the
international collaboration and protective self-interest of this scientific
community that shields the CCAMLR Secretariat to a considerable extent
from the potentially negative impacts of changes in national governments.
For example, where problems are created by the late/non-payment of national
contributions, CCAMLR scientists actively lobby governments to pay their
contributions as a way of ensuring that the scientific foundations of CCAMLR
are not undermined by lack of funds.
The CCAMLR Secretariat is thus able to take advantage of its formal and
informal alliances with international networks of physical and biological
Antarctic scientists to bolster its organizational linkages and resources and
potentially its authority as the network manager. However, as the 'old-timers'
in this network retire and as more countries, particularly developing
countries such as those in Southern Africa, South America and Asia, clamour
for access to the apparently lucrative CCAMLR fisheries, the Secretariat will
need to re-evaluate its dependence on this scientific network to make sure
that the organization is not seen to have been captured by Northern
developed country interests.
Relations with Partner Organizations
A secretariat's relationship with its partner organization(s) can be a source of
tension as well as a source of financial and organizational support. Most
secretariats appear to experience recurring tensions, in this mutually
dependent relationship. However the tension between the CITES
Secretariat/UNEP is entrenched and particularly volatile. Tensions also exist
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between IUCN administration and the Ramsar Bureau over financial and
administrative management practices, although these tensions are not as
severe as those between the CITES Secretariat and UNEP.
Ramsar
The potential for tension between the Ramsar Bureau and its partner
organizations, IWRB and IUCN, has been largely managed by formalizing
relations among the organizations in the areas of data collection and
management, and financial and personnel management, so that the lines of
responsibility and accountability are as clear as possible. There were no
accounts of tension between IWRB and the Bureau. There is an MOU
between IWRB and Ramsar which identifies their respective data
management responsibilities. There is also a formal delegation in an MOU,
from the Ramsar CoP to IUCN which outlines IUCN's authority and
responsibility in the management of personnel, financial and general
administrative matters (Pers.Coms Bureau, IUCN, IWRB 1995).
Tensions which arose in the past between IUCN administrators and Bureau
management were largely attributed by Bureau and IUCN personnel to a
'personality clash' between IUCN and Bureau leadership. With the departure
of these individuals from both organizations, formalization of
interorganizational relations, and the introduction of regular meetings
between key administrators in each organization, these problems appear to
have been overcome.
Co-location appears to be a source of tension between IUCN and Bureau
personnel. Bureau personnel are concerned that some stakeholders may
mistakenly perceive the Bureau to be part of IUCN, rather than as an
independent organization, and they are concerned that perceptions such as
this may adversely prejudice the Bureau's work For example, IUCN is
generally regarded as having a nature conservation focus, whereas Ramsar's
policy direction is 'wise use' which permits some measure of development or
rational use of wetlands by stakeholders. To overcome these concerns, regular
meetings are now in place between Ramsar officials and their IUCN
counterparts.
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Tensions occasionally arise between Ramsar Technical Officers and the IUCN
Headquarters staff who are responsible for IUCN field work in the regions.
This tension seems to be primarily the result of difficulties in role
differentiation between IUCN and Bureau officers in the field. Deliberate
attempts by both IUCN and the Bureau to improve formal and informal
communications between the organizations have now been instigated.
Regular meetings are now held between relevant IUCN and Bureau
personnel and IUCN personnel commented that the Bureau's transition
from a solely thematic to a regional focus had been very positive move for
interorganizational relations as it corresponded with IUCN's own regional
division of responsibilities. This made for greater ease of cooperation and
joint planning. Personnel in both organizations expressed satisfaction with
the progress being made to improve relations in the field.
CITES
As noted in Chapter 5, the CITES Secretariat has had a turbulent relationship
with its partner organization, UNEP. However, the Secretariat appears to
have been very assertive in its recent (1995) difficulties with UNEP over
Common Services. Senior Secretariat personnel said that they had made it
very clear to UNEP that the CITES Secretariat was a financially independent
organization which was more than capable of managing its internal affairs,
and it saw no reason why CITES membership contributions should be used to
prop up less solvent UNEP secretariats such as Basel and CBD, or UNEP itself,
under the guise of contributing to the cost of overheads or Common Services.
According to CITES Secretariat personnel, the organization learned the
importance of being assertive in such matters, following its earlier
experiences with IUCN over similar issues when the CITES Secretariat was
located in IUCN. See Appendix 2.
In 1995, the disparity between classification and salary levels of CITES
Secretariat personnel and those in UNEP's more recent treaty secretariats of
Basel and CBD, had yet to be overcome. This remained a source of tension
between the CITES Secretariat and UNEP as well as among the UNEP
secretariats.
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Several personnel in the CITES Secretariat commented, that from their
observations, UNEP was losing ground to UNDP in the 'hearts and minds' of
developing country governments. In this context, the CITES Secretariat
wanted to distance itself from perceptions of being "one of UNEP's [pro-
environmental] secretariats". The CITES Secretariat is still smarting from the
repercussions of the 1989 La Pointe incident where it felt betrayed by
environmental NGOs.
Capacity building initiatives particularly financial assistance for domestic
projects; regional and in-country training programs; regular formal and
informal contact between Secretariat officials and their domestic bureaucratic
colleagues; Secretariat missions; and regional meetings, are the approaches
used by the CITES Secretariat to dispel any misconceptions of its capture by
UNEP's primary constituency.
CCAMLR
In contrast with the Ramsar Bureau and the CITES Secretariat, the CCAMLR
Secretariat has no partner organizations.
Relations With NGOs
Secretariat relations with non-state actors vary among the conventions, from
the Ramsar Bureau's close and seemingly uncomplicated relationship with
its scientific and environmental NGOs, to the CCAMLR Secretariat's covert
informal relationship with Greenpeace as an essential data source.
Ramsar
There is a long history of cooperation, collaboration and mutually beneficial
relations between the Ramsar Bureau and national and international NGOs.
This is probably not surprising given that Ramsar evolved from the efforts of
scientists and NGOs.
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CITES
The CITES Secretariat's formal relations with international NGOs are
generally sound. However, 1989 was a low point in
Secretariat/environmental NGO relations. It personified the key
philosophical divisions in CITES: North/South and nature
conservation/sustainable use. It has taken from 1989 to 1995 for the
Secretariat to overcome much of its sense of betrayal resulting from the NGO
attack on the impartiality of the Secretariat and its executive head in their
management of the ivory trade issue. A degree of organizational wariness
and lack of trust about the intentions of outsiders still lingers. CITES
Secretariat personnel were very accessible and supportive of my research but
in contrast with the friendliness and openness of the Ramsar Bureau, they
were understandably more cautious in discussing how the Secretariat
performed in situations of tension or conflict. However, the personnel of the
CITES Secretariat were certainly less suspicious of outsiders such as myself,
than were some CCAMLR Secretariat personnel.
The CITES Secretariat has also facilitated the rebuilding of strained
relationships between some range states and Northern NGOs. The 1994
Lusaka Agreement on African wildlife management is a recent example. As
one Secretariat member put it,
staff had to work overtime on the Lusaka Agreement to overcome Parties' resistance and
suspicion that the Lusaka Agreement was another 'Horse of Troy' [concealing the 'real'
intentions of Northern environmental NGOs]. There was resistance even in the
Secretariat. This kind of diplomacy gets an nerves of technical staff of the Secretariat
who don't always understand that immediate results are not always possible or obvious,
and that it doesn't work like that. You have to overcome cultural differences and use
different approaches for different situations---not all the staff are born
politicians(Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
In this situation, Secretariat missions and lengthy, face-to-face discussions
with all stakeholders, plus UNEP assistance, finally persuaded African
governments to sign the Agreement.
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CCAMLR
The CCAMLR Secretariat maintains good relations with a range of
international fisheries organizations and the IWC via regular formal and
informal electronic, written and verbal communications with their
secretariats; attendance at relevant meetings; and data and information
exchange. The CCAMLR Secretariat has little direct interaction with
environmental IOs.
CCAMLR relations with environmental NGOs have been historically very
uneasy, and often sources of conflict. Several of the whaling and fishing
nations such as Japan and Norway have been very outspoken in their
opposition to formal interactions between the CCAMLR Secretariat and
environmental NGOs. As a result, the Secretariat's relations with
environmental NGOs are very cautious because of the historical and
persisting opposition of several governments to environmental NGOs. As a
result, the Secretariat's relationships with environmental NGOs, especially
with Greenpeace, are predominantly informal.
Greenpeace keeps the Secretariat informed of its scientific research activities
and its monitoring of illegal fishing. The Secretariat has found Greenpeace
data to be accurate and extremely useful (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
Secretariat relations with fishing industry organizations appear sound and do
not seem to be a problem. Vessels fishing in CCAMLR waters are required to
keep catch data for submission to the Secretariat, and the Secretariat liaises
with industry organizations to train and encourage their members to keep
accurate records. It is, however, up to a vessel's master, to honestly and
accurately keep these records. Vessel logs alone are notoriously unreliable as
records of catches.
The previous Executive Secretary appears to have had a more relaxed attitude
to working with environmental NGOs than the current executive head who
comes from a background in Spanish fisheries management background. The
current head has strong links with fishing industry organizations and from
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his comments when interviewed, he seems more comfortable in this milieu
than in that of environmental NGOs.
Overcoming Financial Constraints
Late and/or Non-Payment of Contributions
Persistence and persuasion are the primary strategies IOs use to chase up late
and non-payment of national contributions. This is a resource-intensive and
costly exercise in terms of down-time for the personnel of all secretariats, as in
all my cases it is the executive head, who of necessity, has made the collection
of contributions a personal crusade.
Ramsar
In Ramsar's case, the majority of non/late payment follow-ups is done by
senior Bureau members and the Secretary-General personally. To be effective,
in targeting senior members of national governments, such as finance
ministers, persuasion needs to come from secretariat personnel with
international authority and status. The executive head of a secretariat is
charged with the ultimate responsibility for this task, and all past and current
heads admitted to having to make 'contribution-chasing' a personal crusade if
it is to have the required effect of pulling in outstanding contributions.
Formal and informal approaches are used to chase up contributions. They
include formal letters from the Bureau to governments; telephone calls; and
informal approaches to relevant national bureaucrats and government
representatives and politicians at international meetings and on missions.
Partner organizations UNEP, IUCN and IWRB, can also indirectly and
informally bring pressure to bear via their IGO and NGO networks, and
secretariat reports to CoPs and Standing Committees publicly identify the
countries which have not paid.
In 1995, the interim Secretary-General of Ramsar also reported that his
'threat' about the pending bankruptcy of the convention (and the Bureau) if
national contributions were not immediately forthcoming, was very effective
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in ensuring that Ramsar members paid up (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995). An
additional factor in the prompt response he received, could well have been
the political leverage that this executive head carried. He was a long-standing
and highly respected member of the Canadian delegation on short-term loan
to the Bureau. He was not a permanent international civil servant.
Chasing up contributions as described, is however, a very inefficient use of
senior executive time. In any private sector corporation it would be the lower
level financial managers and administrators not the managing director, who
chase up overdue accounts, which is, after all, what these contributions are.
CITES
Like CCAMLR's former Secretary-General, the current Secretary-General of
CITES has made the collection of members' contributions a personal priority.
He maintained that it is only by repeated and persistent, formal and informal,
verbal and written contact, that countries can be nagged into paying as close to
the due date as possible.
Predictably, the CITES Secretariat has not been able to overcome problems
associated with in-country competition among agencies for the declining
international convention dollar. It regularly suggests to governments in
CITES, UNEP and GATT forums that they should be more consistent in their
internal decision making, so that national trade decisions do not create undue
competition for environmental issues in the allocation of national funding
resources.
CCAMLR
Collecting national contributions on time is a problem for the CCAMLR
Secretariat, but the Commission ruling that if Parties' contributions are 2
years late they cannot take part in decision making, appears to have been an
effective deterrent of persistent late payments. As with the other secretariats,
CCAMLR executive heads have made the collection of contributions a
priority, much of the persuasion taking place informally and supplemented
as required by formal correspondence.
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Chronic Inadequacy of Contributions
Problems resulting from a chronic inadequacy of funds are common. All
three case studies had similar difficulties, and all three secretariats
commented that since 1992 their funding difficulties had been aggravated by
the convention fatigue of national governments, and the fact that older
environmental conventions such as Ramsar and CITES were now in
competition for more limited national funds, with the more recent
environmental conventions including the CBD. All the secretariats argued
that this situation called for greater cooperation among environmental
conventions. However, the bottom line is the survival of individual
secretariats and conventions.
Ramsar
Where Ramsar is concerned, chronic funding problems are dealt with by
creatively identifying opportunities to obtain additional financial resources,
particularly from those countries that are the most supportive of Ramsar and
that can afford make additional funds available. Additional funding may be
tied or conditional funding, such as project-specific finance.
According to Bureau members, fund raising takes a lot of time and 'leg work'.
Networks (individual, bureaucratic, scientific/expert, and NGO) are
invaluable in identifying potential sources of funding. However, these ad h o c
strategies cannot solve the underlying problem of the inadequacy of reliable
and regular funding to perform the multitude of Bureau core and substantive
tasks.
Additional or external funding usually comes in the form of project funding.
This is used predominantly for capacity building initiatives in developing
countries; for specific projects such as the compilation of wise use guidelines;
or very occasionally to support a Bureau position for a limited period of time
until more secure funding (core funding) becomes available. The Neotropical
Technical Officer Position in 1994/95 was an example of US funds being used
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temporarily to establish the position. In 1996 the position was transferred to
core funding following approval by CoP6.
Another strategy that has been used to enhance the Bureau's financial
leverage is that of putting proposals to the parties for their endorsement. The
Bureau comes up with an idea for a project, develops a proposal and budget,
and then argues the case for funding with the members. This approach has
been used to secure financial support for the development of wetlands
directories and. As one Ramsar official commented,
None of it is in the treaty, but we decided to go this way. We made proposals to the
parties, we included things in the budget and we argued our case. For special activities
we were able to find external support from countries or WWF or other organizations. You
need to have ideas first, then money--if you [the secretariat] have good basic idea then
the money comes (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
The original text of the Ramsar convention made no provision for funding
its triennial CoPs. This has created significant problems for the members as
the convention is legally required to hold its CoP every three years, even if it
has made no financial provision for such. To date, this problem has been
dealt with by ad hoc measures. Bureau members use personal in-country
networks and contacts to persuade potential host countries to cover the costs
associated with convening a CoP. International prestige, opportunities to
shape the Ramsar agenda and so influence future outcomes, and the
economic multiplier effects of an large influx of international visitors, are the
incentives used by Bureau members to persuade countries to host a CoP. In
1996, Australia paid the majority of expenses incurred in holding Ramsar's
25th anniversary conference, CoP 6, in Brisbane, Australia. Host country
support is supplemented by support in cash or in kind, from other countries,
partner organizations and NGOs such as WWF. So far so good in Ramsar's
case.
Funding for CoPs remains both a financial and a political problem for Ramsar
as developing countries cannot afford to host expensive CoPs. However, in
the interests of equity, harmony and international cooperation, Ramsar has
recognized that CoPs should be held in developing and well as developed
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regions. In 1999, Costa Rica will host CoP7, and the USA has agreed to
underwrite the costs of this event in the interests of international diplomacy.
CITES
The CITES Secretariat's most serious financial problems also relate to a
chronic inadequacy of funds, especially for projects such as capacity building
in developing countries. As with Ramsar, the CITES funding situation has
been aggravated by the convention fatigue of governments, and in-country
(as well as international) competition for national contributions with other
environmental conventions.
In its search for project funding the CITES Secretariat gets around the
potential problem of being seen to be captured by donor interests, by ensuring
that it only accepts project funds from those organizations on the list of
donors approved by the Standing Committee.
After the ivory debacle when some environmental NGOs accused the
Secretary-General of being paid by traders, the Secretariat has been particularly
careful only to accept funds from formally approved sources. However, both
environmental NGOs and traders remain concerned that CITES enforcement
remains limited by the availability of funds and resources. In the case of
environmental NGOs, their enforcement concerns relate to optimizing
species conservation. For traders, their enforcement concerns relate to
optimizing the survival of species for legal trading purposes.
By 1997, the Parties had endorsed the CITES' Secretariat's recognition of the
importance of capacity building initiatives and external project funding for
the successful implementation of the convention, a Capacity Building Unit
was created within the Secretariat, and two new professional officer posts
were advertised at P3 and P4 levels. They are contract positions for two years
each and are renewable. The new appointees have regional coordination
responsibilities for North America and Oceania. The express purpose of these
appointments is to boost the capacity building program of the Secretariat
including training, public awareness, project management, fund raising and
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liaison with international financial institutions on behalf of the Secretariat.
(CITES Sec. Vacancy Announcement No. NA-97-34, 26 November, 1997).
CCAMLR
Chronic funding inadequacies restrict the CCAMLR Secretariat's
organizational capacity to provide even core services such as translating and
interpreting services to its members.
The CCAMLR Secretariat does not undertake fundraising or capacity building
initiatives as do the Ramsar and CITES secretariats, nor does it have ready
access to external project funding (except for the occasional SCAR input for
scientific projects), although CCAMLR members as a group are generally
more prosperous than are many Ramsar or CITES members. Instead, the
CCAMLR Secretariat relies almost entirely on member contributions and the
preparedness of members to increase their contribution levels. In the absence
of a trust fund or similar financial mechanism, the organization depends
heavily on the generosity of individual countries to obtain extra funds for
specific purposes. CCAMLR members, in spite of their relative affluence and
the low cost of their annual CCAMLR contributions have been most
unresponsive to the Secretariat's repeated requests for additional funds to
employ interpreters/translators and administrative staff, and to introduce
new technology such as computers and a VMS to upgrade the effectiveness of
its monitoring activities.2
Of the three conventions, the CCAMLR Secretariat remains the most resource
dependent on its members. I found no evidence to suggest that the Secretariat
had demonstrated initiatives to counter this dependency. For example, I
detected no evidence to support the notion that the Secretariat had made an
effort to build alliances with environmental NGO as a strategy to exert
political pressure on national governments to increase their funding support
2 The CCAMLR formula for calculation of Member Contributions does not follow the UN Scale of
Assessments. Calculation of CCAMLR contributions is based on a relatively complicated percentage
formula per tonnes of finfish and krill harvested, calculated as the average catch over a three year period,
with a maximum percentage of total contributions by any harvesting country being fixed at
25%.(CCAMLR-IX, 3.10, 1990).Since 1990, attempts by the Secretariat to persuade members to review
the formula have been unsuccessful.
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for secretariat monitoring activities such as the installation of a VMS. This
lack of organizational activism might reflect the reluctance of the present
Executive Secretary to demonstrate leadership in this regard. The Secretariat's
reluctance to form relationships with environmental NGOs may also reflect
the executive head's greater degree of comfort with fishing industry
organizations rather than with environmental NGOs. This in turn might
well be a reflection of his professional background in the Spanish fishing
industry.
External or Project Funding
The dilemma for all international agreements and their IOs is that funds are
becoming increasingly hard to find, and that in reality, all offers of funding
are seriously considered and 'gratefully received' in the convention's
interests.
The Ramsar Bureau concedes that tied funding is both a benefit and a
problem. Government decisions to make funds available are ultimately the
prerogative of the donor country and they often tend to favor high-politics,
issue-areas such as trade or security issues rather than Ramsar issues. The
Bureau attempts to overcome allegations of the preferential treatment of
certain nationals in the disbursement of members' project funding, by
arguing the merits of a project and the need to build in-country structures and
mechanisms to ensure technology, skills and information transfer (to sustain
Ramsar objectives on site). To overcome the potential problems associated
with failure to transfer knowledge, skills and technology from developed to
developing countries, the Bureau tries to argue the case with the donor
country for training and skills development to remain in the recipient
country in order to achieve the conventions objectives. The aim here is to
ensure that the expertise imported using external funding, does not depart
with the donor nationals. Bureau personnel also use their in-country
networks with NGOs, academics, experts and bureaucrats to link projects,
parties, and donor nationals with appropriate in-country personnel and to
informally monitor these capacity building activities.
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To overcome stakeholder perceptions of Bureau capture, the Bureau reports
all expressions of financial support to the Finance Committee and prepares
reports on activities that have taken place for each CoP.
Bureau personnel spend an inordinate amount of time fund raising for
capacity building projects. This is regarded by the Bureau as an essential
activity if the convention is to achieve its objectives. However, fund raising is
very time consuming time. It is undertaken by the Bureau's professional
officers, often at the expense of other Bureau tasks including technical advice
and monitoring (Pers.Com. Bureau, 1995).
Networking with international financial institutions such as the GEF
Secretariat, and time spent by boundary-spanning personnel in raising
international awareness of Ramsar within countries and among NGOs, are
the primary strategies used by the Bureau to address the funding problem. As
a senior Bureau member pointed out, countries are members of multiple
conventions, some of which have more ready access to international
financial resources than others. So, if bureaucrats in a country think that one
particular convention is going to bring money into the country, then that is
the convention that gets priority attention. In 1995, the CBD was a high
political priority, so Bureau personnel encouraged Ramsar members to focus
on the biodiversity dimension of wetlands and so be eligible for funding
under the terms of reference of the GEF.
The Ramsar Bureau has actively worked on building links with the GEF and
the World Bank, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, and
regional financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the
African Development Bank. In 1994/95 the executive heads and professional
personnel of the Bureau, GEF officers and CBD Secretariat personnel met to
discuss regional projects and multilateral country projects such as the
management of transboundary wetlands through the formation of
partnerships among countries and NGOs.
This partnership approach is new for Ramsar (Ramsar, Doc. C4-12 (Rev.1)).
Prior to 1995, it seems that most wetlands projects had been funded as
individual country endeavors, and multilateral, cooperative approaches such
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as that described for Lake Victoria had reportedly been discriminated against
in the World Bank's funding assessment process .
According to a senior Bureau officer, in 1995 the GEF had $2.5 billion to spend
and it had more projects than money, but no criteria for rejecting proposals
nor any conservation criteria for determining among "good" and "bad'
projects. GEF decisions to fund specific projects were thus based on the GEF's
response to lobbying by governments, non-state actors, and pressure from
major donor interests (Pers. Com. Bureau, 1995).
In Ramsar's case, the Bureau tries to make sure any project proposals put
forward for funding are "sound in both South and North eyes"(Pers.Com.
Bureau, 1995). The Bureau has learned from experience how to couch
proposals so that Northern countries will understand what a good project
looks like and support it; how best to work with Ramsar people in the
regions; and how to most effectively use Ramsar networks to ensure that
good projects are matched with money and so are successful in terms of
achieving convention implementation objectives (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995). In
assisting Ramsar members in the search for funds, Bureau personnel have
also trained potential applicants and Ramsar colleagues in member countries
in developing projects and writing proposals for funding. The new Strategic
Plan supports greater Bureau initiatives in this area in the future (Ramsar
Doc.6.15 (Rev.1). Under the new Strategic Plan, Bureau Technical Officers are
now responsible for their own program budgets, and the Bureau no longer
operates as a global budget system directed by the Secretary-General.
Another way for Bureau personnel ensure that in-country projects funded
from external sources do not detrimentally affect wetlands, is for the Bureau
to formally advise the World Bank on how to mitigate the adverse effects of a
development project on wetlands and enhance its positive effects. That is,
make the negative effects benign and the benign ones positive (Pers. Com.
Bureau, 1995).
However, not all these strategies have proved sufficient to raise the
increasing amount of funds needed to underwrite projects, especially in
developing countries. As one Bureau officer noted, there has to be a
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minimum of funds to attract parties in the first place and to offer them the
possibility of doing something positive about managing their wetlands (Pers.
Com Bureau, 1995). As a result of the increasing fund-raising demands on
Bureau time and resources, in 1996 the Bureau put forward a proposal to
CoP6 for the creation of a new Bureau position, Development Assistance
Officer. The purpose of this position was to make more effective use of
organizational resources by allocating fundraising to a full-time expert as
mentioned above (Ramsar Doc.6.14 (Rev.1); Ramsar Doc.6.15 (Rev.1).
Unfortunately for the Bureau, the CoP rejected the proposal, as
"unnecessary", perhaps an example of differing perceptions of 'essential'
priorities' between the Bureau and its Contracting Parties. Yet, it seems a
foregone conclusion that some parties will soon start to complain as scarce
Bureau personnel resources become increasingly absorbed in the very time-
consuming task of seeking funds for capacity building, a formally
acknowledged policy priority of the convention.
Ramsar parties appear unable to appreciate that even the Bureau's formally
approved catalytic role of matching projects and funding, as distinct from
fund raising per se, consumes valuable professional personnel time and
resources which might be better spent on providing technical advice to
members and monitoring compliance.
Overcoming Organizational Capacity and Management Constraints
All secretariats have to manage external and internal change. External
changes in a secretariat's environment might include a major expansion in
convention membership; changes in the expectations of members which
reflect changes in membership and policy emphases; and changes in the
nature and availability of organizational resources. Within a secretariat, there
may be changes in leadership, strategic planning and personnel. all of which
impact on workloads, priorities and time management.
The steps taken by the Ramsar Bureau are an example of how one secretariat
has adjusted to rapid and major change in both its external and internal
environments.
332
The Ramsar Bureau has experienced difficulties in managing the rate, nature
and scale of changes in convention membership; the Contracting Parties
expectations of Bureau task performance; and changes in the convention's
policy emphasis from nature conservation to land use planning and
management. It has addressed these changes in several ways.
First, it is continuing to change the composition of the Bureau from an
organizational personnel profile dominated by technical competence, to a
more even spread of generalist and technical skills in order to promote a
greater range and flexibility of limited personnel resources. A second strategy
has been the development of multiskilling, teamwork and 'backstopping' of
positions as intraorganizational strategies to assist personnel to manage the
extra workloads and time pressures associated with external changes. Thirdly,
the introduction of regionalization as the primary operational strategy of the
convention and the focus of the Bureau's service delivery and work
allocation, has meant that the Bureau's professional staff can now target their
activities and networks more directly at 'regional niche markets'.
Regionalization of Bureau service delivery makes more effective use of the
regional, local and cultural expertise, affiliations and networks of the
Technical Officers each of whom comes from a country in the region for
which s/he is responsible. Regional meetings are invaluable for networking.
An individual's networks cannot be replicated precisely when s/he leaves. In
the words of a former Secretary-General networks are not 'backstoppable'.
However, the formalization of regular, regional meetings and missions
means that in-country and regional infrastructures can be used as
springboards for network development by incoming or replacement
boundary-spanning personnel.
Personnel Management
Ramsar
Multi-skilling and team work are the most usual in-house, personnel
management strategies to offset the chronic lack of Ramsar Bureau personnel
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who are available to meet convention expectations and to deal with the
bureaucratic demands of coordinating and managing convention
implementation.
In the field, technical problems associated with site management can be
reduced by working closely with partner organizations, bureaucratic
colleagues, local NGOs and communities as discussed previously. As with
most resource dependent organizations, the Bureau operates most effectively
by forming partnerships, or alliances, with key stakeholders. This is politically
astute, and on an operational level it also helps the .organization to
compensate for staffing deficiencies and still meet its objectives. This
minimizes the risk of criticism from unsympathetic Contracting Parties
which will not accept explanations of lack of staffing as a reason for the
Bureau's failure to deliver policy outputs.
Another difficulty confronting Ramsar officials is that the organization has
too many technical personnel relative to its total personnel establishment,
and too few generalists. This imbalance creates problems for a small Bureau
which needs multiskilling rather than a narrow specialist focus, to optimize
service delivery. It also reflects comments made by Bureau members that the
politics of wetlands management is now overtaking Ramsar's traditional
scientific focus, and there is a need for personnel to be able to deal with these
policy changes.
What is being sought now are generalists, not specialists, people who are good with
people and dealing with problems and issues in a wide range of subjects. They have to be
politically sensitive and culturally sensitive----and to know some of the technical stuff
(Pers. Com. former Secretary-General,1995).
The value of and need for multiskilling, was demonstrated previously and is
evident in the thrust of the Ramsar Strategic Plan. However, the transition
from a specialist unit whose credibility and authority are based firmly on its
technical capacity and expertise has been uncomfortable for the personnel
employed predominantly for their technical expertise. With this change in
organizational emphasis, the fundamental nature of the Bureau's personnel
profile and recruitment policy is changing. It remains to be seen how these
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changes affect the Bureau's task performance, morale, and stakeholder
perceptions of Bureau roles, functions and authority.
CITES
In CITES, the conditions of employment of CITES Secretariat officials are
governed by the United Nations' ICS regulations and by relations between the
Secretariat and the UNEP bureaucracy. Time delays in personnel recruitment
via UNEP's bureaucratic machinery in Nairobi seem unavoidable. To
overcome this, the best approach would probably be to shore up relations
between the CITES Secretariat and UNEP in order to minimize the already
tense situation between these two organizations which might aggravate
delays in personnel appointments to the CITES Secretariat. The Secretariat
remains determined that UNEP should not be able to dictate its personnel
needs and it has persistently taken an assertive stance on this issue, both with
is own CoP and with the UNEP executive.
The CITES Secretary-General advised that the internal management situation
in the Secretariat was far from ideal, partly because the organization had
grown rapidly. To deal with this, he had been trying to put new practices such
as secondments from national bureaucracies, industry, and environmental
NGOs in place, and he personally retained total responsibility for staff
supervision, the overview of the policy of the Secretariat, and work within
the UN system (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
Employment uncertainty remains a primary problem for Secretariat officials
and organizational morale. It is directly affected by the short to medium term
financial resources available to the Secretariat, namely the organization's
ability to collect contributions on time. This has been one of the reasons why
the CITES Secretary-General made contribution collection a personal priority.
In order to introduce greater employment certainty, the current Secretary-
General, Izgrev Topkov, has also tried to ensure that all personnel have
realistic contracts. In 1995 these averaged between 2 and 5 years, rather than
the 6 months or 1 year contracts that many personnel had been on previously.
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The lack of succession planning in the CITES Secretariat (and other
secretariats) could be overcome by building provision for succession planning
into the strategic plans. Mentoring of junior staff by senior managers in the
Secretariat, and multiskilling to ensure that all positions are 'backstoppable'
in the event of an unexpected departure would be other strategies for
overcoming continuity constraints. While some of these activities may occur
informally and sporadically within the CITES Secretariat, internal
management needs to be more strategic and systematic if the Secretariat is to
retain its credibility and reputation as an activist secretariat.
I gained the impression that senior management of the CITES Secretariat is
perhaps more effective in managing outwards, and in anticipating and
responding to external demands and expectations, rather than managing
internally. Inadequacies and oversights in internal management practices
such as succession planning provisions, may well be the result of workload
pressures on personnel who are seriously overloaded by stakeholder
demands. Juggling stakeholder demands and inadequate organizational
resources to meet often unrealistic political deadlines tend to keep personnel
focused on service delivery to parties at the expense of the Secretariat's own
strategic organizational resource needs. Personnel in many private sector
organizations would rebel under similar circumstances. However the
professional personnel of the CITES Secretariat have a 'calling'.
CCAMLR
CCAMLR Secretariat personnel were very cautious about criticizing their
parties' general reluctance to acknowledge the need for additional personnel,
although it was clear that the need for data analysis by the Scientific
Committee and the members had increased significantly since the treaty
entered into force, while Secretariat numbers had decreased. With the
increase in illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean in 1997, it is conceivable that
additional personnel may be needed to monitor compliance. However, I do
not have enough data to be more specific here.
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Data Management and Technology
Dealing with the collection, management and analysis of data and
information, particularly that from national reports and compliance
monitoring activities, was a significant task for all the secretariats I studied.
Ramsar
The need for a Ramsar data base was recognized by both parties and NGOs
soon after the convention entered into force in 1975. Recurring questions
about database operations have focused on: How to facilitate stakeholder
access? How should Ramsar overcome the time consuming nature of
database up-date and maintenance? How much data is enough? What sort of
data should be collected? and, How should the data be analysed and by
whom?
Bureau problems surrounding the day-to-day mechanics and logistics of data
collection and data base management have been overcome by subcontracting
the task to IWRB. The data management relationship and organizational
responsibilities between Ramsar and IWRB have been formalized in an
MOU. This arrangement does not obviate the need for the Bureau to
continually convince stakeholders of its impartiality in its analysis of national
reports and to regularly explain the need for certain sets of data, especially
those relating to the monitoring of changes (and potential changes) in the
ecological character of a site which have been (or might be) caused by
changing land management practices and economic development.
The Bureau accomplishes sensitive tasks such as compliance monitoring by:
developing standardized monitoring guidelines; hiring independent experts
or consultants to participate in Ramsar monitoring teams; convening fact-
finding and problem-solving forums of key stakeholders; and holding formal
and informal discussions on management options with individuals and
organizational representatives in its networks.
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CITES
Analysing the huge volume of CITES trade data is a function of the time
available to the CITES Secretariat. This creates problems for the organization's
workload and time management. However, the CITES Secretariat largely
overcomes problems of data collection by formally contracting out to WCMC,
the primary responsibility for data management and statistical compilations
(WCMC, 1995).
However problems remain for the Secretariat as there are insufficient time
and personnel resources available for it to thoroughly analyse all the
incoming permit data to detect infractions. This was discussed previously.
Instead, the Secretariat has to rely on the random sampling of general trade
data, and selective sampling in circumstances where infringements are
suspected or intelligence has been received This is not an optimum situation,
but the best that is achievable given the limited organizational resources.
CCAMLR
Increasing stakeholder demands for CCAMLR ecosystem management and
fish stock assessment data have placed considerable pressure on the
Secretariat to facilitate both the collection of this data, and stakeholder access
to CCAMLR's databank. The demands of the Scientific Committee for a
greater organizational capacity for analysis are also putting pressure on the
Secretariat. Unfortunately the need for more Secretariat resources to meet this
demand does not appear to be recognized by the parties.
To meet these demands the CCAMLR Secretariat needs more computer
equipment and data management personnel, but it continues to come up
against the Parties' reluctance to outlay funds to enable the Secretariat to meet
even its core tasks - one of which is data management.
Workload and Time Management
All secretariats face unrealistic political and organizational time constraints
and workloads. Almost without exception, secretariat officials see time as
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their most precious resource, and time management as perhaps the most
difficult organizational management task. There is never enough time to
accomplish all the core and substantive organizational tasks. Time
management remains one of the more intractable problems confronting
treaty secretariats.
Ramsar
The Ramsar Strategic Plan prioritizes the Bureau workload to reflect the
ranking of Ramsar goals and objectives in the short, medium and long-term.
It is intended to help Bureau members overcome the dual problems of time
and workload management. Bureau members are now required to develop
individual work plans in the context of the Bureau's Annual Work Plan and
the overarching Strategic Plan.
The Strategic Plan is an ambitious, and eminently rational document. It
prioritizes convention and Bureau policies and tasks, gives clear operational
directions to the Bureau, and no doubt it gives the Parties a sense of control
over their bureaucracy, its budget and its policy directions. While the Strategic
plan may serve as a general management guide, I have no doubt that in the
day-to-day world of the Ramsar Bureau, the more subjective realities of trying
to juggle political demands, technical needs and inadequate organizational
resources, may well prevail over the rationality of this document. If so, the
Bureau will continue to return to successive CoPs with requests for additional
resources to accomplish the ever increasing number of tasks and
responsibilities it is given by Parties who are reluctant to acknowledge (and
pay for), the additional organizational resources required to deliver the
effective policy outcomes detailed in the Strategic Plan.
CITES
Even with a significant increase in the personnel capacity of the CITES
Secretariat since 1975 - from 2 professionals in 1975 to 14 in 1995 - there
appears no way around problems associated with increasing personnel
workloads and the lack of time to accomplish tasks and to respond to the
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increasing demands of parties in an expanding treaty system. CITES
membership increased from 21 countries in 1975 to 138 in 1997.
The appointment of the two new capacity building posts as mentioned
previously, while formalizing capacity building as a strategic priority, will
merely ensure that the Secretariat is expected to perform even more capacity
building work, a case of supply driving demand. This could well be the case
for these two new officers as training (which is very time consuming), has
been identified as a priority task.
For the CITES Secretariat, it is very much a case of an organization chasing,
and never catching, its tail. There is very little likelihood that the CITES
Secretariat will ever obtain the resources it needs to perform to its full
potential as a network manager, owing to the suspicion of most governments
towards the growth of international bureaucracies and their reluctance to pay
what is required to ensure effective implementation.
However, there may be room for optimism about CITES Parties' preparedness
to understand and appreciate the pressures under which the Secretariat
works. At CoP 10 in 1997, the CoP resolved that, any work for the Secretariat
deriving from a new resolution or decision shall only be undertaken if
additional funds are approved or if existing work carried out under the Trust
Fund is re-prioritized at the time such resolution or decision is adopted
(CITES Resolution 10.1).
CCAMLR
Although CCAMLR has only 28 parties, the demands and expectations of the
parties, the Scientific Committee and CCAMLR's assorted working groups,
have increased considerably since it came into force in 1982. These demands
are major constraints on the Secretariat's limited organizational capacity to
meet scientific data, information and documentation needs.
CCAMLR Secretariat requests for additional personnel with scientific and data
management expertise to monitor compliance by analysing the convention's
catch and ecosystem data, have fallen on deaf ears. Although science is the
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raison d'etre of CCAMLR and Secretariat personnel need scientific expertise to
oversee implementation and compliance, CCAMLR parties are
extraordinarily resistant to the Secretariat having the professional personnel
and organizational resources it needs to meet minimum expectations, even
though as one delegate commented, there is a lack of depth in the
Secretariat's professional personnel profile (Pers.Com. Delegate, 1995). It is as
if the Parties resent the Secretariat having a piece of the scientific action,
although they have agreed that the Secretariat has a key role in monitoring
implementation and compliance, and that it needs scientific and data
management expertise to do this.
From the Secretariat's point of view, its organizational credentials depend on
its scientific and data management expertise, including the ability of its
translators to understand and accurately translate, complex scientific concepts
and language. To deal with the unevenness of the intersessional workload of
these personnel, the Secretariat recruits and/or trains interpreters and
translators as multiskilled personnel who can perform other essential
Secretariat tasks, in particular data input. As one Secretariat official put it,
there has to be a great deal of flexibility else the Secretariat could not work. Job
descriptions are mutable, there are no clear-cut distinctions between jobs, as
the organization needs the capacity to take up extra work as it arises
(Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
This 'flexibility' does not, however, solve the problem of workloads and time
management. All personnel commented that the workload was too much for
a small staff having to prepare for and to deal with annual conferences which
in themselves are enormously time consuming. Time spent servicing core
tasks such as annual Commission and Scientific Committee meetings and
intersessional Working Groups (which meet at least once between
Commission meetings), means that little time is available for substantive
tasks such as monitoring compliance.
Travel
Travel costs for secretariat personnel, while being the first line item to be cut
in budget 'pruning' by CoPs, appear to be less of a concern for Ramsar Bureau
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and CITES Secretariat officials than they are for their CCAMLR Secretariat
colleagues. The costs of CCAMLR Secretariat travel to meetings are directly
related to the geographical isolation of Tasmania from the Northern
Hemisphere which is the location of many of the intersessional Working
Group meetings. Travel is essential as Secretariat officials are required to act
as facilitators and rapporteurs at these meetings.
In 1995, the Secretariat's travel budget was reduced by A$12,000 to A$25,200, a
significant amount for a geographically isolated and resource poor
organization (CCAMLR-XIV, Annex 4, 1995; CCAMLR-XV, Appendix 11,
1996). An inadequate travel budget remains a constant operational constraints
for the CCAMLR Secretariat. It can only be resolved by an increase approved
by the parties whose reluctance to approve what they see as any additional
Secretariat expenditure is well known.
Achieving Social and Cultural Diversity
Managing External Diversity and Regionalization.
Regionalization is a two edged sword for most secretariats. On the one hand,
secretariat participation and exposure "on the ground" in the regions
increases the organizational standing of the secretariat as the treaty
representative in the region. Regionalization also facilitates more appropriate
service delivery by increasing the secretariat's first-hand knowledge of
national and sub-national needs. On the other hand the demands of servicing
widely differing and far-flung nation states and cultures from a central locale
(Switzerland for CITES and Ramsar), or a geographically remote location
(Tasmania, Australia, for CCAMLR) are very taxing on the boundary-
spanning personnel who do most of the travelling.
Ramsar
The Ramsar Bureau deals with the potentially negative impacts of
regionalization by building up a critical mass of in-country and regional
Ramsar expertise through networking, missions, training, regional meetings,
and the establishment of national and regional infrastructures including
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national policy committees and transboundary partnerships. As Ramsar only
formally adopted regionalization in 1995, I estimate that the next five years of
regionalization (as the structures and processes are put in place and are 'field
tested') are likely to be the most difficult for the Bureau. Thereafter, even if
the original personnel in each region leave the Bureau, the basic national and
regional frameworks should be sufficiently established to withstand the
inevitable temporary dislocation caused by a change of personnel.
In this period, the positions of regionally-based Ramsar Liaison Officers
which were created in 1996 should be sufficiently established to reinforce a
Ramsar presence in the regions (Ramsar Bureau, 30 September, 1997). They
should also consolidate and expand the work, and the networks of Bureau
personnel; and minimize the potentially adverse effects of personnel
turnover in the Bureau by providing continuity, a visible and accessible
convention presence, and by facilitating easier access to convention resources.
CITES
Regionalization of CITES implementation initiatives, and the allocation of
regional responsibilities to specific Secretariat personnel have been
instrumental in building trust between the CITES Secretariat and its Parties.
Trust is fundamental to managing the ideological and philosophical divides
that continually plague CITES. Within the regions, Secretariat personnel
formally and informally convene and facilitate meetings among countries,
and among officials and stakeholder interests within countries on issues of
concern.
For example, a CITES Secretariat official actively facilitated the imaginative
resolution of a caiman management problem in Venezuela. Here, cattle
ranchers, local communities, environmental NGOs, traders and the
government were at odds regarding how to resolve the problem of the
protection of caiman and caiman habitat, while still meeting the needs of
local residents for food. Ranchers also sought a resolution to their problem of
calves being killed by caiman, while traders were concerned about a
sustainable market for caiman skins.
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Following lengthy discussions with all parties, separately and together, the
Secretariat official suggested a solution that met the needs of all the interest
groups. His solution was accepted by all. The caiman habitat was protected; a
locally-based harvesting enterprise was established which minimized illegal
kills as the skins were carefully tagged; cattle ranchers were reassured that
caiman numbers were being controlled; and by persuading the local Roman
Catholic bishop that caiman were 'fish' the locals were allowed to eat
harvested caiman over Easter, which coincided with the period when the
caiman were harvested. Prior to the church's pronouncement that caiman
could be considered 'fish', (as distinct from 'meat'), the caiman carcasses had
been discarded in a community which experienced severe poverty and
malnutrition (Pers. Com. Sec , Menghi, 1995).
CITES officials also provide direct interpretive advice to members on how
they might implement the convention. From their institutionally central
position in the treaty network, secretariat professionals are able to provide
members with examples of how other countries with comparable problems
have gone about resolving them.
Training programs are regarded by all stakeholders as particularly valuable
trust building and problem-solving opportunities, and they provide non-
confrontational forums for informally addressing issues of mutual concern
such as the management of illegal trade. Informal regional forums such as
training courses are less threatening for participants and do not involve the
loss of face nor force countries into public positions, unlike formal forums
such as Standing Committee meetings and CoPs. Constructive and
sustainable outcomes are thus more likely. Training venues also provide
good testing grounds for government and NGO representatives to informally
try out new ideas and/or policies on each other before putting these
suggestions to the formal decisionmaking forums of the convention.
CCAMLR
Concerns of non-Anglo CCAMLR Parties about "Anglo" bias in information
dissemination and advice, have been mollified by increasing the cultural
diversity of the Secretariat's personnel profile (Pers. Com.Sec.1995). For
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example, the appointment of a Spanish national to replace the retiring
Australian executive head, and the appointment of Japanese translators and
interpreters even though Japanese is not an official language, appear to have
addressed many of these problems. However, it seems to me that many of
these concerns were more to do with perceptions of bias and cultural
discrimination, rather than with direct evidence of Secretariat bias in favor of
"Anglo" members. Had the latter been the case, it is most unlikely that the
former Australian (Anglo) Executive Secretary would have had his term of
appointment renewed twice.
Managing Internal Diversity: Organizational Diversity and Credibility.
Recruiting secretariat personnel from different cultures, language groups, and
countries in the regions for which they are responsible has certainly added to
the organizational credibility of treaty secretariats. However, the nature and
emphasis of the difficulties experienced by the secretariats varies considerably.
Ramsar
Regionalization has helped overcome a perception of the Ramsar Bureau as
being captured by the developed countries of the convention; the stigma of
lucrative UN salaries for Bureau personnel; and the location of the Secretariat
in Switzerland. Getting 'out and about' in the regions, has not only increased
countries' understanding of Ramsar, but it has increased opportunities for
Bureau personnel to formally and informally build trust among stakeholders.
It is unlikely that this could have been done as successfully by a centralized
operation located in the cultural and geographical heartland of Europe.
CITES
In the case of the CITES Secretariat, tension exists between the pragmatics of
ensuring organizational survival by acceding to political pressure for
geographical representation in the Secretariat's workforce, and the ICS merit
principle (appointment on the basis of merit alone).
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The CITES Secretariat is adamant that it needs the best person for the job and
that merit should prevail if the parties are serious about wanting CITES to
succeed. Advertising internationally, and the UN requirement that formal
position descriptions and selection criteria be used in the selection of
personnel, serve as measures of protection against pressure from individual
countries wanting the Secretariat to appoint their own nationals.
Appointments as the result of national pressure might meet the geographical
distribution and regional representativeness needs of the Parties, but staff
appointed in this way might not have the necessary professional credentials
to meet the organization's requirements. The appointment of professionally
substandard personnel would have a profoundly adverse impact on the
Secretariat's performance and credibility, based as it is on specific professional
expertise. Secretariat management is determined to avoid such repercussions
in the interests of both convention success and organizational survival.
CCAMLR
The CCAMLR Secretariat has similar concerns to those of the CITES
Secretariat.
With small and medium sized secretariats you can select personnel subconsciously with
your kind of philosophy. When organisations get larger, you don't select all staff. Look
at the CITES Secretariat [where UNEP is directly involved in recruitment process]
(Pers.Com.CCAMLR Sec.1995).
These are the comments of the first CCAMLR Executive Secretary who
personally selected all his staff. The size of the Secretariat has not increased
appreciably since those days, and the current Executive Secretary remains
directly responsible for personnel recruitment and selection. Both the past
and the current executive heads conceded that direct responsibility for the
selection of the 'right sort of personnel' was perhaps one of the only
advantages of having such a small staff. The Secretariat has four professional
staff, including the executive head.
The persistence of tensions and conflicts among scientists along Anglo/non-
Anglo lines and has meant that the CCAMLR Secretariat has had to make
sure that it is, and is seen to be, scrupulously even-handed in its relations
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with all scientists, and that it provides special, affirmative action assistance to
help non-Anglo scientists gain access to prestigious English language
scientific journals. This tension is being dealt with in two ways. First, the
publication of joint Secretariat-scientist papers; and second, the introduction
of the CCAMLR science journal to ensure equity of access to publication by all
CCAMLR scientists.
A Secretariat official has now been nominated specifically to assist scientists
in preparing papers for publication in the new CCAMLR journal which he
edits. The introduction of this peer-reviewed, international scientific journal
published by the CCAMLR Secretariat, has provided a further outlet for the
scientific research of non-English speaking scientists in the international
scientific marketplace.
Professional personnel have no compunction in taking the initiative and in
making suggestions to the Scientific Committee (Pers.Com.Sec.,1995).
According to one Secretariat member, the Secretariat has very good
communications with the Chairs of both the CCAMLR Commission and the
Scientific Committee. The Chair of the Commission (in 1995) was described as
a "correct diplomat" who preferred to use formal channels of
communication, rather than informal channels of interaction, with the
Secretariat and the Parties. In contrast, the Chair of the Scientific Committee
was described as "more proactive---CCAMLR is his life," and was less hesitant
in asking the Secretariat for its advice and opinions on difficult questions of
precedent and action (Pers. Coms. Sec., Scientists, 1995).
However, it is difficult for the CCAMLR Secretariat to demonstrate political
initiatives in relation to the advice it gives the Commission on the action
CCAMLR might, or should, take in response to the receipt of inspection data
on illegal fishing. Here, the Secretariat tends to "go by the letter of the law"(as
distinct from its more informal and proactive interactions with the Scientific
Committee) (Pers. Com. Sec. 1995).
Secretariat personnel also use the CCAMLR Journal to get their opinions
heard, and they ensure that they maintain an active involvement in
CCAMLR scientific networks (Pers.Com.Sec1995). As one Secretariat official
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commented, "we use informal networks [including scientific networks] to
advance the work of CCAMLR, as general formal, follow-up on decisions can
be a waste of time" (Pers.Com.Sec.1995).
It is the individual scientific credentials of the Secretariat's professional
personnel; their participation in scientific working groups as rapporteurs and
as facilitators of problem-solving; their critical role in data analysis and
interpretation; their preparation of the first drafts of meeting reports; and the
publication of aspects of their own research, that are critical factors in
retaining the Secretariat's professional credibility and its linkages with the
network of national and international scientists that drive CCAMLR.
Dealing with Organizational Loyalties and Leadership
National Government Influence
From the literature on IOs, including that of Weiss (1976), McLaren (1980), Pitt
and Weiss, (1986) and Mouritzen (1990) I had expected to find evidence of
direct or subtle attempts by national governments to influence their nationals
on secondment to IOs. That is, I expected to find that pressure from home
governments would be a relatively common occupational hazard for
secondees. However, I found little evidence that this was the case with only
two countries being cited directly as offenders in this regard over the lifetime
of all three secretariats. One country was named as being a consistent offender
in two secretariats, Ramsar and CITES.
National government influence seems most likely to pose a problem for less
experienced officers who are uncertain how to deal with advances from more
senior national bureaucrats, and those officers who are concerned with career
advancement back home. Mentoring and direct support (and if necessary
intervention) from senior Secretariat personnel are the most effective ways to
help staff deal with this issue.
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Ramsar
The Ramsar Bureau employee expressed considerable anger at what were
seen as attempts to intimidate and influence the impartiality of an
international civil servant. In this instance, the personal philosophy and
professional ethics of the Bureau employee appeared to be at odds with those
of the national government of the day, and the person concerned seemed to
have sufficient inner strength or sense of self to resist considerable political
and bureaucratic pressure to conform with national cultural expectations.
Each attempt to influence the Bureau official was apparently reported to the
senior management of the Bureau which eventually 'suggested' via informal
verbal and then formal written channels that the government in question
should desist. However, the delicate line here for the Bureau was that the
country in question was, and still is, a major contributor to both core and
project funding.
I was told that this did not in any way restrict the actions taken by the Bureau
to dissuade the government from interfering in the activities of its national.
Cynically, I wondered if it just forced the country concerned to be more subtle
in its activities.
CITES
Direct pressure from one country on its national(s) in the CITES Secretariat is
an ongoing problem. This same country poses a problem for the Ramsar
Bureau. In the CITES Secretariat, the situation has been monitored by senior
managers of the Secretariat, including the supervisor of the officer who is
being subjected to overt pressure from the officers' home country.
For the CITES Secretariat to directly challenge the country for attempting to
interfere with, and influence, its national in the Secretariat, would not be
wise. The country is likely to hotly deny the allegation; its national is likely to
suffer professionally on return home; and the Secretary-General could well be
at risk of censure or dismissal as a face saving exercise for the country against
which the allegations are made. Instead, senior CITES Secretariat officials
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have informally used missions, informal forums and 'hallway discussions' to
quietly ask the country to desist from its activities. However, in 1995 the
Secretariat had little success. I suspect that there were several reasons for this.
First, the national concerned was young, had limited experience in dealing
with such a situation, and second the officer had long-term, in-country,
bureaucratic career ambitions. This official also appeared to have less of a
'calling' than his/her Ramsar counterpart.
CCAMLR
During the Cold War, it seems that the former USSR attempted to put
pressure on its national in the CCAMLR Secretariat to release data on the
location and extent of fisheries stock, having first pressured the parties to
support the secondment of a Soviet national to the Secretariat in the interests
of geographical representativeness (Pers. Coms Sec.1995). The official
concerned is still with the Secretariat and he commented that since the
dismantling of the Soviet Union, this pressure has ceased (Pers. Com.
Sec.1995). I found no other information to suggest or support alternative
scenarios.
Leadership Constraints
Any person who takes on the position of executive head of an organization
such as a secretariat where the ultimate authority and decision making power
is vested in a larger decision making body can only be described as a risk taker.
As such, an executive head should be prepared to exert influence as a figure of
some international authority in her/his own right. The converse is that, as
the public face of an international agreement, an executive head also has to
accept the attendant risks of scapegoating and public humiliation that
unfortunately occur when a CoP disagrees with the policy recommendations
made, or the initiatives taken, by its secretariat.
Executive heads can choose to deal with these constraints in several ways.
They can play safe, remain the passive servants of the parties and restrict their
activities to core tasks and tasks clearly defined by the CoP. Second, they may
become the pawns, captives or, as Mouritzen (1990) puts it, 'the instrument of
350
a powerful treaty member or group of members'. Third, an executive may
take an independent stance based on ICS norms of internationalism and
impartiality. A fourth option might be to alternate among these tactics
depending on the issue or set of circumstances. The latter strategy could be a
hazardous undertaking as in choosing this approach, a leader risks being
perceived as inconsistent, unreliable and even untrustworthy. These
perceptions then jeopardize his/her individual professional credibility and
longevity in the position. Such a leader may also lose his/her reputation for
impartiality and may well lose the support of secretariat staff who fear being
tarnished with the same brush.
Ramsar
In the case of the Ramsar Bureau, the position of executive head appears to
have been redesigned in the wake of the departure of the first Secretary-
General, Dan Navid, after the Kyoto conference. Prior to that, the executive
head appears to have had a relatively free reign, assisted by the rather
unstructured beginnings of the convention and the lack of financial and
management infrastructure of the convention. This meant that the first
Secretary-General and senior Bureau personnel were able to take advantage of
the hiatus. They had considerable leeway in shaping the policy directions,
information, communication and financial structures and management of
Ramsar. Decisive leadership and initiative were called for, and certainly
Ramsar made little international headway until the permanent secretariat
was established and an executive head installed.
For those leaders who choose an activist path, the risks might be great but so
are the professional and personal rewards, for those who see the convention
as a 'calling'. As an incoming Ramsar Secretary-General said it is easier to
seek forgiveness than to ask permission - although presumably you need to
choose your battles carefully as the first Secretary-General found out. It seems
that if an executive head is are prepared to take the blame for errors which are
not of his/her doing, the executive head can ultimately be very successful.
Whatever the 'real' reason for the departure of the first Ramsar Secretary-
General, it has certainly afforded the CoP an opportunity to rein in the
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independence and potential influence of the office using the tasks and
responsibilities of the Bureau as outlined in the Strategic Plan to define the
limitations and accountability of the office. On the other hand an astute
executive head could gain a measure of protection from the Strategic Plan by
creatively interpreting its intent to justify his initiatives. The Strategic Plan
could also act as a safety net against members' criticism of Bureau action,
even if strictly speaking, the actions are not encapsulated in the Plan. The
Strategic Plan also gives the Bureau a yardstick against which stakeholders
can measure its performance, and conversely against which the Bureau can
argue its case for additional resources at the next CoP. The success of the
Bureau's argument for additional resources will depend in large measure on
the persuasive powers, networks and ultimately the influence of its new
executive head.
The problems surrounding Ramsar's inability to limit the term of
appointment and to dismiss, if necessary, its executive head have now been
overcome by the adoption of a standard fixed term of appointment with only
one renewal of the term of appointment. This is a standard device used by
governments to control the executive heads in most conventions. The terms
of office of the executive heads of the CITES and CCAMLR Secretariats are
similarly structured.
CITES
Dismissal of the former CITES Secretary-General, Eugene La Pointe, has had a
long-term, negative impact on Secretariat morale and on the Secretariat's
relations with environmental NGOs.
The 1989 leadership crisis undoubtedly rebounded on organizational
credibility and morale. It was certainly a low point in the Secretariat's
normally sound relations with environmental NGOs, and it appears to have
adversely affected general stakeholder perceptions of the Secretariat's
impartiality by raising questions about the capture of Secretariat personnel, in
particular the capture of the Secretary-General, by specific stakeholder
interests. Whether or not the allegations were unfounded is immaterial as
once the Secretariat's relationship of trust with the stakeholders is disrupted
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or destroyed on one issue, it tends to have a negative, ripple effect on
stakeholder perceptions of the organization's performance on other issues.
It appears that the rebuilding of stakeholder confidence in the organizational
integrity and capacity of the Secretariat has been achieved by the dismissal of
the executive head as symbolic gesture to appease his powerful critics, and by
the considerable 'reconstruction' efforts of the Deputy Secretary-General and
the Scientific Officer.3
The current Secretary-General, Izgrev Topkov, was brought in from outside
the CITES system per se, in fact from the UNEP Governing Council, to
provide new leadership 'untainted' by previous association with the
Secretariat. He has essentially managed the organization's 'confidence-
reconstruction' phase including an internal management re-organization.
CCAMLR
The primary leadership constraints this secretariat has experienced have been
the 'nationalities' of the executive heads, their philosophical approaches to
the conservation/use debate, and their very different management styles.
National identity as an 'issue' seems to have been more a reflection of the
division among the Parties along Anglo/non-Anglo lines which mirrored
similar delineations in the AT, than it was a leadership problem per se. More
immediate constraints have been the very different styles of management of
the two heads, and the extent to which each has been seen to favour either a
conservation or a fisheries perspective.
Neither of these constraints appears to have been of great concern to the
Parties, unlike the experiences in both Ramsar and CITES. However, some
'Anglo' delegates and scientists commented that the current, 'non-Anglo'
3These officials had been with CITES Secretariat since its beginnings. Their integrity,
professionalism and expertise remain highly respected, and they seemed to have retained the
confidence of the Secretary-General's detractors, namely the USA and several environmental
NGOs. It seems that hours of missions, meetings and personal conversations (many of which
were informal) by these individuals and other Secretariat boundary spanning professional
officers and personnel, were invested in the efforts to restore the confidence of the parties,
traders and environmental NGOs.
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incumbent is very autocratic, and his suspicion of 'outsiders' especially
"conservation types" adversely reflects on CCAMLR as a transparent and
accessible treaty system (Pers. Com. Delegates and Scientist, 1995). Within the
Secretariat, several personnel also commented on an apparent fisheries
management bias by the leadership coupled with an authoritarian style of
management and a difficulty in delegating.
It was, unfortunately, difficult to determine the extent to which differences in
the two styles of leadership reflected cultural differences, or the sharply
contrasting personalities of the leaders which made the differences in
leadership styles all the more obvious. The former Australian incumbent was
described (by Anglo-interests and Secretariat personnel) as very easy-going
and approachable, while the present incumbent was described as aloof and
autocratic ( by the same group of interviewees).
Nevertheless, in 1995, several personnel expressed frustration with the lack of
delegation of functions and authority, especially when it came to dealing
directly with stakeholders. In 1996 a review of the leadership and
management of the Secretariat was agreed by the Parties (CCAMLR-XV, 3.22,
Annex 4). To the disappointment of several(Anglo) Parties (Pers. Com.
Delegates, 1995), the Executive Secretary's term of appointment was extended
for a further three years. Further information on the outcomes of this review
was not available at the time of writing. Given CCAMLR's reluctance to
discuss its internal workings, it remains uncertain whether the results of this
review will become public.
It appears that overt national government influence is potentially less of a
problem than is organizational leadership. Intellectual leadership provides
policy ideas and implementation guidance; entrepreneurial leadership is
essential to ensure member contributions and organizational resources are
obtained; and structural leadership is vital for turning organizational
resources (including professional expertise and skills) into bargaining
leverage. However, it is unusual for all these leadership qualities to be vested
in any one individual (or executive head). Like any organization, secretariats
and their leadership requirements change over time. A secretariat needs the
organizational capacity and institutional flexibility to change its leadership as
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it matures as an organization, or as its mission and objectives are reviewed
and/re-formed. This is one reason that a limited term appointment for
executive heads is the norm.
Managing Implementation Conflicts
My findings support my original belief that although implementation
conflicts can be significant obstacles for secretariats, they also provide
opportunities for organizational initiative in developing creative solutions
for contemporary network management problems, as distinct from the
traditional, reactive and legalistic solutions proposed in treaty texts.
As Pitt and Weiss (1986), Beigbeder (1988), Mouritzen (1990), and Jonsson
(1993) have all noted, secretariats are an important analytical focus in
international affairs and they exert an influence of their own even when the
odds are most unfavorable. They also all agree that the ICS needs to be
reformed to deal more effectively with the needs of developing countries as
an important constituency in UN politics. Furthermore, to survive and grow
the ICS needs to adjust to new realities and change threats into opportunities
as developments in international politics are providing IOs with increased
freedom to manoeuvre. It is now generally accepted, that the influence of IOs
has the potential to increase. The extent to which it does so will depend in
large measure on how these organizations manage the conflicts and disputes
that arise.
This section examines how the secretariats of Ramsar, CITES and CCAMLR
have tried to deal with the emergence of implementation conflicts among the
parties, within countries, and between state and non-state actors. It will also
examine how they have sought to deal with the intraorganizational impacts
of these conflicts on the organizational capacity of each secretariat.
I believe that it is in the management of implementation conflicts, and to a
lesser extent the resolution of acute, episodic disputes, that secretariats as
network managers, have the potential to play a significant role as facilitators
and to exert considerable influence on the achievement of positive and
sustainable and outcomes. In my opinion, this is the category of
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organisational constraints that offers the most opportunity for further
research and for the development of an interdisciplinary approach to conflict
management within complex, multilateral networks.
Conflicts among the Parties
Conflicts are an implementation norm. However, each treaty secretariat
manages them differently, some being more successful than others.
Ramsar
Conflicts and disputes among Ramsar Parties over transboundary wetland
issues have apparently been rare. Where they have arisen in the context of
more wide-ranging political issues as with the Iran/ Iraq war, they have been
resolved by invoking the objectivity of science and encouraging parties to
focus on the technical and scientific management aspects of the issue, rather
than getting drawn into more conspicuous political issues such as human
rights and sovereignty disputes. The Bureau's role in overt disputes such as
this has been very much behind the scenes. In the Iran/ Iraq case, it was
involved in persuading the scientists representing the relevant countries to
concentrate on the science of wetland restoration and on developing an
effective management regime to ameliorate the effects of chemical warfare. It
was considered that scientific problem-solving (unlike sovereignty disputes),
was something which Ramsar could address and with which the Bureau
could assist by providing expert technical advice and an impartial forum for
negotiation.
In the case of monitoring wetland changes that had occurred as a result of the
war in Yugoslavia and Croatia, the Bureau took the view that to proceed with
monitoring in Yugoslavia at the request of its enemy Croatia, would be
politically provocative and physically dangerous for the monitoring team. To
conduct such a exercise in the face of opposition from the host country would
be counterproductive for Ramsar. The Bureau thus recommended to the
Standing Committee that Ramsar not respond to Croatia's request to monitor
the site while hostilities were in progress. The Standing Committee agreed
(Pers.Com. Bureau, 1995).
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In cases of potential conflict such as the Lake Victoria transboundary wetlands
management initiative involving Ramsar members and a non-member
country, the Bureau's African Technical Officer through a committee of
representatives from each country and key stakeholder groups, helped all 3
countries, to apply to the GEF for funds to carry out their work in eradicating
water hyacinth. The officer assisted them to formulate a project that could be
funded by the GEF, and to write letters requesting funding. In his words, "I see
a much, much, much greater role for Bureau here [in conflict prevention
activity] than it has played in past" (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995). As the person
responsible for Africa, the officer considers that he has a duty to impress on
convention the need to support this kind of Bureau activity in his region.
Another comment on the value of the intermediary role of the Bureau was
made by a former Secretary-General, Dan Navid. He commented that the
Ramsar Bureau performs a critically important role in facilitating work on
cross-border buffers because even if countries are on good terms with each
other they often prefer an intermediary. This was the case when the Bureau
was asked to facilitate negotiations between Belgium and the Netherlands
over the use of Flemish text. There are two main reasons for this. First,
countries are conscious of hierarchy among governments in international
relations; second, governments are reluctant to ask for help as they fear loss of
face. On the other hand, when countries work in an intergovernmental
forum (such as a meeting convened by the Bureau), it is more anonymous
and more evenly based [a level playing field] than if it is a direct bilateral
negotiation (Pers.Com. Bureau, 1995). Navid went on to say that international
cooperation work such as this is very exciting and positive for the Bureau and
for Ramsar as most countries share boundaries with another country, and
often the boundaries are watercourses or the wetlands affected by them.
The Ramsar Bureau has been very active in facilitating and promoting
cooperation among countries in managing wetland dependent species. The
creation of international flyways for migratory birds such as the African-
Eurasian Flyway, and the East Asian-Australian Flyway, are two other
examples of Bureau intermediary activity in transboundary issues. In fact,
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Dan Navid asserts that an unsuccessful treaty can be directly traced back to
lack of an active secretariat.4
The disbursement of Ramsar Wetlands Conservation Funds (now known as
the Ramsar Small Grants Fund), and the selection of the Secretary-General in
1995 have been other sources of inter-party conflict. In the case of the former,
developing countries were particularly concerned that access to the WCF
would be opened up to European states with economies in transition and that
developing countries in other regions would miss out. Here, the Bureau acted
as an intermediary and worked with the Middle East, Hungary and a
representative of the third world, on the wording of resolutions for access to
the WCF. According to a senior Bureau official, the Bureau identified and
then made suggestions to the parties about common ground. However, the
same senior official also felt that the Bureau should proceed with caution in
taking on such a role because,
It's a very short step [from suggesting common ground] to defending a proposal, and you
want to provide objective information and let the countries make the proposal rather
than have the countries all fire at you. Let them fire at each other, that is, if you [the
parties] don't like the proposal, don't shoot the messenger (Pers.Com.Bureau,1995).
This catalytic role has been identified in the Strategic Plan as a network
management role that the Bureau will pursue more frequently in the future
than it has in the past.
In the 1995 selection process for a new Secretary-General, the Bureau had
carriage of the process of organizing a balanced selection committee. The
committee had to represent developing and developed country interests and
its composition had to be accepted by all parties. The Secretary-General was
inappropriately scapegoated for problems in the process but he formally
accepted the blame as discussed in Chapter 5.
4The 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the beginnings of
the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)(also known as the
Bonn Convention) as examples of conventions with no permanent secretariat which he regarded as being
unsuccessful in the sense that the absence of a secretariat has inhibited the implementation and development
of these conventions (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995).
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The Secretary-General's action in accepting responsibility for the actions of
Ramsar members, was in itself an exercise in conflict management.
Intermediaries rarely get thanked for their assistance in managing conflicts or
resolving disputes, although they frequently get criticized and even
scapegoated for the actions, or inactions, of disputants.
As a former Secretary-General said,
If the Bureau is seen to have done something to ease a conflict, it probably hasn't done it
well or done it right. So, if you don't notice the Bureau in the process of [performing]
conflict resolution, that's the way it ought to function. It is a natural way of functioning
as a Bureau. It's all in the attitude and it's all in the service-oriented view of the Bureau
that you are always looking to make your parties happy. --it's a fine line between being
pushy and encouraging and exhorting, and cagily sneaking around front and pulling a
little bit while at the same time making them think it's their own idea. The work
[conflict management] is done in the hallways and you work it through and try and find
compromises (Pers. Com. Bureau,1995).
As another Bureau member noted in commenting on the significance of
individual Bureau operatives in minimizing the negative impacts of conflicts
on Ramsar implementation, "conflict management depends on
personalities"(Pers. Com.Bureau, 1995).
The Ramsar Bureau certainly plays an active, if not always an obvious, role in
facilitating the management of conflicts that occur during implementation.
To achieve a positive outcome whether it be in preventing conflicts from
arising as with Lake Victoria; helping parties to prevent dispute escalation as
occurred in the Iraq/Iran war; or helping stakeholders identify common
ground as a basis for moving forward in transboundary negotiations, Bureau
members capitalize on their professional and technical expertise, their formal
(and particularly their informal) international and in-country networks, and
their knowledge of and experience in international affairs.
As was frequently pointed out by the secretariat personnel I interviewed,
conflict management is not a new phenomenon for secretariats. It is a 'way of
life' and this has always been the case, even if it has not been officially
acknowledged by the parties.
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CITES
Well-publicized conflicts and disputes occur among CITES Parties over issues
such as the trade in ivory, tigers and rhinos. The most serious conflicts have
been between exporting countries and consumers. According to Secretariat
officials, the majority of international disagreements within CITES are caused
by inconsistencies in implementation standards and enforcement measures
among countries.
To minimize the possibility of conflicts among parties, the Secretariat strongly
advocates the international standardization of criteria for listing species, and
the adoption of CITES domestic legislation to implement and enforce the
convention. Domestic capacity building initiatives, are regularly used by the
Secretariat in pursuit of these objectives. Secretariat missions, formal and
informal networks, including those involving in-country NGOs and
scientific experts are also used to promote the advantages of standardardized
of criteria and domestic implementation legislation to individual national
governments.
The CITES Secretariat takes a distinctly activist role in heading off, managing
and resolving conflicts that emerge or threaten to emerge. It is frequently
consulted by all stakeholder interests on the most appropriate course(s) of
action to take to address a disagreement. It consistently helps parties to
identify and focus on the common ground among them rather than on their
differences. It suggests innovative solutions to transboundary and in-country
problems; and it takes advantage of the protection afforded by its formal
recommendatory power to make direct and formal suggestions about what
countries could do to overcome the problems they encounter as it did in
relation to the trade ban on Italy.
However, not all CITES stakeholders agree that the Secretariat is proactive in
its approach to conflict management. One environmental NGO
representative commented that the Secretariat is not proactive about
resolving disputes such as elephants, and that its approach to its mandate is
too legalistic (Pers.Com.NGO.,1995). This comment seems to contradict
comments made by Secretariat personnel, traders and government
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representatives about the approaches used by the Secretariat to deal with
implementation conflicts. It also seems either a somewhat naive or a
deliberately provocative remark for an experienced NGO representative to
make about an 10 whose formal mandate for dealing with high profile,
formal, political disputes (such as those concerning ivory), is known to be
very limited; whose organizational reputation as an activist 10 is well
documented; and whose style of operating is of necessity, relatively low key.
A final interesting observation about the CITES Secretariat's future role in
conflict management among the parties was made by a professional officer in
the Secretariat. In his opinion, bilateral agreements [rather than multilateral]
between countries are likely to dominate in the future management of CITES.
He sees bilateral arrangements between exporting and importing states as the
measure most likely to head off conflict emergence by increasing direct
contact between countries instead of dealing through an intermediary such as
the Secretariat or a multilateral forum where the Secretariat has leverage via
its responsibilities for oversight of infractions and the preparation of reports
(Pers.Com. Sec.,1995). This officer considered that countries needed to do
more work on a bilateral basis so people can build up more contacts and trust
among themselves by working directly with each other on issues such as
timber (South Africa and Italy), and orchids (Thailand and Cuba). In the case
of Thailand and Cuba, the Secretariat used project money to get a Thai
representative to an international meeting where he could make the
necessary bilateral (Cuban) and multilateral contacts. Secretariat initiatives
such as this facilitate the international networking that is an essential
precursor to all international agreements.
Indications from my research are that the ability of the CITES Secretariat to
adopt a proactive approach to the management of implementation conflicts
among CITES parties has been assisted by its activist role in capacity building
as a conflict prevention and containment strategy. The recommendatory
power of the Secretariat also bestows on the organization a formal standing
that outranks that of the Ramsar Bureau and CCAMLR Secretariat in
comparable circumstances. Informal, stakeholder perceptions of the
organization's authority, and formal acknowledgement of the professional
expertise, knowledge, and the experience of CITES Secretariat personnel in
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assisting stakeholders (especially the parties) to manage and resolve
implementation tensions are particularly positive.
CCAMLR
Very few of the stakeholders interviewed in CCAMLR were prepared to
acknowledge the existence of conflicts among the Parties, even though there
were clearly underlying tensions along cultural and conservation/fisheries
lines. There were also recurring international incidents of non-compliance
and censure which are documented in Secretariat infraction reports, and
reports of Commission meetings where Parties vigorously expressed concern
about the monitoring of illegal fishing; the incidental mortality of seabirds;
and the inadequacy of national enforcement (CCAMLR-XIV,5.24,1995).
The stock response from CCAMLR delegates, scientists and the executive
head of the Secretariat to my questions about conflicts, was that the AT deals
with all Antarctic sovereignty (political) issues, including those that emerge
in CCAMLR. The standard phrase was that wherever possible, political issues
are 'kicked up stairs to the ATCPs to resolve'. There was however, some very
limited acknowledgement of tensions among Parties such as those relating to
the reflagging of vessels fishing illegally to conceal their identity as ships of
CCAMLR member states. Another example, was when Poland had gear
installation problems and asked for extension of 12 months to comply with
CCAMLR requirements. Some Parties, including Australia, opposed the
extension and the Commission rejected Poland's request. In a third instance,
the Secretariat was asked by the Commission to conduct talks with Korea on
its capacity (and willingness) to meet CCAMLR ecosystem requirements on
seabird by-catch, by instructing its nationals to use CCAMLR-recommended
tory poles and streamers to deter birds (Pers. Com.Sec., 1995).
From my interviews, it seemed to be very much a case of conflict denial and
avoidance, rather than accepting the inevitable existence of tension and
conflict and managing it constructively and strategically.
Secretariat members were generally a little more forthcoming than their
executive head about their experiences in assisting stakeholders to manage
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implementation difficulties. It was evident from the roles that some
professional personnel have performed in Working Group meetings that the
former Data Manager's abilities as a broker and facilitator of consensus
building initiatives in these Working Groups, were greatly respected and
appreciated by all stakeholders. They commented that he had helped them to
find common ground and that he had suggested innovative solutions for
resolving impasses (Pers.Com. Delegates, Scientists, Sec., 1995).
One former Secretariat official noted that there had been little political
pressure on CCAMLR to 1995, because the initial projections of a big fishing
industry in CCAMLR waters had not developed, partly because of the
disbanding of the USSR. This had given CCAMLR a 3-4 year breathing space
and enabled the Secretariat to do "imaginative things" (such as developing a
system of ecosystem monitoring ), which were then taken up by member
countries. He described the Secretariat of the late 1980s as "a powerhouse of
ideas whose advice was sought on all issues and was highly valued" (Pers.
Com.Powell, 1995).
Several CCAMLR delegates commented that the Secretariat plays a very
influential role in implementation, and has unrealized potential to be even
more influential. They commented on Secretariat influence in agenda and
document preparation; the role of personnel as rapporteurs in Working
Groups and their responsibility for the preparation of the first draft of
minutes and reports, a role that was viewed as potentially very influential.
The delegates also commented on the significance of the Secretariat's role as
'chief adviser' to the Chair of the Commission in the context of CCAMLR's
tradition of rotating chairs. It was considered (by these delegates) that the
Secretariat's potential as a source of influence in this role is enhanced by the
fact that many Commission Chairs are diplomats with no experience in
fisheries management (Pers.Com.Delegates, 1995).
This tradition of the Secretariat as the primary, impartial adviser to the Chair,
increases the dependence of the Chair on Secretariat briefings and advice. It
thus enhances opportunities for the Secretariat to influence decision making.
As one delegate put it, "The Executive Secretary runs the meetings --and the
Chair is the captive of the Executive Secretary"(Pers. Com. Delegate, 1995).
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Nevertheless, the Secretariat's influence also came in for criticism, with a
delegate commenting that the Secretariat often fails to reflect what happens in
its reporting - unlike the IWC which has verbatim records (Pers. Com.
Delegate, 1995).
In another criticism of Secretariat 'inaction' in managing implementation
conflicts, a scientist claimed that the Secretariat needs to be more
internationally visible in promoting CCAMLR's objectives. In fact the
Commission has instructed the Secretariat to,
Get out there and strengthen [its] links with IOs (such as FAO and fisheries IOs) m
contentious implementation issues, although this is a problem in the Southern
Hemisphere where there are few well-structured IOs ............ the Secretariat needs to get
practical relations going between organizations, and increase public awareness especially
in relation to CCAMLR's conservation measures, such as reducing albatross as longline by-
catch by vessels in CCAMLR waters---the Secretariat is the vehicle for that [public
awareness]--and its creativity [in these situations] is rewarded by increasing the
Secretariat's profile (Pers.Com.Delgate and Scientist, 1995).
The profile of the CCAMLR Secretariat might have increased within the
treaty system, but it remains primarily a reactive organization limited by its
organizational capacity to deliver even its core products of servicing
meetings, data management, and the preparation and distribution of reports.
However, it also remains highly unlikely that the CCAMLR Secretariat
would, by choice, adopt an activist stance to conflict management.
As mentioned, the Secretariat, and possibly the entire convention seems to
operate in a permanent state of 'conflict denial'. The easy way out for
scientists (who comprise the majority of CCAMLR delegates), and who are
clearly uncomfortable with, and who probably lack the skills to deal with
conflict situations), is to pass the conflict management and dispute resolution
responsibility to the AT members to resolve any 'political' conflicts that
occur. Virtually all implementation problems can be said have at least some
element of 'politics'. It is, therefore, unrealistic for CCAMLR members to
think that they can continue to avoid taking responsibility for dealing with
conflicts such as illegal fishing, that clearly fall within their own sphere of
responsibility.
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As far as the CCAMLR Secretariat's conflict management role is concerned,
the conservative managerial attitude of the present Executive Secretary
appears to be an additional restraining factor in the exercise of Secretariat
initiative. The Executive Secretary appears reluctant to recognize the value of
conflict management initiatives of his professional officers including the
facilitation of science-intensive negotiations or science-based implementation
problems.
In-Country Conflicts
In-country conflicts among state and non-state actors can have a negative
impact on both the success of secretariat task performance and on the
achievement of national policy objectives. It is thus in a secretariat's self-
interest (as well as in the interests of achieving convention objectives), that
secretariat boundary-spanners assist relevant national and subnational actors
to manage and resolve any conflicts that might obstruct the achievement of
these dual objectives.
Ramsar
Conflicts among government departments within countries are perceived to
be more of an implementation problem for the Ramsar Bureau than are
conflicts among countries. Examples of in-country conflicts include:
competition among government agencies for national resources to
implement conventions; threats of site delistings as in Belgium and Finland;
and dealing with the negative impacts of changes of government on wetlands
management policies as in Uruguay, where there was concern that an
incoming government might overturn the advances in wetlands
management made by its predecessor.
In these circumstances the Bureau uses its networks and alliances particularly
those with international and in-country bureaucrats, NGOs, and experts, to
exert pressure on a government not to take actions that might jeopardize
Ramsar site values and implementation activities. However it is not always
successful. The Bureau's monitoring activities have met with limited success
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in some countries where they risk becoming caught up in intensely political
conflicts as was seen in the Bureau's activities in the Yugoslavia/Croatia and
Iran/Iraq disputes.
However, in many cases, the Bureau can use its networks and linkages with
other international institutions to overcome organizational constraints
associated with its monitoring responsibilities. In Jordan, Ramsar faced the
problem of the impacts on a Ramsar site of the extraction of drinking water
from an oasis to supply a large city in the north of the country. Following
expressions of concern from a variety of domestic stakeholders about the
potentially negative impacts of this development on the Ramsar site, Bureau
personnel conducted a site inspection to monitor the impact of water
extraction on the site.
They found that the provision of a continuous and stable supply of drinking
water was a very politically sensitive issue in the country and that it needed
the application of significant financial resources which the Bureau assessed as
being beyond Ramsar's financial capacity. The Bureau then enlisted the
assistance of the GEF Secretariat to help stakeholders develop a cooperative
solution to this wetlands management problem (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995).
The extent, scope and influence of a secretariat's primary or first level
networks with stakeholders have a multiplier effect as members of these
primary networks are in turn networked to other individuals and
organizations within a country and external to that country. Together, these
multiple, formal and informal networks constitute a dense web of linkages,
interactions and processes which can be mobilized in a convention's interests.
Central to the structure, functions and mobilization of this web is the
secretariat as the 'boundary guardian' of convention values, goals and
objectives (Mouritzen,1990)
Environmental NGOs are networked at all levels within a country from
ministers and senior bureaucrats, to experts, academics and local
communities. NGO networks exert direct political and electoral pressure on
governments to take NGO interests into consideration in policy formulation
and implementation. NGOs usually have strong links with national,
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subnational and international media. This whole battalion of networks can
thus be mobilized to counter negative or hostile government and
departmental action that might pose a threat to a convention's
implementation.
In practice, many of the Ramsar Bureau's networks are informal, as formal
networks are by their very nature restricted to defined interests and
stakeholders. As a usual part of 'doing business,' over their years of
interacting with their domestic and international colleagues to implement
the intent of the convention, Bureau members have built up a portfolio of
informal relationships which is not restricted by the official hierarchical and
diplomatic channels of communication and interaction dictated by the formal
documentation and formal networks of the convention. These informal
networks complement and supplement the formal ones thus intensifying
and expanding the Bureau's reachability, accessibility and impact as the key
Ramsar lynch-pin organization.
As far as its in-country bureaucratic networks are concerned, the Ramsar
Bureau works to strengthen the bargaining power and leverage of its agencies
responsible for Ramsar implementation. It provides these agencies with
technical advice, and links them with experts and supportive in-country,
regional and international networks and allies. Bureau members also make
use of the relationships they have built up with local politicians and senior
decision makers in other agencies whom they have met while visiting the
country on missions. The main objectives of many Bureau missions is to
increase in-country knowledge and awareness about the country's Ramsar
responsibilities; to build up a critical mass of domestic Ramsar expertise and
infrastructure; and to facilitate, often informally, the management of tensions
and conflicts that have developed in the course of policy implementation
such as those mentioned above.
Training activities and regional meetings coordinated and facilitated by
Bureau personnel, also contribute to network construction and maintenance,
as they act as impartial and informal forums for the discussion of issues and
the identification of common ground among stakeholders. The networks
formed via these forums, then act as additional sources of Bureau leverage
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and as mechanisms for resource mobilization in support of the management
and resolution of in-country difficulties.
In-country alliances between the Bureau and its domestic civil service
counterparts are mutually advantageous. As a senior Bureau official
commented,
The reason it [alliances] started in the first place was that weak environment or
conservation departments wanted an international body to say, ' this isn't just me in the
government of X saying this. I am doing this because an international authority says so,
and because my country has signed and is legally obliged to comply with that
international agreement. Therefore I have to do it (Pers.Com.Bureau,1997).
Network management as a conflict management strategy is about building
trust, long-term relationships, strategic alliances and reciprocity among
Ramsar stakeholders, notably between the Bureau and stakeholders. Alliances
are mutually reinforcing and supportive. The leverage of weaker in-country
agencies and NGOs is improved through their relationship with a relatively
prestigious international organization and its global linkages, especially with
international financial institutions. Alliances also broaden the power base of
the Bureau and increase its leverage within the treaty system as well as
within a designated country.
As a former executive head of Ramsar said,
In conflict resolution the Bureau cannot tell a sovereign nation what to do, but you can
certainly give to people who don't want that [an event] to happen, solid ammunition for
them to, do their best to mitigate or terminate the problem from within (Pers. Com.
Bureau, 1995).
Other more direct strategies employed by Bureau members to deal with in-
country conflicts include: writing to governments and calling into question
the potential international repercussions or impacts of their actions. The
shaming of Belgium as potentially the first country to delist a Ramsar site is
an example. Fostering trust and cooperation among domestic stakeholders
and competing agencies by convening and facilitating meetings to assist with
fact-finding and problem-solving such as the Bureau performed in Western
Australia, are yet other examples of in-country conflict management activities
by the Bureau.
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That governments invite and/or support these Bureau activities within their
national boundaries appears to be testament to the value that they place on
the Bureau's network management role, and their trust in the professional
expertise and integrity of Bureau personnel.
CITES
Problems related to implementing CITES' domestic measures are the most
frequent sources of conflict both within and among countries in the treaty
system. In-country conflicts are expected to increase as competition over
limited funding increases, and increased conflict between trade and
conservation issues increases.
The CITES Secretariat has a reputation for being proactive in conflict
prevention and management. This includes its approach to dealing with in-
country conflicts. Some of the ways in which the Secretariat, has sought to
manage in-country conflicts has been to assist its members: to develop
domestic legislation for implementing CITES; to develop and implement
export, import and re-export guidelines; and to standardize trade permits. In
other words it has sought to standardize the implementation of CITES world-
wide, while taking into account political, cultural, economic and
environmental differences. This approach has had the effect of decreasing
tension and arguments among countries over variations in their domestic
CITES implementation regimes.
In the management and resolution of in-country conflicts, a senior CITES
Secretariat official commented that the most important processes used by the
Secretariat were the informal rather than the formal processes. In particular,
the Secretariat tries to increase the weight [influence] of the agency(s) directly
responsible for CITES implementation and enforcement at national and
regional levels, as it is taken for granted that foreign affairs, finance, and
defence agencies have more leverage than conservation and forestry (CITES
management) agencies in national and international decision making. In
addition, these agencies are often more successful in the budgetary and
resource allocation stakes than the CITES management and enforcement
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agencies. So the Secretariat informally adds weight to the bargaining power of
CITES agencies in national policy prioritization and in resource allocation
decisions, by providing direct expert and tactical advice to its national
counterparts. In addition, it raises awareness of the economic as well as the
environmental conservation value of CITES initiatives among domestic
politicians, ministers and senior government officials. Tactics include
drawing their attention to the availability of financial and technical capacity
building assistance for in-country projects.
The proactive approach to conflict management and dispute resolution
adopted by the CITES Secretariat appears to be paying dividends in relation to
both in-country conflicts and problems arising from implementation
discrepancies and lack of standardization among countries. The combination
of Secretariat initiatives to assist countries to standardize CITES
implementation measures, and the organization's use of informal networks
and tactical advice to CITES scientific and national management agencies,
seems to have kept the escalation of conflicts to a minimum.
However, as with other international environmental conventions it remains
to be seen how the CITES Secretariat is able to fend off and manage the
likelihood of increasing conflicts among its stakeholders as competition for
national and international implementation resources expands.
CCAMLR
Little information could be obtained from stakeholders about in-country
conflicts and the significance of these for Secretariat operations and for the
roles of Secretariat members. There appeared to be a general reluctance to talk
about what were seen to be the negative aspects of CCAMLR. The scientists
were as reluctant as the national delegates and the Secretariat officials to
discuss these matters. However, members of the Secretariat, in discussing
briefly, the potential for in-country conflicts suggested that individuals,
particularly individual scientists, play very significant roles in the successful
implementation of CCAMLR. They are often sources of new ideas, and are
willing to promote and support CCAMLR in their own countries. In this way
they act as 'bridge-builders' (Mouritzen, 1990) between CCAMLR and national
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governments, and among competing agencies, especially fisheries and
conservation agencies in their home countries.
This general defensiveness of CCAMLR stakeholders and Secretariat officials
(not including environmental NGOs), seemed to arise from CCAMLR's
institutional isolation and to be reinforced by the institutional culture.
Personnel who work on Antarctic issues and the suite of Antarctic
conventions appear to have trouble seeing themselves and their institutions
as connected with the rest of the world. Historically there has been a very real
physical separation and comparatively little sustained international interest
in Antarctic developments apart from a romantic fascination with polar
explorations and the odd media coverage of scientific events such as the
discovery of the ozone hole. However, advances in technology and electronic
communications, increasing international interest in Antarctic tourism, the
rise to political prominence of policy issues such as global warming,
international concern about the over-exploitation of declining global
fisheries, and the increasing pressure from developing countries for a slice of
Antarctic resource action (particularly now that many developing country
fisheries are exhausted), are turning around the traditional CCAMLR and AT
isolation.
From my research, it appears that the Antarctic political atmosphere is
becoming increasingly volatile, and conflicts are likely increase, not decrease,
over the next decade or so. With its 'head-in-the-sand' attitude to the
existence of resource management, implementation tensions and conflicts,
CCAMLR and its Secretariat are poorly prepared to prevent the emergence of
conflicts, let alone manage or resolve them. This is a scenario which seems to
contradict comments by a senior Secretariat manager that, "no Secretariat
training assistance [in conflict management] is required" (Pers.Com.Sec1995).
My view is that of all the Secretariats studied, CCAMLR is the convention
whose stakeholders and Secretariat personnel are in the most need of training
in conflict management and dispute resolution. The convention's traditional
denial of the existence of conflict in its ranks, and the rapidity and alacrity
with which CCAMLR members pass their conflict management and dispute
resolution responsibilities 'upstairs' to the AT, are symptomatic of an
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immature organization whose personnel lack the skills, confidence and
authority to take the initiative in preventing and managing the tensions and
problems that are inherent in the implementation of any treaty.
Conflicts and NGOs
Ramsar
According to state and non-state interest groups, conflicts between NGOs and
Parties, and between the Bureau and NGOs are extremely rare in Ramsar. In
part, this is probably due to the relatively low key role of politics in Ramsar
prior to 1995, and its historical focus on the science rather than on the politics
of wetlands management.
As one Bureau member commented, conflicts should not always be viewed as
negative. They can be used to draw attention to an issue. For example, NGOs
can create conflicts to draw attention to transboundary issues such as
disagreements over the management of and responsibility for, wetlands on
the India/Bangladesh border (Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995). In cases such as this,
the Bureau understands the underlying and positive intent of NGOs in
drawing international attention to problems in managing wetlands of
international significance. It also acknowledges the value to Ramsar of
international media exposure. However, as the network manager and 'honest
broker' of the system, the Bureau must be seen to be impartial. In cases such
as this, the Bureau has formally expressed concern that NGO efforts may have
unforeseen negative impacts - including strengthening a country's
resentment of the constraints imposed on the use of its national wetlands by
its membership of Ramsar. Informally, the Bureau may support NGO efforts
to disclose non-compliance.
The Bureau is particularly wary about getting involved in conflicts between
NGOs and domestic governments and is careful to remain impartial in
situations where NGOs are critical of, or enter into, a conflict with their
domestic governments. Where these situations occur, the Bureau listens to
all points of view, gives technical and interpretative advice as required, and
tries to informally steer resolution of the disagreement in the direction of a
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solution that will benefit Ramsar's objectives, rather than the political
objectives of either the government or the NGO(s). The relevant regional
Bureau member and/or the Secretary-General may be called on to visit the
country and convene a problem-solving meeting with stakeholders. Meetings
in these situations usually revolve around the provision of expert advice by
Bureau personnel, who may also, informally, make suggestions about the
resolution of the conflict. Bureau personnel take care not to enter into
situations where they might get caught up in domestic political issues. They
keep focused on Ramsar issues at all times.
So, Bureau members endeavour to steer disaffected stakeholders in the
direction of scientific solutions, the rationale being that science-based
solutions are more likely to be objective, acceptable, achievable and
sustainable than political solutions which, governments argue, are formally
outside the Bureau's formal mandate.
CITES
Ongoing communication, endless talking, and always keeping the
communication channels open even when there is tension and disagreement
between the Secretariat and its industry or environmental NGOs, is the
primary strategy used by the CITES Secretariat to deal with the sporadic
conflicts that emerge with stakeholders, be they governments or non-state
actors. These general conflict management strategies proved valuable when
relations between the CITES Secretariat and environmental NGOs became
strained over the La Pointe incident. Although the Secretariat disagreed with
the way in which the issue was dealt with by NGOs, it continued to interact
with them on a day-to-day basis in its usual professional manner. In this way
the door was kept open for subsequent reconciliation.
When tensions and conflicts develop between environmental NGOs and
Parties, the CITES Secretariat may be called on to provide expert technical
and/or interpretative advice, and to act as an informal facilitator or mediator,
as happened between the African nations and environmental NGOs in the
negotiation of the Lusaka Agreement.
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CCAMLR
In dealing with the Parties' resistance to environmental NGO participation,
the CCAMLR Secretariat seems to be of the view that there is little to be
gained from overtly challenging the negative attitudes to NGOs held by some
parties (such as Japan and Norway). The Secretariat takes the view that is
more effective for CCAMLR outcomes if the organization maintains
predominantly informal relationships with environmental NGOs. These
relationships are based primarily on informal interactions among individuals
in the Secretariat and relevant NGOs.
There do not appear to be comparable problems in Secretariat relations with,
nor Party resistance to, Secretariat interactions with fishing industry
organizations.
Intraorganizational Impacts of Conflicts
Implementation conflicts can have negative intraorganizational impacts. In
particular they consume personnel time and organizational resources that
may have been allocated for other substantive tasks such as monitoring
compliance.
Ramsar
The negative impact of the Ramsar's Bureau's conflict management activities
on its organizational resources has not been recognized in Ramsar's strategic
and operational planning. This is not surprising, given the general reluctance
of the Contracting Parties to recognize the existence of conflict, in spite of the
need for the Bureau to manage conflict as part of its network management
responsibilities. This means that no provision to manage conflicts has been
made either by the CoP or by the Bureau in the Bureau's budgetary or task
allocations, or in its personnel profile.
The Bureau has not asked for additional organizational resources to deal
specifically with conflict management. It appreciates that the CoP would be
reluctant to publicly acknowledge the existence of conflicts, seeing them as an
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indication of failure, rather than as an inevitable component of all policy
implementation processes and as an opportunity to fashion innovative and
sustainable solutions to implementation problems.
As a Technical Officer pointed out, staff time is the most precious
organizational resource, and the most important framework Ramsar has to
achieve its objectives is the monitoring procedure. The paradox is that
monitoring is very time consuming.
The monitoring procedure has proved a very potentially powerful tool in [dealing with]
in-country conflicts. For example, in a country where there are federal or quasi federal
structures, the Bureau acts as mechanism for bringing people together under the
international umbrella.----We listen to all sides and make recommendations. This takes
a lot of staff time and we have all these sites where we could be implementing the
monitoring procedure but are limited [in what we can do] because we do not have enough
time, especially where there are disagreements about how a site should be managed
(Pers.Com.Bureau, 1995),
One way the Bureau tries (with a minimal degree of success) to deal with the
organizational costs of its conflict management activities, is by requesting
additional personnel to undertake specific tasks such as capacity building and
fund raising. These tasks (unlike conflict management), are accepted as
legitimate, formal Bureau tasks that do not intrude on a government's
perception of its ability to control its own destiny. Effective implementation
of these Bureau tasks also has discernible benefits for the recipient country, in
particular the prospects of tangible financial rewards without the risk of loss
of face that is an anathema for politicians.
As explained previously, CoP 6 rejected the Bureau's request for an additional
fundraising position. This means that the Bureau is now required to meet the
goals and objectives of the new Strategic Plan without the basic organizational
resources to do so. The Strategic Plan takes no account of the multitude of
Bureau conflict management activities that already eat into current
organizational resources, including: facilitating the transboundary
management of wetlands; assisting governments to reconcile economic
development and/land-use planning with habitat conservation objectives
and programs.
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My projection is that as water resource management becomes more
prominent on the political and national security agendas of many regions,
and is globally recognized as a potentially explosive environmental security
issue, Bureau personnel will become increasingly involved in assisting with
the management and resolution of transboundary wetlands management
issues by virtue of their technical expertise, boundary-spanning roles, regional
credibility and networks.
At this stage, however, the lack of formal CoP recognition of the Bureau's
conflict management role has advantages for Bureau as it .can continue its
informal conflict management work. 'Quiet diplomacy' and a low
organizational profile are more conducive to organizational survival as they
are less threatening for governments, than are high profile bureaucratic roles
and solutions. No government or convention wants to be perceived as being
under the control of its civil service. However, the organizational
disadvantage of a low-key approach, is that a good proportion of Bureau
activities and initiatives that are essential to Ramsar's successful
implementation, namely conflict management and dispute resolution, are
not formally recognized. As a result, the Bureau does not receive the
resources it needs to perform all its tasks, nor does it receive recognition for
its performance of these activities.
It would be ironic indeed if instead of increasing the convention's
effectiveness, the much vaunted Ramsar Strategic Plan, failed to deliver the
expected outcome of increased cost effectiveness because it failed to recognize
and plan for a crucial and organisationally-costly component of the Bureau's
tasks. If this is happens, responsibility must ultimately rest with CoP for its
apparent refusal to acknowledge the negative impacts on policy outcomes of
the Bureau's resource constraints. It is, however, the Bureau that will be
blamed for any apparent 'failure to deliver', and it will be the Secretary-
General of the day who will have to formally accept responsibility for this.
CITES
"CITES does not have disputes" - 'disputes' being regarded solely as those
conflicts that reach the ICJ - and none have (Pers. Com. Sec., and Delegate,
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1995),. Assisting stakeholders to manage and resolve conflicts, takes its toll on
the CITES Secretariat's organizational capacity, particularly on the time and
skills of its senior personnel.
An organization's resource capacity governs the extent to which its resources
can be expended specifically on conflict management, as distinct from other
core and substantive tasks. As with the Ramsar Bureau, conflict avoidance
and management is clearly a key implementation task for the CITES
Secretariat. Given the resource-intensive nature of conflicts as obstacles to
successful implementation, Secretariat conflict management tasks should be
acknowledged in both convention and Secretariat strategic and work plans.
This is currently not the case.
Even an activist and relatively powerful Secretariat such as the CITES
Secretariat, is apparently not able to ask its CoP directly for additional
organizational resources to deal specifically with implementation conflicts
because of the reluctance of the parties to formally and publicly acknowledge
the existence of unresolved conflict as an implementation phenomenon.
Parties are equally reluctant to acknowledge the role of the Secretariat in
assisting stakeholders to manage and resolve such problems. Like the Ramsar
Bureau, the CITES Secretariat will have to camouflage its conflict
management resources, as the resources required to carry out approved core
and substantive tasks such as capacity building and compliance monitoring.
CCAMLR
I could not find evidence (because of my restricted access), that conflict
management was expensive of CCAMLR Secretariat time and resources. I
believe that this was partly because Secretariat personnel did not understand
that much of what they do could be viewed as conflict prevention and
management.
Examples of unrecognized and unwitting conflict management activities by
CCAMLR Secretariat officials include: facilitating Working Group meetings;
fact-finding as part of scientific data analysis and interpretation; assisting
parties with problem-solving in monitoring compliance; and consensus
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building on the need for international cooperation in CCAMLR enforcement.
It was clear that the majority of Secretariat conflict management activities
took place in the context of CCAMLR's scientific endeavours, rather than in
the more political arenas of inter-Party and in-country disagreements.
Based on the evidence from my research, conflict management constitutes a
major portion of a secretariat's workload. However, the conflict management
and dispute resolution initiatives of these organizations have not previously
been identified as substantive tasks, even though the management of
implementation conflicts is fundamental to the success of treaty
implementation and is resource intensive. The implications of this finding
are discussed at length in Chapter 7.
Summary
Secretariat practice in dealing with organizational constraints demonstrates
that although these organizations lack formal power and control of their
resources, they are still able to turn many of these obstacles into opportunities
for ensuring a treaty's success in meeting its objectives. In the language of
interorganizational theory, secretariats accomplish this by marshalling
resources and by mobilizing the behavior of state and non-state actors. The
cumulative effect of these organizational strategies is that secretariats, as IOs,
can have significant impacts on international environmental policy
outcomes.
My research found no evidence of any major negative impacts of secretariat
initiatives. This may well have been due to the general, and primarily
unspoken, reluctance of governmental stakeholders to avoid expressing
negative comments about secretariats for the reasons given in Chapter 1.
Even non-state actors were overwhelmingly positive about secretariat
activities, their criticisms relating more to what they perceived to be
organizational inaction rather than to the rejection of actions undertaken by a
secretariat. Two notable exceptions to governmental and NGO support for
secretariat activities were the 1989 dismissal of the CITES Secretary-General,
and the 1993 Ramsar CoP when parties and NGOs raised questions about the
management of the Ramsar budget.
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In summary, there are two categories of findings from my research which
indicate how secretariats deal with the challenges posed by the constraints
examined in this chapter. They are 'expected' and 'unexpected' findings.
The expected findings support the general conclusions of Jonsson
(1986;1987;1992;1993), Organ (1971), O'Toole (1990), Hanf and O'Toole (1992)
and Mandell (1990) which demonstrate that secretariats use their lynch-pin
position as both the information hub of the treaty system and as the nexus of
formal and informal networks in the treaty system, together with the
boundary-spanning roles of their professional personnel in carrying out key
secretariat tasks, to offset the organization's limited formal authority and
power and its resource dependency on its members.
My findings seem to indicate that the network management role of
multilateral broker (facilitator and mediator) is the dominant and potentially
the most influential role of an activist secretariat. Secretariats definitely
appear to choose informal, rather than formal, networks and strategies as the
primary means by which to change the behavior of their members in favour
of positive policy outcomes. That is not to say that secretariats prefer to
operate by stealth, or to 'go in the back door' in performing their tasks. It is
more a case of weighing up the quickest and most effective means of
achieving the treaty objectives and ensuring organizational survival.
However, as my findings also indicate, the linkages between the formal and
informal components of an international treaty network (while not in
themselves unexpected), reveal some 'unexpected' information about the
ways in which secretariats choose to use these linkages to exert influence. In
this scenario, the significance of the informal dimension in secretariat activity
is what differentiates my 'unexpected' from my 'expected' findings.
The significance of these 'unexpected' findings is examined in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7: SOURCES OF SECRETARIAT INFLUENCE IN COMPLEX
MULTILATERAL NETWORKS
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to use what I have discovered about the previously
unrecognized ways in which secretariats exert influence, to assist both
scholars and practitioners to more fully understand 10 practice and influence
in the context of the implementation - compliance continuum.
My research findings fall into two categories: 'expected' and 'unexpected'. I
expected to find, and I found, that secretariats as network managers and
boundary spanners, are far more influential than the literature indicates.
I did not expect to find that the ways in which secretariats exert influence on
stakeholder behavior are predominantly via their use of international and
domestic informal networks and the formation of informal, overt and covert
alliances with non-state actors. Nor did I expect to find that many
international environmental treaty secretariats actively use their informal
networks to shape domestic or 'in-country' policy implementation processes
and outcomes. Finally, there is clear evidence that these secretariats rely on
various consensus building and dispute resolution techniques to manage and
resolve conflicts that arise among stakeholders in implementing a
convention.
Based on my research findings, I then develop an interdisciplinary,
explanation-building process for understanding the significance of treaty
secretariat intervention in assisting countries to transform domestic
implementation concepts into tangible compliance strategies. I call this
intervention 'catalysis', and I suggest that 'catalysis' is the previously
undiscovered 'missing link' between "implementation" and "compliance" as
these theories are currently identified in the literature.
'Catalysis', as a constellation of secretariat activities, interorganizational
network management processes and organizational responsibilities, is
discussed fully in Chapter 8. In this chapter I first examine the previously
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unacknowledged but significant sources of secretariat influence as these
sources of influence are major determinants of the success of catalysis.
FOUR 'UNEXPECTED' SOURCES OF SECRETARIAT INFLUENCE
My research has discovered several significant things about the ways in which
secretariats have an impact on international environmental policy outcomes.
This section examines four sources of secretariat influence in global
multilateral networks which appear to be at odds with the conventional
literature on IOs. For the purpose of this thesis, the four sources of influence
that I have identified will be discussed as discrete entities, although I
recognize that there is considerable overlap and interaction among them, and
that networking is the common thread.
While some of my findings are known to practitioners, and others to
scholars, the surprising thing is that they do not emerge in the literature I
reviewed. Contrary to conventional academic thought, it appears that it is not
so much the formal structures, networks and processes of a treaty system that
shape how secretariats operate and how they influence party behavior and
treaty implementation outcomes. Rather it is the informal,
interorganizational networks within and among treaty systems that are more
significant in this regard. The central place of these informal networks and
processes in a secretariat's management strategies, also helps explain why
secretariats have such a significant effect on treaty implementation.
I found that:
Secretariats tend to favor the use of the informal, interorganizational
networks and processes which develop among stakeholders in a treaty
system, rather than the more limited formal ones specified in the treaty text,
to fulfil their convention responsibilities and to exert influence. They also
have a greater knowledge of informal, national and sub-national,
interorganizational processes and networks and they make far more
extensive and more long-term use of these, than is often understood or
appreciated by governments and scholars. That is, the secretariats of
multilateral environmental conventions use their in-country/ domestic
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connections and knowledge to exert influence on domestic implementation
initiatives.
Secretariats form informal, even covert, alliances with key non-state actors to
optimize their task performance and to exert influence, and they use conflict
management processes unwittingly, to ensure the success of treaty
implementation and to exert organizational influence.
It is my belief that these findings HELP paint a more complete picture of how
secretariats gain leverage and exert influence in informal global networks.
Use of Informal Networks
Identifying Informal Networks
Informal, interorganizational networks are located at all levels of a regime -
global, regional, national, and sub national - and within and among all
categories of actors - public and private - within the treaty system. Informal
networks link the treaty system with the world beyond its formal confines,
and can include member and non-member governments, and non-state
actors such as professional and expert organizations, key individuals,
academics and the media.
The identification of a specific formal network in a treaty text (its structures,
actors, interactions, processes and procedures) and its supporting
documentation, defines by default, the existence of the informal networks in
a regime. In this context the roles, functions and interactions of secretariat
boundary-spanners are particularly important as they traverse and challenge
the formal boundaries, link formal and informal structures and networks,
and introduce new 'ways of doing business' to actors in the treaty system.
Formal networks and structures have limitations that their informal
counterparts do not have to the same extent. The formal legal and
institutional arrangements of global environmental accords are relatively
static, or at best slow moving. This is a major reason why contemporary,
convention secretariats appear to have made extensive use of the informal
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components of a treaty system rather than limit themselves to the more rigid
formal networks identified in the text and in subsequent CoP
recommendations and resolutions.
International agreements are notoriously difficult to change. They are
wooden rather than dynamic instruments which are dated by the time they
emerge from diplomatic negotiations as legal agreements, having been many
years in the making. They also reflect the lowest common denominator on
which countries can agree as governments strive to obtain the maximum
number of signatures and ratifications.
To change an international agreement is itself a lengthy and problematic
process as witnessed in Ramsar's efforts to introduce the Paris Protocol and
the Regina Amendments. As such, legal constructs are unable to keep pace
with, nor can they reflect change, complexity and interdependence in a
rapidly changing policy environment. Formal networks thus lack the ability
to respond and adapt to change as the dynamics and environment of the
treaty system change. More flexible instruments and management strategies
are required for a treaty to remain relevant.
To be successful, an international convention and its 10 must have the ability
to adapt to changes in the treaty environment. Informal processes and
procedures provide alternative avenues for the maintenance of international
cooperation without the attendant political challenges and the angst of re-
negotiating protocols and amendments.
Consensus decision making is an illustration of the inadequacy of formal
instruments alone as mechanisms for achieving the desired policy outcomes.
In international environmental agreements where consensus decision
making is the norm, multiple plenary sessions and caucuses over a period of
several years are usually required to reach agreement, especially where the
issue in need of amendment is contentious. This was case with the CITES'
1994-97 renegotiation of the ivory trade. It took two CoPs and innumerable
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, caucuses, and private meetings among
officials and international NGOs before the parties reached agreement in time
for CoP 10 in 1997.
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However, it would be naive to think that negotiation and decision making in
any international forum occur only in public sessions such as plenaries. By
the time governments arrive at a plenary to formally state their decision, they
have already been involved in many formal discussions and in multiple
informal behind-the-scenes, private negotiations and side deals. Rarely is the
outcome of a final CoP decision a surprise to any of the delegates, or to the
secretariat. In many cases, the secretariat, has been actively involved in
assisting the governments to reach an outcome that will meet the majority of
the parties' needs, while not undermining or unravelling the convention as
a whole. The complex and frustrating negotiations to arrive at agreed targets
and timetables for global GHG emissions at the FCCC's CoP 3 in 1997, are
classic examples of a secretariat and a CoP Chair working collaboratively to
broker a deal with which all governments could ultimately agree.
In circumstances such as these and in order not to 'miss the boat' as it were,
secretariats tend to develop and rely more on the negotiations which take
place within informal arrangements (rather than on the formal negotiation
processes), to ensure that the spirit of a convention is retained, and that policy
outcomes are delivered - and delivered on time. Frequently it seems, the
approaches such an organization uses to achieve these results are less
orthodox than the formal processes and procedures required by the text.
As Jonsson (1986) noted in his research on international aviation, the
multiplex indirect and direct links between secretariats and national
governments and agencies, were particularly significant. In addition to
briefing members and participating in formal network meetings, secretariat
members had informal meetings with national officials from relevant
agencies; private meetings with leading officials in key national agencies; and
they received information informally from a range of sources inside
governments. This meant that the secretariat consistently knew of US
(government) moves before they were made and could plan its own actions
accordingly.
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Secretariats and Informal Networks
My research indicates that the informal processes, networks, and interactions
(including alliances and coalitions) of a treaty system determine to a far
greater extent than do their formal equivalents, how secretariats operate and
why they have such an effect on international environmental policy
outcomes.
A secretariat is the only organizational entity in a global treaty regime whose
mission and activities are devoted solely to managing that particular treaty
system. The Ramsar Bureau deals only with Ramsar matters, and nothing
else; the CITES Secretariat is focused solely on the implementation of CITES;
and the CCAMLR Secretariat manages CCAMLR issues only.
As the permanent, lynch-pin organization in the treaty system whose sole
mission is to service that treaty, the secretariat plays a critical role in linking
the formal and informal networks of the regime. It is a secretariat's
understanding and use of this linkage or nexus, that enables it to optimize the
success of treaty implementation. A secretariat is well placed to ensure that
when a resolution or report is drafted, it will be accepted by the decision
making body of the convention. The secretariat does this by carefully
observing the formal channels and procedures for drafting such a document,
while simultaneously conducting parallel, informal discussions with the key
representatives of relevant parties and other stakeholders, including its
bureaucratic counterparts in national governments, and influential NGO
representatives. These informal, second-track discussions ensure that key
stakeholder interests are taken into account in the formal drafting process so
that when the formal resolution or report is presented to the CoP, it is less
likely to be opposed. That is, the secretariat acts as a catalyst in facilitating
informal stakeholder agreement in advance of the formal outcome.
The more informal networks, alliances and coalitions a secretariat can form
with a range of state and non-state stakeholders including members, non-
members, scientific experts, academics, industry organizations and
environmental NGOs, the more extensive are its information networks and
the greater its command of convention information and communication
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channels. Knowledge and information are significant informal sources of
power for a secretariat as they enhance its bargaining capability and thus its
leverage in the system. Network interactions also broaden a secretariat's
potential sphere of influence. By judicious cultivation of a wide range of
relationships, a secretariat minimizes its risk of capture by any one interest
group.
The more wide-ranging a secretariat's networks, the more independent it can
become by diversifying its resource and constituency bases. The more
independent a secretariat can become from reliance solely on its member
governments for its funding and the more varied its networks (including in-
country networks), the less it has to worry about possible adverse reactions
from member countries to its use of organizational initiative. The most
serious repercussion for a secretariat would be the withdrawal of core funding
by key member countries. The cultivation and maintenance of informal
networks are good ways for a secretariat to diversify its funding sources, as
funding via informal networks can act as a partial counterbalance to the loss
of core funding.
In addition, the more independent a secretariat becomes, the more impartial
it is likely to be perceived to be. The organization is then seen to be less
vulnerable to capture by dominant interests in the treaty system, and so is
more likely to be acceptable as a impartial intermediary in the management
and resolution of treaty implementation conflicts.
For activist, resource-dependent secretariats, organizational survival is like
walking a tight-rope. Informal networks are useful safety nets which can be
called upon to bring pressure to bear internationally and domestically to
counter the criticism of members which could threaten organizational
survival. The use of informal networks and relationships thus helps ensure a
secretariat's survival and growth by diversifying and extending its
information, knowledge, resource and constituency base, and its potential
sphere of influence.
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Reasons for Using Informal Networks
Secretariats use informal networks for a variety of purposes and in a number
of ways. In a nutshell, to "get things done", that is to perform their core and
particularly their substantive tasks; for information exchange; to
communicate secretariat opinions; to establish their organizational policy
credentials; and to negotiate sensitive issues.
To Perform Secretariat Tasks
Secretariats make consistent and frequent use of informal networks to carry
out their tasks, especially their substantive tasks. An example of secretariat
use of informal networks for task performance, is when an executive head
delegates regional implementation responsibilities to specific boundary-
spanning personnel in the secretariat. This means that one officer is
designated the person responsible for looking after all the member countries,
treaty interests and issues in a geographically defined region such as East Asia,
the Pacific or the Neotropics.
To carry out her/his tasks in a region, the officer responsible will devote
considerable energy and time to building up relationships with boundary-
spanning counterparts in agencies and non-state actors including industry
and environmental NGOs. While many of these interactions will fall within
the formal rubric, many will not. Sound personal as well as professional
relations are acknowledged by most policy practitioners as perhaps the most
effective means by which many secretariat officials accomplish their tasks.
These relationships are most efficiently and effectively developed via face-to-
face contact when secretariat personnel visit the countries in their region on a
regular basis. In attempts to monitor and control the illegal, traditional
medicine trade in endangered species in the Asian region, the CITES
Secretariat delegate responsible for the region has used informal networks to
discreetly bring pressure to bear in support of the policy stance of the CoP and
the secretariat.
The informal relationships that secretariat officials develop with all
stakeholders during missions, serve several purposes. They enable the
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secretariat official to gain a direct understanding of the important treaty issues
in the region in their national as well as in their regional and global contexts.
They enhance mutual understanding of cultural differences and ways of
doing business between the secretariat and the countries concerned. Finally,
the mutual trust and respect resultant of sound working relationships
between secretariat officials and their national counterparts are valuable
organizational assets in developing conflict avoidance and management
strategies for the treaty system.
For Information Exchange
Secretariats and other actors use informal networks for information
transmission and dissemination. As the information hub of the treaty system,
the secretariat is accessible to organizations within the treaty system as well as
to those external to the formal system. Many individuals (even school
children) contact the CITES and Ramsar secretariats directly for information
on treaty issues. The use of electronic communication has greatly facilitated
ready and rapid access to secretariats. Many secretariats now have a home
page on the Internet.
Secretariats are the official clearing houses for treaty-related information. This
is not a one way street. Actors approach secretariats for information, as well as
the other way around. There are many informal interactions between
secretariats, national agencies, and NGOs in which information exchange is
the primary focus. There is also a lot of information exchange which
stakeholders do not want officially recorded. It may be that an NGO wants to
use the secretariat as an informal sounding board for its ideas on monitoring
compliance or to pass on 'off-the-record' information about violations.
Informal interactions between Greenpeace and the CCAMLR Secretariat are
regularly used by Greenpeace to convey scientific data as well as information
on illegal fishing activities.
Stakeholders rely very much on the knowledge, expertise and experience of
secretariat personnel for advice on the interpretation and application of the
convention in a particular set of circumstances with which a government is
confronted, or which an NGO identifies as being of concern. The CITES
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Secretariat's recommendation to some African countries to enter a
reservation on the 1997 ivory trade issue until their governments were in a
better position to ensure compliance, is such an example.
Informal conversations with secretariat personnel are often held by
telephone, in informal venues, and when secretariat personnel are travelling
on missions. This avoids risks associated with possible breaches of
confidentiality which might occur when government representatives indicate
their government's position on paper at a stage in the negotiation (or re-
negotiation) of an issue, when to do so may be premature as far as the
government is concerned as it may lock the government into a position from
which it later wishes to withdraw.
To Communicate Secretariat Opinions
Secretariats use informal networks to get across to other stakeholders, their
point of view on an issue, including where a secretariat's perspective on an
issue may differ from that of some of its members and even its CoP. In the
course of their network management activities and boundary-spanning
forays, secretariats hold informal discussions with key non-state actors,
member and non-member governments. These discussions act as unofficial
conduits for the communication of organizational views on policy. Even
though the outcomes of these informal communications may or may not
support the secretariat's view, the communication process itself builds
relationships between the secretariat and other actors. In 1995, the majority of
the CCAMLR Secretariat's professional personnel were less suspicious of and
hostile to, environmental NGO/Secretariat interactions aimed at curbing
illegal fishing in CCAMLR waters, than were either the CCAMLR
Commission or the executive head of the Secretariat. Individuals in the
CCAMLR Secretariat maintained both formal, ongoing contact with ASOC as
well as discreet, informal, direct contact with Greenpeace representatives, in
order to ensure that vital communication and information transmission
channels were kept open.
Informal discussions between a secretariat and non-state actors may also be
used to bring indirect pressure to bear on parties to comply with treaty
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requirements and objectives. However, secretariats do not go against CoP
policy lightly, and I found no evidence to suggest that they directly pressure
countries to support their preferred organizational policy position.
To Establish Organizational Policy Credentials
As any civil servant knows, regular, formal briefing sessions of governments
are a fundamental way to establish an organization's credibility. Although
based on fact, briefings inevitably include an element of subjective judgment.
So, if secretariat personnel have good working relationships with their
domestic counterparts who are in turn able to convince their own national
leaders of the secretariat's professional abilities and impartiality, then the
secretariat's reputation and leverage in the formal treaty network, as well as
in its informal networks, will be enhanced. As I discuss in Finding 4 (Conflict
Management and Dispute Resolution), professional credibility and a
reputation for impartiality are crucial for secretariats that are engaged in, or
that wish to be engaged in, conflict management and dispute resolution
activities as trusted intermediaries.
To Negotiate Sensitive Issues
The importance of cultural differences in secretariat 'ways of doing business'
is often overlooked in academic research on organizations. In many cultures,
the value of the personal relationships and informal networks developed
among organizational leaders and other significant individuals is considered
the key to achieving a mutual gains outcome, especially where the
negotiation of politically sensitive issues is concerned. You cannot do
business by rote when negotiating issues such as the use of endangered
species parts in traditional medicine. Such issues require sensitive
management and cultural understanding. The designation of experienced
and skilled secretariat personnel with appropriate regional expertise and
networks, to informally advise on, pave the way, and even handle such
negotiations is common place. However, it is not often public knowledge, as
governments must be seen publicly to be the actors who undertake these
politically delicate and economically significant transactions.
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Summary
The influence potential of secretariats should not be underestimated.
Secretariat use of informal networks and processes can increase the sphere of
influence and the leverage of the organization by widening support for the
secretariat within the treaty system. Informal networks and interactions
expand a secretariat's power base by enhancing organizational task
performance, information exchange, and building informal relationships
with international and national bureaucrats and non-state actors such as
scientific experts, industry and environmental NGOs. The development of
informal networks may also reduce organizational resource-dependence on a
limited number of powerful stakeholders by facilitating access to
supplementary resources such as information, personnel and funding, from
non-state actors. Finally, the greater a secretariat's organizational capacity, its
resource independence and its network diversification, the more likely it is to
be perceived as impartial by stakeholders - impartiality being an essential
quality for a conflict manager.
In- Country Penetration: Influencing Domestic Policy Implementation
My research indicates that secretariat use of informal state and non-state
networks results in more substantial, in-country penetration or involvement
in domestic policy implementation than is recognized in the literature. It also
appears to contradict the international relations norm that international civil
servants wield very little influence at the international policy level, and none
at the national and sub-national policy implementation levels where their
input to the domestic policy process has traditionally been deliberately
discouraged by sovereign states. The reasons for the prohibition of ICS
intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state are enshrined in the
ICS ethic of internationalism and its supporting code of practice which
indicate clearly that international civil servants are not to intrude in the
internal affairs of a nation state. In international law and international
relations, protection of national sovereignty is a core value, and formal treaty
arrangements are designed to achieve this.
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This being so, how then do treaty IOs penetrate the domestic affairs of their
member states, and why ?
Knowledge as Power
Over the life time of a treaty, an international secretariat develops a complex
web of informal interactions with bureaucrats and non-state actors within a
country. It does this through the boundary-spanning activities of its leaders
and officials; by providing continuity of service to members; and by acting as
the institutional memory of the treaty system.
In this context, domestic non-state actors with which secretariats regularly
interact include: scientists, academics, industry organizations, environmental
NGOs, national politicians and community-based interest groups including
indigenous peoples and other minority groups.
Knowledge of domestic networks is retained in the institutional memory of
the secretariat, and connections and relationships are adapted and extended as
secretariat personnel and their in-country contacts change over time. As Ernst
Haas (1990) notes, "knowledge is power", and an activist secretariat's
command of information and knowledge about the treaty system and its
operation together with its use of informal networks to amplify this
knowledge, is potentially a significant source of power.
In this regard, the CITES, Secretariat is second to none. In fact the 'elder
statesmen' of the CITES Secretariat who have been with the secretariat since
the 1970s were regarded by many interviewees, including industry and
environmental NGO representatives, national bureaucrats and delegates,
with a reverence akin to that accorded the Delphic Oracle. Governments may
change every few years, but civil servants often remain in policy
implementation for the long-haul, and they remain a potent force long after
national governments have gone.
Bureaucratic networks are a key source of secretariat knowledge and power.
Of particular significance to the nature and degree of international secretariat
involvement in domestic policy implementation, are the networks
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established and maintained between and among international and national
bureaucrats. These sub-sets of actors have a direct and long-term investment
in treaty implementation success.
Within a country, it is bureaucrats as government employees and agents of
government, who are primarily responsible for treaty implementation at
national and sub-national levels and for reporting back to the CoP and the
secretariat on national implementation progress. That is, environmental
treaty secretariats are responsible to their CoPs for global oversight and
coordination of (domestic) policy implementation by all parties. To monitor a
convention's progress, global treaty secretariats must therefore be in regular
contact with their national counterparts and other relevant stakeholders.
Such contact is not without its difficulties.
An example of this is, what the World Heritage Secretariat found to be an
embarrassing and difficult encounter. The state government of Queensland,
Australia, directly and informally contacted the World Heritage Secretariat to
lobby the Secretariat (and through it the CoP), to support the Queensland
government's, anti-conservation position on an issue of local political
significance, namely commercial development in a World Heritage site. The
state government's position was in direct opposition to the international
position taken by the federal government of the day. In this case, the
secretariat claims it did not seek the encounter. According to the World
Heritage Secretariat, contact was initiated by representatives of the
Queensland government, bureaucrats acting at the request of their
government on the basis of formal and informal relationships they had
previously established with secretariat personnel (Sandford, 1994).
Bureaucratic cultures, national and international, speak the same 'language'
world wide. They also share a common and direct responsibility for the
management of the regime's implementation at the international and the
national level. Mutual understanding and interaction among these actors are
assisted by personnel secondments and exchanges. The organizational
credibility and capacity of both national and international bureaucracies
depend on the success or failure of their task performance and the
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management of their treaty networks. On these successes or failures, hang
individual professional careers and organizational reputations.
Professional relationships among bureaucrats become less formal over time.
As the officials responsible for the implementation of a particular regime
tend to interact frequently over long periods of time, the original formality of
their relationships relaxes as trust develops in the management of common
tasks. However, the lowest common denominators (organizational and
personal survival, and career enhancement), cannot be disregarded.'
Non-bureaucratic networks of environmental NGOs, industry organizations
and groups of experts, including legal experts and scientists, can be valuable
allies for secretariats as they have their own domestic and international
networks of constituents, and professional associations. Secretariat access to
these networks at the international level then facilitates secretariat access to
their domestic equivalents. Each domestic actor has its own set of
interorganizational networks with its domestic and international
counterparts and affiliates - a world wide web. An international secretariat
has only to access one node of this network to gain (potentially) access to the
whole. The use of electronic communication facilitates this process.
The CCAMLR Secretariat can tap into a myriad of domestic scientific
networks via its interactions with individual scientists who are members of
CCAMLR working groups, the CCAMLR Scientific Committee, and SCAR.
Individual scientists are not isolated nor politically nor financially
independent. Usually they are members of national bureaucracies, academic
and scientific institutions, international and national scientific associations.
Participation by scientists as members of multiple and often overlapping
organizations, has a multiplier or ripple effect on their potential leverage and
Interestingly, in the secretariats I studied, there appeared to be a distinction between the
organizational culture and personal motivations of officials in the treaty secretariats
established in the 1970s (World Heritage, Ramsar and CITES), and those of the 1990s (Basel,
FCCC and CBD). Many of the secretariat personnel in the latter group seemed more focused m
the career opportunities afforded by working for an environmental treaty secretariat at a time
when multilateral environmental treaties were a boom industry, than those in the former group
where achievement of the environmental conservation objectives of the treaty was a clear
personal and professional priority, as well as the organizational objective.
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their power as a secretariat ally as they are able to call on these networks for
information and -support.
More detail about the nature of these networks and secretariat use of them is
provided in Finding 3, 'Alliances with Non-State Actors'. It is sufficient here
to note, that secretariat access to these networks and the concept of reciprocity
involved in secretariat alliances with non-state actors, further facilitates
secretariat penetration of domestic policy circles. By reciprocity I mean, if a
network such as the scientific networks mentioned above, provides a global
secretariat with information and domestic access, it expects something in
return, for example, assistance with placing and/or advancing a policy item of
its own on the CoP agenda.
Examples of Secretariat In-Country Influence
Governments have historically taken precautionary measures to guard
against the possibility of secretariat influence in the internal affairs of a
sovereign state as noted previously. The reality of secretariat practice
identified in my research reveals a different picture. Governmental resistance
notwithstanding, the ICS has the potential to have a considerable indirect
impact on domestic policy networks. Whether they do so or not, depends on a
number of factors.
First, a secretariat's potential to influence the internal affairs of a country, is
derived from the extent and depth of its in-country knowledge of domestic
politics and public policy processes; the formal and informal in-country
networks arising from its relationships with key domestic government and
non-government actors and interest groups; the effectiveness of its network
management strategies; and its organizational preparedness to use initiative
and take risks.
Secretariats do not always realize their potential to influence domestic policy
implementation. It is up to the secretariat whether it takes up the challenge of
accessing and mobilizing in-country networks. A passive or managerially
conservative secretariat such as that of CCAMLR, might decide to play it safe
and confine its focus largely to the formal networks of the convention. A
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moderately activist secretariat such as the Ramsar Bureau is likely to
demonstrate considerably more initiative than the CCAMLR Secretariat and
encourage its officials to identify and mobilize informal networks in the
geographical regions for which they are responsible. While the CITES
Secretariat, as the most activist of the three, might go a step further and
actively encourage the formation of informal networks within and among
countries and NGOs if the Secretariat considered that this would serve the
convention's implementation interests, and the compliance monitoring
needs of the organization.
Secretariat use and encouragement of informal in-country networks is a
particularly sensitive issue in many developing countries and countries
without a pluralist polity. Here, western-style NGOs may be regarded with
suspicion. In these situations, secretariats find that assisting a country to
obtain technical assistance and funding (capacity building) to help it meet its
international obligations, facilitates the interaction of government officials
and NGOs by focusing their attention on their common interests and on
achieving common goals.
An example of this is where the CITES Secretariat conducts and/or
coordinates regular training courses for customs and environmental
management personnel in CITES exporting countries. The Secretariat
regularly involves representatives from the local and regional offices of
NGOs such as WWF/TRAFFIC in these courses to provide advice on field-
based approaches to monitoring compliance. Training courses develop greater
understanding and trust among the course participants and positive working
relationships between the CITES Secretariat and the participants, in that they
recognize their mutual commitment to the achievement of a common
objective, even if their tactics differ.
To overcome the loss of knowledge and skills caused by the frequent
turnover of personnel in national agencies, the CITES Secretariat repeats
these courses at regular intervals. This builds and expands its network of
formal and informal contacts, its in-country knowledge base, and its own
organizational reputation for positive initiatives. It is an example of capacity
building as network management.
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Summary
The realization that secretariat influence has the potential to penetrate
further into the domestic affairs of a country than had previously been
publicly acknowledged, will be uncomfortable for many governments. It also
appears to contradict conventional IR wisdom about the lack or insignificance
of, the influence of international civil servants at both the international and
the national and sub-national policy implementation levels.
The possibility of secretariat intrusion in the internal policy making processes
of a country is a recurring theme in governmental criticism of secretariats'
roles in international affairs. If, as IR theory suggests, power and decision
making authority (and thus influence) are vested in the state, then
government concern seems unwarranted, as under this rubric if secretariats
have no comparable formal power nor authority, then presumably they
cannot exert influence.
So why are governments concerned? Perhaps because politicians understand
the resilience of the international and national civil services relative to that
of national governments.
Through their network management strategies and skills and their boundary-
spanning roles, secretariats have the potential to be more involved in and to
exert more influence on, domestic policy implementation than is recognized
in the literature. It is my finding that the use of informal, interorganizational
networks is a major factor in this. Network management does not cease at the
boundaries of the formal treaty network. This would be an artificial
perimeter. Instead it encompasses all the informal networks with which a
secretariat is connected, including those within countries.
Informal Alliances With Non-State Actors
International treaty secretariats enter into informal alliances with a wide
variety of non-state actors including: scientists; academics; IGOs such as IUCN
and the IPCC; industry associations; environmental NGOs; indigenous
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peoples and human rights organizations; and the media. Alliances may be
open or covert. The majority of secretariat alliances are open rather than
covert.
Secretariat objectives in entering into alliances with these stakeholders are as
varied as the interests of the stakeholders themselves. However, there are
three primary objectives why secretariats establish informal alliances with
non-state actors. They are to achieve treaty objectives; to gain leverage in the
regime; and to boost organizational survival.
Secretariat alliances can take several forms, two of the most significant being
ad hoc alliances. Strategic alliances are purposefully created by secretariats to
achieve a specific policy or tactical objective; and interest-based alliances are
where participation in the alliance is determined by shared or common
interests as seen with groups of experts and professionals. In this respect,
interest-based alliances bear a resemblance to the "epistemic communities"
identified by Peter Haas, (1990; 1992).2
Secretariats may deliberately orchestrate alliances with non-state actors for a
specific reason. Secretariats may form strategic alliances with environmental
NGOs to achieve a mutual implementation objective such as the more
accurate monitoring of illegal, wildlife trading activities in a country which is
resistant to the presence of Western-style, environmental NGOs. In this
situation, an 'unofficial' endorsement of the NGO by the highly credible
CITES Secretariat might be achieved by facilitating NGO inclusion in capacity
building, training, and reporting activities within the country. This informal
approach is more likely to achieve a greater measure of acceptance of an
NGOs presence and its contribution to CITES implementation, than is a
direct, formal request for cooperation from either the NGO or the Secretariat
to the national government of the day. The NGOs on-ground presence then
2 For example, experts such as bureaucrats, scientists, lawyers and other specialists with whom
secretariats interact, are employed by in the public sector, the private sector and in academia.
They are what Peter Haas (1990; 1992 ) calls 'epistemic communities', that is, "networks of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue- area" (
Haas, 1992:3). These groups are bound by a shared values, causal beliefs and notions of validity
(Haas, 1990; 1992).
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assists the Secretariat to gather the data it needs to ensure more accurate cross-
checking of international and national reports.
Another example of a strategic alliance in action, is where an informal
alliance between the CCAMLR Secretariat and ASOC was formed to promote
the use of tory poles and streamers as devices to reduce the incidence of
seabird by-catch by long-liners in CCAMLR waters.
Informal, interest-based groups are a regular feature of environmental treaty
regimes. Scientists engaged in CCAMLR-related activities may belong either
to the Secretariat or to other governmental and non-state organizations such
as scientific associations and Greenpeace. They are bound by their shared
interest in the successful implementation of CCAMLR although their precise
fields of scientific expertise may differ, some being more focused on fisheries
management than on seabird by-catch issues. Similarly the Ramsar Bureau's
Technical Officers, and wetlands experts from IUCN, Wetlands International
and Bird International, share a common concern and determination to
conserve and sustainably manage wetlands of international significance, even
though the targets of their day-to-day activities might vary. The Bureau's
Technical Officers tend to focus on building relationships with and
maintaining the support of, government officials. IUCN and the NGOs tend
to concentrate their initiatives on enhancing community understanding of
wetlands issues, and activating community involvement in wetlands
management.
Reasons for Alliances
There appear to be four major reasons why secretariats establish informal
alliances or coalitions with non-state actors. First, alliances are normal 'ways
of doing business'. Second, they are used to perform secretariat tasks. Third,
they are a way of dealing with contentious issues 'off the record'; and fourth,
they serve as an organizational insurance policy.
While this breakdown may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is a useful way of
understanding the multifaceted relationships between secretariats and non-
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state actors. They are alliances of mutual gain for both secretariats and non-
state actors.
Ways of Doing Business
For secretariats, informal interorganizational interactions and alliances are
normal ways of doing business.
International relations research on IOs in the 1970s focused on state actor
relations and sovereignty, but there have been major changes in geopolitics
since then. The concept of the nation state as the cornerstone of the
international order, has now been overtaken by concepts of interdependence,
globalization, and the gradual disintegration of sovereignty as we know it, to
be replaced by what Chayes and Chayes (1995) call the "new sovereignty".
These changes have been accelerated by the ascendancy of global
interconnections (via the transnational activities of global corporations), the
development of sophisticated electronic communications and information
management systems, the growth in the number and types of IGOs and
NGOs, and the improved standing of non-state actors as stakeholders in treaty
systems.
This change of emphasis in world politics is also reflected in a shift in IOs
'ways of doing business', from formal to informal networks, and from a
primary focus on governments as the constituents of IOs, to a greater
emphasis on their interorganizational interactions with non-state actors as
well as with governments.
Many relationships and interactions in a treaty system are not formalized.
Informal, interorganizational communication of various kinds occurs among
boundary-spanning personnel from both governmental and non-state
organizations. This informal communication is merely 'a way of doing
business', as is usual practice in most public sector or private organizations
which have a set of organizational objectives to meet and outputs to deliver.
The majority of informal, secretariat/non-state actor communications are not
clandestine nor covert. Most are known to the members and are not
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considered newsworthy items nor items of concern. Even where informal
interactions exist as between the CCAMLR Secretariat and Greenpeace,
convention members appear to have chosen to ignore (by failing to formally
acknowledge) the existence of these interactions. To acknowledge the
existence of this communication (in contradiction of Commission
'instructions'), would create a new set of tensions and potentially conflict,
between the Secretariat and its CoP. Members would be forced to take formal
action to reprimand the Secretariat and/or its executive head as occurred with
the CITES and Ramsar executive heads. In the interests of international
harmony, it is more expedient to 'look the other way'.
Alliances and coalitions may emerge as the result of communication and
understanding that develops over time between secretariat personnel and
representatives of non-state actors in the normal course of 'doing treaty
business'. The CITES Secretariat's relationship with WWF/TRAFFIC on
compliance monitoring is a particularly successful alliance for both
organizations.
Task Performance
A secretariat forms alliances with non-state actors to assist it in carrying out
its key substantive tasks of: data verification, national reporting and
performance review; compliance monitoring; and assisting countries with
capacity building.
Data and information sought by secretariats from non-state sources are used
to develop a global profile of member performance and compliance.
Governments and non-state actors are the primary sources of treaty system
data. Secretariat access to this information is via formal channels such as self-
reporting by governments as well as via informal channels such as direct and
indirect communications with non-government stakeholders.
Information obtained from government sources is inevitably biased in favor
of the policy perspective favored by the government of the day. It is
understandably nationalistic in flavor and unlikely to highlight national
implementation inadequacies and deficiencies. Information from non-
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government, on-ground or field-based domestic sources and the advice of
international and national experts, is a valuable supplement to formal
governmental sources of data. However, just as information obtained from
governments is likely to favor a particular point of view, so information
from non-state actors will reflect the interests and biases of the non-state
organization. Even information from 'independent scientific experts' is not
devoid of bias. Science is not apolitical. The work of scientists, however
objective they try to be, unavoidably reflects their personal and organizational
perspectives in some way - the way they frame their research questions,
interpret data and construct reports.
A secretariat needs to be sure that it has as much accurate information as
possible in order to construct a complete profile of a country's performance in
implementing, or failing to implement, a convention. Both formal and
informal information sources are required to achieve this. As a secretariat's
analysis or review of a member's performance may be used as a basis for CoP
decisions to reprimand, shame and/or sanction non-compliant members, the
information contained in it must be accurate. Secretariat management of
formal and informal data/information flows and processes (including its
decision to use, or not to use, data from non-state sources) is a powerful tool
of influence.
In situations where a member is consistently or flagrantly in breach of its
treaty obligations and refuses to accept the secretariat's advice or assistance, or
to respond to pressure from other members, the secretariat may informally
seek the assistance of domestic and international NGOs and other non-state
actors to focus political and media attention on the offender. In this way, a
secretariat uses its alliances with non-state actors to bring pressure to bear
domestically on a party to meet its treaty obligations.
Academic freedom means that in most Western industrialized countries,
scholars can voice opinions and publish material critical of mainstream
governmental policy. Scientists, academics and environmental NGOs are able
to mobilize the attention of the media and are often willing to take direct
action to raise public awareness of an issue. In so doing they raise the political
stakes for governments which fail to respond to their voters' concerns. In
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contrast, secretariat dealings with the media are very circumspect. Even
activist secretariats must remain, publicly, the servants of the parties.
In more authoritarian political regimes, there may be less freedom for non-
state actors to voice a point of view contrary to official government policy.
Where direct relations with international secretariats must of necessity be less
visible, non-state actors are able to use their informal interactions with
secretariats to convey information on a particular country's failure to
adequately comply with treaty requirements. The secretariat can then use its
lynch-pin position and its informal networks with other members and non-
state actors to seek cooperative solutions to the compliance problems so
identified.
Secretariat action might take the form of marshalling institutional resources
to directly assist the country with capacity building to develop domestic
enforcement legislation as happened with the CITES legislation in Guyana. A
secretariat might use its contacts in the international media to increase public
awareness of the problems in the country with a view to mobilizing
assistance external to the treaty system such as funding from IMF, the World
Bank or the GEE. This was the Ramsar Bureau's strategy in relation to
securing funds for the management of the Lake Victoria wetlands.
A converse scenario might also apply. Where a party refuses to accept
secretariat advice and/assistance with capacity building to address that same
set of internal problems, a secretariat (after repeated attempts at persuasion
and negotiation) might use alliances with non-state actors to focus negative
international publicity on the country in order to achieve a positive change in
the government's response to the situation. The CITES Secretariat's alliances
with WWF/TRAFFIC and its international networks of environmental
NGOs were mobilized for a similar purpose when Italy and Thailand failed to
comply.
These are illustrations of the informal approaches employed by secretariats to
obtain assistance with compliance monitoring in member countries as
identified via non-state actor/secretariat alliances.
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In previous chapters, I have given numerous examples of how and why
secretariats and non-state actors form alliances to assist countries with
capacity building, including the involvement of WWF/TRAFFIC, IUCN and
national and local NGOs, experts and industry organizations in training
courses coordinated and delivered by the CITES and Ramsar secretariats.
It is sufficient to say that secretariat alliances with non-state actors are
potential sources of capacity building assistance. Resources acquired from
non-state alliances frequently include: information, project funding, expert
personnel, skills and technology transfer. Often capacity building alliances
start off as informal communications between a secretariat and interested
stakeholders (or potential donors). To be accepted by a recipient country and
implemented for optimum results, these informal communications may
then need to be transformed into more formal arrangements.
Information Acquisition and Exchange
Environmental NGOs and industry organizations often provide differing
perspectives on an issue. Their interest in a particular convention stems from
the philosophical base to which they and their constituents subscribe, and
their collective belief that a specific convention is perhaps the best available
international means of achieving the objectives of the constituents they
represent. Even when they do not fully support the intent of a convention or
its actions, these interest groups still participate in order to keep an eye on
actions proposed and decisions taken by their own governments. For
environmental representatives, protection and conservation of a species or
habitat; the regulation of hazardous practices such as the release of toxic
emissions; the ocean dumping of pollutants; and illegal trade in prohibited
products, might be the focus of their activities.
Industry organizations frequently argue a contrary point of view to that of
environmental NGOs. For example, they might argue in favor of the use of
species and habitat, 'wise or sustainable use' (CCAMLR, Ramsar) and
regulated trade (CITES, Basel). Although coming from different points of
view and value bases, together, environmental NGO and industry networks
are valuable sources of information for a secretariat in its collection,
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verification and analysis of data, and the compilation of reports on a country's
performance.
Environmental NGO and industry data and information may differ
substantially from that submitted to a secretariat in the national reports of
governments. However, from all these stakeholder contributions, a
secretariat is able to piece together a global picture of what is actually
happening in an issue- area, as distinct from what each stakeholder claims is
happening.
Secretariats form interest-based alliances with scientists, lawyers and other
specialists with whom secretariats interact. Specialists may be employed in the
public sector, the private sector and academia. From a secretariat point of
view what is important about specialists individually and collectively, is that
they are sources of expert information. Their expertise has authority, their
networks and constituents are politically potent, and they (or their
governments) are potential sources of additional organizational resources.
Associations of experts usually have direct access to government decision
makers and key politicians in both the domestic and the international arena.
In Australia, global change scientists from academia and scientific institutions
are participants in, advisers to, and/or have access to: federal and state
governments; industry organizations such as the powerful fossil fuel lobby;
the Australian Conservation Foundation; and policy "think tanks" such as
the Australia Institute. Individual Australian experts and scientists are also
members of the IPCC, and they have been Chairs and Vice Chairs of IPCC and
FCCC Committees. Regular interactions with these Australian domestic
experts, and with their counterparts in all member countries, thus provide
the FCCC and IPCC Secretariats with valuable global, national and sub-
national networks of contacts.
As with environmental NGOs and industry, the relationship between
secretariats and experts is reciprocal. Experts provide the secretariat with
advice and information, and in return the secretariat in its capacity as the
CoP's institutional policy adviser can ensure that issues of concern to the
experts are placed on the CoP's policy agenda. Scientists who want to draw
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attention to the disappearance of wetlands (Ramsar), global warming (FCCC),
or the rate of decline of a species or habitat (CITES, World Heritage CBD,
CCD), keep the relevant secretariat informed about changes that might impact
on the achievement of treaty objectives. Having received this information, a
secretariat will then consult with relevant members and interest groups and
consider the most effective strategy for ensuring placement of the issue on the
CoP agenda. Timing, the priority of the stakeholder issue relative to other
issues on the CoP agenda, and the secretariat's 'debt' to its ally are all factors a
secretariat will consider in determining the most appropriate course of action.
The media can be a further valuable strategic ally for a secretariat. Secretariats
use media outlets to promote convention objectives, and media items can be
cross-checked against government, industry and NGOs sources for
verification. However, secretariats are inherently wary about forming even
informal alliances with the media, and tend to leave that to non-state actors.
Finally, secretariat/non-state actor alliances are used by secretariats as sources
of organizational support in times of tension between a secretariat and its
members as when the Ramsar Bureau sought the assistance of
environmental NGOs to prevent the delisting and economic development of
the Ramsar site in Belgium. Reciprocity is the name of the game for all
secretariat alliances, and when non-state actors assist secretariats, they expect
this assistance to be reciprocated.
Dealing with Contentious Issues
Where there is concern among some stakeholders about particularly sensitive
matters on which parties cannot agree (such as the public exposure of illegal
practices by members), non-state actors often contact the secretariat either
directly or indirectly about their concerns. Examples of these informal
interactions are seen in the tracking and verification of the transportation of
prohibited products and substances including wildlife and hazardous wastes.
Acquiring additional information via non-state alliances, enables a secretariat
to bring sensitive matters to the attention of the decision making body of the
treaty. Without this informal assistance, non-compliance might not be
substantiated. National reports prepared by member governments are most
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unlikely to disclose information that shows them in a negative light in an
international forum such as a CoP. CCAMLR faces this problem regularly
with the failure of CCAMLR member countries to formally acknowledge
illegal fishing by their nationals using reflagged vessels.
Informal alliances with non-state actors can be an effective way to deal with
implementation conflicts off the formal record. 'Off the formal record' does
not necessarily mean that interactions to resolve the situation are conducted
in secret. Just that parties and relevant non-state actors agree that there may
be more effective, informal ways of handling a situation to reach a mutually
agreeable and sustainable outcome, than conducting negotiations in the more
public arena of the CoP and its committees. In these forums, actions by
individual countries are formally recorded. This then leaves a negative paper
trail about the actions or inaction of governments in implementing
convention requirements.
Informal conflict management and resolution (which is 'off the formal
record') is of more benefit to the treaty system as a whole. It helps a non-
compliant member save face by not publicly exposing a country's deficiencies,
and as noted previously, a country never knows when it might require
reciprocal salvation.
Non-state actors in many developing countries or countries with economies
in transition are more concerned with achieving long-term, positive results
by encouraging these countries to implement the treaty, than with publicly
chastising them for their failure or their inability to do so. In these situations
secretariat/non-state actor alliances are mobilized to build in-country
communication networks, treaty implementation skills and issue-area
expertise; and facilitate technology transfer.
In situations of non-compliance, a secretariat might also call governmental
and non-state actors together to broker a solution. The secretariat uses its
informal relationship with domestic non-state actors to persuade them to
mobilize in-country support for the secretariat's proposal, and to dissuade
them from seeking negative publicity on the issue
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Organizational Insurance Policy
I have already covered the major reasons for secretariat/non-state actor
alliances which emerged from my study, but perhaps the fundamental reason
for a secretariat to enter into such alliances is that these alliances can act as
insurance policies to ensure organizational survival.
Informal networks are largely beyond the control of members and can act as a
safety net for secretariat survival as required. A secretariat, when under threat
from its members, can call on its non-state colleagues for assistance.
Assistance to the secretariat may take the form of the direct provision of
supplementary organizational resources by non-state actors, such as the
personnel and/or the funding to carry out secretariat-specific tasks. The
Ramsar Bureau has sought the assistance of partner organizations, scientific
experts and environmental NGOs to monitor ecological changes in wetlands
on the Montreux Record. Non-state actors also may exert pressure on treaty
members to provide additional resources to enable the secretariat to carry out
its responsibilities. WWF/TRAFFIC and environmental NGOs in the USA
have provided training support to the CITES Secretariat
Non-state actors may apply pressure to treaty members to support a
secretariat's recommendation to reprimand a particular member for its treaty
violations, in circumstances where other members are reluctant to support
negative action in case it jeopardizes their unilateral foreign policy
negotiations with the non-compliant country.
By expanding, diversifying and maintaining its informal alliances with key
international, non-state actors, a secretariat may decrease its resource
dependence on member governments. The caveat here is, that an 10 has to be
extremely careful it does not jump from the frying pan into the fire, by
transferring its dependence from state actors to non-state actors. To do so,
would not just transfer its capture from one set of interests to another, but
could jeopardize the survival of the organization. If capture were perceived to
occur, member governments whose financial contributions constitute the
life-blood of a secretariat, would probably withdraw support from the 10. It is
a fine line between resource dependence/independence, and organizational
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survival. International environmental treaty secretariats are only too aware
of this.
Covert Alliances
The majority of secretariat alliances with non- state actors appears to be 'open'
or at least not deliberately 'covert'. I am sure that secretariats and
governments will take issue with my use of 'covert' to describe a category of
interactions between secretariats and non-state actors, as the word evokes
images of deception and betrayal. However, there appear to be distinct
differences between the ways secretariats 'do business' with some non-state
actors in a given convention and the ways they 'do business' with other non-
state actors in a comparable situation or regime.
Where an international convention formally and informally encourages
transparency and an open exchange of information in the interests of
achieving sustainable and positive implementation outcomes, covert
alliances appear less frequently, Ramsar being a case in point. Covert alliances
are most likely to develop when transparency is not a treaty norm, and when
the treaty culture is closed to outsiders as in CCAMLR's case. In these
circumstances, covert alliances with non-state actors are often the only way
for a secretariat to get the information it needs to perform its substantive
tasks.
In CCAMLR, secretariat communication with public interest groups is
discouraged by the treaty culture. CCAMLR actively discourages open
communication between its secretariat and non-government actors unless
they are the non-state actors with which CCAMLR Secretariat personnel are
'permitted' to directly interact. It is a list of two - ASOC an international
environmental NGO, and IUCN, that latter being an IGO rather than an
NGO.
Unlike most UN environmental treaties including Ramsar, CITES, FCCC,
Basel, and World Heritage, all of which promote information exchange and
operational transparency in the international public interest, the CCAMLR
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institutional culture appears to be one of intense distrust of 'outsiders',
particularly non-state actors. 3
The CCAMLR Secretariat has to exercise extreme caution in its relations with
'outsiders', even though the Secretariat relies heavily on the scientific
expertise and information provided by non-state actors such as Greenpeace
and independent scientists, to monitor compliance in the Southern Ocean.
The CCAMLR treaty culture thus promotes covert, rather than an open
alliances/interactions, between its secretariat and key non-state actors as an
informal mechanism to enable the CCAMLR Secretariat to obtain the
information it needs to ensure that treaty members are meeting their
international obligations.
However in a culture such as CCAMLR's, these apparently covert
communications or alliances are likely to be perceived as a direct threat to the
authority of the members because of the historical lack of trust between
government and non-state actors in this issue-area, and because these
alliances may alter the predictability of institutional dynamics. The spill-over
into CCAMLR dynamics of the animosity between the IWC and Greenpeace
over whaling by Japan and Norway (which are members of both the IWC and
CCAMLR), has made some CCAMLR members very wary of encouraging
further interactions between their secretariat and environmental NGOs.
Finally, covert alliances between secretariats and non-state actors may
develop when a secretariat feels under threat, and is fighting for its
organizational survival. Covert alliances are a predictable and defensive
organizational response to a potential or perceived threat. It appears to be
common practice for secretariats to 'enter an understanding' with interest
groups to lobby members on their behalf to achieve additional organizational
resources or to avoid budget and resource cutbacks.
3 Observers are formally excluded from CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee
meetings by resolution of the members unless their attendance has been officially approved 12
months in advance of the meeting they wish to attend and then only if attendance is approved
by all members. This was discussed in Chapters 1 and 5.
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The formation of covert alliances between the personnel of a secretariat and
non-state actors such as scientists and NGOs can be an important
organizational survival strategy for a secretariat. However, in a relatively
closed treaty system, such as CCAMLR, a secretariat is particularly vulnerable
to criticism as it is completely at the mercy of its members for its resources
and survival. The institutionally vulnerable position of the CCAMLR
Secretariat, its poor resource base and its organizational passivity, mean that
covert alliances are a very risky enterprise for the CCAMLR Secretariat.
Summary
The formation of secretariat alliances with non-state actors inside and outside
a regime, broadens a secretariat's network and its power base, including
opportunities for media coverage of crucial events of non-compliance. Both
secretariats and non-state actors benefit from their informal alliances. They
are reciprocal relationships based on mutual needs for mutual gains.
Secretariats need informal, and sometimes covert, alliances with non-state
actors as much as non-state actors need alliances with secretariats. To put it
bluntly, there is a self- interest factor at work for all actors in alliances. On
balance however, a secretariat is the actor potentially more at risk in entering
alliances with non-state actors as it has more to lose in terms of its
professional credibility, informal authority and resources.
Members are often suspicious of a secretariat's informal relations with non-
state actors (particularly those actors of which members 'disapprove'), as their
interactions with these actors are less visible than those with governments.
They are especially concerned that a secretariat might divulge information
about the members' activities to non-state actors, who might then use this
information to embarrass or destabilise the government at home. In addition,
members understand that alliances with non-state actors broaden the
secretariat's power base.
Non-state actors also need to prove their worth to their constituents in order
to ensure their own organizational survival. For many non-state actors such
as environmental NGOs and industry organizations, organizational survival
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and financial solvency are closely linked. For these organizations, solvency is
frequently dependent on donations and subscriptions from their constituents,
be they environmentalists or corporations.
Environmental NGOs need to locate 'incidents' of non-compliance to prove
to their constituents and to government they are doing their job as treaty
implementation watchdogs. By demonstrating their worth, donations keep
rolling in and the environmental NGO lives to fight another day. On the
other hand, corporations need to demonstrate to their constituents and to
government that environmental NGO reports of corporate non-compliance
such as excessive emissions or pollution, are flawed. In both instances neither
organization has the complete picture and each comes from a partisan
viewpoint.
In entering into alliances with non-state actors, a secretariat risks losing the
trust and support of its members; its reputation for professional integrity and
organizational impartiality; and resources. Contraction of secretariat tasks by
disgruntled members and thus contraction of the organization's informal
authority, autonomy and power which come with successful task
performance, may also be at stake. Consequently a secretariat does not enter
into any informal alliances, let alone covert alliances, lightly. When it does
so, the rationale given to members is that the interaction is 'in the interests of
the treaty'. On the other hand, the information and relationships that flow
from these alliances bolster the secretariat's power base and leverage in the
system.
Managing Conflicts And Resolving Disputes
The most 'unexpected' finding from my study is the extent to which
secretariats use informal conflict management and dispute resolution
processes unwittingly to influence the behavior of stakeholders. As
multilateral brokers, facilitators and mediators, they actively assist
stakeholders, particularly the parties, to prevent and manage implementation
conflicts.
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In my opinion, this is the finding that offers the most scope for
understanding how secretariats actually manage networks creatively in the
face of significant organizational constraints, and for considering how these
organizations might be used more effectively by regime stakeholders to
realize their full organizational potential as facilitators of catalysis.
Conflicts and Disputes: Intrinsic Components of International Treaty Systems
The presence of conflicts in an international treaty system is not an aberration
nor a sign of system failure. On the contrary, the existence of conflict is an
interorganizational network norm (Buntz and Radin, 1983). In fact conflict
management is the way a treaty moves forward or progresses.
Policy conflicts raise issues within a regime and those issues have to be
resolved. Formal voting will not resolve the underlying causes of a conflict,
nor resolve the presenting symptoms. In fact taking a formal vote can
completely disable regime effectiveness as has happened with the whaling
convention (Pers.Com. Chayes, 1998). Voting to resolve a conflict creates an
adversarial situation or confrontation which more frequently than not results
in a stalemate as no party wants to lose face by being perceived to concede.
The end result of such a situation is non-compliance and the failure of the
regime to meet its objectives.
Avoiding and managing conflict is then, the work of the regime and the way
a regime moves forward and managing implementation conflicts is the
responsibility of the secretariat in its capacity as regime manager. In the
absence of an activist secretariat acting as a conflict manager, unresolved
conflict frequently holds back regime development. Unresolved or
unmanaged conflict prevents a regime from adapting to changes in its policy
environment. A conflict may also escalate into a fully-fledged dispute which
requires external intervention by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the
international entity responsible for dispute settlement in the majority of
international agreements. Conflict management is an adaptation measure
which must be mastered if regime implementation is to progress towards the
successful achievement of compliance.
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Treaty systems are essentially frameworks for managing international issues
which are, or might become, sources of international tension and conflict. An
international treaty or convention is a conflict containment system which is
constructed specifically to address a set of actual or potentially emerging
concerns within an issue-area.
Formal dispute settlement procedures have been the traditional devices used
to promote compliance. The majority of international agreements, contain
clauses providing specifically for the resolution of 'disputes' among two or
more member nations. That is, formal dispute settlement tends to say that
parties are the disputants, while conflict management has the capacity and the
flexibility to include actors who are not parties. This is an especially important
distinction if complex, multi-stakeholder, multi-issue, international
environmental policy conflicts are to be successfully managed and resolved.
In most cases formal dispute resolution or settlement is relegated to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a court of last resort, should direct
negotiation, arbitration and mediation among the parties not succeed. As
noted, disputes in international treaty systems rarely reach the ICJ (Chayes
and Chayes, 1995). Members would rather keep conflict management and
dispute settlement in-house as this saves face and largely avoids international
public condemnation. By keeping dispute settlement, effectively 'in-house',
members argue that they have a greater opportunity bring pressure to bear on
disputing parties to reconcile their differences in the interests of the treaty as a
whole, rather than resorting to judgment by an outsider (the ICJ) which has
no commitment to either the treaty objectives or to achieving a sustainable
outcome of the dispute.
In taking this stance, members are motivated largely by self-interest. They
prefer to keep a treaty's 'dirty linen' away from public scrutiny. In collectively
opting for in-house management of disagreements, each member is
protecting its own interests. A member never knows when the time might
come for its own actions, or lack of actions, to be criticized by other members
and when it too might be required to submit to the treaty's chosen means of
resolving problems.
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In treaty texts and scholarly works, in-house treaty processes for managing
problems that arise during implementation (negotiation, mediation and
arbitration) are formally considered the responsibility and province of the
members, not of the secretariat. In reality, there is a big gap between theory
and practice. When members decide to take an active role in dealing with
treaty problems, it is usually in high-profile environmental disputes (such as
the ivory trade case), which have already reached an impasse, are in the
public eye, and are in danger of spilling over as diplomatic or political
incidents into other issue-areas or regimes such as those of national security,
trade or human rights. However, secretariats acting as intermediaries or
multilateral brokers, do the lion's share of assisting stakeholders to sort out
operational and management problems and conflicts that arise when
implementing a treaty.
Conflict management and dispute resolution are part of normal network
management activities for all activist secretariats when they act as
multilateral brokers. Even passive secretariats such as the CCAMLR
Secretariat undertake some conflict management activities at what is
generally considered the lower end of a broker's or intermediary's
intervention scale. In building consensus among members to take a particular
course of action, even a passive secretariat will usually assist stakeholders
with fact-finding. The former Data Manager of the CCAMLR Secretariat acted
as a facilitator to assist CCAMLR's scientific working groups to reach
agreement on the objectives, priorities and methods of fish stock assessment
and ecosystem data collection and analysis. As decision making in CCAMLR
is by consensus, agreement on the approach to data management was an
essential prerequisite for enabling members to reach consensus in the
Commission.
An additional complication in treaty implementation disagreements is that
many implementation tensions and problems do not present as clear-cut
disputes between two or more countries, which is the legal model that seems
to have been used for drafting the dispute settlement clauses in international
agreements. In contrast, policy implementation problems tend to take the
form of wide-ranging and/or long-standing areas of disagreement or conflict
within which acute episodes emerge as distinct disputes. In this context, I
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make a fundamental distinction between conflict management and dispute
settlement as it is usually known in convention texts.
As noted earlier, the existence of a global environmental agreement is
international recognition of the need for a set of structures and processes to
contain tensions and conflicts which arise, or might arise, in issue-areas such
as the management of wetlands, deserts, Antarctic marine living resources,
and the disposal of hazardous wastes. On-going dialogue and negotiations are
required to reach a global agreement on the management of an issue-area
over time. To be successful, management must be seen to be fair, sustainable
and acceptable to all major stakeholders.
The ivory trade issue in CITES is an area of chronic disagreement in which
acute episodes of disputation occur as happened at CoP9 in 1994 over the
relaxation of trade in ivory and elephant parts proposed by several African
countries. This escalated into a dispute fueled by the opposition of the
majority of the Northern-developed member countries and international
environmental NGOs to the proposal. It was resolved by a negotiated
compromise at CoPlO in 1997, brokered in part by senior personnel of the
CITES Secretariat. The outcome was an agreement to relax trade restrictions
on stockpiled ivory with a caveat that the situation would be monitored and
would be formally reviewed at the next CoP in 3 years time.
International public policy implementation conflicts and disputes inevitably
include a wide range of member and non-member states and non-state actors
and interests, including stakeholders such as local communities which are
outside the formal treaty system, but which have a stake in the outcome of a
conflict.
Ramsar's multilateral water hyacinth eradication and management regime
for Lake Victoria in Africa might not have an immediate nor readily
discernible impact on down-stream local communities, but these
communities might still be concerned about the medium and long-term
impacts of herbicide use on their livestock and drinking water. They are thus
stakeholders. In a similar vein, the logging and mining of tropical rainforests
by transnational companies in South East Asia, Ecuador and the Amazon
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River basin are of immediate interest to indigenous peoples in these areas
who have traditionally depended on these forests for their physical and
cultural survival.
Fair, successful and sustainable outcomes of conflicts such as these, need to
take into account all the interests, needs and the BATNA (Best Alternative to
a Negotiated Agreement, Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991), of each stakeholder in
a particular treaty. Assisting stakeholders to reach agreement can be a time
consuming, resource-expensive and complicated task network management
task for secretariats who are regularly approached by groups such as those
mentioned, or by NGOs on their behalf. This has occurred in Ramsar, the
ITTA and the World Heritage Convention, where local communities and
indigenous peoples have sought secretariat intervention in conflicts either
directly or through IUCN, to ensure their cultural survival (Pers. Com. W H
Sec.1993; Ramsar Bureau, 1995).
Explaining Conflict Management and Dispute Resolution
Before discussing the approaches taken by specific secretariats to assist
stakeholders to avoid, manage and resolve disagreements, I shall first explain
the terms that I have chosen to use - 'conflicts' and 'conflict management;'
and 'disputes' and 'dispute resolution' - and the reasons for my choice. I then
outline the conflict management and dispute resolution processes which
make up these ambit terms.
Crowfoot and Wondelleck (1990) provide a useful explanation for
distinguishing between public policy conflicts and public policy disputes. I
have found their explanation to be as applicable in the international public
policy context as it is in their North American natural resource management
context. As suggested by Crowfoot and Wondelleck (1990), conflicts involve:
Fundamental and ongoing differences, opposition, and sometimes coercion among major
groups in society over their values and behaviors toward the natural environment. Such
conflict is very wide in scope and in part arises from the rapid change in human
population, technology, social structures, and social norms. Within this conflict, there
are many smaller and quite specific episodes referred to here as 'disputes' [my italics]
(Crowfoot and Wondelleck ( 1990:17-18) in Dukes (1996:194-95).
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Dukes (1996) then goes on to say, and I agree, that it thus seems appropriate to
understand 'conflict' as the larger problem or class of problems represented by
episodes of 'disputes'.
Where I differ from Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) and Dukes (1996) in my
choice of terminology, is that I have chosen to use the generic term 'conflict
management', instead of Dukes' term "public conflict resolution". I believe
that 'conflict management' is a simple though accurate descriptor of the
activities undertaken by secretariats to deal with implementation difficulties.
In any event, all international environmental treaty implementation
conflicts are public conflicts as they all involve governments as stakeholders
or interested parties (Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987).
If public policy development is an incremental process of bargaining and
negotiation, then international public policy implementation is an
incremental process of public conflict management interrupted by episodic
disputes which must be resolved if a treaty is to continue to exist and thrive.
Secretariats use a range of third party intervention or intermediation (assisted
negotiation) strategies and processes to fill a vacuum in the formal treaty
system in the ways in which implementation difficulties and disputes are
avoided, managed and resolved.'
'These processes are known variously in US negotiation and dispute resolution literature as
alternative dispute resolution (ADR); public policy dispute resolution (when applied to public
policy conflicts); or environmental dispute resolution (EDR) when applied to environmental
conflicts. The US body of negotiation and dispute resolution literature has emerged primarily
from the legal disciplinary stream, hence the preponderance 'dispute' acronyms. However, to
use the term 'dispute' in an international public policy context risks misinterpretation and
confusion with the terminology in the legal text of international agreements, where there is a
clear, legal interpretation of the term 'dispute,' and a set of formally required processes to
address and resolve 'disputes'.
For this reason I have used the term conflict management as a generic term to describe the
approaches adopted by secretariats to prevent, minimize and manage conflicts in their capacity
as the network managers of a convention. Within this general descriptor, I then identify (from
the existing negotiation and dispute resolution literature), sets or groups of processes which are
used to prevent and manage conflicts which have the potential to impede and/or derail policy
implementation. These processes are known as conflict management or consensus building
processes.
I use the terms 'disputes' and 'dispute resolution' to refer to specific incidents which have
reached an impasse within the larger field of convention implementation conflicts. From the
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Conflict Management
I consider that conflict management aptly describes the network management
initiatives taken by secretariats to avoid, manage and resolve tensions and
difficulties that predictably emerge as patterns of conflict in implementing a
convention. In practice, international policy conflicts are rarely neatly
resolved. However, they can be managed sufficiently to ensure that policy is
implemented, that the majority of treaty objectives is achieved, and that the
treaty moves forward.
The conflict management processes and skills used by secretariats are ways of
managing the complex interdependencies of interorganizational networks as
harmoniously as possible. Conflict management strategies and processes help
build relationships of trust among individuals and organizations; they act as
communication channels for the transfer of information and knowledge;
they provide forums in which stakeholder behavior may be changed to
achieve positive outcomes for all treaty stakeholders; and they serve as a
means to mobilize networks and resources. Participation in conflict
management processes is an individual and (hopefully) an organizational
learning experience, whatever the collective outcome.
Conflict management skills are essential for professional secretariat personnel
especially those in boundary-spanning roles who act as multilateral brokers
which, in practice, was all of those I interviewed. Personnel involved in
conflict management initiatives, need to understand and anticipate how, and
in what circumstances, conflicts and disputes might develop. Many of the
professional personnel in secretariats are experts in their professional fields -
scientists, lawyers and economists. However, to my knowledge, none of the
professionals in the case study organizations was trained specifically to deal
same negotiation and dispute resolution literature source I then identify the processes that are
used to resolve disputes. These are dispute resolution processes.
Both consensus building and dispute resolution processes are forms of assisted (as distinct from
unassisted) negotiation.
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with conflict. They learned these skills 'on the job' by observing and working
with more experienced colleagues and mentors.
Secretariats may be called on informally by any one of the stakeholders in a
disagreement to assist them in dealing with a conflict that has emerged or is
in danger of emerging, and which could have a negative effect on policy
implementation outcomes - and on the interests of the stakeholder.
In these circumstances, secretariats select the best possible combination of
processes to reach a solution. For secretariats, with no formal knowledge of
the terms 'conflict management' or 'dispute resolution', they see it as
choosing from among the portfolio diplomatic and management strategies
and skills that they have built up over years of ad hoc experience in
comparable situations, or that they have learned from talking with, and
observing, mentors and colleagues in action. It is very much a case of mixing
and matching the processes to suit the issues and interest groups in the
conflict or dispute. No one conflict or dispute is ever the same, so there can be
no uniform or universal, prescribed approach for all conflicts or disputes in a
treaty system. It is highly probable that several different consensus building
and/or dispute resolution processes will be used in each case before a solution
is reached.
As multilateral brokers, professional secretariat personnel regularly facilitate
the prevention and resolution of conflicts. They assist parties with fact-
finding to solve problems of data insufficiency for transboundary wetlands
management, or to agree on the nature of the data to be collected as happens
in CCAMLR.
Secretariat mediation of disputes, occurs less frequently. This appears to be
primarily because of the potential loss of face involved for the parties if they
are perceived to have relinquished control of this activity to their 'servant',
the secretariat.
I agree with the US negotiation and dispute resolution literature which
distinguishes between consensus building and dispute resolution processes.
Consensus building processes such as fact-finding, collaborative problem-
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solving, policy dialogue, regulation-negotiation (reg-neg), and facilitation are
conflict management processes; while mediation is a dispute resolution
process (Susskind, 1993).
However, there is agreement in the literature that both consensus building
and dispute resolution processes are assisted negotiation processes, as distinct
from unassisted negotiation processes where the parties in conflict or dispute
resolve the problems directly themselves without the assistance of an
intermediary. All assisted negotiation processes involve the help of a skilled
intermediary who assists the parties to develop appropriate problem-solving
processes aimed at maintaining or improving relationships in the treaty
system to prevent the escalation of a contentious issue or problem (consensus
building); and/or to resolve a dispute that has reached an impasse (dispute
resolution) (Susskind, 1993).
The objective of both conflict management and dispute resolution is for all
parties to achieve mutual gains by working together to find mutually
acceptable alternatives to what are usually perceived to be 'no option'
solutions (Susskind, 1993). It is a requirement of both sets of processes that the
stakeholders negotiate face-to-face. These negotiations may be formal or
informal. In a treaty context they are usually a combination of both. Informal
negotiations are often used at least initially to build trust and understanding
among the participants and to get to the substance of an issue, without
requiring a politically or legally binding commitment by the participants.
Having reached agreement, the outcome of an informal consensus building
process may well result in a formal or legally binding agreement or policy
which is then endorsed by the Standing Committee on CoP. This
combination of informal and formal processes has been used for fact-finding
and policy dialogue by CCAMLR in its determination and formal
endorsement of policies for ecosystems management.
In both conflict management and dispute resolution, it is not unusual for the
treaty secretariat to do the work of facilitating or mediating the problem,
although it appears to be an unwritten rule that, in the event of a successful
outcome the parties (rather than the secretariat), get the glory or the public
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recognition. In contrast, should a process not be successful, it is likely that the
intermediary (the secretariat), will be blamed.
The next section outlines specific conflict management processes which have
been used by global environmental treaty secretariats to manage and resolve
implementation problems
Conflict Management Processes
Consensus building constitutes the bulk of the conflict management to
dispute the resolution processes used by secretariats. In consensus building,
the stakeholders in a conflict agree to invest time, energy and resources in the
'front end' of a problem before an impasse has been reached in order to
minimize risk of conflict escalation and its attendant costs (Sandford,
1995:149).
Consensus building processes, such as fact-finding, collaborative problem-
solving, policy dialogue, and regulation-negotiation(reg-neg)) are the primary
focus of secretariat intermediary activities.
Fact Finding
Fact-finding is used to assemble all the pertinent information required to
reach agreement on an issue. It is facilitated by an intermediary, in this case a
secretariat. Fact-finding is a relatively non-threatening process both for the
stakeholders and for a secretariat which is reluctant to risk taking the
initiative in potentially difficult situations.
The CCAMLR Secretariat used fact-finding to identify data objectives,
priorities and collection strategies in the Fish Stock Assessment Group and
the Ecosystem Monitoring Group. The group facilitator, in this case the
former CCAMLR Data Manager, then 'worked' (talked and negotiated)
individually and collectively with the members of each group to help them
reach a consensus on how they wanted to go about sorting out their
disagreements on methodology. He helped the participating scientists to
identify common ground and points of difference among themselves
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(Pers.Com.Sec.Delegates, 1995). Having reached agreement on the data
required and how they would solve any problems they encountered in its
application (collaborative problem-solving), the group was then in a position
to take its findings and policy recommendations to the CCAMLR
Commission for formal political endorsement and eventual publication as
CCAMLR's official policy statements.
Policy Dialogue
CCAMLR's official position statement on ecosystem management followed a
series of negotiations (policy dialogue) among Commission members and
Secretariat personnel on what the policy should contain in order to reflect the
collective CCAMLR view. Policy dialogue was thus used to generate public
policy from scientific fact. As an 'honest broker', the Secretariat provided
ideas leadership and policy guidance (based on its global perspective), to assist
the parties to reconcile diverging national policy views and to achieve an
agreed policy outcome.
Regulation-Negotiation (reg-neg)
An example of regulation-negotiation used by the Ramsar Bureau was its
facilitation of the development of the Ramsar Wise-Use Guidelines for global
application in the management of Listed sites. Here, Bureau personnel
facilitated a series of meetings among members, partner organizations and
key NGOs to draft guidelines for the implementation of Ramsar's wise-use
concept (Annex to Rec.C.4.10).
A similar consensus-building approach was used by the CITES Secretariat in
facilitating the development of the principles of CITES implementing
legislation for domestic application.
Secretariats as Multilateral Brokers: Two Case Studies
Conflict management initiatives taken by secretariats may be clearly visible,
or they may be less transparent, to observers outside a treaty system. The
following examples demonstrate how the Ramsar and CITES secretariats
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have used consensus building processes to overcome implementation
conflicts as obstacles to successful treaty implementation. In addition, these
cases demonstrate the differences in the conflict management approaches
adopted by each secretariat.
Preventing Transboundary Conflicts: Ramsar
The Lake Victoria case illustrates the Bureau's transparent approach to
building consensus among a diverse group of stakeholders each of whom has
an interest in the management of a transboundary wetland of international
importance but who are divided by their differing perceptions of their
individual national and sub-national needs, and their BATNAs.
In brokering a strategy for the management of Lake Victoria, the Ramsar
Bureau official took the following steps to build consensus and reduce
mounting tensions over the future use and management the site .
(i) Through his formal and informal networks, the Bureau's Technical Officer
for the African region identified all the relevant stakeholders - including
member and non-member states, state and non-state stakeholders - their
interests, needs and BATNAs.
(ii) He then facilitated a fact-finding process to obtain all the hydrological,
ecosystem, social, economic and other data necessary to develop a
comprehensive picture of this particular wetland. The fact-finding process
mobilized the relevant technical and scientific experts, state and non-state
actors and their interorganizational networks. It also ensured a level playing
field of information for all stakeholders, in that all stakeholders had access to
all the information identified by this process, including relevant information
from neighboring countries which would not have normally been available.
Fact-finding was the first step towards obtaining the information and data
required as the baseline for negotiating and implementing a multilateral
management plan.
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(iii) The Bureau official then facilitated a collaborative problem-solving
process, bringing together representatives of the key stakeholder groups in
informal, face-to-face interactions such as site inspections, impact assessment,
and informal meetings to identify common ground as well as the issues in
contention; to learn about each other's needs and political positions,
including budgetary and personnel constraints; to identify the management
options that would be acceptable to all stakeholders with an interest in the
current and future use of the wetland; and to brainstorm potential solutions.
Discussions included: the application of the Ramsar of Wise-Use guidelines
to this site; the responsibilities of individual states; and the development of a
transboundary management plan for the site.
(iv) The Bureau officer then directly facilitated the preparation of the
management plan for submission to the GEF for funding to implement the
agreed multilateral, wetland management regime.
Preventing Conflict Escalation: CITES
Another example of secretariat conflict management action concerns
relations between a member and a non-member state of a convention where
policy implementation was constrained by the inability of the governments
concerned to communicate directly on matters of common interest.
Interaction between secretariats and non-member states may be formal or
informal. It is formal when the secretariat, acting on behalf of members of the
treaty system interacts with non-member states to encourage them to join the
convention by spelling out the benefits of membership of the network. Often
though, the interaction is informal. Secretariats can interact with non-
member states in ways that members cannot. In many instances, a secretariat
acting as a go-between, contacts a non-member state as an informal proxy for a
treaty member whose political and diplomatic position does not allow its
formal interaction with a particular non-member country. In this capacity, the
secretariat facilitates indirect and informal interaction between the two
governments as more formal contact between the member and the non-
member might be misinterpreted with negative consequences for either, or
both, countries. It might also have a possible negative ripple effect on
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international relations in other issue-areas such as national security. Similar
national stand-off situations may occur between member countries within
the treaty system.
The CITES Secretariat is an example of a secretariat acting as a facilitator of
consensus building between a member and a non-member state as in the case
of the relationship between the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan.
There are no diplomatic or other formal relations between these countries.
Political relations are cold at best. Yet the successful global control of the
illegal trade in endangered species and their parts for use in traditional
medicines is heavily dependent on the compliance of both countries as
importers of body parts of endangered species for their domestic, traditional
medicine markets.
China is a member of CITES but Taiwan is not. China refused to participate in
CITES if Taiwan was a member. For China and Taiwan to openly
communicate in a CITES forum would have been seen to compromise the
long-standing political standoff between the two countries with a resultant
loss of face for both governments. This would have been politically and
culturally intolerable for both Taiwan and China. However, the cooperation
of both countries was needed if CITES trade regulation was to be successful.
Successful regulation could not be achieved without agreed regional
management strategies involving both China and Taiwan as significant
regional importers, re-exporters and consumers of these products.
So, although there could be no direct communication between these
countries, senior management from the CITES secretariat acting informally
and accepted as an honest broker by both parties, conducted shuttle
negotiations and communications to arrive at a solution which aimed to
meet CITES' objectives in a way that also met the needs of both Taiwan and
China without their having to formally interact.
Given the official 'absence' of face-to-face contact in these Secretariat
manoeuvres, the consensus building processes used by the Secretariat in these
circumstances cannot be officially categorized as such, as by definition,
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consensus building requires direct face-to-face contact among the
stakeholders. It was however, unequivocally a consensus building exercise.
On an informal level, the CITES Secretariat provided an impartial forum for
representatives from each government to meet unofficially, thus overcoming
the obstacle of loss of face and the risk of confrontation. Informal social
occasions and CITES educational and training programs, provided additional
and politically acceptable opportunities for the relevant representatives from
China and Taiwan to interact unofficially, to collaboratively work out ways
for CITES to meet its sustainable trade objectives. All these activities were
facilitated by the CITES Secretariat acting as a multilateral broker
Dispute Resolution
In this study, 'dispute resolution' is used in a very specific way to mean
facilitation and mediation processes, these being the dispute resolution
processes used by secretariats to break an impasse or resolve a specific
international environmental policy dispute. In acting as a dispute resolution
intermediary, secretariat personnel may also perform the roles of facilitator
and/or mediator at different stages in the negotiations.'
'Variations of 'facilitation' and 'mediation' appear to be used in the negotiation and dispute
resolution literature to describe both the roles (facilitator and mediator) of intermediaries in
assisting actors to deal with problems encountered; and to describe the processes (facilitation
and mediation) which intermediaries use to arrive at a solution. The only consistent distinction
that I could ascertain was that 'facilitation' (and not 'mediation') is used to describe the
management activities used by intermediaries to assist stakeholders to design and then manage
the processes by which they agree to address and manage their conflict. Facilitators are thus
process managers, whereas mediators tend to be more interventionist in and directive of, both
process and substance (content) of the issue in contention.
Both 'facilitation' and 'mediation processes may be used to resolve disputes that have reached
an impasse. While facilitation focuses an the actual intermediation processes themselves,
dispute resolution usually involves more direction by the intermediary in terms of both process
and substance, including suggestions about how the participants might go about generating
options and packaging solutions.
To my mind, the distinction in the literature between 'facilitation' and 'mediation' as roles
and/or processes remains unclear. I shall therefore use these terms to describe both the role, and
the processes used by the intermediary.
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By the time a conflict has escalated into a dispute and reached an impasse, it
usually has a high political and public profile. As discussed previously, it
would be most unusual for governments to allow, let alone encourage, their
secretariat to act as an intermediary in such circumstances because they fear of
international perceptions of loss of governmental control of treaty decision
making to the ICS.
US domestic dispute resolution processes also include non-binding
arbitration. I found no evidence to suggest this process is part of an
international treaty secretariat's dispute resolution portfolio.
Treaty secretariats have no formal powers to use non-binding arbitration, nor
do they have a comparable process in their professional repertoire. One
possible exception to this last comment, might be the "weighted average
option"(Mouritzen, 1990), which was apparently trialed by an FCCC
Secretariat officer in facilitating several working groups in the lead up to the
FCCC's CoP2 in Bonn in 1996. Given the profound and apparently insoluble
differences among the parties in trying to reach agreement on targets and
timetables for GHG emissions, the officer endeavored to push for a
compromise based on a weighted average of the participants positions
(Pers.Com.FCCC Sec.1995). This was only feasible given the numerical nature
of the resolution sought, that is, a tangible level of agreed emissions, and a
date by which these were to be achieved globally. I do not know to what extent
this objective was achieved nor how productive this "weighted average"
formula was.
In contrast with my findings on secretariat use of conflict management, I was
unable to obtain concrete and publishable evidence that secretariats mediated
disputes. Certainly, the relatively passive CCAMLR Secretariat does not, and
has not, acted as a mediator in terms of providing direction and substantive
input to the resolution of the much publicized CCAMLR disputes such as
those over illegal fishing.
In the Ramsar Bureau, a senior, experienced, and highly internationally
respected professional, by his own admission and supported by comments
from IUCN and IWRB representatives and several national delegates, has
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regularly been asked to facilitate and mediate both in-country and
transboundary disputes, particularly disputes involving the interpretation
and application of Ramsar's Wise-Use Guidelines. However, these requests
for him to mediate disputes appear to have been made more on the basis of
his abilities and reputation as a individual who is perceived to be a skilled
and trusted intermediary, rather than in his capacity as an official of the
Ramsar Bureau.
I was told of two examples of senior CITES Secretariat personnel acting as
both facilitators and mediators of highly public disputes. However, it was
specifically requested that I not divulge this information on the grounds that
the political fallout could be extremely damaging to the countries' successful
implementation of CITES. No doubt these revelations would also be
damaging to the careers of my sources as trusted intermediaries.
From the information I was able to obtain from personal interviews with
Secretariat personnel, NGOs and a few delegates from developed countries in
1995, it appears that senior CITES Secretariat personnel, especially the Deputy
Secretary-General and the Scientific Officer, Central and Southern America
CITES are regularly asked to perform as mediators of volatile disputes. As
with the Ramsar Bureau official, requests for their mediation services seem to
be related to stakeholder perceptions of individual professionals as being
trustworthy and impartial with a long-track record of successfully managing
treaty implementation conflicts
The need to preserve client confidentiality is clearly a limitation on the
evidence I am able to present to substantiate the significance of secretariats as
mediators of treaty system disputes. However, I would be surprised if, for the
reasons I mentioned earlier, governments formally supported secretariats in
their mediation initiatives or gave them much leeway in this regard.
From what I could gauge, requests for CITES and Ramsar secretariat
personnel to assist in resolving disputes, were based more on the qualities of
the individuals sought, including their impartiality; their professional
expertise and experience; their standing; and their (informal) authority in the
treaty system as perceived by stakeholders. Personal qualities were also
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considered significant. Specific additional personal and professional qualities
mentioned were: they were able to guarantee confidentiality; they were
considered trustworthy; and they had demonstrated leadership, tolerance,
patience, empathy, cultural sensitivity, and a sense of humor in previous
encounters. These qualities, rather than secretariat membership alone, were
regarded as important 'eligibility criteria' for potential facilitators and
mediators in international treaty systems.
Summary
My research indicates that international treaty secretariats do not knowingly
use conflict management and dispute resolution processes. Rather, they have
developed and accumulated an ad hoc repertoire of skills for managing
difficulties and disputes that arise in the course of treaty implementation.
These skills are derived from the professional and personal expertise and
experiences of individual personnel, particularly the professional boundary-
spanning personnel. Over time, this expertise and skills become part of a
secretariat's skills base and corporate memory. Should personnel skilled in
conflict management leave a secretariat, unless this ad hoc expertise has been
recognized, institutionalized in the corporate memory and transferred to the
organization's resource base by mentoring and training, it is lost to the
organization and the treaty system. In this way the secretariat and the treaty
become de-skilled. De-skilling is a significant organizational problem for all
environmental treaty secretariats and the only way to ensure a secretariat
does not lose essential skills, is to instigate management policies for strategic
and succession planning (Pers. Coms CITES, Ramsar and CCAMLR Secs,
1995).6
6Unfortunately there is lack of succession planning in most treaty secretariats. Reasons given
were: the lack of time from day to day operations and the pressure of work to think about it; i t
is not an immediate priority. The latter reason was cited by several senior CITES Secretariat
professionals even though in that Secretariat, the Deputy Secretary-General and the Scientific
Officer in charge of the Central and Southern American region in whom a large proportion of
the members' confidence was located, were verging on retirement in 1995, as was the similarly
placed Deputy Secretary-General of the Ramsar Bureau.
All these officers had been with their secretariats since they began in the 1970s. In the small
CCAMLR Secretariat, the loss by resignation for career path reasons of the Data Manager, who
was also widely regarded by delegates and NGOs as an effective manager of data
disagreements, was not anticipated and there was considerable down-time in recruiting a
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Secretariat conflict management and dispute resolution skills are critical to
the development and success of international agreements. Environmental
conventions such as those studied, rely heavily on the collection and analysis
of complex, scientific data as the basis for policy development and decision
making. In cases where there are conflicts, or there is the potential for
conflicts and disputes over the nature of the data, its interpretation and
management, a secretariat inevitably has to play a conflict management role
(in some case willingly, in others reluctantly). This being so, its boundary-
spanners must have the skills to perform effectively as multilateral brokers.
Summary of Chapter 7
These four 'unexpected' findings demonstrate the previously recognized
ways in which international environmental treaty secretariats exert influence
on treaty implementation processes and outcomes. They make extensive use
of informal rather than formal interorganizational networks, and penetrate
domestic policy processes to a far greater extent than is acknowledged in the
literature. The formation of overt and covert strategic and interest-based
alliances with non-state actors and their unwitting use of conflict
management processes in the ocurse of advancing implementation and
achieving compliance, further consolidate their influence.
These sources of influence serve a dual purpose. Not only do they ensure that
activist secretariats have potentially, a significant impact on the success of
international policy implementation and compliance, they also assist an
activist organization to substantially overcome the organizational constraints
it experiences as a resource-dependent network manager of a treaty system.
For secretariats, the successful management of conflicts and the resolution of
disputes is a key way to exert positive influence as it can directly change
stakeholder behavior. By more effectively managing and resolving the
replacement. However, it remains to be seen if his replacement has a similar repertoire of
conflict management skills.
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conflicts and disputes that inevitably develop during the lifetime of a treaty,
secretariats can thus make a valuable contribution to the achievement,
sustainability and success fo implementkation outcomes.
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CHAPTER 8: CATALYSIS: DEVELOPING THEORY FROM PRACTICE
Introduction
The central question that this final chapter seeks to address is: How do my
research findings help explanation-building about the influence of
international treaty secretariats on the policy outcomes of international
agreements? I demonstrate that theory has a lot to learn from practice when it
comes to developing useful theoretical frameworks to explain how small,
resource-dependent IOs such as global environmental treaty secretariats,
actually go about influencing international policy outcomes. This chapter is a
first step towards exploring the dimensions of an interdisciplinary theoretical
process derived from the policy practice of international treaty secretariats.
My research identified the key substantive tasks performed by
environmental treaty secretariats, the exogenous and endogenous constraints
they face in carrying out these tasks, and the strategies they have adopted to
minimize or overcome the adverse effects of these constraints on secretariat
performance, survival and growth.
In addition I also discovered four previously unacknowledged ('unexpected')
and significant sources of secretariat influence on stakeholder behavior.' They
are: secretariat use of informal international and domestic networks; in-
country policy penetration; alliances with non-state actors; and the unwitting
use of conflict management and dispute resolution processes.
Knowing that secretariats use predominantly informal sources of influence to
change stakeholder behavior internationally and within member countries,
places state and non-state actors in a better position to work out how best to
harness this organizational expertise and energy in the interests of the global
public interest and the more successful implementation of international
agreements.
1I contend that the sources of influence I have identified are the actual and informal sources of secretariat
influence, as distinct from those hypothesized, formal sources of influence which dominate international
relations and international law literature. This literature appears to disregard the potential importance of
informal sources of IO influence.
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By developing, consolidating and maintaining these sources of influence, an
activist secretariat is thus in a position to intervene to assist treaty
stakeholders to transform implementation rhetoric into on-ground
compliance. The secretariat does this by undertaking a variety of activities,
accepting certain responsibilities, and playing a variety of roles as the network
manager of this constellation of tasks, interorganizational processes and
networks of influence. The process of secretariat intervention or
intermediation in pulling together this portfolio of activities, roles and
responsibilities, I call 'catalysis'.
I argue that 'catalysis', is a much-needed, interdisciplinary, explanation-
building process or approach that has the capacity to transcend the differences
and divisions among the stakeholders responsible for implementing
international agreements and achieving compliance. The success of 'catalysis'
depends on the intermediation of an activist IO such as a treaty secretariat to
assist stakeholders to transform what are frequently fragmented and disparate
implementation initiatives into tangible and ultimately global, compliance
outcomes. In this way, catalysis contrasts with the analytical frameworks
currently available through the traditional, mediums of international law
and international relations. These frameworks focus on the sovereignty of
nation states as their primary theoretical building block, and in so doing
appear to enhance differences and divisions among stakeholders, rather than
building on commonalities and encouraging international cooperation.
If 'catalysis' is so important, why has it not been discovered before ?
The primary reasons why my concept of 'catalysis' has not been discovered
before now, probably lie in the choice of analytical framework (disciplinary
rather than interdisciplinary) and the lack of understanding and experience of
day-to-day secretariat practice, by the scholars investigating implementation
and compliance issues.
Previous analysts of international secretariats and IOs have tended to stick to
the tried and true disciplinary-based approaches of political science and
international law. Public policy implementation theorists have focused on
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domestic public policy implementation; and exponents of international
public sector management such as McLaren (1980), have concentrated on
analyzing the intraorganizational (and to a much lesser extent the
interorganizational) aspects of large UN IOs. Finally, strategic management
theory has concentrated on the private sector.
The second reason that little interorganizational secretariat research has been
done before, is because the few scholars who have written about international
secretariats do not appear to have had substantial prior experience as public
policy practitioners. Experience in the practical realities of policy
implementation would have given these scholars a firmer grasp of the
operations and the problems of juggling complex networks and the
competing expectations and demands of a myriad of actors, while working
within tight political deadlines and with inadequate resources. Practical
experience would also have afforded researchers insights into the extent to
which secretariats actually deal with and resolve multiparty, multi-issue,
implementation conflicts. By working from practice to theory, rather than the
other way around, it is more likely that the theoretical frameworks so
developed will seem relevant to and be used by, reflective practitioners.
Understandably perhaps, theories crafted in academia, which do not seem
applicable or useful in the 'real-world' of policy practice, will be discarded or
ignored by practitioners.
Finally, the importance of understanding secretariat influence lies in what
Beigbeder (1988) and Mouritzen (1990) acknowledge as the significance of IOs
including secretariats, as the engines of international policy implementation
into the next century, and the need for these organizations to be more
creative and visionary in exercising their network management tasks and
roles as the key lynch-pin organizations in the treaty system.
We therefore need some way to capture the essence of secretariat practice in a
form that can be universally understood and that is transferable to non-
environmental treaty systems if the implementation of international
agreements is to be successful in the long-term. To accomplish this we need to
understand and harness secretariat expertise, knowledge, skills, resources and
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influence in ways that are useful (as well as instructive) to practitioners as
well as scholars.
I hope that my identification of this public policy phenomenon I call
'catalysis', will contribute to a greater understanding between practice and
scholarship.
Theoretical Frameworks Revisited: Jonsson, Mouritzen, Interorganizational
Theory, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution.
In arriving at my identification of the phenomenon I have called 'catalysis', I
first looked critically at the limitations of the existing frameworks of Jonsson,
Mourtizen, and interorganizational theory as these were the approaches I had
originally selected as being the most pertinent of the existing theories for my
purposes. I then considered what negotiation and dispute resolution theory
(Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987; Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991; Chayes and
Chayes, 1995; Princen,1992; Susskind, 1991,1994; and Dukes 1996) had to offer
in order to construct a more relevant interdisciplinary lens for analyzing the
practice of international treaty secretariats in the implementation of
international public policy.
None of these theoretical frameworks was adequate in its own right, and
none was able to capture all the complex facets of secretariat practice I
uncovered in my field work. In particular, none of the disciplinary-based
frameworks I discussed previously, was able to coherently address and
reconcile the multitude of activities, responsibilities and roles performed by
secretariats to move a convention towards compliance in ways that might
also enhance the scholarship-practice interface by improving our
understanding of precisely what secretariats actually do, as distinct from what
many academics think they do.
Jonsson Revisited
My initial reservations about the practical adequacy of Jonsson's framework
were confirmed by my primary research findings. While Jonsson's issue-
specific factors (issue-area, issue-structure, issue-setting and regime) are
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features that have been used by political scientists to characterize
international political systems, applying these factors to my case studies did
not advance my understanding of how secretariats actually exerted influence.
On the other hand, Jonsson's set of organization-specific factors (reachability,
mobility, conspicuousness, constituents and leadership) proved to be a
relevant starting point for analyzing organizational performance, and his
conclusions about the relevance of these criteria to organizational
performance and influence potential were supported by much of my
interview data. However my original questions remained: How to
benchmark and measure the concepts as he proposed?
Jonsson also seems to assume that issue-specific and organization-specific
factors remain constant over time. In contrast, my research indicates that both
the issue-specific and the organization-specific factors change frequently over
the lifetime of a treaty in response to external and internal institutional
developments. Finally, Jonsson does not tell us how convention secretariats
actually manage institutional changes, nor how they deal with the constraints
they encounter in performing their primary role as network manager.
Mouritzen Revisited
I selected Mouritzen's role categorization as having the most promise for
understanding the roles secretariats perform in task performance as it was
derived from an empirical study of an IO, namely NATO. However, I found
that while some elements of what Mouritzen calls "political roles" and
"substantial roles", corresponded with what I found (See Table 2), his
categorization was too fragmented to be of practical use to treaty secretariats.
In addition, Mouritzen's concepts were constructed in Danish, although his
research was published in English, and there seemed to me to have been
some difficulties with the cultural interpretation and the translation of these
concepts into English.
For example, Mouritzen talks about "passive and active mediation". These
concepts do not translate comfortably into the language of the US negotiation
and dispute resolution literature, where their closest equivalents appear to be
"facilitation" (passive mediation) and "mediation" (active mediation). I have,
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therefore, found it more culturally consistent to use the language of the US
negotiation and dispute resolution tradition in my study to avoid apparent
inconsistencies and contradictions in concept interpretation which may have
resulted from the translation of Mouritzen's original manuscript.
Finally, I find confusing Mouritzen's grouping of what he calls "political
roles" (including those of 'conflict preventor', 'boundary-role guardian', and
'instrument for a powerful treaty member') as distinct from what he calls
"substantial" roles" which are intended to realize both the treaty's and
secretariat's objectives, for example ('initiator', 'treaty-identity supporter',
controller/observer', and 'expert/coordinator'.
In practice, "political" and "substantial" roles often overlap. For example, I
regard conflict prevention as a "substantial" as well as a "political" role.
Conflict prevention serves the political purpose of increasing a treaty's
chances of success by minimizing the possibilities of implementation
disruption. However to my mind, the actual conflict prevention processes
such as fact-finding and collaborative problem-solving which are used by
secretariats to achieve successful policy outcomes, are examples of the
secretariat performing a "substantial" role.
In summary, while Mouritzen's role classifications initially looked
promising, having undertaken my field work I found it very difficult to
constructively reconcile the roles I saw being carried out by environmental
treaty secretariats in practice, with the role categorizations suggested by
Mouritzen.
I suggest that the main reason for the difficulties I experienced in trying to
make use of Mouritzen's roles, was that the field data from which his role
typology was developed, was based on his analysis of one large 10 which
could afford considerably more role demarcation among its ICS personnel,
than is possible in the small treaty secretariats I studied. With a larger staff,
role specialization is more likely to occur as it is more feasible operationally.
Individual staff in large organizations prefer a degree of role differentiation as
it makes it easier to distinguish among positions for promotional purposes.
From a management perspective, role specialization is easier to achieve in a
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larger organization as there are more staff among whom to allocate roles.
Clear role demarcation reduces the likelihood of intraorganizational conflict
and organizational inefficiency which are often caused by the overlap and
duplication of jobs within an organization. As all my case study secretariats
pointed out, they are seeking multiskilled generalists, not specialists;
promotional opportunities are few; and in the secretariats I studied, job
satisfaction and a 'calling' appeared more important to personnel than
promotion.
Another apparent disparity between global environmental treaty secretariats
and Mouritzen' s findings is that, "NATO is a more homogeneous 10 than
the UN, and the political systems of NATO members are pluralistic when
seen in a global-comparative perspective" (Mouritzen, 1990:133-134).
The same certainly cannot be said of either environmental treaty secretariats
or their conventions. Organizational heterogeneity was the aim of all the
organizations I studied, even the CCAMLR Secretariat, and member countries
were characterized by an eclectic mix of social, cultural, economic and
national political systems. The political systems ranged from the well
established, Western-style democracies of the USA and Europe, to embryonic
democracies struggling to emerge from former socialist regimes of Eastern
Europe, to more authoritarian regimes in parts of Africa, Asia and South
America.
However, some of Mouritzen's comments on the difficulties of studying IOs,
including secretariats, echo my own experiences that,
when it comes to [role] categories at the micro-level, regarding the contemporary
decision-making processes in the closed worlds of IOs and their ICSs, we are in a difficult
position indeed. We must primarily rely on interviews with civil servants involved in
the processes, or in a position to observe them. The [research] questions provided a certain
structure-----It turned out, frequently, that spontaneous 'stories' or other comments, not
specifically asked for, were the most interesting results from an interview (Mouritzen
1990:134).
The limitations of case study research and inclusion of 'spontaneous stories'
in research are not without their critics. This is discussed at length in a
subsequent section. However, I contend that I could not have obtained the
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previously unknown and critical material on informal networks and
secretariat influence that I did, had I not adopted a case study approach and
taken note of the 'spontaneous stories' of those interviewed.
Interorganizational Theory Revisited
Foundation concepts of interorganizational theory such as the significance of
networks, lynch-pin organizations, and the potential influence of the
boundary-spanning personnel of these organizations, were borne out by my
research. Interorganizational theory has proved to be the theoretical
framework that most closely approximates what my study has found out
about secretariat network management practices. Interorganizational theory
uses concepts and language that are readily understood by bureaucrats, and
perhaps most importantly, it has the capacity to link all institutional levels
from the individual in a local community to the global institution. This
capability is important. I found that the networks that link individuals,
organizations and international institutions are fundamental to the success of
international conventions. That is, multilateral networks have a multiplier
effect on individual and organizational networks, and they are the key
channels or pathways by which secretariat influence is exerted, consolidated
and extended.
However, although interorganizational theory pays considerable attention to
formal networks, it appears to overlook the significance of informal networks
in network management. Informal networks are not readily visible to
outsiders. I found that formal networks are generally visible and can be
linked to governments and organizations by paper trails of memos,
correspondence, and documentation from meetings. In contrast, informal
networks are largely manifestations of individual relationships and
interactions. In many cases they consist predominantly of verbal exchanges
which take place on the telephone and at meetings; in informal venues such
as hallways and golf courses; and they also include informal interactions
which occur in formal venues such as official diplomatic and social events.
Electronic communications including faxes and e.mail are used for formal as
well as informal communications. They can be traced via paper trails, but
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they can also be erased or lost more easily as e.mail is often directed
specifically to an individual rather than to the organization per se. The onus
is then on the individual to pass the communication to the central document
filing system of the secretariat for retention in its organizational memory.
As far as informal networks are concerned, all the secretariats noted that
when individuals leave the organization, they take their informal networks
with them. Informal network loss is considered an organizational asset loss
by the secretariats I studied.
The networks that each employee brings to an organization are unique. Once
new recruits commence in a secretariat, they effectively have to start from
scratch to construct relationships and networks which will differ from those
of the previous incumbent of the position, although there is likely to be some
overlap given that they occupy similar roles and that some informal
networks will remain linked to the secretariat rather than to the individual.
However, informal networks appear to differ from formal organizational
networks in that they appear to have an individualistic stamp/identity, in
much the same way that human fingerprints are similar but distinctively
individual. To identify these informal networks, it seems to me that a
researcher has to be able to identify and interview chains of individuals and
track these informal networks via largely anecdotal evidence, verbal
communications, 'spontaneous stories' (Mouritzen, 1990) and policy
narratives (Roe,1994). In my experience, corroboration of informal networks
by formal documentation was extremely difficult to obtain. This raises issues
of validity and reliability for academic researchers which are addressed in a
later section of this chapter.
Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Revisited
In considering all the findings, expected and 'unexpected', it seems to me that
the one that offers the most potential for explanation-building analysis about
the influence of treaty secretariats, is the unconscious use of conflict
management processes by these organizations in carrying out their tasks and
in overcoming organizational constraints.
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The value of conflict management lies in its capacity to build on the common
ground identified among stakeholder interests, rather than concentrating on
and even exacerbating, the differences and divisions among the stakeholders
and their interests. In my view, we need to focus on commonalities rather
than perpetuating the divisions existing already among stakeholders in the
interests of successful treaty implementation. Conflict management is the
theoretical framework most capable of achieving this for several reasons.
Conflict and its management are universally understood concepts. They cross
political, economic, social and cultural divides. Conflict is an underlying
theme in all treaty implementation, as is the need to manage it if
international cooperation and harmony are to be achieved and sustained
within and among international agreements, governments and non-state
actors.
Conflict management is capable of cutting across issue-areas. 2 Conflict
management processes are versatile. They are capable of dealing with issue-
linkage as in: trade/environment; human rights/arms control;
environmental protection/national security, which formal legal approaches
and remedies under specific treaties are not.
Conflict management processes link formal and informal treaty systems and
networks. They are inclusive, transparent and accountable. They have the
capacity to involve all stakeholders (not just governments) in the interests of
reaching agreed, fair and sustainable outcomes. They are also able to assist
stakeholders (and secretariats) to develop systems to anticipate and manage
change - in contrast with legal solutions which can only operate reactively. 3
2Conflict management processes processes in various forms have been applied nationally and sub-nationally
in both Northern and Southern countries, and internationally to issues as diverse as human rights, health,
trade, arms control trade and environmental protection (Sandford, 1992).
3By the time a legal solution has been activated, the conflict has usually escalated into a dispute and the
formal legal solutions in treaty text have swung into play to resolve it. Legal solutions may well be useful
for resolving high-profile, international disputes, but they are inappropriate for the prevention and
management of the majority of implementation conflicts. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the formal
dispute resolution mechanisms in international agreements is well documented (Chayes and Chayes,
1992,1995; Susskind, 1994).
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The legal resolution of disputes is confined to facts. Yet, facts are only one part
of the profile of an environmental conflict or dispute which comprise in large
measure, values and emotions such as the intrinsic worth of a habitat or
species. Emotions run high in many environmental conflicts such as those
concerning ivory, whaling, and world heritage protection. Legal processes and
solutions are not equipped to deal with the subjective elements of conflicts
and disputes.The activation of conflict management processes, as distinct
from formal dispute settlement processes, also minimizes the loss of face that
governments so determinedly avoid.
National laws also vary and to many stakeholders their application appears to
be inconsistent and frequently unjust (as in the prosecution, or lack of
prosecution, of CCAMLR's illegal fishers). On the other hand, conflict
management, is considered a universal concept that can transcend national
borders and cultural differences.
How then, can we most constructively harness the influence of secretariats in
their use of conflict management processes to achieve implementation
objectives? The best way to do this is to understand more precisely how the
boundary-spanners of global convention secretariats use conflict management
in the interorganizational context of complex, multilateral global networks.
This will enable us to develop an explanation of how and under what
circumstances, secretariats use conflict management processes.
Network managers as conflict managers, need skills and training in conflict
management techniques. However unlike law, conflict management is not
shrouded in the mystique of a specialist profession nor is it necessarily elitist.
This makes conflict management processes and skills generally more
accessible to those responsible for implementing treaties. They are more easily
understood by both policy practitioners and stakeholders, and so they are
more likely to be used by those responsible for treaty implementation,
including bureaucrats and non-state actors at all institutional levels.
Conflict management is NOT a guarantee of implementation and compliance
success. However I believe that an international convention has a greater
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chance of succeeding in reaching its objectives, if its members acknowledge
(rather than deny) the inevitability of implementation conflicts. CoPs should
take steps to anticipate and deal with conflicts. To this end they should ensure
that secretariat boundary-spanners are trained and skilled in conflict
management, and that conflict management and dispute resolution
provisions are built into the organization's strategic plan, thus pre-empting
some of the problems of task prioritization, resource allocation and
succession planning.
In summary, conflict management and dispute resolution processes and skills
are proven, generalizable, positive and an organizational resource. They also
have the potential to be transferred among institutions as part of an
international, career civil servant's portfolio of network management skills.
The promotion of international cooperation and harmony via initiatives
such as conflict management is therefore consistent with the objectives of all
the international environmental agreements studied, and the skills and
processes learned in managing one agreement are transferable to other treaty
systems.
Lessons from Practice
Of the theoretical frameworks I originally selected as having potential for my
research, each has its merits and its disadvantages, but none alone has proved
adequate. I have, therefore, tried to construct a composite approach which I
believe more adequately captures the ways in which treaty secretariats go
about their tasks in practice, and in the process change stakeholder behavior
and so influence policy outcomes. I have chosen to focus on three elements of
network management: secretariat task performance; their network
management role as a multilateral broker; and their extensive (though
unknowing) use of conflict management and dispute resolution processes
within an international, interorganizational context. Taken together these
elements constitute 'catalysis'. In 'catalysis', a secretariat actively assists
members to transform implementation concepts into tangible compliance
outputs, while the secretariat itself as the facilitator of catalysis remains
essentially unchanged.
444
Task performance legitimizes secretariat implementation activity. The tasks
carried out by secretariats have been formally and/or informally endorsed by
the decision making bodies of the treaty system, such as the CoP and the
Standing Committee. Informal endorsement amounts to the absence of
objections to a secretariat's task performance of a task(s), while formal
endorsement refers to formally documented records as in the minutes of
meetings, resolutions and recommendations.
The key substantive tasks of oversight of national reporting and performance
review, capacity building, and compliance monitoring are the primary
vehicles of secretariat influence, and these tasks are driven by processes
instigated by secretariats. To assist a country with capacity building is
impressive rhetoric, but what does this mean in practice? Numerous
examples of secretariat capacity-building initiatives were given in Chapters 5
and 6.
Even core tasks are potential vehicles or pathways of influence. Examples of
ways in which secretariats can use their core tasks to exert influence are: the
inclusion of items on a meeting agenda; the prioritization of agenda items;
inferences and suggestions contained in a briefing document, or secretariat
report; the choice of wording used in the minutes of meetings in which a
secretariat representative has acted as a rapporteur; and a secretariat's
suggestions about the selection of data and information for incorporation in
documentation drafting and preparation.
Having decided not to use Mouritzen's role classifications and opted instead
for the network management role cluster described by Mandell as multilateral
broker (MLB), I then divided this MLB role cluster in two based on my
examination of the roles performed in practice by my case study secretariats in
carrying out their tasks. The two interorganizational roles that I have selected
as being the most significant MLB roles performed by these secretariats are,
facilitator and mediator. Both roles are forms of assisted negotiation where an
impartial party or intermediary works with the stakeholders in a treaty
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system (and in particular with the members), to help them reach an agreed
solution to an implementation problem or 'conflict'. 4
In catalysis, the key role that treaty secretariats perform as network managers
is that of facilitator. As a facilitator, the secretariat DIRECTLY assists
stakeholders, particularly the parties, to manage implementation processes
such as fact-finding and collaborative problem-solving in order to build
consensus among them and prevent conflict emergence and/or to manage
any tensions or conflicts that have emerged. This role, enables a secretariat to
identify and to actively assist all the stakeholders, not just the members, to
meet their treaty implementation obligations. Facilitation is arguably the key
network mnagement role of secretariat boundary-spanners. The former Data
Manager official in the CCAMLR Secretariat was regularly asked to facilitate
scientific and technical meetings when differences of opinion concerning data
interpretation among scientists and agreement arose and a resolution of the
disagreement was required to achieve CCAMLR's implementation objectives.
In situations such as this, he assisted the scientists to develop consensus-
building processes to reach agreement. He did not, however, direct the
scientific content or substance of the discussion, although as a professional
scientist himself and the representative of an impartial 10, he gave carefully
considered responses and suggestions as requested (Pers. Coms. Sec.,1995; Pers.
Coms. Scientists, 1995).
A network manager's second, but less usual, role is that of mediator. 5 A
mediator demonstrates more initiative than a facilitator in making a
substantive contribution to the resolution of disputes after an impasse is
reached. The parties' request for intermediation by the CITES' Secretariat in
4 Ideally the stakeholders in a treaty implementation conflict should be able to directly negotiate its
resolution. However, this is not always possible, and conflicts can rapidly escalate out of control until an
impasse or deadlock is reached. Once this level of polarization has been reached, parties to the conflict are
locked in to the negotiating positions they have been advocating publicly and cannot be seen to back down
without considerable loss of face. The introduction of an impartial facilitator can assist the parties to
develop negotiation processes such as collaborative problem-solving, to prevent and/or minimize the risk of
conflict escalation. Should an impasse be reached, a mediator might then be called in to provide substantive
advice and assistance (as distinct from the essentially process assistance provided by a facilitator), about how
a sustainable and mutually agreed outcome might be reached. Mediation differs from facilitation in that a
facilitator manages the assisted negotiation, consensus-building or conflict management process, whereas a
mediator manages the process and makes a direct contribution to the content or substance of the conflict.
5 As mentioned repeatedly, publishable evidence of secretariat mediation was almost impossible to obtain.
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the negotiation of the Lusaka Agreement among African countries (which
was highly controversially and involved Northern environmental NGOs), is
an example of secretariat mediation.
Interorganizational processes such as those of conflict management and
dispute resolution are the actual means by which secretariats carry out their
tasks. I found that implementation tensions were significant organizational
constraints in that while conflict is inevitable in policy implementation and
conflict management by secretariats is resource intensive, it is not formally
acknowledged as a legitimate substantive task. This lack of recognition makes
it difficult for secretariats to argue their case for additional organizational
resources to intervene in implementation conflicts and help the treaty move
forward Yet, secretariat management of implementation tensions and wide-
ranging, low-level conflict was from all accounts, a significant component of
the key substantive tasks I identified. Conflict management and resolution
were also fundamental to the success of a convention. I discussed conflict
management and dispute resolution processes in detail in Chapter 7.
Catalysis: Transforming Implementation
I have rejected Jonsson's and Mouritzen's models as I find their emphases
too exclusive of the realities of secretariat practice, particularly secretariat use
of informal networks, alliances and processes. Instead I have found it more
instructive to concentrate on the processes secretariats have used, and might
use, to perform their tasks and overcome organizational constraints, I have
paid special attention to the processes these organizations use to manage the
conflicts that inevitably emerge during policy implementation as they seem
fundamental to the success of a secretariat's performance as a network
manager.
Conflict management as a unifying concept is at the core of catalysis. It links
interorganizational processes, formal and informal networks, and the
organizational tasks and roles that make up implementation and compliance.
I define catalysis as the interorganizational network management process by
which secretariats actively intervene to assist countries in transforming
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domestic implementation concepts into tangible compliance with
international treaty objectives. Activist secretariats are the critical actors in
this process. As network managers and boundary-spanners, secretariat
personnel act as 'catalysts' in activating and brokering those sets of initiatives
that constitute catalysis.
As catalysts, secretariats facilitate: national capacity building; informal
network interactions among both international and in-country state and non-
state actors; and the prevention and management of implementation
conflicts through consensus building activities such as fact-finding,
collaborative problem-solving, policy dialogue and regulation-
negotiation(reg-neg) to keep implementation on track.
When secretariats act as catalysts, they ensure that member countries
transform their legal agreement to implement an international convention
into practical policy measures to actually achieve compliance. Catalysis is no
guarantee of compliance, but without entities such as activist secretariats in
each treaty system, it appears likely from my research, that the level of
compliance with multilateral environmental accords would be considerably
less.
Catalysis is my contribution to theory. I believe that it provides an
interdisciplinary framework for analysing the impacts or influence of
international treaty secretariats on treaty implementation outcomes.
The Value of Catalysis as an Organizational Resource
So, what does catalysis contribute to our understanding of secretariat
influence that other theoretical frameworks such as interorgnizational
theory, specifically those advanced by Jonsson and Mouritzen, do not?
My 'unexpected' findings demonstrate the central place of informal networks
interactions and alliances, and conflict management and dispute resolution
processes as the implementation currency of international treaty secretariats.
My aim is the development of accessible, accountable and transparent
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approaches to more successfully contain and manage conflicts in treaty
networks.
A primary value of catalysis is that it links individual, organizational,
institutional networks and interactions in an interorganizational context, and
it can be applied at international, national and sub national levels. In
addition, informal conflict management and dispute resolution practices are
internationally recognized. The use of intermediaries to manage and resolve
conflicts has been a common practice for centuries in countries and cultures
as different as China and the Pacific Islands (Sandford, 1992). In more recent
times, intermediaries have been used formally and successfully to resolve US
domestic public policy disputes. In the international arena, the UN Secretariat
has been using intermediaries for a number of years to help resolve
international peacekeeping crises (Sandford, 1992).
There is sufficient anecdotal proof from a variety of sources, (national
delegates, experts, environmental and industry NGOs, past and present
secretariat personnel) to confirm that fluctuating levels of conflict and dispute
already exist in international networks. However, I found no formal evidence
to suggest that conflict was regarded as a treaty norm in environmental
accords and that as such it should be planned for and managed.
Failure to formally deny or acknowledge the existence of conflict is a mistake.
When I analyzed secretariat network management activities as well as
anecdotes from secretariats, NGOs and to a lesser extent delegates, it became
very clear that conflict exists and has always existed in convention networks.
However, the prevailing attitudes of most of the delegates I interviewed
appeared to be that to formally admit to the existence of conflict in documents
and resolutions, risked recriminations and a loss of face for parties who were
seen to be so involved. Thus, governments generally consider that it is more
convenient to 'let the secretariat deal with it', that is, to manage the conflict
informally. Of course, the members are ever ready to blame secretariat if its
conflict management efforts are deemed to be unsuccessful or 'fail'.
Denial of conflicts by a CoP will not make them disappear. They are more
likely to smoulder until they are triggered by some action, possibly external to
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the system, which then creates an impasse. Alternatively, denial results in
inaction as no one can agree on what action to take, or on who should or
could take the action. Inaction is often preferred to action which might
culminate in an impasse. Inaction is less dangerous for international
relations generally, as there is less risk of adverse spill-over effects into
another issue-area, and so less loss of face for those involved. However, the
down-side of inaction is that it contributes to mounting frustration and the
likelihood that to reach a solution stakeholders will resort to informal
activities, such as inappropriate alliance formation, negative media coverage,
or the withdrawal of dissaffected members from the convention. In effect,
inaction is passive resistance. Viewed constructively, secretariats acting as
catalysts could be used to prevent and manage conflict emergence.
Intermediation by the secretariat is likely to have a greater chance of
implementation success, than its alternative, failure by inaction.
Conflict Management and Catalysis: Some Recommendations for Practice
Catalysis is really just naming and institutionalizing what secretariats do
already. Since the concept of catalysis as an interorganizational, network
management process is derived from practice, it is more likely that it will be
used by practitioners who are traditionally wary of "new" theories from
scholarship. Catalysis is thus an approach based on what is familiar, and it
convincingly captures the day-to-day realities of secretariat practice.
Secretariats are more likely to accept an analytical approach based on
organisational task and role performance than they are to accept an approach
constructed in the absence of empirical evidence. If secretariat personnel
realized that many of their traditional ways of doing business were known in
academic circles as conflict management and dispute resolution, it would
help them to understand what they do, why it works when it does, or fails
when it does. They would then be in a better position. to reflect on their
network management roles and activities, and so develop more effective
practices to achieve their individual, organizational and treaty objectives.
In addition, the concept and practice of conflict avoidance and management
provides a good basis for training secretariat personnel and stakeholders in
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managing implementation and compliance difficulties as these concepts
create a level playing field and a common language that facilitates
communication across cultures, political and organizational boundaries, and
among interests groups with very different philosophies. Conflict
management is thus a sound basis for training all stakeholders in
international accords (governments, non-state actors, secretariats and
community groups) in pursuit of international cooperation which is the
ultimate objective of most international agreements and all global
environmental accords.
The application of conflict management in secretariat policy practice has
several valuable and practical uses. It can provide a common basis for
training incoming personnel. For example scientists could be trained to deal
with science-intensive controversies. As the Deputy Secretary-General of
CITES remarked, professional staff may be expert scientists, but that does not
mean they are proficient or experienced in dealing with contentious issues,
angry or difficult stakeholders (Pers.Com.Topkov,1995).
Training stakeholders such as national officials and NGO representatives in
conflict management techniques, would have a positive ripple effect
throughout treaty system. It would help build trust and relationships both
among stakeholders who might otherwise not interact, and between
secretariat personnel and stakeholders. In this way too, secretariats would be
seen as making a positive contribution to treaty interactions, rather than
being perceived by some interest groups as simply the "institutional police"
for their role in analysing national reports, overseeing performance review
and monitoring compliance.
Training secretariat professionals in conflict management techniques would
have a valuable multiplier effect. These personnel could then go out and
train operatives in their regions. In human management resource parlance,
this is known as 'training the trainers'.
As network managers, secretariats already perform conflict management roles
as facilitators and mediators. However, for their conflict management efforts
to be taken more seriously and to attract the resources they need to more
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effectively perform these roles, conflict management must be formally
institutionalized as a conscious network management strategy.
Conflict management should be built into a secretariat's strategic plan as an
integral component of the plan in the same way as any other task. It should
not just be an afterthought which is brought out of the closet when the going
gets rough. Ideally, conflict management needs to be a line item in an
secretariat's budget in the same way that training programs and regional
meetings are. A predictable, governmental argument against this, is the well
known difficulty of predicting and costing conflict management initiatives.
This is not impossible. There is a lot of US domestic negotiation and dispute
resolution experience from which to draw.
As long as conflict management remains ad hoc and NOT institutionalized,
secretariats will not get the resources they need to perform their tasks, all of
which - both core and substantive - contain elements of conflict management.
Conflict management knowledge, experience and skills need to become part
of the institutional memory of the treaty system, and to be included in the
active management strategies of all contemporary international convention
secretariats.
Case Study Research: Some Criticisms And Responses
There are two criticisms of case study research which regularly occur in the
more traditional disciplines of academia. First, case study research of
secretariats must, of necessity, rely heavily on interviews such as those
conducted by Jonsson, Mouritzen and myself in the absence of alternative
empirical data on the subject. Structured and semi-structured personal
interviews shed valuable light on how the real worlds of international
politics and the ICS operate in practice, although such researchers encounter
considerable skepticism from mainstream academia about the authenticity of
the data so obtained. For example, much of the evidence is verbal and
anecdotal with a scant paper trail (especially where negative comments about
convention stakeholders are concerned). According to a majority of the
secretariat boundary-spanning personnel I interviewed, and as conceded by
interviewees from WWF, IWRB, Wildlife Management International, and
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IUCN, profoundly negative aspects of interorganizational interactions are
rarely entered in official records unless relevant stakeholders specifically
request that their comments be noted. The rationale for this approach (as
given to me by secretariat and NGO personnel), was twofold. First, all the
environmental conventions I examined are premised on a norm of
international cooperation. To have a negative paper trail might be seen as
running counter to, or to be damaging to, the creation and maintenance of a
public image of implementation as a cooperative endeavor. This then might
result in a loss of political commitment and thus financial support, for treaty
implementation at all levels of government - international, national and sub-
national. Second, parties are generally reluctant to make negative comments
about fellow members for self-serving reasons. That is, such comments may
rebound on the instigator at some stage in the future. If there is no negative
paper trail, denial of potentially damaging negative remarks is much easier
for all concerned, both for the perpetrator and the offended party. In the
absence of documentary evidence, it also seems to be much easier to heal
wounds and build, or rebuild, a new consensus and cooperation in the
collective self- interest.
The second criticism of case study research concerns methodological rigor.
This is in part, questioned by traditionalists because of the need for the field
researcher to incorporate what Mouritzen describes as 'spontaneous stories'
which in themselves throw further light on decisions or events that is not
immediately obvious, but which is particularly valuable in identifying crucial
informal networks. As discussed, informal networks appear to be particularly
important as secretariat pathways of influence, and these networks are rarely
evident from formal documentation. Rather, they tend to emerge from
anecdotal evidence and 'spontaneous stories'.
Not withstanding these limitations, I used elements from each of the
frameworks proposed by Jonsson, Mouritizen, Mandell and other
interorganizational theorists. In particular, I have used the constellation of
network management roles described variously in the literature as: 'fixer'
(Bardach, 1974); activist broker (Jonsson,1986); facilitator (Hanf and O'Toole,
1992); multilateral broker (Mandell,1990); and activist manager (Chayes and
Chayes, 1995). Several of Mouritzen's overlapping "political" and
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"substantial' roles add up to a similar portfolio of network management
roles. For example, Mouritzen's bridge-building roles and his substantial roles
appear to overlap to varying degrees. They are, however, all performed by
secretariats in their capacity as network managers and multilateral brokers.
In summary, it seems to me that it is the tasks that secretariat boundary
spanners perform, and the processes that these officials use in performing
their tasks and their network management role of multilateral broker, that
provide the most useful information on the ways in which secretariats have
an impact on policy outcomes.
Areas for Future Research
As explained, the unexpected findings of my study are that informal networks
and their multiplier effects or linkages are used extensively by secretariats.
These networks appear to significantly increase a secretariat's in-country
penetration; and they provide opportunities for an 10 to form mutually
beneficial alliances with NGOS, thus enhancing the organization's potential
to influence national as well as international, implementation policies and
practice.
Identifying and tracking specific informal networks within selected treaty
systems to test the viability of my suggested approach, is beyond the scope of
this study. However, it could be a valuable area for future research if it is
accepted that this study has identified informal networks as significant
sources and channels of secretariat influence. There is sufficient evidence
from my study to support my assertion that the informal networks of
secretariat boundary-spanning personnel play a more significant role in treaty
success and in exerting influence on policy outcomes, than has been indicated
in the literature to date. I also contend that treaty secretariats in their network
management role of multilateral broker, exert significant influence on policy
outcomes; and that catalysis has the potential to provide the basis for the
further development of an interdisciplinary approach to more adequately
explain why and how secretariats are influential as they are in treaty
implementation outcomes.
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CONCLUSION
This study unequivocally supports my original assertion that global
environmental treaty secretariats are more influential and have a far greater
impact on treaty implementation outcomes that is evident from the
conventional literature. Secretariats exert influence through the performance
of their core and especially their substantive tasks, their primary role as the
network manager and multilateral broker of the treaty system, and their use
of informal sources of influence including informal interactions with
international and national and sub-national state and non- state actors, the
formation of alliances with non- state actors and the use of informal conflict
management and dispute resolution processes and techniques.
As the lynch-pin organizations and network managers of the system,
secretariats are the only organizations in the system to effect a global and
impartial, as distinct from a national or a partisan, perspective of treaty
implementation progress and compliance success. In their role as network
manager, they act as the informal or unoffical caretakers of the health of the
treaty system. When activist secretariats act as network managers, they are
alert to and are able anticipate the emergence of dysfunctional
communications and interactions among stakeholders. By acting as an early
warning system of conflict emergence secretariats are able to put into place
conflict avoidance and management initiatives, frequently in defiance of the
dominant official view of most treaty members that conflicts do not exist. In
this capacity secretariats act as the unofficial multilateral brokers of treaty
conflicts.
As facilitators, and to a lesser extent as mediators of the inevitable
institutional conflicts and disputes, my research reveals that secretariat
intermediation is a critical element of convention success. In fact I believe
that activist secretariats are critical actors in assisting members to transform
the implementation promises of governments into actual compliance. In this
way secretariat intermediation is a fundamental driving force in, and a
determinant of, treaty implementation success.
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In conclusion, it became apparent early on in my research that an
interdisciplinary approach was the only way that the complexity and
dimensions of secretariat activities, roles and responsibilities could be
adequately described, analysed and explained. As there did not appear to be a
disciplinary-based framework capable of capturing these dimensions of
secretariat performance, I have developed the first step in an interdisciplinary
approach that I call 'catalysis'. By 'catalysis' I mean the process of active
intermediation by which activist secretariats of international conventions use
their roles as network managers and multilateral brokers to actively assist
treaty members to transform global and national implementation policies
into actions to achieve compliance. As 'catalysts', secretariats act as non-
traditional facilitators and mediators of the difficulties and disagreements that
emerge over the lifetime of a treaty. 'Catalysis' acknowledges the existence of
conflict as a treaty norm rather than as solely a negative phenomenon and a
symptom of system or secretariat failure.
This dissertation is not meant to be the last word on 'catalysis'. It is merely a
beginning. In my view 'catalysis' has the conceptual flexibility and capacity to
capture the essence and dimensions of secretariat practice in all its
multifaceted glory, and to act as an approach to facilitate a more accurate
analysis of the activities, roles and the influence of these organizations on the
policy outcomes of international agreements
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APPENDIX 1: RAMSAR:
Problems Of Institutional Evolution
This appendix contains details of specific problems experienced in the
institutional evolution of Ramsar which have been major constraints on the
development of the convention and the Ramsar Bureau as discussed in
Chapter 5.
They are: the need for an amendments clause; the establishment of a
permanent secretariat; the development of financial mechanisms; and the
development and adoption of the Ramsar Strategic plan 1997-2002.
Amendments Clause: Paris Protocol
Although the Ramsar Convention was signed in 1971, the first Meeting of the
Contracting Parties was not held until 1980 by which time a number of
problems had emerged. Nothing happened for nine years in part due to the
absence of an active secretariat. An Extraordinary Conference of the
Contracting Parties was called for 1982 and approved a protocol to amend the
treaty. However the protocol itself (Paris Protocol) did not enter into force
until 1986, some 15 years after the treaty was signed. By 1994, almost all the
Contracting Parties had accepted the Paris Protocol (Davis, 1994).
Permanent Secretariat: The Ramsar Bureau
The evolution of the Ramsar Bureau is an object lesson in what not to do
when trying to establish a stable organizational infrastructure. In my opinion,
it is remarkable that the Bureau has been as successful as it has given its
relatively inauspicious beginnings. Its effectiveness owes much to its
technical capacity, the personal and professional commitment of its
personnel, and the support of its non-state partner organizations. Ramsar
differs from both CITES and CCAMLR in that much of the credit for its
creation and its continuation rests with non-state actors, particularly IWRB
and IUCN.
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The need for a permanent body to supervise the implementation of a
convention and to convene regular meetings of the parties, and the need for
financial support was recognized in the 1960's. However, no agreement could
be reached on the form these entities should take.
In 1971, IUCN agreed to take on the 'ongoing duties' of a secretariat on an
interim basis without payment, but for financial and resource reasons was
unwilling to convene meetings of the parties. IWRB, which had been a
driving force behind the creation of Ramsar, agreed to do this as it had already
invested heavily in bringing the convention into existence and did not want
it to fail. This was the beginning of the split-Bureau (an interim arrangement)
with some Bureau functions located with IUCN in Gland, Switzerland and
the remainder with IWRB in Slimbridge, UK. The rationale for this division
of duties was that IUCN had legal personality which IWRB did not, while
IWRB had the scientific expertise.
In 1982, the arrangement was formalized in a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between IWRB and IUCN. In 1987, at an Extraordinary
Meeting of the Contracting Parties, the Regina Amendments were adopted.
Among other things, these amendments made formal provision for the
establishment of a Standing Committee and a permanent secretariat, and
adequate funding (Mathews, 1993). The Regina Amendments constituted a
major overhaul of the institutional infrastructure of the convention but
although signed in 1987, they did not enter into force until 1994.
The bifurcated Bureau arrangement persisted until the Fourth Meeting of the
Contracting Parties in 1990 at Montreux when the Ramsar Bureau was
consolidated into a single unit within IUCN headquarters in Gland. Also at
Montreux, the MOU between IWRB and IUCN was revised to provide a
continued formal role and financial support for IWRB in the provision of
technical and scientific support services to the Bureau. IWRB has also
retained responsibility for the Ramsar database which is the engine of the
Ramsar Monitoring Procedure (since 1996 known as the Ramsar
Management Guidelines). Bureau personnel, NGOs, and Ramsar partner
organizations are adamant that the monitoring procedure is the key Ramsar
implementation tool.
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Finally, also in 1990, the parties agreed to double the Bureau staff - to five
professional and three support staff. In November, 1996 the Bureau had 8
professional and 9 support staff personnel (Green Globe Yearbook, 1997).
According to a former Secretary-General, if it had not been for an active
secretariat organizing things the convention would not have moved forward
the way it did (Pers. Com.Navid, 1995). However there is a price to pay when
an activist secretariat or its leadership is seen to be too far in front of its
members or too assertive.
Financial Mechanisms
There are two financial mechanisms in Ramsar. The budget (mandatory,
annual contributions form members), and the line item Wetlands
Conservation Fund (WCF). In 1996 the WCF was renamed the Ramsar Small
Grants Fund (SGF). It comprises voluntary funds or contributions from both
state and non- state actors.
Ramsar was originally set up without a convention budget. There was no
provision for funding triennial CoPs, nor for funding its implementation
tasks. This fundamental omission appears to support wry comments made by
past and present Bureau personnel that had Ramsar been negotiated by
lawyers and bureaucrats, rather than by scientists, no such mistakes would
have been made.
IUCN, on behalf of the Bureau, administers the finances of the Convention.
The Secretary-General of the Bureau is responsible for the administration of
Convention funds through the Ramsar Standing Committee to the Meeting
of the Contracting Parties (Terms of Reference for the Financial
Administration of the Ramsar Convention 1994-96 in Davis, 1994). Financial
resources and their management are recurring sources of frustration and
tension for secretariats. The Ramsar Bureau is no exception.
At the Montreux Conference in 1990, the concept of a Wetland Fund (which
had earlier been discarded), was revived as a mechanism for financial
assistance to help developing countries implement the convention. The
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Parties were called on to set up a fund in the budget for this purpose. Most
parties were unwilling to support a substantial increase in the proposed
budget for the triennium 1991-93 of just over 1 million Swiss francs per
annum, but they agreed to provide a budget line of SFr10,000 per annum for a
Wetland Conservation Fund (WCF) on the understanding that it would be
augmented by substantial voluntary contributions. The WCF was only to
provide assistance to developing countries, and was to be used to support
activities which enabled the designation of Listed sites, improved their
management, or promoted wise use of wetlands (Mathews, 1993).
In 1996 at the 6th Meeting of the Contracting Parties the name of the Fund
was changed to the Ramsar Small Grants Fund for Wetland Conservation
and Wise Use (SGF). It is available to all countries on the List of Aid
Recipients established by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the OECD. There is an upper limit of SFr 40,000 for each project, and the
Bureau conducts a technical and feasibility analysis of all projects proposed. It
then submits its recommendations for funding, for consideration at the
annual meeting of the Subgroup on Finance, which in turn submits its
recommendations to the Standing Committee (SGF: Operational Guidelines
for the Triennium 1997-99, Ramsar,1996).
Strategic Plan 1997-2002
The adoption of the Strategic Plan by CoP6 in 1996 is a significant
achievement in the institutional management of Ramsar. In part, the
decision to develop a Strategic Plan, appears to have arisen from members'
realization of the need for a more systematic approach to managing the
convention fatigue felt by many delegates and NGO stakeholders in
persuading their governments to continue their financial contributions to
Ramsar as just one of the many multilateral treaties that member countries
are now legally obliged to support. This situation is a far cry from 1971 when
Ramsar was one of the only global environmental convention 'on the block'.
The second impetus for the Strategic Plan appears to have come from CoP
dissatisfaction with the way the inaugural Secretary-General, Dan Navid, was
managing the Bureau's budget. For example he reputedly called on the CoP to
double the Bureau's budget in 1993 at Koshiro without first running the
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proposal past the Standing Committee, causing loss of face for all involved. It
appeared to be a tactical error on his part, as it was obvious that the Bureau
needed the additional funding.
To call for a doubling of the Bureau's budget sounds extravagant and risky. In
real terms it was not extravagant and it amounted to asking for SFr 2 million.
Unfortunately this proposal resulted in a call for Navid's resignation. He had
been with Ramsar since its very early days in one capacity or another, first
with IUCN and then with the Bureau.
This error of judgment also appears to have cemented the Parties' opposition
to any further requests by the Bureau for budget additions. The Ramsar
Bureau operates on a 'minimal budget'. The Bureau's budget could not be
regarded as even remotely excessive by any reasonable assessment of its tasks
and its organizational capacity relative to the members' expectations of its
performance. However, in 1996 at CoP6, the Contracting Parties rejected the
Bureau's request for an additional position to employ a Development
Assistance Officer to assist the Bureau with fund raising for capacity building,
and approved a 15% increase in budget rather than the Bureau's requested
49% increase. [INSERT REF]
The Koshiro incident finally catalyzed the development of the Strategic Plan
and the installation of an Interim Secretary-General, Jim McCuaig (a
Canadian delegate) with specialized management skills. His purpose was to
restructure the Bureau and make Ramsar more efficient prior the
appointment of the new Secretary-General in late 1995. The intent was to
have the Strategic Plan in place by CoP6 in March, 1996, Ramsar's 25th
anniversary.
The development of the Ramsar Strategic Plan signals the convention's
coming of age. McCuaig commented that it was a time of major change
ranging from the philosophical right down to the practical allocation of
resources, and "the imposition of management rigor on the whole process
which is part of a maturing convention" (Pers. Com. McCuaig, 1995). The
Strategic Plan was intended to provide the yardstick against which future
policy outcomes would be measured.
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Incorporated in the Strategic Plan are: the triennial program which identifies
goals and programs for each 3 year period between the conferences; a business
plan; an annual Bureau work plan; and individual work plans. Succession
planning and a distinct teamwork orientation with provision for 'backups'
via multiskilling of personnel in the Bureau, are also being incorporated into
convention management strategies to buffer Ramsar against the impending
loss of a generation of delegates, NGO representatives and Bureau personnel
who have been with Ramsar since its beginnings and who are now
approaching retirement. These people are institutional assets and their loss
will be keenly felt. They are the institutional memory of the treaty system and
it is their formal and particularly their informal networks and relationships,
both professional and personal that have developed and sustained Ramsar
thus far.
APPENDIX 2: CITES
The Evolution of CITES
The issue of international trade in endangered species was first discussed
internationally in 1961 at the Ashura Conference which IUCN designed to
bring together conservation experts and officials from newly independent
African nations and assess the future conservation requirements of the
continent (Boardman, 1981). At this conference, several African countries
expressed frustration over their inability to control poaching, and urged that
an international convention be considered to address the problem of illegal
wildlife trade (Talbot, Pers.. com. in Trexler, 1989). The Seventh General
Assembly of IUCN in Nairobi in 1963 urged governments to restrict the
import of animals in accordance with the export regulations of the countries
of origin (Boardman, 1981; Wijnstekers,1992).
IUCN subsequently resolved to undertake the drafting of an international
convention on regulation of export, transit and import of rare or threatened
wildlife species or their skins and trophies (IUCN, 163:130, in Trexler, 1989). A
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first draft was produced by IUCN in 1964, but it was not until 1967, that draft
three was circulated to governments for their comments. It was hoped that
the treaty would be ready for signatures at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on
Human Environment and Development (UNCHED). However according to
Trexler (1989), several individuals were concerned that the treaty was too
weak to achieve species conservation aims and that the views reflected those
of European importing countries. As a result, IUCN did not put forward a
draft at UNCHED (Trexler (1989). The final drafting process was dominated by
conservation interests, and wildlife trading interests were not represented
during the process. Trexler (1989:25) comments they were generally perceived
to have been caught napping.
Eventually, in 1973 in Washington, DC, 21 countries signed the CITES
convention which mandated national and international implementation and
oversight structures, and provided a clear biological standard for treaty
success. The end result was well received by conservationists and they had
high hopes for its success in neutralizing the negative impacts of the
international wildlife trade (King,1974 in Trexler, 1989). Trexler (1989:26) also
noted that CITES was given a helpful push by the media disclosure during the
closing days of the Washington Conference, of a major wildlife smuggling
ring operating from South America through New York to Europe. CITES
entered into force in 1975, and by late 1997 CITES had 138 parties.
As summarized by Birnie and Boyle (1992:458), CITES is one of the most
effective and, therefore, important international conventions whereby species
or specimens of whose survival is threatened by international trade, or which
may become so unless trade is regulated, are listed on Appendices which can
be amended at biennial CoPs. Appendix I includes all species threatened with
extinction which are or may be affected by trade (CITES, Article II, 1);
Appendix II includes all species which although not necessarily now
threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens is
subject to strict regulation(CITES Article 11,2); and Appendix III includes all
species which any party identifies as being subject to regulation within its
jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as
needing the cooperation of other parties in the control of trade( CITES, Article
II, 3). The import-export permit system which is based on the Appendices, is
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the crux of this convention, although exemptions are permitted, and if a
country does not accept a placing of a species on an Appendix it may enter a
reservation.
The first CITES CoP was held in Berne in 1976, one year after it entered into
force. It took Ramsar until 1980 to hold its first CoP. The major differences in
the speed with which each convention got underway appear to relate to the
loss of time by Ramsar in having to renegotiate and correct drafting and
structural inadequacies, and the governmental backing CITES received. This
seemed to reflect that CITES issues had a higher political and media profile
and were more significant policy priorities than were wetlands issues.
According to Boardman (1981), the landmark importance of CITES in the
history of international wildlife conservation rests primarily on three factors.
First, it was a well constructed and carefully prepared instrument that drew
on both the pre-conference drafting work initiated by IUCN and on the long
history of data gathering by IUCN which had firmly established the point that
international trade was a factor in the continued decline of at least some
threatened species. Second, provision for continuing machinery to oversee its
operations ensured that CITES did not merely gather dust in government
archives. For example, the establishment of a permanent secretariat was tied
to the IUCN network including the Species Survival Commission (SSC). The
SSC's trade monitoring activities had been formalized with the establishment
of the TRAFFIC Group which is based in the UK and which has since 1978,
acted as a data bank on trade in international wildlife and wildlife products
through a consultancy agreement with the CITES Secretariat. Third, CITES
became a central focus of world conservation politics. The convention proved
a good way of attracting media coverage of wildlife issues, smuggler makes
good copy, and it sharpened the demands of environmental groups. Instead
of seeking diffuse goals such as the protection of species, they could pursue
more explicit objectives such as the transfer of species from Appendix II to
Appendix I.
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APPENDIX 3: CCAMLR
The Institutional Structure of CCAMLR
Central to the institutional apparatus of CCAMLR are: the CCAMLR
Commission and the Scientific Committee and their associated Working
Groups and ATS-affiliated organizations; and the Secretariat.
The Commission is the supreme decision making body of the Convention. It
is responsible for the implementation of the Convention, including the
implementation of a system of observation and inspection to ensure
compliance with conservation measures and other decisions of the
Commission (Article IX (g)). Any State which has acceded to CCAMLR is
entitled to become a member of the Commission if it is actively conducting
research or harvesting in the Convention area. The key word here is
"actively".
Commission decisions on matters of substance are taken by consensus
(Article XII, 1), and decisions on matters other than substance are taken by a
simple majority (Article XII, 2). Consensus takes longer and tends to be more
difficult to reach, but agreements decided by consensus are more likely to
stick, although others argue that consensus is merely veto power by another
name as it only takes one objection to derail an agreement
(Pers.Com,.NG01995).
Unlike the biennial and triennial CoP meetings of CITES and Ramsar
respectively, the CCAMLR Commission holds annual meetings at its
headquarters in Hobart, Australia, and extraordinary meetings as requested by
members. At these meetings, the Commission receives reports of Members'
activities over the past year; and their plans for the coming year to review
compliance with Conservation measures in force and, on the basis of advice
from the Scientific Committee, to review existing Conservation measures
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and adopt new ones as necessary. Matters related to the annual
administration and financing of Commission activities are also considered at
these annual Meetings of the Commission.
Two permanent sub-committees assist the Commission, the Standing
Committee of Administration and Finance (SCAF), and the Standing
Committee on Observation and Inspection (SCOI). SCAF provides an
opportunity for detailed discussion of administrative and financial matters
currently before the Commission. SCOI advises the Commission on all
matters relating to observation and inspection. For example, SCOI was
responsible for the design of the Inspection System and has an ongoing
function to review reports of inspections and advise the Commission on
compliance with conservation measures and other decisions of the
Commission (CCAMLR 1991:20).
The Scientific Committee is a consultative body to the Commission. In
principle it meets as often as required, but in practice, it has met annually
ever since the Commission commenced operation in 1982. It holds its annual
meetings back-to-back with those of the Commission. The Scientific
Committee provides a forum for consultation and cooperation concerning
the collection, study and exchange of information with respect to the marine
living resources to which CCAMLR applies.; and it encourages and promotes
cooperation in the field of scientific research in order to extend knowledge of
marine living resources of the Antarctic marine ecosystem (Article XV).
Activities of* the Committee include: the establishment of criteria and
methods to be used in determining conservation measures; regular
assessment of the status and trends of the populations of relevant Antarctic
marine resources; data analysis concerning the direct and indirect effects of
harvesting on these populations; and the formulation of proposals for the
conduct international and national research programs (Article XV).
Several Scientific Committee working groups meet intersessionally to assist
the Committee in its work. In 1995, they were: the Working Group on
Ecosystem Monitoring and Management (WG-EMM); the Working Group on
Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA); and the ad hoc Working Group on
Incidental Mortality Arising from Longline Fishing (WG-IMALF).
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CCAMLR requires that the Commission and the Scientific Committee
cooperate with the ATCPs on matters falling within their competence. It also
requires that they cooperate as appropriate, with FAO, other specialised UN
agencies, SCAR, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR), and
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) (CCAMLR ,1991)
Factors Which Have Influenced The Evolution Of CCAMLR
The Cold War,
CCAMLR evolved in the shadow of ATS politics which in turn reflected Cold
War tensions between the former USSR and the USA as the global
superpowers of the latter half of the twentieth century. The ATS was signed
in 1959, in the 'heat' of the Cold War. It served as a containment mechanism
for managing the only truly terrestrial global commons on earth, in that
Antarctica was not 'owned' by any nation. The pervading institutional
climate of both the ATS and CCAMLR has been one of a general suspicion of
outsiders. Both treaties have been accused, justifiably, of being developed
country clubs which actively discourage the participation of 'outsiders' such as
developing countries. In both cases this has been relatively easy to do, as in
order to conduct scientific research or to fish in the remote and hostile
environment of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, advanced technology
and substantial funding are the essential prerequisites which have
successfully kept 'intruders' at bay.
In commenting on the negative effects of the Cold War on relations among
CCAMLR member countries, Darry Powell, the inaugural executive head of
CCAMLR, said that it affected the atmosphere right from the first meeting,
and he was surprised the extent to which the former Soviet Union pushed to
get certain concessions, including a Soviet member of staff on the Secretariat
(who is still there). He also commented that everything was opposed by the
Soviet Union in those days. Instead of taking things in small steps, for
example, fish stock assessment, they always wanted a major research project,
to study everything in Antarctic waters, after which they would look at fish
stocks (Pers.Com.Powell, 1995).
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This was a delaying tactic and they delayed practically everything. However, they certainly
cooperated with the Secretariat at the same level at which they cooperated with the
Commission, and we had no problem with the Soviet staff member (Pers. Com. Powell, 1995)
A Culture of Exclusion
A hallmark of CCAMLR and in part a legacy from its ATS and Cold War
origins, is what I have called its " culture of exclusion". CCAMLR is not
welcoming of 'outsiders', that is non-parties, and it actively seeks to exclude
their involvement in CCAMLR issues and decision making.
Observers attend CCAMLR by invitation only. It is established practice that
Acceding States are invited to attend as observers. Observers in national
delegations can make a statement and it is noted in the Commission report
and questions can be directed from Commission to observers.
However as a result of a review of arrangements for inviting observers to
CCAMLR meetings (CCAMLR XXX 13.1-13.14), all other observers including
intergovernmental and non-governmental representatives must be approved
by a consensus of the Members of the Commission at the meeting before the
one the observers wish to attend. For example, to attend the 1997 Meeting of
the Commission, observers must submit an application to, and be approved
by, the 1996 meeting. This effectively eliminates opportunities which exist in
the CCAMLR Rules of Procedure for observers to be nominated and approved
intersessionally, as is normal practice in most other environmental
conventions including those of CITES and Ramsar.
It is also less welcoming of NGO partnerships and NGO participation in
delegations. Individual observers cannot attend either Scientific Committee
or Commission meetings. Australia, NZ and the USA are the only countries
with NGO representatives on their delegations and NGO participation in
national delegations is not a general thing.
However, the level of trust among those nations that are also members of
CCAMLR appears to have improved over the years as informal as well as
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formal networks and interactions have increased often via mechanisms such
as Working Group meetings. In fact in recent years, there has even been
discussion about expanding observer attendance at CCAMLR meetings,
although it is proposed that attendance should still be limited to scientists,
who currently comprise about 50% of the attendees at CCAMLR Commission
meetings (Pers. Com. Sec.,1995).
In CCAMLR, decisions are made by consensus rather than by majority voting
as is the case in the IWC. The CCAMLR stakeholders I interviewed argued
that consensus might take longer, but the outcomes were inherently more
stable and sustainable. A more cautious view was put in the NGO newsletter
ECO, which voiced concern about CCAMLR's consensus decision making on
the basis that one nation can block an action that all the other nations want to
take, thus making adherence to conservation measures such as limited
catches for krill, almost an impossibility. In a conciliatory gesture, the same
newsletter did however, note that although consensus is a tough and
laboriously tedious process, it does offer the guarantee that decisions will be
accepted (ECO xix nos 1, and 3., 1982).
The Influence of Scientists in CCAMLR
Science is the centerpiece of CCAMLR. Without the active participation of
international scientists and their ongoing research, CCAMLR would be hard-
pressed to justify its existence. The development of CCAMLR science is
illustrated in Darry Powell's comments. See below.
Changes in the Soviet Union following Perestroika helped CCAMLR as they made it no longer profitable for
USSR-based vessels to fish and so eased the pressure on the fish stocks whose numbers were uncertain and
the management of which was being debated in CCAMLR. These political changes occurred at time when
CCAMLR was talking about precautionary catch limits, and there were a lot of NGOs making
recommendations in support of precautionary catch limits. At that stage the problem was that the science just
did not exist to be able to set those limits accurately, and the nature of precautionary limits is that we didn't
have enough information on which to base scientific assessment, therefore you make a guess'. Precautionary
limits by their nature are soft science" (Pers. Com. Powell, 1995).
490
This is similar to the comment by the CITES Secretariat official about the
value of a 'grey area' between black letter law and soft law and/or science, as it
gives a secretariat room to move in giving policy guidance to convention
decision makers.
In about 1988/89, statements started being made by the Scientific Committee, and instead of just
providing advice, the Scientific Committee actually asked the Commission for research
direction. Previous to that, direction was implied or taken to be implied from the terms of
reference to various groups, and gleaned out of reports before a meeting took place. For example,
I [Executive Secretary] would go through the report of the Commission and identify the things I
thought were the issues that needed to be addressed, and then do something up for the
Chairman of whatever scientific working group was going to attend to this issue so he had
guidance(Pers. Com. Powell1995).
Inspection, Observation and Compliance
As far as inspection and observation are concerned, the number of vessels
that can get down [to CCAMLR waters] to fish, is limited to a 3 or 4 month
period each year and to specific locations. This averages out at 20 vessels per
area. All legal ships have minimum of one CCAMLR scientific observer on
board for formal monitoring purposes. The observer reports his/her
observations to the Scientific Committee which in turn reports these
observations of, for example, incidental mortality of seabirds, to the
Commission for it to take action. Parity of observers on vessels is related to
the level of concern about the species being harvested (Pers. Com,. Sec.1995).
International observers are insisted on in CCAMLR. In addition, there are
often national observers on many vessels. International observers must
report to CCAMLR, and national observers may report to CCAMLR. The
reports are not public documents, but the data gathered in this way may come
out in SCOI, and it may be reported to Working Groups. In these ways it
impacts on recommendations made.
Inspection is differs from observation as follows. As locating and boarding
ships is not very effective in huge ocean, observation is the preferred
monitoring mechanism (Pers. Com.Sec.1995). Inspection Reports go to the
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Secretariat. They are then lodged with Scientific Committee. The reports are
never public documents at this stage. From here they go to the Standing
Committee and ultimately to the Commission. By the time they reach the
Commission they are public documents which may, or may not, name
countries which violate the convention. National reports often end up in
CCAMLR journal as scientific reports, such as the reports on krill, where they
are accessible to the public. However, there is usually a time delay of several
years before this data is analysed and written up for presentation in a peer
reviewed journal. By then any damage to ecosystems is done and it may be
too late for remedial action.
